Tag: European Union
Some ideas are better than others
I have been puzzled by some Balkan economic initiatives. So I turned to Demush Shasha, Executive Director of the Pristina-based thinktank EPIK and former Secretary General of the Ministry for European Integration, for answers. While I think Demush has done an admirable job of analyzing the situation, I’d be glad to hear from others who may have different views of the merits and demerits of the initiatives discussed. Demush writes:
First let’s try and delineate the discussion surrounding these issues. So, these are two separate, though related, conversations.
1. CEFTA vs SEFTA;
2. Mini-Schengen vs Berlin process.
Former is more specific and economic discussion, later is more general and political discussion. To put it differently, the former is about “free movement of goods” – so almost exclusively a trade discussion. Later is about more than trade, it is about ALL types of freedoms in Western Balkans – people, capital, goods, establishment of companies, recognition of academic and professional qualifications, etc.
With that out of the way, a few words on differences between competing proposals.
CEFTA vs SEFTA
Kosovo proposed that CEFTA is succeeded by SEFTA. There are two reasons for this: (1) When CEFTA was launched Czechoslovakia was part of it 😊. So, the first argument is that agreement was designed for a different time and place, and it needs simply an update to new realities. (2) Kosovo is not a party to CEFTA as a sovereign country, but through UNMIK. This is because of Serbian veto within CEFTA mechanisms and procedures. So, Kosovo believes that with the launch of SEFTA, as a new mechanism, this issue can be addressed. Serbia on the other hand, for obvious reasons is against the proposal.
Mini-Schengen vs Berlin process
The Berlin process was launched in 2014 by the EU as a political mechanism to spur political cooperation in the region, allocate funds for important infrastructure investment, and ensure that the region gradually increases its competitiveness and prepares itself for EU Single Market. Since the launch, all 6 WB [Western Balkan] countries + 10 EU countries have been part of the process. So no brainer, everything was running great and smooth, until…
Mini-Schengen was launched in 2019 by three WB countries, without serious international political support, it failed to ensure inclusiveness of all WB countries and without any financial resources. Immediately, after a few first meetings it was obvious that this is not a serious undertaking, but rather a platform from which frustrated WB countries can get together and communicate their displeasure with the EU. Albania and North Macedonia were not being allowed to start accession talks, and Serbia’s accession process practically stalled, without any new negotiating chapter being opened.
In this light, Kosovo decided that it will continue to support Berlin process initiative and stay out of the Mini-Schengen. This decision is based on several factors:
1. Berlin process goal is regional cooperation in view of EU accession. Mini-Schengen goal is to create a mechanism that “will take the fate of the Balkans in our own hands”. You can imagine why in the Balkans, and in particular countries like Kosovo and BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], this kind of language makes people edgy.
2. The Berlin process is led by Germany, and supported by its key EU member states. Mini-Schengen is led by Serbia.
3. Mini-Schengen goal is to undermine the Berlin process and EU influence in the region, since it is a duplication of the Berlin process. Mini-Schengen would create a political forum where out of all participating countries, Serbia would be a natural leader of the group. This raises eyebrows with regard to creating an opening for Russian influence in the region through Serbia and Mini-Schengen.
4. The Berlin process has at its disposal 9 billion EURO funding, for 2021-2027, allocated by the EU in the forms of grants, which the EU has assessed will generate additional 20 billion investments in loans. Mini-Schengen has zero.
On US position: No high level US official ever took part in Mini-Schengen meetings. Mini-Schengen is mentioned in Washington KS [Kosovo]-SRB [Serbia] letters of intent, but it was never followed-up in any serious and structural manner by US administration. My reading is that the US supports any initiative that contributes to regional cooperation, and additionally on Mini-Schengen I think they understand the politics of it and they are simply allowing those 3 countries (Srb, Alb, NM) for the moment to vent some (justified to an extent) displeasure with the EU.
On EU position: Despite that the initiative in its title had the word “Schengen”, and aimed to transpose four fundamental freedoms of the EU, the EU never supported the initiative. They have continuously communicated that the Berlin process is the way forward. However, noting the current lack of enlargement momentum they really had little moral capital to be more aggressive publicly.
In a nutshell, I think it is one of those things that is not on the priority list of the US/EU, so they refrained from going publicly against it. They recognize that the initiative has no teeth, nor future. However, I believe that behind the public eye, they have strongly advised Kosovo, Montenegro and BiH to stay outside of the initiative.
PS: At this event earlier this week, Jim O’Brien of Albright-Stonebridge gave a vigorous and detailed defense of “Open Balkans,” which is a rebranding of mini-Schengen:
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No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.
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Republika Srpska unifies in defense of genocide, “again and again”
The Serb political parties of the 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) called Republika Srpska (RS) have unified in rejecting the international community’s High Representative’s decision to prohibit denial of genocide and defense of war criminals under the country’s criminal code. This tells you all you need to know about about the RS, which is the product of the 1990s genocidal enterprise conducted principally against the country’s Bosniak population. It is entirely appropriate that the RS would stand up to be counted in defense of genocide and war criminals.
The question is what will the Americans and Europeans do about it? The RS is an essential component of the Dayton peace accords, which divided BiH into two regional entities, the RS and a Bosniak/Croat Federation. The latter controls 51% of the territory. Their active collaboration is required to make the central government (Bosnians call it the “state” government) to function. The Serb political parties are vowing not to participate in the central government.
Boycott is a frequent political tactic throughout the Balkans. Those who use it believe that nothing legitimate can be decided without their participation. This is of course untrue in a liberal democracy, where the majority rules, with respect for minority rights. But still the tactic is used: witness the Republican withdrawal of their pro-Trump members of the Congressional Select Committee investigating the January 6 insurrectionary riot. The Republican leader in the House is hoping this will delegitimize the investigation. The Democrats will simply proceed with the committee, including Republicans who did not supported the riot and are willing to serve.
That is what the “state” government should do: proceed without the participation of those who decline to participate. This can be difficult in the BiH context, so it would require some ingenuity on the part of those who wish to do it and the internationals who support them, including the High Representative who issued the initial decision. Nonparticipation should have consequences. Nonparticipation by those who wish to defend genocide and war criminals should have serious consequences.
Why should it be illegal to deny genocide and defend war criminals? In short, because in the Bosnian context it constitutes incitement. Incitement to genocide is illegal under international law (the 1948 Genocide Convention) and also in the US, including by foreigners present here. An arrest or two would go a long way to making the point. The situation is presumably comparable in the countries of the European Union. For those who may wonder: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state party of the Genocide Convention, as a consequence of its succession from Yugoslavia.
Odds are, nothing like what I am suggesting will happen. Instead, there will be some sort of fudged “solution” that concedes ever more ground to genocide deniers and inciters. I have been around too long not to know what that means. “Never again” can turn easily into “again and again.”
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Who comes to equity must come with clean hands
Serbian President Vucic, after meeting with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti yesterday, said:
We have received EU proposals that have been harmonized with our chief negotiators and Serbia has fully agreed with what the EU has proposed, three points – to intensify efforts to identify the remains of missing persons, to refrain from actions that could potentially destabilize the situation…on the ground and third, that the main negotiators meet regularly once a month and prepare meetings when necessary. We could not agree on these three points.
Kurti was rather more graphic:
The lack of agreement is not a surprise. It was foretold. Belgrade and Pristina are into the blame game. Neither Kurti nor Vucic has much to gain politically at home from an agreement. Both are posturing, mainly for their respective domestic political audiences but also for Brussels and Washington.
What can we learn from the posturing? Vucic is taking a minimalist approach. Agreement on missing persons 20 years after the war is no big step. Nor is a proposal on destabilization, because it would apply presumably inside Kosovo, not in Serbia. Meeting once a month is easy too, since it is unlikely given the current atmosphere that more than one or two meetings more will be necessary before Brussels tires of the posturing and lets the schedule slide.
Kurti is taking a maximalist approach, in part to distinguish himself from his predecessors. He regards them as patsies. A non-aggression pact would apply principally to Serbia, as there is no likelihood of Kosovo, which lacks an army, attacking Serbia, which has a big and well-armed one. Facing the past applies to both, but in much larger measure to Serbia, as it was the prime aggressor and human rights abuser in the 1990s conflict. And the barriers to free trade cited are all Serbia’s of course.
I am personally more sympathetic to Kurti’s maximalist agenda than Vucic’s minimalist one, but that doesn’t mean we are likely to see progress. These two are talking past each other, not with each other. The EU mediator, Miroslav Lajcak, is under pressure to produce something, so he may well want to continue the process. But if he does, he needs to underpin it with a more constructive conversation at lower levels, out of the public eye.
My guess is–and it is only a guess–that Belgrade and Pristina could really make some progress on missing people, on protection of Serbs in Kosovo and Albanians in Serbia, and on freeing up trade. Kurti seems intent on threatening to reimpose tariffs on Serbian goods if he gets no satisfaction on access to Serbia’s markets. It’s a good idea only if it leads to lowered barriers. Protection of their respective minorities in the other country is important. There is no excuse for interethnic violence in Kosovo, and in southern Serbia there is a concerted effort to displace the Albanian population through administrative means. Both should stop.
I don’t know what to say that hasn’t already been said about missing people. Twenty years is far too long for governments that claim to be democratic to fail to give a full accounting and return the bodies. I fear that in both countries it is people responsible for the crimes that killed civilians who are now sufficiently powerful to prevent their respective governments from doing what they know is right.
If there is one thing I would prioritize to improve the prospects for the dialogue, it is not at the table in Brussels but before anyone gets there. The day Pristina comes to the table with visible support from Kosovo’s Serb population is the day things will begin to move in a more peaceful, stable direction. Vucic has worked hard to prevent that from happening: he controls the political party that holds all the Serb seats in the Kosovo Assembly. Kurti should be working hard to gain Kosovo Serb support by preventing violence against Serbs and Serb property in Kosovo, ensuring that both are respected fully, and facing Kosovo’s own past, which includes deadly violence by fighters of its Liberation Army against both Serbs and Albanians before, during, and after the 1999 war.
Who comes to equity must come with clean hands. Kosovo can wash its hands a lot easier, and with much greater effect, than Serbia can.
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What to expect from renewal of the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue
Alma Baxhaku of Klan Kosova asked some questions today; I answered:
Q: The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is resuming. The new Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has said that this process is not a continuation of what it was until now. Do you think that Kosovo should radically change its approach to dialogue with Serbia?
A: The Prime Minister has good reason to want to underline that he will take a different approach, as the past several years of the dialogue have not been productive. I do think some changes are in order.
Q: What should be Kosovo’s position at the negotiating table?
A: Kosovo needs to insist on equality and reciprocity. If something is agreed for Serbs in Kosovo, an equivalent should be available to Albanians inside Serbia. The Specialist Chambers violated this principle. I’d like to see their jurisdiction extended to Serbia, where the Albanian American Bytyqi brothers were murdered after the war.
Kosovo also needs to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. And it needs to strengthen its international support.
Q: In the first meeting with President Vucic, PM Kurti came up with four new proposals. How did you see them?
A: I’m mostly in agreement. I obviously agree with him on reciprocity in general, though I might have some quarrels with how it is applied in practice. I also agree that the missing persons of all ethnicities need to be identified and their remains returned.
On CEFTA/SEFTA I’m inclined to agree as well. Mini-Schengen seems to me an ill-defined enterprise, one in which Kosovo’s equality is not clearly recognized. I also like the idea of a non-aggression agreement, though I imagine Serbia will hesitate because it implies Kosovo sovereignty and Belgrade would want NATO to sign on as well.
Q: PM Kurti said in front of the MEPs that the authors of the documents that would bring ideas for a final solution between Kosovo and Serbia are missing. Do you think the EU should offer a concrete solution to the parties?
A: Only if it is one that recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo. In the meanwhile, the EU should allow Kosovo into the visa waiver program.
Q: What should be the role of the US in this resumed process?
A: The US should be supporting the EU, but it will also be called on to “deliver” Kosovo. I think Brussels and Washington should form an entity like the International Civilian Office to monitor implementation of agreements reached in the dialogue as well as name and shame those who fail to implement them.
Q: According to the statements made public, both Kurti and Vucic have much opposite attitudes. Do you think that a final agreement between Kosovars and Serbs is near?
A: I don’t. President Vucic sees little prospect of EU membership in the near term and has consequently turned toward Moscow and Beijing rather than Brussels. He has made it eminently clear he is not prepared for a major move before next year’s Serbian presidential election.
Kosovo in these circumstances has to do what it can to use the time to strengthen its bargaining position. The recent movement of non-recognizers Greece and Spain toward upgrading their relationships with Kosovo is precisely the kind of thing needed. I’d like Pristina to improve relations with Beijing, which is more interested in commerce in the Balkans than politics. The Kosovo government should also be doing everything it can to improve relations with the Serb and other communities inside Kosovo, including identifying and returning the remains of missing people, implementing the Constitutional Court decision of the Decan/Decani monastery’s property, and protecting all of the communities from interethnic violence.
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Stevenson’s army, June 26
Not good news. Tucker Carlson.Trump.Stephen Miller.
US will keep 650 [or more] troops in Afghanistan after “withdrawal.”
EU rejects Macron-Merkel call for summit with Putin
Biden-Ghani meeting
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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