Tag: European Union
What Kosovo needs now is not only Serbian recognition
Kosovo’s early elections have produced, as expected, a clear victory for Vetevendosje (VV or “Self-Determination”). According to preliminary results, it has won close to 48% and a commanding lead of something over 50 seats in the 120-seata Kosovo Assembly.
This is Albin Kurti’s moment. The still young, articulate VV leader had a couple of months in the Prime Minister’s chair last year. The Trump Administration didn’t like his insistence on reciprocity with Serbia or his skepticism about Trump’s bizarre choice of an American envoy. Washington took advantage of a squabble within his coalition to bring him down. That isn’t likely this time around, not only because of VV’s strong showing at the polls but also because Trump is gone. The Biden Administration will at least try to be respectful of Kosovo’s democracy.
That however won’t save Albin from a bigger challenge: constructing the kind of majority in parliament that will enable election of a new president as well as a strong position in negotiations with Serbia. Both in practice require a two-thirds majority. Part of the difference will come from ethnic minority parties, but at least one more Albanian-based party will be needed. Two obvious candidates both have a bad history with VV: the LDK, running a poor third in yesterday’s election, brought down Albin’s short-lived coalition last year and VV has been a stern critic of the second-place Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), in particular its now-indicted former President Hashim Thaci. Ramush Haradinaj’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) will not have enough seats to get VV to two-thirds, but it would be step in that direction.
Kosovo’s parliamentary system has often produced long inter-regna. Albin could cut this one short by acting unilaterally, but that might make forming the necessary coalition later more difficult rather than less. Negotiations with Serbia and electing a new president will not be top priorities for VV. Albin would prefer to focus on his campaign priorities: jobs and justice. That will not be easy, as Covid-19 has hit the Kosovo economy hard and reform of the justice system is a long-term project. The Americans and Europeans will be trying to get Pristina to engage as soon as possible on the dialogue with Belgrade, which faces presidential and likely parliamentary elections by April 2022 (and possibly earlier). No serious negotiations with Serbia will be possible after the end of this year.
Though the EU aims at it, there is little prospect of a “final” agreement within that timeframe. Serbian President Vucic has made eminently clear he will not recognize Kosovo before his re-election, if then. Some interim confidence-building steps might be possible, focused on missing people from the 1999 war and implementation of the several dozen existing agreements between Belgrade and Pristina, few of which have been executed to the satisfaction of both capitals. In any event, Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. Albin would do well to match Vucic’s reluctance.
A more comprehensive agreement is however needed. Serbia’s refusal to recognize its erstwhile “autonomous province” leaves Kosovo in international limbo with unclear and unmarked borders, enabling Serbia to undermine its statehood, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. But it also leaves Serbia without the “good neighborly relations” required for EU membership. The two capitals would do well to contemplate seriously the much-mentioned German/German solution, which entailed UN membership for the German Democratic Republic as well as ambassadorial-level representation in both capitals but no formal recognition. No one who knows Kosovo would expect the longer-term outcome to be like Germany’s (i.e. re-incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia).
If Kurti, either as leader of VV or prime minister, is even modestly successful in using the next couple of years to deliver on “jobs and justice,” Kosovo will find itself in a far stronger position to negotiate successfully with Serbia. A stronger economy and a judicial system that can handle both inter-ethnic crime and high-level corruption would make both Washington and Brussels more unequivocal in their support. Success would also enable a stronger position on reciprocity with Belgrade. Albin Kurti has big shoes to fill: his own.
Stevenson’s army, February 10
– NYT says Israeli intelligence reports it would take 2 years for Iran to build nuclear weapons, given recent problems.
– Army Times sees great danger from drones. Defense One suggests ways to counter them.
– Politico says SecDef Austin is hiring talented civilians.
– Defense One urges rethinking our various national stockpiles.
-AEI analyst has good summary of US ideas about China.
– EU diplomat humiliated by Russians.
– NYT says many in France say American “woke leftism” threatens French culture & society.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, February 3
Quick administration decision on Myanmar coup.
Resource: CFR Global Conflict Tracker.
Politico says EU goes “soft” on China because of climate change, in contrast to US.
Dan Drezner notes that people inside the Beltway are more hawkish on China than those in the heartland.
SecDef Austin empties advisory panels, will name new people.
Kath Hicks has “smooth” confirmation hearing for DepSecDef.
Defense industry in poor shape.Defen
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
A warm welcome to the no swagger Secretary of State!
Newly confirmed Secretary of State Blinken appeared at a press briefing today. The difference was dramatic. Secretary’s Pompeo bragged about his “swagger.” Blinken isn’t bragging and there was no swagger, just a deliberate and careful (though not over-cautious) effort to re-assert American competence and leadership. Blinken is not going to please those who won’t settle for less than hyperbolic denunciation of the Chinese Communist Party and over-the-top admiration for Russian President Putin, but he doesn’t mince words. He was unequivocal in denouncing Beijing’s genocide of Uighurs and Moscow’s effort to murder Alexei Navalny.
He was also anxious to allay the concerns of allies and friends, most of whom have found the Trump Administration little short of a disaster. Biden and Blinken see friendly foreigners as force multipliers, not burdens. They aren’t going engage in the Europe-baiting and South Korea-slamming that Trump’s people enjoyed. There will be differences with friends and allies, but this Administration will try to handle them calmly and professionally, not provocatively and counterproductively.
That will be true for individuals and issues as well. Blinken has already asked Zal Khalilzad, who has negotiated an agreement with the Taliban for US withdrawal from Afghanistan, to stay on. The Administration is reviewing a Trump decision on declaring the Houthis in Yemen terrorists that could hinder assistance to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Blinken praises Trump’s “Abrahamic” agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Israel and Bahrain, though he stayed silent on whether the Administration will stick with Trump’s decision to recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, which was a change in US policy offered as a quid pro quo for normalization of Morocco’s relationship with Israel.
Blinken’s strong endorsement of the free press and its role in democracy is just as welcome as his calm and professionalism. In the wake of an administration that regarded the best of the press as the “enemies of the people,” it is truly a pleasure to hear that the new administration welcomes interaction with the press and public scrutiny. A warm welcome to the no swagger Secretary of State!
Serbia needs to get on the right side of history
Saša Janković, runner-up at the latest Presidential elections in the Republic of Serbia (2017), writes in Danas:
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has made an unnecessary and inappropriate personal gamble with national interests, participating in a campaign of one candidate in the US presidential elections. To make the case even worse, his candidate lost. This is not the first time he has made this mistake. But unlike when he supported Hillary Clinton, this time the consequences will be severe. This was the drop that flooded the cup and his actions will affect the whole country negatively.
At the recent hearing of the American House Committee on Foreign Affairs, likely perspectives of the new American policy towards the Western Balkans were heard. Serbia – or more accurately put – the kind of influence it exercises in the region was defined as a problem. The new American administration will no longer tolerate Serbia making trouble in Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia… nor anywhere else in the Region.
If and when Vučić loses support from Washington, he will have no other shield to hide behind – he has wasted them all already.
The U-turn away from the EU (to which, in fact, he never aspired) will now, unlike previously, hit back. The EU and US are beginning to coordinate their foreign policies again and Washington will not continue compensating for heavy messages from Brussels, as in the previous years. The revival of US – EU cooperation effectively closes the space for Vučić to continue manipulating them against each other.
As for the Russian Federation, Maria Zakharova’s public (and close to vulgar) mockery of the Vučić’s overall position in the Washington agreement (the infamous “Sharon Stone tweet”), revealed Moscow’s attitude towards his troubles. If the Kremlin interferes in the Region, it is in pursuit of Russian interests, not Vučić’s, nor Serbia’s.
Finally, China: if anyone believed Vučić when he claimed (including on billboards throughout Belgrade) that Xi Jinping is his “brother” and will shower Serbia with investments, flying cars, weaponry and protection of all kinds, then we deserve whatever is thrown at us, don’t we?
It is no secret anymore that changes are being considered to the Dayton Agreements. Both entities, including Republika Srpska, could easily lose the position of “state within a state.” That status, which could have been used constructively and as an advantage, Serbian and Croatian political leaders (ab)used as a rope around the neck of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Bosniak leaders didn’t help either, constantly playing victims.
The outcome? A quarter of a century after the war, the citizens of BiH do not have a functional state. Instead, the region has a continuing challenge, despite the lies of politicians from Serbia and Croatia that, as guarantors of the Dayton Agreement, they will support the integrity and sovereignty of BiH. In the meantime, Serbs in Bosnia developed very strong feelings for Republika Srpska.
Republika Srpska is not its most powerful and visible politician, Milorad Dodik. But Dodik, in cooperation with the authorities from Belgrade, ruined the opportunity for the Serbian entity to be constructive and favored by the world. After Vučić has lost his latest gamble, if and when the structure of BiH is changed the question is how much of Republika Srpska’s jurisdiction will remain. He broke so many promises that many in the West have become determined not to let him continue fooling them.
Another challenge, its solution long overdue, is Kosovo. The US and the EU will now insist, without further delay, on a comprehensive agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. Serbia should actively influence its content with its proposals, but Vučić’s populist regime abstains so that it can decline any responsibility for the outcome and blame it on others. His oppressed political opposition acts the same way.
There was just one proposal from the side of the opposition that didn’t include formal recognition of independence and still had some chance to be considered internationally.* It was swiftly declared treasonous by both the Vučić’s regime and the rest of the opposition. Since then, three years ago, neither the regime nor the opposition has proposed what to do.
Instead, some opposition leaders consider that putting forward a proposal would provide Vučić with an opportunity to blame them for the loss of Kosovo, using his propaganda machine. And he would, the record shows. So they choose to wait for the West to force Vučić into making a move, so that they can accuse him of treason and topple him. In the meantime, they join him in inspiring cheap nationalist feelings, needed to help their plan – which in fact mirrors his own.
Other opposition leaders silently agree with Vučić’s tactics of blackmailing everybody, inside and out, with Kosovo and Republika Srpska, with a faint view of the “Greater Serbia” somewhere down the road. They would only do it “faster, stronger, better” (an electoral slogan of Vučić’s own party).
The ultimate result is that the agreement on Kosovo will be written by foreign diplomats, without a substantive role of Serbia. Vučić’s regime and the opposition (with lesser responsibility but in an equal manner) are depriving Serbia of influence on the decision that deeply concerns national interests.
The US and the EU, of course, know that changes in BiH and Kosovo are high-risk operations. They will not make the mistake of conducting them without first weakening those who, for fear of losing their power, can sabotage changes by lighting fires in the region. Therefore the first cracks in the grandiose Vučić’s media image outside and inside of Serbia begin to appear. Cracks begin to show in Vučić’s own party, too – Nebojša Stefanović (for years, Vučić’s most trusted aide) is doing what Vučić, advised and used to do in the extremist Serbian Radical Party before he split it with other dissidents to establish the Serbian Progressive Party. Surely, Vučić recognizes the scenario, working against him now.
No injustice inflicted there on Vučić – what brought him up will pull him down. But the citizens of Serbia will suffer – Vučić’s party captured their state and will leave it in scraps. Not only economically, institutionally and legally, but also emotionally – he deprived the nation of self-respect and hope. Furthermore, Vučić will probably not behave like Kosovo’s Thaci and resign from the presidential post to avoid dragging his country into the dirt. No matter how hard one tries to differentiate between Vučić’s regime and Serbia, when he gets under more serious international criticism and, possibly, restrictive measures, that will not be possible.
So, in the world’s eyes, Serbia will once again be seen as a source of problems and a nation that, for the second time in only two decades, allowed a destructive autocrat to gain a position of unlimited power. Not yet fully recovered from the scars left by Milosevic, Serbia will get new ones. From a symbol of freedom, anti-fascism, vitality and capacity to stand united with South Slavic peoples in a strong and prosperous alliance, to a powerless, excommunicated, humiliated and problematic country that has lost its sense of direction and lags behind – the picture will be daunting and generations of Serbians will carry its shadow as a burden. No one can harm Serbian national interests as Serbian nationalists can.
There is a better way. Serbia should identify itself within the trinity of 1) universal human and civil values, 2) positive elements of our national identity, and 3) Western political culture. We are first human beings and free individuals, citizens with dignity and responsibilities to ourselves and the world we live in. Then we are the Serbs – a freedom-loving, friendly, and brave Slavic nation. Finally, we firmly belong to the civilization of Western democracies!
Saint Sava pointed Serbian religion (and partly spirituality) to the East, towards our Orthodox Slavic brothers. But his brother Stefan, the first crowned ruler of Serbia, not accidentally and not without an agreement with his brother, firmly oriented the Serbian state towards the West. In 1217 he sought and received the first Serbian crown from the Pope, not from the Patriarch in the East (which was an option at the time). Such are the foundations of our identity, which is still the direction for our progress. Every detour costs us lost generations and underdevelopment. Shortcomings of Western democracy, which we speak of constantly as “sour grapes,” we can improve upon only after we master its basics. We must work honestly and never again look for shortcuts. Long live Serbia!
*The proposal included the following:
1. Serbia agrees with (and in fact actively supports) the membership of Kosovo in all international organizations, including the UN. Serbia will not ask for any restrictions or create any obstacles for Kosovo to fully avail itself of every right, obligation, or interest arising from such membership. This attitude of Serbia does not mean and can not be used as proof that it formally recognizes the independence of Kosovo, nor Serbia will be conditioned in any way to do so.
2. The sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church of major historical and religious importance (the key monasteries and churches) shall be given extraterritorial status and left to be self-governed by the Church authorities (similar to the examples of monasteries in Mount Athos in Greece, or the Vatican in Rome).
3. Local self-governance in North Mitrovica and the Association of Serbian Municipalities shall be established, not to be used to the detriment of the authority of Pristina over the whole territory of Kosovo.
4. Individual and collective human rights of Serbs shall be guaranteed at the highest level.
5. Property rights shall be guaranteed in line with international norms and standards.
6. The Agreement shall be valid for 30 years. If before the expiry of that term a new one is not reached, it shall be automatically prolonged for the next 30 years, and so on.
Some answers on the Balkans, and other things
I did this interview with Janusz Bugajski on November 5, but if I understand correctly it was broadcast in Kosovo on RTK recently. So it’s a bit dated (but not wrong) on US election issues, but still okay on Balkan issues: