Tag: European Union
Assad is imploding, but it’s not over yet
With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine and Iran weakened, Syria’s President Bashar al Assad is now under siege. The forces opposing him include both Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish-supported rebel groups. Opposition forces in several Syrian provinces are joining the fray, as are the Syrian Democratic
Forces. HTS and the Turks have been governing in Syria’s northwest Idlib and Afrin provinces. The Syrian Democratic Forces are affiliated with Kurdish institutions that govern in much of the east.
How far, how fast?
The HTS offensive has moved fast and far. It controls most of Aleppo, Syria’s largest or second largest city depending on how you count. HTS has also evacuated Kurdish forces from Aleppo and advanced south to the outskirts of Hama. In the meanwhile, the Turkish-supported groups have chased Kurds from their strongholds in Aleppo province. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish led but partly Arab manned, have evicted Iranian and Shia militias from the east.
The question is whether rebel forces can sustain their momentum and move further south to Hama and Homs. So far, there has been little fighting. The Syrian Army is evaporating. It is poorly staffed, trained, and equipped after more than 13 years of fighting rebels. After hesitating at first, Russian air attacks are now battering rebel-held territory, including civilian targets. Lebanese Hezbollah, a major Iranian-supported factor in Syria, has let it be known it will not send more forces. Israel has battered Hezbollah badly in both Lebanon and Syria.
The quandaries
For the US and EU, these sudden developments pose a difficult issue. They don’t like Assad and have maintained vigorous sanctions against him. But they also don’t like HTS, which is a spinoff from Al Qaeda. And Washington won’t want the Turkish-supported forces beating up on the SDF. They have been helpful in fighting remnants of the Islamic State in eastern Syria.
Israel has its own issues. It did not mind the Assad devil it knew and won’t want a jihadist state in Syria. But if he falls, the Israelis will be happy to see Iran and its proxies disappear from their border. And they will want some cred with whoever takes over. In the past they have been supportive to at least some of the opposition to Assad.
The endgame
HTS is trying hard to project a more tolerant image than many jihadists. It has reached out to the Kurds:
HTS has sought to justify its more tolerant approach (translation from a Tweet by Aaron Zelin):
The jihad in Syria has the duty to repel the attacks of the Assad regime. It is part of sharia politics that the mujahidin in Syria should only fight those who fight them, and refrain from attacking those who refrain from attacking them, and strive to disperse the enemies and reduce them.
Assad will have well-equipped, loyal forces defending Damascus. But if HTS takes Hama and Homs, he won’t have much country left. Opposition forces are rising in the south even as the SDF clears regime forces and its allies from the east. The western, Mediterranean coast would still be his, but vulnerable.
The greatest threat to the opposition forces will arise if Turkiye unleashes its proxies against the Kurds. That would divide the opposition and provide an opportunity for Assad to complicate the fight. He might try to strike a deal with the Kurds. Assad is imploding, but it isn’t over yet.
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What happens if Trump wins?
In many parts of the world, the answer is obvious. Trump has said he would strike a deal with Putin on Ukraine. That means surrender of at least Ukrainian territory Russia already controls. In the Middle East, Trump backs Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu 100%. That means Palestinians will be restricted to even smaller areas of the West Bank and Gaza. The prospects for a Palestinian state will be reduced to nil. In Asia, Trump has encouraged Japan and South Korea to get their own nuclear weapons. That, he hopes, will enable US withdrawal. Taiwan will be surrendered, sooner or later, to China.
But what about the Balkans? The region won’t be a priority for either a President Trump or a President Harris. She has said nothing so far as I know about the Balkans. But she is a vigorous rule of law defender of human rights. Trump has also said little about the Balkans, but we know what he did last time. We should expect more of the same.
President Harris: human rights and rule of law
Balkan policy under Harris will hopefully be consistent with her commitment to human rights and rule of law.
That implies keeping NATO and EU membership open, protecting individual rights, and fighting corruption. Consistency would require that American diplomacy return to opposing ethnic nationalism and promoting liberal democracy. Appeasement of President Vucic should decline, as should tolerance for the current Bosnia HiRep. He has backed ethnonationalists and opposed the pending European Court of Human Rights decision that undermines their hold on Bosnia. Interest in extending Kosovo’s sovereignty and countering corruption in Serbia and Albania should increase.
President Trump: partition and profits
In Trump’s first term, his Balkan envoy Ric Grenell favored partition of Kosovo. I am not among those who believe that he can become Secretary of State. But he could take Jim O’Brien’s place as Assistant Secretary for Europe. As soon as the partition option is opened again, it will spread. First to southern Serbia but then to Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and southwestern Serbia (Sandjak). Populations will start moving. Violence will result.
Trump/Grenell will also favor the Balkan fortunes of son-in-law Jared Kushner. That means more appeasement of Serbia’s President Vucic and Albania’s Prime Minister Rama. Both of them have sought to line Trump’s pockets with real estate deals. No doubt they stand to gain as well, politically if not financially.
Sooner rather than later
I don’t think any of this will respect the diplomatic clock. If Trump wins, the changes will start quickly. Europeans will assume NATO is dead. Russia will too. In the Balkans, Vucic and Republika Srpska President Dodik will try to produce facts on the ground. They’ll leave the conference rooms for later. With NATO immobilized, Serbia could try to grab northern Kosovo and the RS can secede from Bosnia. This could all happen during the lame duck presidency, before the January 20 inauguration, or very soon thereafter.
The Biden Administration needs to prevent disaster on its own watch, if Trump is elected. The State and Defense Departments should be preparing now and forewarning the Balkanites, even before the election. EUFOR and KFOR should be prepared to counter partition moves in Kosovo and Bosnia. Plans for reinforcement should be ready. Even now, it would be a good idea to move more troops to Brcko, in northeastern Bosnia. Without Brcko, RS secession is improbable.
Later rather than sooner
If Harris wins, all of the above could still happen. But later rather than sooner, if she fails to correct the mistakes of the Biden Administration. A thorough review of Balkans policy is long overdue. It won’t be hard to discern why Biden couldn’t get anything more than ammunition for Ukraine from appeasing Serbia. Vucic is not embracing the West and won’t. Russia has infested his security services. His own ambition for a Serbian world is analogous to Putin’s Russian world.
The harder part will be correcting course. The EU and US need to lower ambitions for the Dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. They need to raise the pressure on Belgrade and counter Russia’s malign influence there and in Montenegro. And Washington and Brussels need to strengthen the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Bosnia and Kosovo.
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Complaint department, North Macedonia
I received today this letter from Ali Ahmeti, the President of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). It is the leading Albanian opposition party in North Macedonia. The letter’s aim is to generate action by the US and EU:
I am writing to you today with deep concern about recent political and constitutional developments in North Macedonia that threaten the historic achievements of the Ohrid Agreement, as well as the fundamental principles of equality and peace in our multiethnic state, particularly for the Albanian community in North Macedonia.
It is troubling that plans, surprisingly announced by the government itself, indicate that the Constitutional Court intends to annul key provisions of the Law on the Use of Languages, which established the Albanian language as an equal official language under Amendment 5 of the Constitution. This poses a severe blow to the Ohrid Agreement, interethnic harmony, and stability in the country, potentially taking us back to the pre-2001 conditions that led to crisis and conflict.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court’s decision to prohibit the identification of citizens’ ethnic affiliation within state institutions undermines the principle of collective rights of ethnic communities and nullifies the core balancing mechanisms and the Badinter principle, which are central to the Ohrid Agreement.
These mechanisms were established to guarantee the collective rights of ethnic communities based on demographic reality, thereby providing essential protection against any form of domination. By eliminating the declaration of ethnic affiliation, the Constitutional Court is breaching the Constitution itself, whose fundamental value is fair and adequate representation, effectively reverting us to pre-Ohrid conditions.
Lastly, following the recent elections, the fundamental principle of the Ohrid Agreement, which requires the formation of a political majority based on fair representation of ethnic communities, has been severely violated.
This action is not merely an issue for the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), but affects the principle of fair representation guaranteed by Amendment 6 of North Macedonia’s Constitution, serving as a safeguard against majority dominance over minorities.
These three significant setbacks to the foundations of the Ohrid Agreement pose a serious threat to peace, stability, interethnic harmony, and multiethnic democracy in North Macedonia.
These are not merely internal political matters but carry severe regional implications for overall stability. These interventions threaten to dismantle the key elements of peace and equality, taking us back to a period of crisis and conflict.
At this critical juncture, I urge for joint and decisive action to protect the achievements of the Ohrid Agreement and the guaranteed rights of the Albanian community. Your engagement in raising international awareness and mobilizing relevant institutions regarding this constitutional and political crisis is essential.
Thank you for your tireless efforts to promote peace, stability, and European integration in the Western Balkans.
Regular readers may imagine that I have ambivalent feelings about some of the issues raised in this letter.
Language
Not, however, about the language question. The Ohrid agreement is crystal clear on this subject. It requires that any language spoken by more than 20% of the population should be co-official with Macedonian.
I don’t see how you bring that obligation into question without creating more problems than North Macedonia already has. It was an important part of the 2001 peace settlement. Maintaining it is important.
Ethnic identification of government employees
The second issue concerns ethnic identification of government employees. Of course I prefer a system that is color blind and based on merit. But not specifying ethnic identification of government employees will not make government employment color blind. Names pretty much tell you who is Albanian and who is Macedonian. I suspect the intention of this proposition is to continue the current predominance of Macedonians in senior government positions.
Faking color blindness won’t work. Macedonia needs to diversify its public sector employees to more fully reflect the population’s diversity. I’m not a fan of quotas. But affirmative action with priority given to qualifications is a process that can yield reasonable results. Many Albanians have a qualification most Macedonians lack: they speak both languages. Government hiring should take that into account.
Fair representation in government
The third issue of fair representation is not fully specified. I imagine it refers to the positions given to ethnic Albanians in the current government. That is is more a political complaint than a juridical or constitutional one. One of the main Macedonian complaints about the previous government was the preponderance of Albanians in key positions. The winners of the last election sought to weaken the Albanian presence because they won the election.
DUI’s Albanian rivals negotiated the current coalition deal. If they did it badly, that is an issue for the next election. American and European diplomats can point that out to the Prime Minister, but it is not really an international issue.
Bottom lines
So my responses are
- Yes to Ali Ahmeti on the language issue,
- No to the government on the ethnic identification issue, and
- Let the voters decide on the fair representation issue.
But what difference does it make what I think? Fundamentally, these are issues that Macedonia’s citizens need to decide.
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A Balkans agenda for the lame duck
We are entering the final stretch before the US election. That means a lame duck period for lower priority parts of the world like the Balkans until January 20. Neither Kamala Harris nor Donald Trump is likely to say anything about the region before November 5. Even after Inauguration Day it will be some time before the new administration focuses on the Balkans.
We can guess their views
Harris’ views on the Balkans are unknown. But she has spent a career prosecuting criminals and defending equal rights. That likely tells you something about her attitude toward corruption and ethnonationalism. Trump is a corrupt white supremacist who tried to partition Kosovo while in the White House. If elected, he will no doubt empower Ric Grenell or his doppelganger to try again in Kosovo and Bosnia. Serbia has leverage on Trump. Jared Kushner has been looking for investment opportunities there.
What should the people at the State Department and in the White House do in this lame duck period? They should seek to correct the mistakes of the last three years, which have produced mainly diplomatic failure in the Balkans. The Biden Administration mistakenly focused on creating a statutory Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo. In Bosnia, it rightly sought to disempower ethnonationalist politicians, but it succeeded mainly with Bosniaks. Those priorities condemned Biden’s Balkan policies to strategic defeat. They also alienated Kosovars and Bosniaks, America’s best friends in the region.
Here are a few ideas to correct course. Assuming that Harris will be elected, as I fondly hope, these thoughts aim to reduce the sway of ethnic nationalism. They would also increase the functionality of governance in still-fragile Kosovo as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Some ideas
- Consult with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti on a joint plan to establish beyond doubt his country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This should include an end to Belgrade intimidation of Serbs who join Kosovo security institutions and wider international recognition.
- Adopt as the official US stance conditional support for a nongovernmental Association of Serb Majority Municipalities. The municipalities themselves should form this Association consistent with the Kosovo constitution. The conditions should include Belgrade fulfillment of its obligations under the agreement in which Pristina agreed to the Association.
- Tell Belgrade publicly that it needs to produce accountability for the Serbian government malfeasance of last year. That includes the kidnapping of Kosovo police, rioting against KFOR, and the Banjska terrorist plot.
- Stop the bad-mouthing of Serbian environmentalists who oppose the Rio Tinto lithium plant. Start publicly criticizing corruption and growing autocracy in Belgrade.
- End the Bosnia High Representative’s intervention to reverse the European Court of Human Rights ruling in the Kovacevic case. The ECHR ruling promises a big step in reducing ethnic nationalist control of state institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Develop criminal charges in the US against the leading Serb and Croat advocates (Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic) of ethnonational division in Bosnia.
There are some tall orders in this list. But the failure of three years of misguided US and EU diplomatic efforts suggests a dramatic turn is needed.
The resistance will be strong
Serbia’s President Vucic is committed to the “Serbian world” goal of governing Serbs in neighboring countries. He has succeeded in Montenegro. The government in Podgorica is under Serbia’s thumb. In Bosnia and Kosovo, only de facto partition can deliver success to Serbia. Belgrade will resist all the above moves, as will their proxies in the neighboring countries.
Belgrade is at risk of falling irreversibly under the influence of Russia and China. The US needs to counter that influence with sticks as well as carrots. The carrots only appeasement approach has failed. Here is the result:
The Americans will be far more effective at all of this if the EU and UK will act in tandem. The UK will likely follow a strong US lead. The EU may not follow right away, That makes another task for the lame duck interval: getting Brussels on board.
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A real incursion with an unclear purpose
Ukrainian forces have penetrated upwards of 15 kilometers or so into the Kursk oblast of Russia north of Kharkiv. This is the most serious Ukrainian penetration of Russian territory during the current war. Milbloggers claim the Russians are trying to counter the incursion with new recruits. They will likely also need to weaken defenses somewhere along the more or less 600-mile front to respond inKursksion.
The balance is shifting
The past year of fighting has seen little change overall. The Russians have gained marginally, especially in the east. They have recently been pushed back from Kharkiv (though not all the way to the border), where they had made some progress in the spring. US failure to keep up the supply of weapons and ammunition last winter damaged Ukrainian morale and defensive capabilities. So too did European hesitancy about economic aid.
Now that economic aid and military supplies are flowing once again, Ukrainian morale and capability are on the mend. F16s are arriving. Better air defense and longer-range artillery and missiles will enhance Ukrainian capabilities. The Kursk incursion will no doubt raise morale further, if it is successful.
Russia’s supplies of stockpiled weapons are running low, but North Korea and Iran are providing missiles and drones. The Russian army has manpower issues, but arguably less serious than those of Ukraine. Still, Vladimir Vladimirovich is not sounding confident, or offering to help the Kursk Governor:
Still, the objective is unclear
Ukraine’s military objective is still unclear. Kyiv has said nothing. A rail line important to supplying Russian troops farther south? The Kursk nuclear power plant? Capture of soldiers or territory that could be traded for Ukrainian territory or soldiers? Encirclement of the Russian units to the south that had fought their way close to Kharkiv? Forcing the Russians to weaken offensive and defensive operations farther south? Encouraging international supporters to hasten arms supplies? Encouraging Putin’s opponents in Moscow and across the Russian Federation to confront him? It still seems to be anyone’s guess.
Ukraine has committed elements of four experienced brigades to the effort, which suggests this is not merely a cross-border raid. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Ukrainians will seek to hold the territory they take. That would be a daunting task, assuming the population is still loyal to Moscow. The population in present-day Kursk oblast overwhelmingly identifies as Russian, not Ukrainian.
War is not math
War, unlike mathematics, has uncertain outcomes, brought about in unexpected ways. The Ukrainians have rolled their dice. We’ll have to wait and see what the result is.
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Montenegro needs to right itself, now
Miodrag Vlahović, former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, writes:
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić should be gratified. Politicians close to him have finally become part of the 44th Government of Montenegro, Serbia’s neighbor to the southwest.
Others are not so pleased. The US Embassy in Montenegro has expressed concern that there are pro-Russian parties in the government. The EU Mission warns of hindrance to the European agenda. The new government uses European and NATO rhetoric, but their political practice and decisions follow the Belgrade-Moscow lead.
What happened
A Bosniak party enabled this governing coalition. It holds six ministerial mandates in the farcically cumbersome cabinet of Prime Minister Milojko Spajić. That is what it got to compensate for joining with parties that deny the Srebrenica genocide and treat war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladić as heros.
The new government has the two-thirds majority (54 out of 81 deputies) needed to enact significant legal and constitutional changes. They will want to enable dual citizenship and enact changes that would eliminate the civic concept of Montenegrin society. Already political leaders are presenting themselves as “the only authentic representatives” of their ethnic group. The dysfunctional Bosnian model of governance, based on ethnic group rights, is the daydream of ethnic nationalists in Montenegro.
But that is only one dimension of the new political constellation. The government includes no one who identifies as Montenegrin. The shrunken opposition includes parties of a civic, European and democratic orientation, but American and European diplomats have deemed them not “reformed enough.”
What it means
Spajić will allegedly try to implement the official European agenda and Euro-Atlantic policy. He will be doing this in cooperation with declared opponents of NATO, advocates of lifting EU-required sanctions against Russia, and parties that want to realize Greater Serbia. Mission impossible, but therefore desirable from the commanding heights of Belgrade and Moscow.
These same parties of the governing coalition, including Prime Minister Spajić himself, naturally look with enthusiasm at the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House. That shows precisely how little they are really oriented towards Europe, which Trump despises.
The Western policy of appeasement towards Serbia has now handed Montenegro to Moscow. The Biden Administration wasted four years pushing the anti-European project known as “Open Balkans.” That has enabled Vučić to meddle not only in Montenegro but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, with inevitable negative implications for North Macedonia as well.
Deliveries of Serbian arms and ammunition to Ukraine and mammoth contracts for lithium exploitation in Serbia have made this possible. They are both an explanation and a verdict. The EU’s continuing financial support for Serbia, regardless of Belgrade’s other behavior, reveals its true intentions, which condemn the rest of the Balkans to instability.
What needs to be done
Montenegro is on the brink. The Bosniak party is in power with nationalist populists and chauvinists from the Serbian-Russian milieu. A coalition of three nationalist parties presided over the beginning of the 1992 war in Bosnia. The Bosniak leaders who join this coalition will enable threats to Montenegrin sovereignty and independence.
The opposition parties need to answer the question whether this is a “point of no return” for Montenegro. There will be no help from the West. That makes the task of the opposition urgent and dramatic. Montenegro needs to right itself, now.
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