Tag: European Union
Kosovo’s decisive summer
These were my remarks to a Columbia University panel on “The Future of Kosovo” held via Zoom today.
Let me start by saying how much I appreciate David Phillips having put this panel together. It isn’t easy to wrangle such illustrious participants, even to a remote meeting. Thank you, David.
My job today is to try to frame the issues in a broader context and from a Washington perspective.
The key thing to understand is that the Americans have abandoned their well-established policy on the Balkans and on Kosovo in particular.
That well-established Balkans policy, part of the broader 1990s effort to establish “Europe whole and free,” had three pillars:
• Protection of Kosovo’s population and sympathy for Kosovo’s independence aspirations as well as commitment to Bosnian sovereignty.
• Support for liberal democracy throughout the Balkans.
• Commitment to acting in tandem with the Europeans, especially with Germany and the United Kingdom.
My message is just this: things have changed. The Trump Administration has equivocated on all three of these pillars. Let me take them in reverse order.
I see no real effort in this Administration to cooperate with Europe. It has put the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue in the hands of an American Ambassador in Berlin who has offended the German government and spoken against the EU. Professional diplomats who know the Balkans well are now sidelined.
Washington now favors border changes to accommodate ethnic differences, even though they would signify inability to treat all people equally, which is the liberal democratic ideal. Regrettably, Europe’s High Representative Borell has gone along, as did his predecessor.
Finally, it is all too clear that Belgrade, not Sarajevo or Pristina, is today Washington’s preferred Balkan partner.
These changes signify a major shift in U.S. policy. How did it happen?
The Trump Administration is ethnic nationalist. It sympathizes when it hears from Serbia’s government and lobbyists that Serbs should govern Serbs and Albanians should govern Albanians. President Trump is trying to appeal almost exclusively to whites and to limit minority voting. Why wouldn’t it listen to Balkan ethnic nationalists?
Moreover, Republicans know that Serb Americans in a potential swing state like Ohio are an electoral bonanza far more valuable than the Albanian Americans in New York, which is a lock for the Democrats.
The Trump Administration has failed so far in all its major foreign policy initiatives. Ric Grenell is trying to give the President a good headline before November 3. All the better if it is one that kills two Clinton achievements, Bosnia and Kosovo.
So U.S. government support for Kosovo’s aspirations has weakened: you see it in the cut off of funding and the threat to withdraw U.S. troops. These are irresponsible moves.
You see the weakening of U.S. support also in the lack of concern in the Administration about the impact of a Kosovo land swap on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
So, you may ask, what is to be done? I’ll leave it to the panel participants to address the issues. My views on some of them are well-known: I support reciprocity between Pristina and Belgrade, I oppose partition, and I think a deal on tariffs and non-tariff barriers is doable.
Three further options for Kosovo need to be considered. I’ll call them the 3Ds:
• Diversify
• Deter
• Delay
Let me take each of these in turn.
How can Kosovo diversify its support beyond the U.S.? Germany first and foremost: Kosovo needs to ensure that opposition to land swaps is sustained not only in the Chancellor’s office but also in the Bundestag. Berlin must continue to make it clear that it will not accept changes in borders to accommodate ethnic differences. It needs to reign in Borrell.
Switzerland, the UK, and Ukraine are other countries that have their own powerful reasons for opposing land swaps. Even for non-recognizing Spain, the idea should be anathema.
How can Kosovo deter land swaps? The key here is reciprocity.
In all future discussions, Kosovo should seek the equivalent of whatever Serbia seeks: the same acreage, the same powers for an Albanian municipal association in Serbia as for a Serb one in Kosovo, the same representation in Belgrade for Albanians that Serbia has in Pristina, equivalent removal of non-tariff barriers in exchange for removal of tariffs.
And above all, mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives, with an unequivocal and verifiable commitment not to block Kosovo entry into the UN or other international organizations.
Sadly, deterrence is unlikely to work perfectly, because of the strong American lean towards Belgrade. Delay is also vital.
Vucic has made it clear he will wait until after the Serbian election and government formation in late June for any deal with Pristina. The Trump Administration will then press for land swaps before the fall. So July and August, when Europe is asleep, may be crucial months.
A Kosovo Constitutional Court decision to disallow formation of a new government without new elections could cause a further, welcome delay.
By October 1, Kosovo will be safe from partition if it hasn’t been done yet.
What, you will ask, about the American elections?
If I were a Kosovo patriot, I wouldn’t bank on a Biden victory in November, but I would hope for one. Joe Biden knows the Balkans well and would return to the well-established policy of support for Kosovo and Bosnia and cooperation with Europe. A Biden Administration should close the door on land swaps, loudly.
If Trump wins a second term, the electoral pressure for a quick deal will fade but I would still expect Grenell and others to pursue land swaps, if only to feather their nests for their next jobs.
And the President himself will feel completely uninhibited: expect wild moves, not only in the Balkans.
So the next few months are vital for Kosovo’s future. I am hoping to hear from the other panelists how they think its statehood, territorial integrity, and sovereignty can be ensured.
P.S. Here is the full video of the Columbia event:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Serbia should align
A group of people described to me as “prominent individuals from all walks of life in Serbia” have issued an appeal in the runup to the (remote) EU/Western Balkans Summit meeting on Wednesday:
The tone is muted, but the overall message is clear: democracy is in danger in Serbia, due in part but not only to executive action in response to the Covid-19 epidemic.
In fact democracy was at risk in Serbia well before this year. President Vucic had already accumulated vast power, including over the media and judiciary as well as uncontested control of the executive branch. There has been no effective opposition in parliament for years. Protesters against his rule came from all ends of the political spectrum, liberal and ultra-nationalist, but they had little impact. Any hope they had of winning in elections evaporated when the epidemic caused the polling to be postponed.
As in so many other countries, including my own, the epidemic has aggravated tendencies that already existed in Serbia. In mid-March, President Vucic had harsh words for the lack of EU solidarity with his country and praise for the Chinese, who have been investing more in Serbia than in the rest of Balkans. This was an intensification of his effort to return Serbia from the nominally pro-Western stance he adopted in the last Serbian presidential election in 2017 to a “non-aligned” one in keeping with the Socialist Yugoslav tradition. He had already balanced Serbia’s cooperation with NATO by leaning heavily in Russia’s direction, including by procuring its military equipment and refusing to implement EU-levied (Ukraine-related) sanctions.
Much of the rest of the Western Balkans is choosing an unequivocally Western path for its economic and political development, even if performance often falls short. Bosnia is the exception, but only because its Serb-run Republika Srpska constrains the country from making a serious run at NATO. Montenegro is still struggling with an anti-independence, anti-NATO opposition, but it has joined NATO and its government is clear about its goal of aligning economically and politically with Europe. The same is true in North Macedonia, which likewise has joined NATO after settling its “name” issue with Greece. Kosovo has always been clear about its pro-NATO, pro-EU ambitions, despite the obvious shortfalls in its performance.
Serbia is different for several reasons. The Orthodox connection is stronger than in the other countries of the Balkans, Russophilia and ethnic nationalism are dominant sentiments in the still unreconstructed right wing of its politics, and Belgrade is the successor state to Socialist Yugoslavia in much more than the legal sense. Some Serbs are nostalgic for the unaligned Yugoslav role, which they believe brought goodies from both East and West. Others just like the familiarity of the Slav-dominated East.
No one should begrudge Serbia the benefits of Russian and Chinese investment. Belgrade needs every dinar it can get for its moribund economy. Germany does a lot of business with Russia too, but has nevertheless remained a leader in the liberal democratic world.
But it is high time the EU makes clear that the path to accession will not be open unless Serbia aligns itself economically and politically with Western standards, however much it enjoys Russian and Chinese cash. It is far from that ideal today. That is the significance of the pre-Summit appeal. Brussels and the EU national capitals need to send a strong message to Serbia: you are not getting into our club unless you meet entry requirements, in particular the Copenhagen criteria:
Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm
Sad to say, the Europeans can expect no support for now from the US in the effort to turn Serbia into a viable accession candidate. Washington is hostile to the EU, uninterested in promoting democracy except in adversary states, and cares only about quid pro quo rather than international norms or maintaining alliance relationships.
So yes, the EU/Western Balkans Summit should send a message not only about solidarity in the face of Covid-19, but also about maintaining European standards and requiring adherence to them by countries that seek membership. An anocratic Serbia is not one that can accede to the EU. Vucic should be told to align, or find Serbia lagging in the regatta for EU membership.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The politics of faith
Ambassador Miodrag Vlahovic* writes:
The new Law on Religious and Freedoms of Opinion was adopted by the Montenegrin Parliament in December 2019, after almost five years of continuous talks and consultation between Government of Montenegro (GoM) and all religious communities in our country. Unfortunately, the Serbian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan of Cetinje) repeatedly refused to take part in this process, claiming that Montenegro and its legal institutions have no right to legislate on religion.
The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, which is responsible for reviewing the constitutional legislation of member states, thoroughly analyzed the draft Law, and confirmed that the provisions fully correspond and comply with the highest European criteria and standards, in addition to suggesting some amendments. Two of the Commission’s members dissented – the representative of Bosnia, from Banja Luka, abstained, and the representative of Serbia voted against.
The Government and Parliament of Montenegro adopted all the non-binding expert suggestions, with one exception – obligatory religious education in schools, inappropriate for our country’s multicultural and multi religious traditions. The goal was to replace the previous out-dated and inappropriate Tito-era regulations, in order to provide for equal legal status for all religious communities and for their members and followers (Orthodox Christian, Muslim, Catholic, Jewish and others), as well as for non-religious people.
In response, the Serbian Orthodox Church, both in Montenegro as well as its leadership and clergy in Serbia, has started a destructive political campaign, fully backed by the most radical national-chauvinist political parties, media and “intellectual” circles in both countries. That campaign has all the characteristics and narrative that dominated political and public life in ex-Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s and which promoted, provoked and, afterwards, tried to justify the tragic Yugoslav wars and to minimize or deny the crimes and atrocities committed.
The core of the dispute with Serbian church is related to three articles of the Law, which stipulate that all the property which was for centuries Montenegrin state property – and especially prior to 1918, when Montenegro was brutally, illegally and unconstitutionally annexed by Serbia – shall be re-registered as state property of Montenegro. Full legal procedure and protection are provided for, including the possibility to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
No other religious community in Montenegro had any substantial objection or opposition to the Law; they fully support equal and balanced treatment for all.
The Law also requires mandatory registration of religious communities with the Montenegrin authorities, a formality that the Serbian church repeatedly and vehemently rejects, claiming that the Serbian church in Montenegro cannot be subjected to Montenegrin law. The Serbian church is duly registered in all other countries, including Serbia itself, their numerous European dioceses, and those in the US, as well as in Argentina and in Australia, without any objection. In addition, the Serbian church does not want to pay taxes for its diversified and growing business activities in Montenegro.
For almost two months prior to coronavirus shutdown, the Serbian church organized so-called religious processions, with participation of clergy from other countries.
Montenegro remains fully committed, as a member of NATO and as an aspirant for EU membership, to continuing its democratic and overall development, based on its historic traditions and values. Our positive and successful policies in recent history, including the preparation and organization of the peaceful and democratic referendum on independence in May 2006, were based on our functioning multi-ethnic and multi-religious governments. This was true throughout the Yugoslav wars.
These are the values and principles we shall defend, maintain and further promote. We are absolutely committed and ready to resolve any issue related to the implementation of the new Law on Religious Freedoms though negotiations and with mutual respect and correctness, fully protecting and securing the secular nature of Montenegrin state structures and on the basis of our multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious society.
Just before the global breakout of the virus, the GoM and the Metropolitan of Cetinje agreed to start negotiations concerning the new law. The position of the Church is that three articles related to property issues should be abolished. The position of GoM is that only the implementation of the Law should be discussed. That deadlock was temporarily put aside. Post-virus Montenegro will have to return to these issues.
*Montenegrin ambassador to the Holy See and a former foreign minister of Montenegro, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the official Montenegrin positions.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Slower can be better
Drilon S. Gashi* writes:
It does not look like my call for a pause and reset will be heeded in Kosovo. President Thaci, US Special Envoy Richard Grenell, and the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) look intent on moving ahead to replace Albin Kurti as prime minister. That would mean the formation of a new coalition agreement, removal of reciprocity on Serbian goods, and a sprint towards a hazily understood, Kosovo-Serbia “normalization” agreement.
The deal likely encompasses a land swap, extraterritoriality for Serb Orthodox Churches, and possibly a supra-institutional status for an Association of Serb Municipalities. It is unlikely to include UN membership or even Serbian recognition. Any combination of these components would mean a bad deal for Kosovo but a good one for Serbia. A new, even-handed deal based on economic cooperation and joint EU accession could be mutually beneficial.
False paradigm
For years, Kosovo has pursued a false paradigm: additional concessions to Serbia may further Kosovo’s international subjectivity and possibly even achieve UN membership. The truth is Kosovo’s international fate relies more on it reforming its own institutions and democracy, prospering economically, strengthening its military, garnering new recognitions of its independence, and convincing Russia and China to accept its existence. Some of these it can achieve on its own. For others, it will surely continue to need EU and US support.
It will also require greater competence and activism in Kosovo’s institutions and among its political parties, whose negotiating positions on normalization with Belgrade are consistently weakening. Yet this is the same Kosovo that achieved the 2010 ICJ verdict concluding “the declaration of independence of the 17th of February 2008 did not violate general international law.” So, Kosovo can do better.
Serbia continues to pursue a long game in which it strips away Kosovo’s gains since independence in 2008. A land swap deal would be a coup for Serbia, and a means to continue undermining Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade’s goal is to further isolate Kosovo and assure it remains far from universal recognition. Serbia has plastered posters all across Belgrade thanking President Xi Jinping for his COVID-19 support. It should be no surprise to learn Serbia seeks China’s support to make Kosovo further resemble Taiwan.
The “normalization” process should lead to mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia, border demarcation along their internationally recognized borders, and an exchange of Ambassadors. It is not moving in that direction. In fact, this normalization process “abnormalizes” Kosovo.
New government? The Constitution’s call
The Kosovo Constitutional Court has in the past struck down a Kosovo-Serbia agreement that contravened Kosovo’s Constitution. The Constitutional Court should step in again, but this time to settle the matter of how Kosovo should determine its new government.
Kosovo is currently in a constitutional crisis. President Thaci believes the LDK, the second place party in the October 2019 elections, should try its turn at forming a government. Vetevendosje (VV), the election winner, believes the recent vote of no confidence should lead to the President disbanding the parliament and calling post-COVID elections. VV believes it should not have to respond to requests to form a government based on the October 2019 election.
LDK now plans to circumvent VV, as well as its own Parliament Speaker—and previous candidate for Prime Minister—Vjosa Osmani, in forming a government. There’s a struggle inside the LDK between its old guard, and a new guard led by Osmani. The new guard brought in a significant portion of the LDK vote last election. But the old guard has remained in charge. It’s actions may also be circumventing the Constitution.
Acting Prime Minister Kurti and Speaker Osmani are popular. Their success in the recent election brought hope to Kosovo. They are well-educated, relatively young politicians, and committed to good governance and economic development. Kosovo’s voters have too often been let down by their establishment parties. And now the country faces a potential government of the losers of the last election.
Moves to replace a popular government managing the pandemic may lead to alarm and protest. While extraordinary in times of a pandemic, thousands gathered in Israel recently to protest government corruption. Nobody wants that for Kosovo. There’s still time for a constitutional solution, or a compromise unity government, instead of a contentious government.
Hope for a new deal
A rushed Kosovo-Serbia deal led by an unpopular—and potentially unconstitutional—Kosovo government, during a pandemic, spells trouble. What both sides need, and EU and US mediators should support, is a new deal for a sustainable peace. One that does not detract from Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity, but rather is based on a formula for Kosovo and Serbia to accept one another as independent countries.
This deal could focus on economic and trade cooperation, significant EU support, and joint EU accession. A new trade deal could help settle disagreements over tariff and non-tariff barriers. The Serbian and Kosovo Chambers of Commerce have a working relationship. As recently as two years ago Serbian business associations took part in a Prishtina trade fair, emphasizing they’re creating jobs, products, and making a profit with their Kosovar counterparts. Together, they can work to solve their mutual long lists of trade grievances. The US administration, Richard Grenell and Matt Palmer, have been right to focus here and can work to show real progress.
For its part, the EU, and Special Envoy Lajcak, can prove to the sides, and others, that EU accession is still a powerful tool for progress. Whether it be through achieving multi-country infrastructure projects, joint legislative and rule of law reform, joint economic sector reform, or greater linkages for both sides to EU markets. The EU can also do a great deal by conditioning EU accession for both countries as part of the same process, with them simultaneously acceding. That way, it does not import problematic relations, but improves those relations, and encourages the accession of the countries as new EU partners.
The EU and US have all the carrots and sticks needed to put this process back on track. Fast-forwarding now to an unpopular deal will do much more harm than good, lead to failure for Kosovo, and ultimately for all. A new deal where both sides are winners, is not only better, it can last.
*Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He has spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
A really bad deal
Kosovo caretaker Prime Minister Kurti in a Zoom press conference this morning confirmed a lot of suspicions:
- The United States, in particular Special Envoy and Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell, has played an important role in unseating Kurti, who has been defeated in a confidence vote the US welcomed.
- Grenell has opposed Kurti’s efforts to get reciprocity for Kosovo and instead insists on unilateral and complete abolition of the tariffs Kurti’s predecessor imposed on Serbian goods, without any quid pro quo from Serbia.
- The dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade should be held under the auspices of both the EU and the US, not one or the other but both acting together.
- Kurti said he was not invited to such a dialogue but only to an opportunity to sign up for the land (and people) swap Presidents Vucic and Thaci have been discussing.
- It would send three majority-Serb municipalities (but not North Mitrovica) to Serbia and provide for both extraterritoriality for Serbian sites south of the Ibar river as well as a Serb Association of Municipalities, with only part of the majority-Albanian Serbian municipality of Presevo in return.
- Kosovo would not even get Serbian recognition, but rather a kind of acceptance of the status quo, like West and East Germany.
- NATO would still protect Kosovo’s main water supply, Gazivoda.
- Kurti believes Thaci is doing this to protect himself from indictment by the Special Tribunal in The Hague but does not see how such a deal could be approved in Kosovo’s parliament, much less by the electorate.
Albin is proving strikingly popular in recent polling, not least due to his insistence on reciprocity with Serbia and his opposition to his President’s land/people swap plans. He made it clear in his remarks that he anticipates instability if he is removed from office (and implied he wouldn’t do anything to discourage it). What he wants is early elections, which he anticipates winning, perhaps even with an absolute majority in parliament.
This is all happening in the midst of the corona virus epidemic, which remains a big challenge for a poor country that has a weak health care system and has lost many medical personnel to emigration. For now, a new election is out of the question. More likely is that President Thaci will find an alternative majority in parliament that will name a new prime minister and grant him the emergency powers he has sought. They will be used not only to fight Covid-19 but also to try to proceed with the land swap deal, under pressure from the Americans to give President Trump something he can boast about during the US election campaign.
This is an ugly situation, with much wider implications in the Balkans and beyond. The land swap would validate an ethno-territorial concept Moscow has pursued not only in the Balkans, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Russian President Putin would enjoy the consequences no end, a result the ethno-nationalist Trump Administration would welcome.
Ironically, President Vucic may right now be the biggest obstacle to a quick deal. He has made it clear he will not proceed until after the Serbian elections, which have been postponed from April due to Covid-19. That said, the kind of deal Kurti outlined today should be more than satisfactory to Belgrade, which is required to do little but give up part of a municipality whose population it finds troublesome. By the same token, it is hard to fathom how anyone in Pristina would even consider it.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Pause and reset
Drilon Gashi writes:
Stops and starts have riddled the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. Right now, the US Administration is showing great interest and the European Union has renewed its commitment, but Washington and Brussels disagree on the content, leadership, and approach of the talks. There is also disagreement among Kosovo’s leaders. Ironically, the otherwise devastating coronavirus pandemic may offer just the pause and reset opportunity all the parties need.
A Brief History
Having started out as an EU initiative in 2011, the dialogue has had mixed results. There were early positive signals that EU mediation helped overcome a previous zero-sum logic, and that conditionality tied to EU accession would bring the sides closer. However, many of the 23 agreements achieved as of 2018 have only been partially implemented. Presidential talks in the past few years between Kosovo’s Hashim Thaci and Serbia’s Alexander Vucic have added the wrinkle of “border correction,” a euphemism for a land swap. While statements from the presidents are contradictory, they have discussed some sort of territorial swap, with Kosovo ceding part of its north to Serbia, which would cede a lesser par of its southwest to Kosovo.
The Debate on the Deal’s Content
The land swap has become contentious.
First the con: such ethno-national solutions often produce more problems than they solve and may embolden others in the region, namely Republika Srpska, to separate from Bosnia or join Serbia. A departure from the Ahtisaari Plan—the internationally sponsored agreement endorsing Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity—could bring Kosovo’s independence into question, rather than help make it a universally accepted fact.
Second the pro: former US diplomat James Hooper argues that Kosovo will not be able to “fulfill its maximalist stance.” He claims that all solutions to conflict include “territorial components,” so Kosovo should be prepared to accept one that provides full normalization, including Serbian recognition and security guarantees, an end to the conflict, admission to the UN, and advancement in EU and NATO integration.
Kosovo gets little
Little of what Hooper suggests is proximate or achievable.
Serbia continues to refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence and actively campaigns against it. It interprets the dialogue as a negotiation over Kosovo’s status, rather than normalizing relations. It has never said it would recognize Kosovo, but rather that it may accept its existence. That’s not normalization but a continuation of the status quo.
Kosovo cannot alone balance the military threat Serbia poses and thus it relies on the presence of US and European troops as part of the NATO-led forces in the country. The troop presence and the promise of NATO membership are firmer security guarantees than anything Belgrade will be willing to offer.
Serbia does not control Kosovo’s admission to the UN. The five veto-wielding members of the Security Council do. Two of them, Russia and China, have not warmed to Kosovo’s independence, and thus it is not clear how Serbian recognition—without Russia’s or China’s endorsement—will lead to Kosovo’s UN membership.
Serbia says it aims for a “face-saving compromise,” in which both it and Kosovo give something up. However, a primary Serb concern—the rights of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo’s Serbian Orthodox Church—is already enshrined in Kosovo’s constitution and laws. Serbia seeks more: extraterritoriality for both Kosovo’s Serbs and Serb Orthodox Churches. That is not compromise.
It is not clear what Kosovo gains in a land swap of this sort.
A Reset and New Momentum
Besides the content of the deal, there are other challenges. The EU has appointed a Special Envoy on Kosovo-Serbia normalization, Slovakian diplomat Miroslav Lajcak. The US also has its own Special Envoy on the talks, Richard Grenell, who is also Acting Director of US National Intelligence and Ambassador to Germany. It is not clear who is in charge. Past EU-US cooperation has been key to lasting progress in the region, but for now it is lacking.
Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti currently leads a caretaker government. He is a rival of President Hashim Thaci. The two rarely see eye-to-eye, especially on the talks with Serbia. Kosovo needs a new, fully empowered, government before it can re-engage in normalization with Serbia. The Constitutional Court and Assembly have both determined the government, not the President, should lead talks with Serbia.
The Constitutional Court may also need to decide whether a new government should be chosen through new elections or a new coalition agreement based on the October 2019 election. Kurti wants new elections, since his party’s popularity has grown. That would enable him to avoid a deal neither he nor the general public is privy to. Thaci prefers a new government based on the current parliament, which he hopes will back the kind of deal he wants.
Kosovo needs time to reconcile its government and president and to achieve the unity needed for normalization with Serbia. The EU and US need time to strengthen their collaboration. Serbia needs time not only to conduct its elections delayed due to the Covid-19, but also to come to terms with the need to acknowledge Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The corona virus provides the pause and reset everyone needs.
Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He has spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.
RSS - Posts
