peacefare.net

No closer to full normalization

Drilon S. Gashi* writes:

US-led, high stakes Kosovo-Serbia peace talks culminated Friday in an “economic normalization” deal signed at the White House. I had recommended that early, politically contentious discussions be replaced by a bilateral trade deal, but this agreement is less about trade and more about economic infrastructure, with notable extras. It is unclear whether it is binding, or will be implemented, which likely depends on President Trump’s re-election.

Nonetheless, Kosovo should follow through on the good, mitigate the bad, and better articulate its interests going forward—achieving Serbia’s recognition and tangible international subjectivity. Serbia would benefit from strategically aligning with the US and fully normalizing ties with Kosovo.

Political Adversaries

Kosovo and Serbia are political adversaries with important outstanding disagreements. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and actively undermines it. Kosovo retaliated in the past by levying tariffs on Serbian goods. The sides have different interpretations of the 1999 Kosovo war and real reconciliation is lacking. Serbia does not accept that it led a state-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo.

The sides began peace talks in 2011 under EU auspices, agreeing on many small deals but implementing few of them. Creative ambiguity allowed each to claim that the deals were in its interest—treating Kosovo as a state according to Pristina, and strengthening Serbia’s presence in Kosovo according to Belgrade. But without implementation the talks risked becoming never-ending.

Serbia and especially Kosovo welcomed renewed White House interest in a Balkan peace deal. A jolt of energy and new ideas was needed. Yet the heightened interest yielded little in new modalities for full bilateral normalization. Serbia did not budge from earlier negotiation positions. Kosovo elected new political leadership, but it quickly returned to a more traditional governing coalition.

The parties agreed on 16 points, organized around the below four main themes. 

Regional Cooperation

The parties agreed on:

• formalizing agreements on road, rail, and airline networks;
• Kosovo joining a “mini-Schengen” (border-free) zone with Serbia; Albania, and North Macedonia;
• recognizing each others diplomas and professional certificates; and
• opening and operationalizing an important border crossing.

Joint infrastructure projects between neighbors pursuing EU membership is commonsense. Kosovo should, however, consider whether this will enable it to expand its export markets in Serbia or elsewhere, or just increase imports from Serbia. The mini-Schengen idea was previously rejected by all Kosovo leaders, so it was a concession to accept it here. A much-needed reduction of bilateral non-tariff trade barriers was not agreed. Kosovo needs to guard against becoming more economically dependent on Serbia, which has undermined Kosovo sovereignty in energy, telecommunications, and other sectors.

• Cross-border issues

A contentious point states US government entities will work with the parties “on a feasibility study for the purposes of sharing Ujman/Gazivoda Lake, as a reliable water and energy supply.” Nearly 80 percent of the lake is in Kosovo and 20 percent in Serbia. Kosovo should not allow Serbia to meddle in its resource management. They agreed also to diversify energy sources, which may mean importing US gas, which is particularly interesting for Kosovo.

The deal touches on enhancing religious tolerance and calls for “implementing judicial decisions on the Serbian Orthodox Church.” It commits the sides to make progress on identifying the remains of missing persons, although it does not call out Serbia as the major perpetrator of war crimes, leading to nearly 2,000 missing persons from Kosovo.

• Foreign policy

Another controversial point places a 1-year moratorium on Kosovo applying to join international organizations. This was equated with Serbia halting its Kosovo de-recognition campaign, with both states and international organizations, for a year. Kosovo was strong-armed into agreeing to drop tariffs before this negotiation, although the earlier parallel was Kosovo tariffs on Serbian goods with Serbia’s de-recognition campaign. As an independent country seeking global recognition, Kosovo should not have to desist any attempts at achieving greater internal subjectivity.

Kosovo received the consolation of Israel’s diplomatic recognition, and also recognized Israel. This was the firmest outcome of the deal, and is symbolically important for Kosovo, Israel, and the US.

• Endorsing US foreign policy

Kosovo and Serbia agreed to support several items of US concern. This included:

• prohibiting 5G from untrusted vendors (a reference to Huawei);
• adopting strict US screening and information systems for airline passengers;
• encouraging decriminalization of homosexuality in the 69 countries that criminalize it; and
• designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

These are administration policy priorities and personal initiatives of Special Envoy Grenell. These and as well as Serbia and Kosovo locating their respective embassies to Israel in Jerusalem are US wins.

Full Normalization Still Needed

This deal is a lost opportunity for Kosovo, which needs a breakthrough on Serbian recognition and steps towards unlocking NATO and UN membership. Serbia made strides towards rapprochement with the US, achieving US infrastructure and energy assistance, and alignment with US foreign policy.

Serbia may continue to use Kosovo-Serbia normalization to normalize its US relations, and re-balance its partnerships with China and Russia. Kosovo needs to assure it gets real progress on recognition. It should also further diversify its international support base and not be overly reliant on one ally. Much of this deal may not stick.

Although it contains aspects that both parties may benefit from, Kosovo and Serbia still need to achieve full normalization. This deal does not get them close.

*Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.

Serbia is oscillating, not turning

A Serbian friend writes:

Serbia has recently purchased refurbished Russian-made MiG-29 combat aircraft, Mi17, and Mi35 helicopters, Pantsir -S medium-range surface-to-air and anti-aircraft system, Chinese-built CH—92A combat drones (UCAVs) and according to some media reports the Chinese FK-3 anti-aircraft system. These purchases have made some in the West believe Belgrade is making a sharp Eastern turn, de-facto abandoning EU integration and decades of partnership with NATO within the Partnership for Peace (PfP). An influx of  Chinese investments in the Serbian economy and infrastructure amplifies that impression. Is this a swing to the East or might be something else?

Let’s begin with the basics. Since 1999, the US and EU have paid little attention to the Balkans. The US was busy with Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, and other conflict areas, delegating post-conflict stabilization of the Western Balkans to the EU. Despite the 2003 Thessaloniki declaration committing to integrate the region, the Union has hesitated. Slovenia and Croatia became member states, but Macedonia was on hold for decades due to the name dispute with Greece, and other countries are only slowly moving through the bureaucratic phases of the accession process.

The Western Balkans was too poor and too unstable for quick integration, which the EU didn’t want after its bad experience with Bulgaria and Romania. For nine years the EU tried to facilitate dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, without tangible results. Bosnia remains divided. Nothing has dramatically changed in the region for decades. Many countries of the region struggle with the “Balkan Ghosts” of nationalism, corruption, negative stereotypes, poverty, and brain drain. The shadow of an autocratic collective mindset has never dissipated. Democratic processes and institutions are not safe from overpowering executive power, the judiciary is not truly free and independent, the grip of executive power and influential individuals over media has never disappeared. The NGO community, once strong, almost perished after funders lost interest. Few checks and balances remain. Populist right-wing movements got stronger, mobilizing masses for the political benefit of local elites.

The EU is also not immune to right-wing populism, nationalism, and xenophobia, which are growing trends in some member states. There is no linear progress and the everlasting victory of European democratic values, which are threatened by the heritage of autocratic mentality and collective mindset. Things turn quickly back to the “old track” if the population does not nourish and genuinely accept democracy.

Serbia in particular had its struggles after devastating sanctions, dictatorship, and conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, which not only crippled the economy but also damaged national values and consciences. Yugoslav identity collapsed. Many Serbs searched and tried to rediscover who they were and where they belonged. Their ambitious, intelligent, and arrogant leader, Slobodan Milosevic, did not understand the world after the collapse of the Eastern Block. Serbian policy was reactionary, hovering between the desire to protect Serbs in other former Yugoslav republics, a self-image of strength and greatness, and the general feeling of rejection by almost all others, including most of the international community. Isolated and outcast, Serbia ended up in limbo, with no proper way out. The policy of neutrality, which is to some extent based on non-alignment mindset from the Yugoslav communist era, was the only logical way to go. The result is Serbia tolerated by all, but not entirely trusted by anyone.

For 30 years, Serbia has not been able to decide to go either East or West. The pendulum swings from side to side.  This requires constant juggling and balancing, which is dangerous, expensive, and unproductive.

China and Russia are far away and no country in the region is big enough to be an important ally.

Russian economic presence in Serbia is limited mostly to the energy sector (since 2009 the Serbian National Oil Company NIS is majority-owned by Gazprom-Neft) and media (Sputnik and some web portals). Russia is today not a big investor. Russian infrastructure loans are not fully utilized. Moscow sells arms cheaper than Western ones, but there are no free rides or brotherhood policy there. Serbia has also recently purchased Airbus H145M helicopters, and President Vucic recently announced that Serbia could purchase some weapons from the US and Israel. After its abortive effort to take over the Pristina Airport in June 1999, Russia abandoned Kosovo, as it has no profound geostrategic interest in the region. Moscow continued to help Serbia politically in difficult times, for which Serbia is grateful. Moscow keeps its foot in the door and tries to sustain its influence to prevent Serbian membership into NATO, which was never a real option due to the 1999 bombing and Serbia’s policy of military neutrality. Serbian and Russian interests coincide with the independence of Kosovo since Russia opposed it.

Russia has never however favored Serbia over other countries of the region. Croatia and Bulgaria were always crucially important countries for Russia. Almost 15 years ago Russian President Putin decorated former Croatian President Stjepan Mesic for contributing to the anti-fascist struggle. No one from Serbia ever received such an honor. During the Communist period, the Soviet leadership did not favor Serbs, who represented an obstacle to Communism due to their deep commitment to Orthodoxy, Serbian identity, and national traditions. During the 1990s Yeltsin did not favor Milosevic since his wife, Mirjana Markovic, openly supported Yeltsin’s opponents. Additionally, Yeltsin did not want to jeopardize relations with the US and the West over Serbia. Former Prime Minister of Russia Chernomyrdin allegedly delivered a threat to Milosevic that Serbia would be flattened if he refused to withdraw from Kosovo.

Historical ties to Russia are however strong. For decades former Yugoslavia purchased Soviet weapons, which with some modifications were sold to third countries. The Soviets turned a blind eye because they did not want to jeopardize fragile political relations between Stalin and Tito. Most Yugoslavs at that time, including the Serbian population, considered the Red Army and Soviets brothers and liberators. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia also hosted pro-czarist Russian emigrants who had fled after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. These well-educated emigrants helped the progress of Serbian society since they worked as medical doctors, engineers, musicians, etc. They are deeply integrated into Serbian society.

Serbia belongs to Europe, and that Europe is a foundation of its foreign policy. Although there were some initiatives in a past to establish closer ties with Moscow (proposed by Vojislav Seselj’s Serbian Radical Party), it is hard to imagine any substantial alliance with no common border. Such an alliance would also be impossible since Serbia is surrounded by NATO member states. Christian Orthodox heritage and generally mutually positive sentiment are not sufficient foundations for a substantial deepening of relations. Therefore, although Serbian bilateral relations with Russia are stable, friendly, and good, that does not mean that Serbia is making a sharp turn to the East.

The same logic applies to China.

Serbia is just too small to play an important role in China. Beijing wants to expand throughout the Balkans to counter US influence, exploiting the historic relationship with Hoxha’s Communist Albania to spread its influence also to Kosovo, and Macedonia. As elsewhere, China is supporting infrastructure in Serbia as a part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Only $561 million of $ 2.2 billion in Chinese funds are investments however; the rest is loans. China has invested $8.9 billion in the UK. Does it mean that the UK is a pro-Chinese country?

Serbia is not going East or West. It will continue to trade with the EU, develop a substantial partnership with NATO, nourish friendly relations with Russia, and get cheap loans from China until a major shift occurs. Serbia is balancing many moving parts to survive until the EU decides to open its doors. Although the EU is Serbia’s largest trading partner as well as its biggest donor and investor, Belgrade is still in the outer lobby waiting for the Union to move forward. The main problem is that the Western Balkans is not high on the EU agenda. While the European idea is slowly fading away in the region, a vacuum is growing. It will not remain empty long.

Problems in the Western Balkans cannot be resolved with magic wands from Brussels and Washington. Although foreigners share responsibility for the current situation, the main responsibility falls on local people. If they can find a way to peacefully contain destructive spirits of the past, move on with life and profoundly reform their societies by rule of law and respect of fundamental values of democracy, no foreign help is needed. Local ownership is the key to sustainable progress. Healing the wounds from the past and dismantling the war generation of political leadership (which Pristina is currently experiencing – Belgrade underwent the same experience a decade earlier) are just initial steps, which will not lead to “collective catharsis” or mentality change.

Locals have more to do. They need to strengthen their administrative capacities, deepen their knowledge, dedicate more funds for R&D, and open their minds to be more cosmopolitan through hard work and education. They should travel more and interact with their neighbors, giving an honest chance to a mutual future. That will not be easy, since “dreams of a better past” and zero-sum interpretation of history are deeply rooted. The EU could help to strengthen knowledge-based education in the region, devoting more funds for education and science.  The Union could also assist all nations of the Western Balkans to travel freely and enjoy Europe. Interaction of young people with their peers in the EU, US, UK, and other countries is crucially important for developing a prejudice-free post-war leadership generation. This is all within our reach. It does not require too much political capital for implementation. Breaking negative stereotypes is the first step to free our minds from the pitfalls of the past.

Serbia’s turn East

The indicators are multiple:

• A financial crackdown on civil society and media organizations, not including the nationalist ones
• Control over conventional print and electronic media as well as abusive use of social media
• Purchase of major military equipment from Moscow and China
• Signature of a free trade agreement with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and refusal to align with EU Ukraine-related sanctions on Moscow
• Courting of Chinese investment and inordinate praise for Beijing’s help in response to coronavirus
• Refusal to prosecute known war criminals
• Failure to make substantial progress on independence of the judiciary
• Growing capture of the state for purposes of grand corruption

Aleksandar Vucic, one-time Information Minister to Slobodan Milosevic and now in his second term as President of Serbia, was always an unlikely vehicle of democratization and Europeanization. But some of us (that means me too) thought it possible he would do the right thing, if only because nothing else really makes sense and his credibility with Serbia’s nationalists was high. Serbia’s road to prosperity and security, we thought, lies in Brussels, not Moscow. Nixon to China and all that.

We had it wrong. Prosperity and security are not Vucic’s real concerns. His own hold on power is. Vucic has been centralizing power, aided by an inept and divided political opposition. Like his Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, he is far more comfortable with the Russian and Chinese autocracies than with Washington and Brussels. He has undermined independent media and slow-rolled judicial reform. Separation of powers is a joke–Vucic holds all of them. He allies himself with the Belgrade Church and its right-wing supporters. He has become palsy with Milorad Dodik, despite his understandable distaste for Dodik’s ambition to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, since that would put Serbia in a dicey situation.

Vucic is no longer “sitting on two stools.” It is amusing to see that some people imagine that they can still convince him to opt for the West. He has chosen the East, but we are not in the midst of the Cold War. The Balkans is no longer a major arena for great power competition. It barely rates as a minor one. Tito’s nonaligned fence-sitting served Western purposes. There is no fence now. The EU and the US shouldn’t care if Vucic goes East, and we shouldn’t try to buy him off. We need to be patient for the day when there is a Serbian leader who truly believes in liberal democracy and is prepared to sacrifice to take his country in that direction.

What does this mean for Kosovo? It means patience. Prime Minister Hoti is in no position to make territorial or other major concessions, as he faces real opposition in parliament. At least some Serbs are drifting in the right direction. Vucic, given his strong political position inside Serbia, could recognize Kosovo now with little impact on his re-election prospects in 2022. But if he doesn’t I can hope someone will emerge to challenge him precisely on this point: do you want a friendly southern neighbor, or a hostile one? Do you want Serbs to be safe in Kosovo or in danger? Do you want to qualify for EU membership faster or slower?