Tag: European Union
A vote for change
Kosovo voted for a new parliament today. The results are striking: the two parties that formed most of the majority in the last parliament came in third and fourth. Two opposition parties came in first and second. The PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo), which has been in government since independence, has declared it will go into opposition. The electoral mechanism seems to have functioned well, but official assessments won’t be available for a couple of days.
The leaders were the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo), which led the non-violent protest movement before the 1999 war and has participated in government coalitions in the past, and VV (Self-Determination), which is a post-war movement that has never been in the government. At this writing, VV is claiming to have won. The cautious and moderate Isa Mustafa, a former prime minister, leads the LDK. The sometimes unruly and charismatic Albin Kurti leads VV. Many have thought they might govern together in the next coalition, but that was before they won virtually equal shares of yesterday’s vote. There are now presumably other arithmetic possibilities, so an intense negotiation is likely, taking weeks if not months unless the LDK and VV agree quickly on a prime minister and a government program.
Yesterday’s result was foreshadowed in National Democratic Institute polling from March, which concluded:
The research shows that citizens desire reforms that will foster social cohesion, economic opportunity, and the rule of law. Tackling corruption cuts across all of these areas and remains at the forefront of citizen priorities. On dialogue with Serbia to normalize post-war relations, citizens seek greater transparency and are not in favor of border changes to bring about a resolution. Generally, citizens seek greater efforts of political leaders to foster consensus to bring policy changes that will improve their lives.
The citizens wanted change and voted for it. Those who think the US and Europe are determined to maintain “stabilocracy” take note: Washington and Brussels will not be unhappy to see alternation in power.
The governing challenge will be a big one. Complaints about corruption in Kosovo in my experience focus on two levels:
- Grand corruption by political leaders and their families, who are known to control assets far larger than their salaries can have provided;
- More or less petty corruption via nepotism, especially in hiring for government positions.
I hope the new government, whoever enters it, will launch a major effort to document and prosecute grand corruption. Nepotism is going to be harder: Kosovo is a society in which extended family ties are still strong. Hiring your cousin is a familial obligation that many see as corrup only when others do it.
The dialogue with Serbia will be another priority, as both Brussels and Washington are pressing for complete normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade. But they are pressing for different solutions: Washington is looking for a land swap that its newly appointed Special Envoy will no doubt press; Brussels is looking for a solution that maintains Kosovo’s territorial integrity even if it compromises its sovereignty over Serb communities. This kind of split between the EU and the US is not a good omen.
Nor is the impending Serbian election, due by April next year. President Vucic is a skilled manipulator of Western thinking, even if he has presided over a years-long slide of Serbia in Russia’s direction. He will argue that Serbia has to “get something” in the negotiations with Kosovo because he needs a parliament that will have to ratify the outcome. In order to get a good deal, Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad one, but that will be difficult if Brussels and Washington decide to back it.
One unfortunate wrinkle in the election results: over 90% of Serbs voted for a list controlled by Belgrade. Vucic regards this as a triumph. I regard it as betraying the unfortunate autocratic control Belgrade exercises among the Serbs of Kosovo. Maybe it is also evidence that Serbia can agree to just about anything on Kosovo without Vucic getting something.
Any government that wants to please the citizens of Kosovo will want to deliver economic results. Kosovo has not done all that badly in recent years:
That’s 2000 on the lower left and 2018 on the upper right. The World Bank appropriately puts this performance in perspective:
Kosovo is a lower-middle-income country which has experienced solid economic growth over the last decade. Kosovo is one of only four countries in Europe to experience growth in every year since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008.
Like it or not, Kosovo’s economy is heavily dependent on the Balkans region, which in turn is heavily dependent on Europe. Growth at higher rates than in the recent past (about 4%) will require that the EU grow faster, but the next Kosovo government would do well to prepare for that day by increasing transparency and reducing grand corruption. That’s what change should mean on the economic front.
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One more failure
I’d like to revise my judgment yesterday that the appointment of Richard Grenell as Special Presidential Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Peace Negotiations is bizarre. It is likely worse than that, possibly even tragic. I hasten to add that I have not talked with the White House about it. There is no point: they lie too much for me to rely on anything they say.
A few things are nevertheless clear. Grenell is a John Bolton protege and far right advocate who has gone out of his way to offend his German hosts. If you wanted to make common cause with Europe in the Balkans, Grenell is the last American you would choose for the task. The Germans have made it clear they will not accept land swaps in the Balkans. Bolton was an advocate of land swaps between Kosovo and Serbia. The logic was compelling for an ethnic nationalist: Serbs want to be governed by Serbs and Albanians by Albanians. Anything else is too hard. Equal rights is liberal democratic clap trap, at home and abroad.
In addition, land swaps would kill two Clinton accomplishments with one blow: Kosovo will become the eastern province of Albania, sooner or later, and Bosnia and Herzegovina will be partitioned. Don’t worry about how many people will be displaced or die in the process, or even the radicalization of the Bosnian Muslims if they are forced into a rump Islamic Republic. Serbia will be so delighted to gain northern Kosovo as well as Republika Srpska that it will love the Americans again. It might even be possible to cut a deal with the Russians to recognize the annexation of Crimea in exchange for UN membership for rump Kosovo, which won’t matter for long as it will join Albania in due course. That is the kind of crude ethnonationalist logic the Administration is applying elsewhere, in particular to Israel and Palestine. Why not in the Balkans?
What does this mean for the good people of Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia? Pandora’s box will be opened with the border changes:
- Serbs will leave from south of the Ibar in Kosovo,
- Albanians will be pushed out of Serbia,
- Muslims will try to seize Brcko in Bosnia to prevent partition there,
- Bosnian Croats will declare the re-creation of their Herzeg-Bosna parastate.
In short, this is a formula for destabilization of the Balkans, precisely what the Russians have sought. Is it any wonder that the Trump Administration might try to deliver it?
Ironically, Secretary of State Pompeo* has been visiting Macedonia and Montenegro, the two newest members of NATO. He’ll get an earful there about the dangers that lurk in any land swap arrangement. Montenegro, because it has been governed for many years with the support of minorities, is not so much in danger, though quite a few of its Albanians might like to join Kosovo and most of its Serbs remain opposed to its independence. Macedonia is certainly at risk if some sort of land swap becomes a reality, even if many Albanians there will be reluctant to lose their sweet power-sharing arrangement in Skopje.
You might think the Trump Administration has enough trouble of its own making in the Middle East, Ukraine, North Korea, China, Venezuela and half a dozen other places, without reviving the zombie idea of land swaps in the Balkans. But they seem determined, with Grenell’s appointment, to add the Balkans to the list of their foreign policy failures.
*The original post said it was Vice President Pence. Apologies for my mistake.
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Bizarre
I got into the office this morning to find this in my email:
President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Appoint Individual to a Key Administration Post
President Donald J. Trump today announced his intent to appoint the following individual to a key position in his Administration:
Richard Grenell of California to serve concurrently as Special Presidential Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Peace Negotiations and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Federal Republic of Germany.
That, plus multiple requests to comment from outlets that broadcast in the Balkans.
So I’ll try to do that here: it’s bizarre. I had assumed that the recent appointment of Matt Palmer as Special Representative for the Balkans, if it did anything, ensured that no one else would get the job of resolving the remaining issues between Kosovo and Serbia as well as within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now the Administration has chosen to name in addition a controversial political figure who has managed to deeply offend Berlin, one of America’s most important allies, to handle the sensitive issues in the Belgrade/Pristina talks.
What does that signify?
To me, it communicates confusion and disorder in US policy, not the clarity of purpose and desire to cooperate with the European Union that is required. What might the relationship between Palmer and Grenell be? I don’t know. Political appointee Grenell clearly outranks professional diplomat Palmer because he has an ambassadorial title (never mind he is presumably closer to the White House), but if one has the Balkans and the other has the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue, the logical chain of command would be the opposite.
In short: this is an appointment likely to cause even more uncertainty about US policy than already prevails. I suggest the press try to get Palmer and Grenell to clarify. Not me.
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No rush
Pristina’s Gazeta Express (Besnik Velija) asked me questions today. I replied:
Q: How do you see the decision of State Secretary to appoint Matt Palmer as a Special Envoy for Western Balkan and for the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I suppose it signals one more push to settle things, especially between Pristina and Belgrad.
Q: What are your expectations from Matt Palmer, as a Special Envoy ?
A: Matt is a good soul, but I’m not sure he brings the full weight of the United States to the table: military, economic, and political as well as diplomatic. We’ll have to wait and see.
Q: There is reporting saying that US wants a solution until next summer. Do you see latest moves from the US, as a hurry for reaching a final solution between Prishtina and Belgrade? If yes, can that be good for the whole process?
A: Yes, the Americans are in a hurry, but that doesn’t mean Pristina should be. First it needs to hold a good election and form a government that can take a widely supported position to the dialogue. Serbian parliamentary elections are due by April 2020, which means any negotiation this winter will include enormous pressure from Europe and the US for an agreement that President Vucic can sell as a victory to his electorate. I think Pristina should not be expected to negotiate during the pre-electoral period in Serbia.
Q: There was also a declaration from Bundestag member, Peter Beyer, that even EU should appoint a Special Envoy for Western Balkan and for Kosovo and Serbia dialogue. Do you see these moves as an effort to show who leads the European policy?
A: Once the Americans appointed a Special Envoy I suppose it was inevitable that Europe would want one too. I’d prefer that both the US and EU get a common policy before appointing special envoys, but that is not the way it is proceeding.
Q: Who should be the main mediator on dialogue, Brussels or Washington, or both? What about ideas to involve Russia? (ex US ambassador at Belgrade, Cameron Munter said that Russian Ambassador at Belgrade, Alexander Bocan-Harchenko, is an expert and he could help on the dialogue process).
A: Brussels has most of the leverage, but Washington support is vital, especially in pressuring Pristina. I don’t think the Russians will be helpful to the mediation in any way. Moscow favors Belgrade and does not want to see a solution that would allow Kosovo to proceed to NATO membership. It will also want a high price for UN membership: likely US acceptance of the annexation of Crimea and perhaps recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That will not help the negotiations.
Q: Senator Chris Murphy on a personal statement about the last visit in Kosovo, when he describe meeting with Kosovo politicians, said that they told on meeting at US embassy that they don’t know who to listen to, EU or USA , about the dialogue issue: “The leaders tell us that these days, the United States and Europe come to Pristina and give them different advice on how to break the impasse — they don’t know who to listen to. More fallout from the disastrous Trump foreign policy.”
A: Nothing good happens in the Balkans until Brussels and Washington speak in unison.
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Iran options
As the complexity of the attack on Saudi oil facilities becomes apparent, the odds that it was state-sponsored go up. Iran is the prime suspect. So if convincing evidence is provided, what would an appropriate response be? Here are some options:
- Military
An attack on Iranian oil-producing facilities would be the obvious, proportional response. But Iran already is unable to export all the oil is producing, so the immediate additional damage to Tehran’s finances would be minimal. A US attack would increase the price for what oil it is able to sell, helping Iran’s finances rather than hurting them while alienating oil importing countries.
The US could skip the niceities and proceed directly to an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. That would give Iran an incentive to move as quickly as possible to build a nuclear weapon, requiring repeated American attacks to prevent the crash program from achieving success. In the meanwhile, Iran would certainly retaliate against US assets in the Middle East and perhaps also in the US, where Hizbollah is thought to maintain a network of sleeper cells. Iran would also retaliate against Israel, perhaps using the same sophisticated cruise missiles used against the Saudi oil facilities.
Neither of these options is appealing. There are others: the US could attack, overtly or covertly, Iranians in Syria or Iranian proxies in many countries, it could mount a massive cyber attack, and it could combine those options with the above. All these lead in the direction of long-term instability in the Middle East.
2. Diplomatic
The US could take its evidence of Iranian origins of the attack to the Security Council to seek a condemnation of Iran and renewed multilateral sanctions. The condemnation Washington should be able to get if the evidence is good. But neither the Russians nor the Chinese are likely to go along with multilateral sanctions in the absence of a US move back to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka nuclear deal) and loosening of American unilateral sanctions.
President Trump, while begging for Iran to come back to the negotiating table, has been unwilling to loosen or suspend unilateral sanctions that are causing serious damage to the Iranian economy. Doing so would be a major concession. We know how he would feel about that. If ever Iran is to get weakening of the sanctions, it will need to provide Trump with a TV moment, which the Supreme Leader has been loathe to do.
3. Political
Washington could resort to regime change efforts, likely clandestine, to try to collapse the Islamic Republic from within. This would entail extensive efforts to promote alternatives other than the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the exile group that John Bolton and Rudy Giuliani favor. The MEK is entirely lacking in support inside Iran. In addition to padding Bolton and Giuliani’s bank accounts, it may be useful for economic sabotage and assassinations but does not have the traction with the Iranian people (not least due to its terrorist history) that would be required to topple the Supreme Leader.
The US could also promote minority political movements within Iran willing to challenge Tehran’s authority. There are Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, and others who would be useful in such an effort. A bare majority of Iranians are Persians. But ethnic civil war risks causing even more instability in the region than currently exists, which is saying something.
4. Economic
There are basically two ways to go on sanctions: tighten up the unilateral ones, or loosen them in an effort to get others to impose multilateral sanctions. Iran is feeling the pain of unilateral sanctions, but their response is clear: escalate to cause damage to the world economy so long as Iran is suffering. I suppose it is possible they will throw in the towel one day, but there is no telling when that day might come.
Getting others to go along with multilateral sanctions will be a hard sell for an Administration that pulled the plug on the JCPOA, which the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and others liked. While it is conceivable that if they are convinced the attacks were Iranian that they would go along with multilateral sanctions without the US back in the JCPOA, it isn’t likely.
Bottom line: If the US wants multilateral sanctions, which look like the best option, and return of Iran to the negotiating table, President Trump is going to have to swallow a bitter pill: get the US back into the JCPOA. Otherwise, we can expect continued escalation from the Iranians. Better to reverse course now rather than after the next round of attacks. But it is unlikely Trump will do that.
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The tide is turning
I hope I’m right: the tide is turning. President Trump, Prime Minister Johnson, President Putin, and President Erdogan are all being taken out to sea. I won’t miss any that drown in the polluted waters they have created.
- Donald Trump
He has had a terrible summer on many fronts, not just his prediction that Hurricane Dorian would make a beeline for Alabama. The G7 treated him like a pariah. The North Koreans continue to launch missiles. The Iranians are amping up their enrichment of uranium. He has suspended the Afghanistan negotiations he hoped would allow a drawdown of American troops and canceled primaries in states where he feared facing an opponent. He is misappropriating money from the military to build a border wall that won’t prevent most illegal immigration. The economy is slowing and the deficit is ballooning. China is still absorbing trade war blows without yielding at the negotiating table.
2. Boris Johnson
It is hard to recount all of the new prime minister’s comeuppances in the past few weeks (his mandate began only on July 24!), but suffice it to say he has lost his majority in parliament (including his brother), lost his bid for a very snap election, and lost the legal means of crashing the UK out of the the European Union while suspending parliament in a way that has generated widespread protest. None of this seems to phase him or his supporters, but I think there is a pretty good chance his party will do poorly in the election when it happens sometime in the next couple of months. Only Labour’s weak leadership is helping the Conservatives at this point. It is now completely unclear whether or when the UK will exit the EU.
3. Vladimir Putin
His losses in the Moscow municipal election are not enormously consequential to running the city, but Putin made concerted efforts to prevent them so they matter nevertheless. The opposition is learning how to challenge him successfully, even if only symbolically so far. But as one Russian put it to me: “we love our czars until we don’t. Then we string them up.” The Russian economy and Putin’s popularity are both sinking fast, as did a Russian nuclear missile under development that Putin had boasted of.
4. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Turkey’s economy is also in big trouble, along with its president. Erdogan’s party has lost mayoral elections in both Ankara and Istanbul, even if it did well in other places. He has the Turkish Army stuck in several dicey situations inside Syria, where the Russians, the regime, and the Kurds are all taking pot shots at Turkish soldiers and their Turkoman and Arab allies while Ankara tries to force Syrians back. Erdogan has strained relations with the US and much of the rest of NATO almost to the breaking point by buying Russian air defenses. He is still campaigning ineffectually for extradition of his arch-nemesis and alleged coup-plotter Fetullah Gulen from the US but hasn’t been able to convince an American court to send him to Turkey.
All four of these leaders are wannabe autocrats who come from a common political perspective: they are ethno-nationalists who respectively seek to protect the interests of dominant ethnicities at the expense of other citizens of their countries. They have all denigrated foreigners and minorities as well as immigration and liberal democracy while trying to maintain their own dominant ethnic group in power.
But they also all govern in nominal, if illiberal, electoral democracies. We’ll have to wait a while to see how far the tide has turned. Johnson faces an early election, likely within the next few months. The US will go to the polls in November of next year. Erdogan is relatively safe, with presidential elections required only in 2023. Putin is in principle term-limited, though he may seek to change that, but in any event safe from electoral challenge until 2024. All will do their best to bias the media and the electoral systems in their favor, but I think there is a pretty good chance we’ll see the backs of all of them. The sooner the better.
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