Tag: European Union
Redemption
The British parliament yesterday refused to accept a “no deal” Brexit and instead pulled the rug out from under Prime Minister Johnson’s losing game of chicken with the EU by insisting on its prerogative of approving whatever is going to happen. It was only possible because Tory members, horrified by Johnson’s effort to “prorogue” parliament, abandoned their now fractured party, depriving Johnson of his majority.
Something analogous has happened also in Italy, where the (Northern) League’s withdrawal from a government coalition, rather than precipitating new elections and a League victory, stirred the opposition to ally with the League’s erstwhile coalition partner, the Five Star Movement. An unlikely coalition then supported continuation of the relatively “technical” prime minister originally installed with support from the League.
This is what the redemption of good sense and democratic process looks like: people so appalled by the xenophobic ethno-nationalist hogwash that passes today for “conservatism” that at least a few of those associated with it decide to go in a different direction. That was relatively easy for the Five Star Movement, which has no discernible principles other than populist appeal, but hard indeed for individual British Tories, some of whom have become independents and others of whom have joined the Liberal Democrats.
It is apparently also hard for American Republicans, who are announcing their retirements in unprecedented numbers but not joining the pro-impeachment tide that is steadily growing among the Democrats. Only a single Republican member of the House has called for impeachment. Without a few Republican senators willing to buck Donald Trump and their own party, the Democrats are stuck: they can impeach but they can’t win removal from office in the Senate. Speaker Pelosi is therefore holding back, hoping to compile all the evidence needed to win at least the Senate if not the presidency in 2020.
It is sad that Americans can expect nothing better from the Republicans in our time of need. You don’t have to look far for impeachable offenses. Any government employee who suggests that the hotel he happens to own would be a good place for a government delegation to stay would find himself ousted quickly: this is Conflict of Interest 101. But that is precisely what President Trump did for the Vice President’s visit over last weekend to Ireland, and the Vice President accepted the suggestion. This is improper and one of many “high crimes and misdmeanors,” as the Constitution puts it. But accountability will need to await a few good Republicans with the courage to abandon their now thoroughly corrupted party.
In the end though, elections should decide the fate of the Trump’s Republicans, the League, and the Johnson’s Conservatives. The Brits may be headed for the polls as early as next month. The Lib Dems are likely to do well, which won’t displease me. The Italians won’t vote until spring. Who knows what they will do with the League, which represents some of the worst racist sentiments in Italian public life. The Americans have 14 months to wait, but the economy is slowing, Trump’s defects are glaring, and the Democrats are energized. There are no guarantees, but if these three countries begin to turn against their dreadful right wings, the world will be a much safer place.
It’s not all about Washington and Brussels
Florian Bieber of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) has written an eminently sensible report on “Leadership Adrift: American Policy in the Western Balkans” based on a BiEPAG visit to Washington last spring. The subtitle really should have been “American and European Policy in the Western Balkans,” but I won’t insist too much.
The point is that neither Washington nor Brussels is approaching the Balkans with a clear concept and both are distracted by other issues, out of tune with each other, and divided at home. The results are dangerous. In both Kosovo and Bosnia there are signs of stagnation and retrogression. Even Macedonia, whose “name” problem seemed solved with the addition of “North” in front of it, is suffering a shaky moment with the arrest of its Special Prosecutor by less special prosecutors.
The “Quint” countries (that’s the US, France, UK, Germany and Italy) this month tried to unify their voices in a statement intended to restart the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue. They explicitly suggested a reasonable quid pro quo: Kosovo to suspend the tariffs it has imposed on Serbian imports and Serbia to suspend its campaign for “de-recognition” of Kosovo. This corresponds precisely to what Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj wants. It is unclear whether Serbian President Vucic, who met recently with Secretary of State Pompeo, is prepared to move in that direction.
The Quint called for urgent action. That really isn’t possible in the Serbia/Kosovo space, since the Kosovo Prime Minister has resigned in response to a summons from the Special Tribunal in The Hague. Elections are now scheduled for October 6. It would be nonsensical for anyone to expect real progress until there is a new parliament and government in Pristina. There too unity is a big issue: the next Kosovo government needs to go to Brussels with a platform for the dialogue agreed among its coalition at a minimum, and preferably by a much wider political group.
The Bosnia situation is more urgent. There no government has been formed for almost 11 months. The main issue appears to be (sorry about the pay wall) whether or not to proceed with the NATO membership process. The Serb member of the collective presidency is opposed. The Croat and Bosniak members are in favor. Fudging this is difficult, not least because the Serb member views NATO as an enemy, is in the pocket of the Russians, and is threatening to paralyze the country’s existing state institutions if he doesn’t get his way. The Croat and Bosniak have been unwilling to yield, as the people they represent regard NATO as a savior.
None of this registers on the Washington politograph. As Florian notes in his report, Washington is obsessed now with geopolitical challenges (that means jihadists as well as Moscow and Beijing, not democratization or rule of law, much less EU accession). Even in Brussels, Balkan problems are minor tremors. But the EU is worsening the situation, by making it appear that enlargement is over and maybe none of the Balkan countries will get in. That is a big mistake, one that my BiEPAG colleagues unfortunately ignore. French President Macron’s insistence on internal EU reform and nastiness about enlargement is a major factor in unsettling the Balkans.
That said, I share BiEPAG’s concern for increasing support to civil society and independent media. It is hard to see how the Balkans will climb out of the hole the region is in without new and more democratic leadership that is serious about taking advantage of whatever EU enlargement opportunities are offered. It’s not all about Brussels and Washington. Sarajevo, Pristina, and Belgrade are where the problems and most of the solutions lie.
Stevenson’s army, August 13
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes an almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, follow the instructions below:
– I’m mildly persuaded by this piece arguing that Boris Johnson’s game plan is to win an election, and that’s more important than Brexit.
– Jeffrey Lewis discusses what the failed Russian test with nuclear release might mean.
– NYT says Afghan army is in sad shape.
– Why did Trump delay Chinese tariffs today? Vox suggests retail pressures; I’d add the sinking stock market.
Or maybe these polls.
– Former Senate Leader Harry Reid calls for an end to the legislative filibuster. WRONG. WRONG. BAD!
– Interesting Dutch report on Russian cyber threats.
To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Europeanization hasn’t failed
Balkan Insight this morning published my piece taking issue with colleagues who have termed Europeanization failed in the Balkans. I don’t think it has succeeded, but it needs time, the development of political alternatives, and a Europe that makes the prospect of accession more palpable than it is today. Progress should be measured not from where the Balkans are headed, but from where the region started: in war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.
Calm in Pristina
I’ve been in Pristina all week, where yesterday Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj resigned. A Special Tribunal concerned with crimes committed after its 1998-99 war has summoned him to The Hague. It is not yet known whether he is an indictee or a witness. He has been tried twice before at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and found not guilty.
I talked with the Prime Minister Wednesday. He gave no hint of what was coming and likely didn’t know.
It’s a fraught time here. Tariffs Ramush levied on Serbian imports have stalled a European Union dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina that aimed to resolve the many issues remaining a generation after Slobodan Milosevic expelled half of Kosovo’s Albanian population but yielded after a 78-day NATO bombing campaign to UN administration of the Serbian-ruled province. Kosovo is now a parliamentary democracy–not yet recognized as sovereign by some–that requires elections within 45 days of resignation of the prime minister. The opposition, which had aimed for elections in October, is unlikely to be ready for them by the beginning of September.
Some will wonder whether the United States is behind the judicial maneuver that caused Ramush to resign. The Special Court is constituted under Kosovo law, but manned by mostly Europeans with an American chief prosecutor, one appointed by the Trump Administration. You don’t even have to be a practiced conspiracy theorist to imagine that the Americans, who were upset with Ramush’s tariffs and opposition to an ethnically based land swap deal with Belgrade, decided to get rid of him.
If so, they’ve made a big mistake. Ramush’s previous two court battles in The Hague did nothing but increase his popularity here. The tariffs and opposition to the land swap deal are popular here. Ramush’s summons to The Hague is far more likely to strengthen his political support than diminish it.
But it may well be that the court, acting on its own volition, thinks it has reason to question Ramush or even indict him. We just don’t know. Certainly Serbs and Albanians were murdered after the war; most people here think the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) of which Ramush was then a regional commander was in part responsible. I would favor holding the guilty accountable for those crimes. But it would be entirely premature to judge who.
So far, the popular reaction to Ramush’s resignation is calm. We attended the ongoing Pristina Film Festival last night, across from the Prime Minister’s office. A street basketball tournament occupied the space between the two. Families strolled happily in Mother Teresa Boulevard. Of course all that could change, but for the moment people seem more interested in enjoying the relatively cool, clear weather than worrying about what has happened to their prime minister.
Kosovo President Thaci, also a former KLA cadre, will need now to oversee the formation of some sort of caretaker government. That itself will be difficult as Ramush had a narrow margin in parliament. The election outcome is unpredictable. That’s the good news: despite political party abuses both in the campaigns and at the polling places, the press here is free by Balkan standards and elections are serious political contests. Coalition formation before and after leaves a lot uncertain about their outcome.
Elections are inherently divisive. Before it goes back to talks with Belgrade, Pristina will need more unity than it has had during Ramush’s tenure. My advice to whoever the powers will be: the only way to get a good deal is to be willing to walk away from a bad one. And the only way to make a good deal stick is to ensure that most of the citizens are convinced it is good.
Two can play
President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran is generating a “smart pressure” campaign in return. Tehran can’t limit American ability to export oil and gas or pay for imports, but it can threaten Gulf shipping, move towards enriching uranium to levels required for nuclear weapons, and convince at least some trading partners to pay for Iranian exports in ways that circumvent US sanctions. Both Europe and Iraq are planning to use “special purpose vehicles” to do just that, the latter likely with the implicit approval of the US since it desperately needs Iranian electricity this summer.
Trump is feeling the impact. He has dropped the insistence on talking about missiles and Iran’s regional behavior, but Tehran is still not yielding to his begging to re-open nuclear talks. Nor is it inclined to give Trump the kind of photo-op flattery that North Korea’s Kim Jong-un has learned gets the President to soften his stance. Maximum pressure has unified Iran’s fractious ruling elite behind a policy of defiance and disdain, tempered however with caution. While prepared to endure an American strike, and return the blow by more or less surreptitious means, Tehran knows it cannot sustain a real war against the US.
Trump can’t sustain a long war either. Another lengthy Middle Eastern war would end his chances for re-election, as Fox star Tucker Carlson has advised. Trump has done nothing to prepare popular opinion for it and would face substantial opposition in Congress, where quite a few Republicans as well as most Democrats are prepared to claim he lacks the legislative authority needed to go to war. The existing authorization to use military force (AUMF) covers only Al Qaeda and its affiliates. That has been stretched to cover the Islamic State, which did in fact emerge out of Al Qaeda’s erstwhile Iraqi affiliate. But no one serious reasonable thinks it can cover war with Iran. Trump will have to use an implicit “self-defense” authorization if he decides to strike Iran.
So the shadow-boxing continues, with the unavoidable risk of escalation. But there are serious possibilities for negotiation as well. It should be clear by now to all but the most hawkish in both Tehran and Washington that the alternative is a war from which neither capital can reasonably hope to emerge victorious. Trump may still hope for some spectacular photo-op: a visit to Tehran perhaps? But Supreme Leader Khamenei seems incapable of the kind of political acrobatics that Kim has successfully pursued to get the President of the United States to confirm his otherwise doubtful legitimacy.
A quieter, perhaps clandestine diplomacy is required: talks about talks, perhaps in Oman or Qatar. A few confidence-building measures like release of prisoners. A humanitarian gesture or two. A more or less explicit understanding about the limits of what each side is prepared to tolerate, both in political rhetoric and the use of military force. Iran will try to make it to November 2020 without going farther than that, knowing that if Trump loses a Democratic administration would want to reenter the nuclear agreement of its own free will.
That is what Trump should do as well. But he can’t without Iranian cooperation in hiding the concession under a photo-op or some sort of fig leaf revision of the agreement. So we’re stuck with a pressure campaign, which two can play.