Tag: European Union
Trump gets it right
President Trump got it right last night for once: he called off a disproportionate retaliatory attack on Iran. It would not, he said, have been proportionate, because it would have killed perhaps 150 Iranians in response to the Iranian downing of an unmanned drone, albeit a big and expensive on. The Iranians have claimed that a manned aircraft accompanied the drone but that they chose not to shoot it down. That public claim likely made it harder for the Americans to proceed, as the implied threat is clear: next time they won’t hesitate.
There is still a possibility of US retaliation. We may never know what Trump does, since retaliation might be covert. In addition, Washington can certainly down Iranian drones, which won’t be as big as the $180 million dollar behemoth Tehran targeted. But keeping things proportionate and giving the Iranians no excuse for further escalation is important. The Americans need to convince the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese that Iran is a threat to world oil supplies, not that the US is at fault for escalating a dangerous conflict unwisely.
The best opportunity to do that is this weekend’s G20 meeting in Osaka. The opportunity is mutual. The Europeans, Russians, and Chinese will also have an opportunity there to convince President Trump that if he wants Iran back at the negotiating table he’ll need to provide some relief from sanctions, at the very least. Tehran says it won’t talk with the Americans until they are back in the nuclear deal, but that is asking too much. They’ll need to settle for a gesture of some sort. After all, talking to the Americans doesn’t necessarily mean giving them anything substantial.
President Trump is capable of sudden 180 degree turns. Erratic comes naturally to him. He did it with Kim Jong-un. He can do it with President Rouhani. He’ll have to if he wants to get anything out of the Iranians, who are a lot more stalwart than he is. He is still bad-mouthing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but that is mainly because it was an Obama achievement. He could rename it and add a few bells and whistles. Then go out and sell it as brand new, the way he did the North American Free Trade Agreement.
We are still a long way from that. But last night Trump got it right. Even a stopped clock is correct twice a day. I’m glad this was the moment. Now is the time to climb down the escalatory ladder, not up.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Reenter
President Trump has driven the United States into a cul-de-sac. Withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) and re-imposition of sanctions has made it nigh on impossible for Iran to gain the economic benefits of the agreement. But rather than driving Tehran back to the negotiating table, Washington has strengthened its hardliners and given them an excuse to begin enriching uranium beyond the level permitted by the JCPOA, which they threaten to reach within the next 10 days. The Iranians may also have attacked shipping in and near the Gulf, though that is still an unverified American and British allegation.
The first law of holes applies to this situation: when you are in a hole, stop digging. Trump of course is not law-abiding, so instead he is increasing the US troop, naval, and air force presence in the Gulf. That’s simply foolish: it puts more Americans at risk. I’ll know this administration is serious about attacking Iran when it removes as much of the exposed military and civilian presence in the Gulf as possible. Much of it–including the warplanes at Al Udeid in Qatar–are within the range of Iranian missiles. They and the embassies in Muscat, Doha, Manama and likely Riyadh will need to be draw down in advance of even a limited strike.
The alternative is to reenter the JCPOA, which would have prevented Iran from developing nuclear weapons before 2025 or so and arguably thereafter. Had the US stayed in the deal and ensured that the benefits flowed to Tehran, it could now be arguing for negotiations on missiles and Iran’s regional behavior with support from Europe and perhaps even Russia.
It could also have argued for a follow-on nuclear agreement. Iran has very good reasons not to go all the way to developing nuclear weapons. Well-informed Israelis have long believed that Tehran wants to develop all the enabling technology but not build nuclear weapons or deploy them, for fear of what Israel might do if it thought Iran might do so. Even the current runup of enrichment is explicitly planned to stop before the levels needed for nuclear weapons are reached.
The only way out of America’s current cul-de-sac is to back up. Tehran has made plain that it will talk with Washington only if the US reenters the JCPOA. I imagine they might even offer some sweeteners: release of some US citizens from prison, for example, or a modicum of restraint in Yemen, where their Houthi partners are not doing brilliantly anyway. President Trump has backed up in the past with an aspiring nuclear power, when he agreed to meet Kim Jong-un in Singapore. He could do it again, with his usual triumphalist bombast about how the Iranians will be his newest best friends once they see the Trump golf courses they might acquire. The Iranians understand that the North Koreans have not yet given up anything significant in exchange for Trump’s good graces. They might hope for the same treatment.
But Tehran also might figure that Pyongyang is treated with kid gloves because it does in fact have nuclear weapons. The closer Tehran gets without triggering an Israeli reaction, the better from the point of view of the Supreme Leader. So he might just prefer that Trump continue digging his hole by putting more American military and civilian assets at risk. Iran is a country of more than 80 million people. It endured an 8-year war with Iraq, suffered enormous casualties, and continues to pride itself on “resistance.” An American air attack would strengthen Iran’s hardliners further and dismay the Europeans, Russia, and China. Why not let Trump bury himself in the hole he has dug?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Paying later will cost even more
I spent last week in Kosovo, where the presidency hosted Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright for a celebration of the country’s liberation by NATO forces 20 years ago. For the 90% of the population that is Albanian, half of whom were expelled in 1998 and 1999, the NATO deployment was a source of great joy, enabling them to return en masse. For Serbs and Roma, the moment was terrifying, as some returning Albanians sought revenge on them for Serbian President Milosevic’s depredations.
The main event last week consisted of speeches in the main square, followed by lunch in the fine Swiss Diamond Hotel and a stroll down Mother Teresa Street to dedicate a bust of former Secretary of State Albright, followed by a motorcade to a statue of former President Clinton. I skipped the Clinton statue, as it was beastly hot and sunny, and I needed to prepare for the evening’s conference on Balkans security 20 years after the NATO/Serbia war.
The Kosovars were out in force for the stroll, anxious to show their affections for the United States. American flags were at least as apparent as Kosovo flags, and chants of “USA” broke out with enthusiasm. President Clinton enjoys pressing the flesh and did it with a big smile on his face. Kosovo President Thaci got far less attention and a few boos. Secretary Albright was in good spirits I knew from a chat we had getting off the plane from Munich, but to tell the truth I rarely caught a glimpse of her short stature during the celebration due to the surrounding crowd.
The mood in Pristina these days is anxious. Talks with Belgrade have been going nowhere. European Union member countries, especially France, have been trying to slow progress towards any further enlargement in the Balkans. Montenegro is too small and too far advanced in accession negotiations to stop, I think, but the consensus needed to open accession talks with Macedonia is not solid. Albania is likely blocked for now. Europe’s hesitation darkens the mood throughout the Balkans and perhaps especially in Kosovo, where NATO and EU membership are the country’s strategic goals.
Reaching them is far off. Kosovo legislation must be compatible with EU requirements, but implementation often lags and EU responsiveness is declining. Even after fulfilling elaborate requirements, Kosovo has not been given the EU visa waiver it was promised. President Thaci and Prime Minister Haradinaj, both products of the wartime Kosovo Liberation Army, are at odds, mainly over how to approach “normalization” with Belgrade. Thaci had indicated he was ready to exchange some Serb-populated territory for Albanian-populated territory in Serbia, but that deal has evaporated under examination by critics (including me). Haradinaj opposed Thaci’s unconsummated deal and has imposed tariffs on Serbian goods imported into Kosovo, stalling the talks with Belgrade. Meanwhile, governance in Kosovo is lamentably corrupt and young people are leaving (as they are from most other countries in the Balkans).
So the celebration of NATO liberation was happy, but Kosovo is not. I was stopped in the street one night by three strangers, two brothers and a cousin, and asked to chat with them in a cafe. They lamented the current situation and tried to convince me that all Kosovo’s ills would be solved by union with Albania. They were uninterested in my questioning whether they would be happy to be governed from Tirana, whose politics are even more contentious than Pristina’s. Nor did they want to discuss my suggestion that neither Kosovo’s politicians nor Albania’s were likely to agree to move their capital. They were content with the notion that Serbs would need to move out of Kosovo if Greater Albania comes into existence.
I am not. There is no reason why, if governed fairly, Serbs and Albanians can’t both enjoy a future in Kosovo. But the current international mood–ethnic nationalism and xenophobia–piled on top of Kosovo’s history of the same is making a liberal democratic outcome there and in the rest of the Balkans less likely than at any time during the past 25 years. Europe and America need to find a way of renewing their promises or face the loss of the statebuilding projects in Kosovo as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina on which they have spent a good deal of time, money, and effort. Their collapse will certainly cost a great deal more.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
20 years on
I spoke today at a conference in Pristina commenmorating the 20th anniversary of the NATO deployment in Kosovo. These were my speaking notes, but time restriction meant I started around point 11.
I underlined in addition that solid US/EU agreement is vital to getting things done in the Balkans. It does not exist for swapping people and territory on an ethnic basis, as the Americans have said they would entertain the idea but Germany and the UK have ruled it out.
- It is a pleasure to be back in Pristina, a city I have known since it was under Serb control.
- Whatever your preoccupations today—and I know they are many—let me assure you that this is a far more lively, free, interesting, youthful, and energetic place than it was in 1998.
- The Kosovo state that exists today is a product of an amazing, unlikely, and entirely unpredictable series of events. In addition to Kosovo’s own hard work, it involved
- Albanian nonviolent and violent rebellion,
- Serbian repression,
- the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia,
- state collapse in Albania,
- NATO intervention,
- U.S. and EU support,
- Russian weakness, and
- ample international assistance and UN administration.
- Without one or another of these ingredients, it might never have occurred, and certainly not in the surprising way that it did.
- I underline this point for a reason: those who think they can predict the future of Kosovo, or of the region, are unlikely to be correct. That includes me.
- But I do think that we can hope to identify some factors that will either contribute to or detract from regional stability and sustainable peace.
- The Prespa agreement, for example, clearly improved regional stability, as it ended any prospect of partition there and opened the door to NATO membership for North Macedonia.
- I think normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade is the next important step towards sustainable peace.
- But like the Prespa agreement it needs to be done in a way that respects regional requirements, not only the desires of Belgrade and Pristina.
- This is one of many reasons why I believe all transfers of territory, except those technically required in the border demarcation process, need to be ruled out.
- Exchange of people and territory on an ethnic basis would not only demonstrate that neither Pristina nor Belgrade is able to treat all its citizens correctly. It would also destabilize Bosnia as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Only President Putin could welcome such a move.
- Land swaps would even cast doubt on the future of the Serbs south of the Ibar River and of remaining Albanians in southern Serbia.
- None of us should want to take such risks.
- So what is the alternative?
- First, Kosovars need to be patient. Pristina’s leverage will increase as Belgrade approaches EU accession. To get a good deal, you need to be able and willing to walk away from a bad one.
- But you also need to be prepared to put something on the table that Belgrade finds attractive. I’ve made several suggestions: limits on the capabilities of the Kosovo army, enhanced protection for Serb sites south of the Ibar, implementation of an Association of Serb Municipalities consistent with the Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
- You also need to get the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue restarted, because the Americans and Europeans want it and you need it.
- Here I am going to offend, in a single sentence, both your President and your Prime Minister: you need to forget about ethnic territorial division and get rid of the tariffs on Serbian goods.
- To your President I say this: Vucic cannot give you what you want in southern Serbia and you cannot give him what he wants in northern Kosovo. Neither parliament nor a referendum in either country will approve such a deal.
- To your Prime Minister I say this: the tariffs have succeeded in getting you back into the dialogue, but now you should stand on the well-crafted Platform that the political parties have generated. The tariffs have served your purpose and need at least to be suspended.
- But you should expect something in return: the EU should implement the visa waiver and the Serbs should end their campaign against Kosovo membership in international organizations. CEFTA should open a serious discussion of Kosovo’s concerns with trade barriers in Serbia.
- A mini-package of that sort could restart the dialogue on a more realistic basis, which means ending the discussion of territory but beginning the process of demarcating the border.
- A final appeal: you are going to need the Americans to cut a deal with the Russians for your UN membership, a deal that may involve serious sacrifice on the part of Washington.
- The Americans will only be ready and willing if you can carry over the incredibly friendly spirit of these two days celebrating the NATO deployment in Kosovo to the dialogue.
- That is one more reason for ending talk of ethnic division and tariffs and thereby making sure that the Americans will be ready to do whatever is necessary to ensure your UN membership.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Too big to fail or bail
On June 4 the American Enterprise Institute hosted a panel discussion titled “Europe’s Populist and Brexit Economic Challenge” moderated by Alex J. Pollock of the R Street Institute and featuring Lorenzi Forni (Prometeia Associazione), Vitor Gaspar (International Monetary Fund), Desmond Lachman (AEI) and Athanasios Orphanides (MIT). The panel discussion was centered around Italy’s rising populism and economic woes, with a short discussion about the possibility of a no-deal Brexit causing damage to the European economy.
Gaspar showed that only 24% Europeans polled believe in the political system at both the national level and at the European level, while 38% of people said neither works. Voter turnout in both national and European parliament elections is going down, while the share of votes going to populist parties has increased. The mainstream parties are losing votes. In 2019 there was almost a 50/50 split between votes for populist parties and those for establishment parties. With parliament more fragmented than ever, coalitions of at least 4 parties are needed to get a majority, which makes governing difficult. The 2014 and 2019 voter maps of Germany show virtually no change, while Italy’s map shifted solidly populist. “Support for populism in Western Europe is strongly correlated with exposure to the shocks of globalization,”Gaspar said. Europe needs risk-sharing mechanisms.
Orphanides sees Europe stuck between two competing narratives. The technocratic elite believes the EU has been an economic success in the past decade or two. Others think the prescriptions by the technocratic elite have not served the European population as a whole and have instead acted for the benefit of one or two member states. In the latter view, the mainstream parties of the past have to be kicked out of government and replaced by new parties that will serve the people better.
Orphanides believes there is some truth in both narratives, but people presenting them fail to talk directly with each other, causing tension. “Europe is not a club of equals” he said, citing mismanagement of the euro crisis as the root of many present crises such as Brexit. Elites in Brussels and Frankfurt drive the agenda and have to acknowledge what has gone wrong. “Instead,” Orphanides said, “they are still in the denial phase.”
Moving on to Italy, Orphanides declared “the fact that the euro has been a disaster should be acknowledged.” Italy is a rich country and has been running a primary surplus for twenty years, so there is no reason for the Italian economy to be doing as poorly as it is. Lachman agreed a primary surplus is necessary but said the current 1% surplus is nowhere near sufficient and has to be closer to 3-4% to have a noticeable impact.
Forni disagreed, saying Italy joined the European Union because its public finances, inflation, and debt were out of control in the 1980s. You should not take averages when looking at Italy’s economy over the past twenty years. The 2008 financial crisis and the euro crisis in 2011 were damaging. Since 2013, things have gotten better and Italy has strengthened its position.
In Forni‘s view, Italian economic performance was poor because the productive structure of Italy in 1998, built on small, family-owned businesses with limited IT capabilities, was not ready for globalization. Add an aging population and brain drain, and it is easy to see why Italy suffered economically. Italy’s current debt is sustainable given no further crises the likes of 2008 or 2011, but Lachman cautioned that the Italian debt issue has to be addressed because Italy is ten times the size of Greece and bailing it out in a crisis would be a massive undertaking. “We might find ourselves in a situation in which Italy is too big to fail, but too big to bail” Lachman said.
Forni then mentioned three things Italy needs to thrive in Europe: A debt target of 90% of GDP (Italy’s debt to GDP ratio was 132.20% in 2018), a plan of structural reforms to address issues of tax evasion and corruption, and an increase in risk-sharing at the European level. Safe assets, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), and an increase in labor mobility could help reduce and share risks.
Lachman noted he was pessimistic about Europe’s future for 4 reasons:
- Disappointing economic and political developments;
- Fundamental flaws in the euro which he doesn’t believe can be fixed;
- Major challenges in Italy and Brexit;
- The limited room for policy maneuver in Europe.
Lachman also addressed the north-south economic divide in Europe, showing that Italy’s per capita income is lower now than it was twenty years ago while Germany’s has risen. Unemployment in the southern parts of Europe remains much higher than in the north. These differences cause political resentment between the north and the south which, combined with the weakened center in EU politics and the fragmentation of parliament, make reform difficult. “The euro is fundamentally flawed,” Lachman said. “A country with low productivity like Italy cannot survive in an economic policy straitjacket with a high productivity country like Germany.” A key issue is the lack of a European fiscal union. Germany requiring a balanced budget limits its expenditures in economic downturns, while Italy’s weak banking system and unsustainable finances hold it back.
Lachman also mentioned Germany and the US trade war. “Germany has a highly export dependent economy” and cannot afford the resulting economic slowdown and falling exports. Adding a 25% tariff on German automobiles exported to the United States would be catastrophic.
On Brexit, Orphanides said a hard Brexit would be bad for the UK and the EU, but he accuses the EU of only negotiating deals that punish the UK for leaving instead of negotiating a win-win deal. To him the only light at the end of the tunnel is the possibility of stopping the clock on Brexit to keep negotiating or a second referendum. Lachman pointed out that both candidates to take over for Theresa May have talked about the UK leaving the EU on October 31 with or without a deal.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Overload
The Trump Administration has taken on a lot of foreign policy burdens:
- Replacing Venezuelan President Maduro with opposition interim President Guaido.
- Ending North Korea’s nuclear program.
- Solving the Israel/Palestine conflict.
- Getting Mexico to end transit of asylum-seekers headed for the US.
- Negotiating a trade deal with China.
- Initiating talks on nuclear, missile, and regional issues with Iran.
Right now, President Trump is in London taking on still a few more burdens: encouraging Brexit, negotiating a trade deal with whatever remains of the UK thereafter, and pushing Boris Johnson as the next Prime Minister. So far, he is failing at all these things.
That is not surprising. The US government finds it hard to do two things at once, much less six high priorities and dozens of others lower down the totem pole. It is hard even to talk about priorities when there are so many. And some interact: you can’t impose tariffs on China without weakening Beijing’s commitment to sanctions on North Korea. Nor can you get Europe to support Jared Kushner’s cockamamie Middle East peace plan while dissing the Union’s interest in maintaining the nuclear agreement with Iran.
Any serious president would be re-examining and resetting priorities, with a view to accomplishing something substantial before the November 2020 election, less than 18 months off. Trump isn’t going to do that, because he believes he can create reality by what he says rather than what he accomplishes. Today in London he said the protests were negligible and the crowds adoring. He was booed pretty much everywhere he went in public. The photos with the Queen (courtesy of @Weinsteinlaw) couldn’t be more telling:
But no doubt Trump and his loyal press will portray the state visit as a great triumph.
That however does not change the reality. Trump has bitten off far more than he can chew. American prestige almost everywhere is at a nadir. Only in countries where ethnic nationalism or autocracy or both are in vogue does Trump enjoy some support: Hungary, Poland, Brazil, the Philippines, and Israel. Making America great again is admired only by those who have similar ambitions.
Without wider international support, there is little prospect that Trump can deliver on more than one or two of his foreign policy priorities before the next election. Failure to cut back on the multiple, sometimes contradictory, efforts makes it less likely that any will succeed. The Administration is overloaded and doomed to failure.
RSS - Posts
