Tag: European Union
The bromance isn’t going well
Agon Maliqi raises three legitimate issues in response to my post welcoming Kosovo’s negotiating platform:
1) Domestic costs of prolonging this indefinitely not taken into account;
2) Can we rely on EU accession as a carrot considering EU crisis?
3) Will there be leaders with political capital to pull it off?
He concludes that waiting seems the higher risk.
I don’t agree. Of course there are domestic pressures, but the proper role of leadership is to manage those, not to cave to them. I don’t think a flag at the UN or in Belgrade is what most citizens in Kosovo are thinking about: their primary concern is jobs. When you start counting your GDP growth at 3%, you are not doing so badly, but the economy has slowed significantly:
Maybe a bit more attention to that and less to the sovereignty question is in order.
Nor is there any sign that giving up a piece of Kosovo’s territory to Serbia, which is what the President has been proposing as a short-cut to an agreement, will be accepted either by the Parliament or the citizens. Kosovo’s best negotiating strategy is to make its red lines clear–that the Platform does–and wait until Serbia is hungry enough to talk.
I understand those who doubt the future attraction of the EU, but what better choice do either Serbia or Kosovo have? Euroskepticism in my experience (which is now many decades long) is tightly correlated with the business cycle. Kosovo’s near-term goal is getting a Schengen visa waiver, this year. Ensuring that is far more important right now than signing on the dotted line with Serbia.
Once we are passed whatever the Brits are going to do to themselves, as well as the ridiculous trade war Trump has conducted with China, my guess is the recovery will resume. Everyone, including those who live in Kosovo, will cheer. No one can ever guarantee that the political door to the EU will open, even if Kosovo gets busy and qualifies in 10 years or so. But most of the benefits of EU membership accrue by qualification, not membership. The money a candidate gets during the process is also pretty good.
As for political leadership, I have been critical of President Thaci’s pursuit of a people and land swap, which would demonstrate that both Kosovo and Serbia are incapable of treating their minorities equally under the law. Thaci would do much better to sit back and wait for President Vucic to come to him, which should happen sooner rather than later if he hopes to get anything for whatever they agree. Neither is listening to me at the moment, but their bromance isn’t going well:
Are these really the political leaders who can pull off the historic compromise between Kosovo and Serbia? May be, but they are not sounding like it right now. The simple fact is that neither can get a land swap through his own parliament, never mind the referendum promised in Kosovo.
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Bravo, but Kosovo can wait
On the eve of today’s 11th anniversary of its independence, Kosovo has published its “Platform for Dialogue on a Final, Comprehensive and Legally Binding Agreement on Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia.” There are a lot of things to like in this document, including:
- A clear statement of Kosovo’s negotiating goals, which has been lacking: Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
- Re-assertion of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on the state’s entire territory and explicit rejection of any cession of part of that territory.
- Reciprocity: for Albanians in Serbia to be treated as well as Serbs in Kosovo, for war crimes committed by Serbs to be treated like war crimes committed by Albanians, including in a special tribunal.
- Refusal to create any layer of government between the central one and municipalities (read any association of Serb municipalities with governing authority or responsibility).
- Approval of the ultimate agreement in a referendum and by parliament in both Kosovo and Serbia.
- Provisions for transparency, inclusivity, and accessibility of the state negotiating team.
- Settlement of outstanding wartime issues (accounting for missing persons, return of displaced people, return of property, compensation, reparations, division of sovereign debt, etc.).
- An end to UN Security Council resolution 1244 and approval of the final agreement in the Council and the General Assembly.
- Conditioning of progress in EU accession on implementation of the final agreement.
All good. So what’s missing?
Two things:
- Clarity on how and when UN membership will occur. It may be implicit in the reference to UNSC approval of the agreement, but it will need to be explicit before the negotiations are concluded. The controlling powers are China and Russia: how will they be brought around to allow a breakaway province to enter the UN? China won’t like it because of Tibet. Russia may like it but will want a quid pro quo in Crimea and possibly also South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria.
- Any indication of what Serbia might get in the deal. It is not Pristina’s responsibility to worry about this in the first instance, but it will need to worry about it in due course. What would be helpful is for Serbia to publish a similar platform. It has never been clear what Belgrade wants from the talks with Pristina, other than convincing Washington and Brussels that Serbia is willing to talk. That itself does have value, especially as it has been done on an equal basis that implicitly acknowledges that Kosovo has a legitimate and independent governing structure (already also recognized in the April 2013 “Brussels agreement”).
Of course Belgrade has also appeared to want territory, especially the majority-Serb municipalities north of the Ibar River. The Platform however is unequivocal in seeking “recognition of Kosovo’s independence and statehood within the existing borders.”
There are outstanding issues that might have value for Serbia: the composition and capabilities of the Kosovo army, the functions (other than governing) of the not yet created Association of Serb Municipalities, and Kosovo’s assumption of its share of Yugoslavia’s debt (mentioned in the Platform). But I doubt these will be sufficient to lead to an early agreement. More likely, Serbia will not engage seriously until the failure to reach an agreement with Kosovo noticeably slows its progress toward EU accession. Then it will be too late: all the leverage in the endgame of EU accession lies with the individual member states, which have to ratify accession, not with the candidate country.
One member state has dared to say what we all have known for years but no one wanted to say out loud. At the Security Council 10 days ago Christoph Heusgen, the German representative, said bluntly in a prepared (therefore cleared in Berlin) statement:
The only way that Serbia will enter the European Union will be with a successful normalization dialogue, with the recognition of Kosovo.
Belgrade would be wise to enter a serious negotiation sooner rather than later, while it can hope to still get something in exchange for recognizing Kosovo. Now that it has made its position clear, Pristina can afford to wait, as its EU accession is much further in the future.
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The Balkan regatta
I’m not a handicapper, but it seem to me the race for EU membership in the Balkans is shifting. Serbia is often referred to as the “frontrunner,” but it no longer really is, if it ever was. Macedonia has been a laggard, but that too is no longer the case. Kosovo is having a hard time keeping up, but that is in part due to an unreceptive EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina still occupies last place.
Serbia was arguably never really in first place, but by now it has certainly yielded to Montenegro, which has opened 32 chapters of the acquis communautaire required to become an EU member (and closed 3 of the 32). Serbia has opened 16 and closed 2. But Montenegro also has an easier path to EU membership, as it lacks many of the industries that Serbia needs to make comply with EU regulations. Montenegro also has a far freer press, whereas Serbia’s is under the government’s informal but still tight control. Both countries lack the fully independent and professional judiciary that will be necessary before accession. That is the long pole in the tent throughout the Balkans.
The big difference between Montenegro and Serbia lies in foreign policy. Montenegro, already a NATO member, is fully aligned with the EU on Russia. Serbia is not: it hosts a Russian “humanitarian” base and has refused to go along with sanctions against Moscow for its annexation of Crimea. Belgrade has no intention of seeking NATO membership. Serbian President Vucic recently gave President Putin a hero’s welcome in Belgrade, complete with paid crowds bused in from the provinces.
Skopje’s resolution of its “name” dispute with Athens has thrown the door to NATO wide open. Accession for “the Republic of North Macedonia” will follow as soon as ratifications are received from the 29 other members. The name change will also re-initiate Macedonia’s stalled EU accession process. As with Serbia and Montenegro, the long pole in the tent will be an independent and professional judiciary, but North Macedonia will likely make quick progress on other chapters.
Kosovo carries several burdens that the others don’t, even though all its legislation has been required to be EU-compatible since independence. Its stalled dialogue with Serbia needs to get restarted. Only after a fully normalized relationship can it hope to open accession talks, because of opposition from the EU’s five non-recognizing members. In addition, the EU sets a particularly high bar for Kosovo. This was apparent in its postponement of a visa waiver program even after Pristina had fully met many more requirements than any other country in the Balkans. Judicial professionalism and independence will also be a serious challenge in a country where personal relations count for a lot and institutional consolidation is still limited.
Still, Bosnia brings up the rear. It has been saddled with a coordination mechanism that gives both its entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska, as well as the ten Federation cantons and the Brcko District veto power over negotiation and implementation of the acquis. This is unworkable. Only when the Sarajevo government gets full authority to negotiate and implement the acquis will Bosnia be able to make serious progress on EU accession. NATO membership for Bosnia is ruled out for now by the leadership of Republika Srpska, which shares Belgrade’s antipathy for the Alliance as well as its affection for Russia and Putin.
So here is my sense of the regatta: Montenegro>Macedonia>Serbia>Kosovo>Bosnia. Serbia has slipped a couple of places, Macedonia is gaining, Kosovo is lagging in part because the EU wants it that way, and Bosnia is bringing up the rear.
Of course there are serious questions about the condition NATO and the EU will be in when any of these countries accede. Brexit, President Trump, and ethnic nationalist populism are real drags on the liberal democratic evolution of the former Yugoslav states, where ethnic nationalist populism in the 1990s became homicidal and even genocidal. But let there be no doubt that the accession processes are still the best thing going for the Balkans: they give people and governments there purpose and hope.
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The Berlin Wall is falling in Venezuela
The Atlantic Council held a discussion on January 30 about supporting the new Venezuelan interim government (VIG) led by Juan Guaidó. The panel included Carlos Vecchio, chargé d’affairs to the United States of the interim government of Venezuela, Julio Borges, VIG representative to Lima Group, David Smolansky, former Mayor and exiled activist. They were joined by David O’Sullivan, Head of EU delegation to the US, Manuel Maria Cáceres, Paraguay ambassador to the US, Alfonso Silva, Chile Ambassador to the US, and Edward Royce, former chairman of the House International Relations Committee.
Vecchio spoke about three types of pressure to make President Maduro quit power: internal pressure by the opposition; pressure from the National Assembly, which Vecchio sees as the legitimate democratically elected institution; and pressure from the international community. The regime has always tried to play the dialogue card to get enough oxygen and to divide and manipulate the international community. But unless Maduro is gone, the sociopolitical condition will not change and constitutional transition to a stable democracy will not be possible.
Borges spoke about three intersecting factors that prevented Maduro from falling quickly: the military, oil, and Cuba. Nowhere in Latin America have these three factors ever coincided. Maduro came to power and led Venezuela to ruin, including the economy. A few generals along with Cuba are keeping hold of the country. According to Borges, two dynamics persist in Latin America: the axis of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela still play the Cold War card and the rest of the countries, who follow the post-Cold War rules of freedom and democracy. But Borges is optimistic the Berlin Wall is falling in Latin America thirty years later, opening the door to a new system of democracy, human rights, and freedom.
Exiled in Washington DC for almost eighteen months, Smolansky described Guaidó as the interim president, head of state, and commander of arm forces, promising fair and democratic elections. Almost 3.5 million migrants are the result of the current crisis, the largest in the history of Latin America. Venezuelans are fleeing to neighbors: Colombia has one million, Ecuador seven hundred thousand, Chile two hundred thousand, Brazil more than one hundred thousand, and US more than half a million. For Smolansky, the most viable way out to this crisis is by restoring democracy in the country, regaining its freedom and establishing rule of law.
O’Sullivan presented the EU’s position, which supports transition in Venezuela. The EU did not accept the May election results and decided not to attend the inauguration, preferring to back the National Assembly and interim president Guaidó in restoring democracy. Alarmed by the humanitarian crisis in the country and its implications for the region, the EU provided $66 million for humanitarian support. EU countries have allowed Maduro some time to hold democratic elections, and the member states continue to engage with each other to have one stand on the issue.
As the first country recognizing the interim government, the newly appointed ambassador of Paraguay to the US, Cáceres, stated it was the right thing to do as Venezuelan people are suffering beyond imagination. Cáceres added that upon his recent inauguration, the president of Paraguay gave a pledge to support the people of Venezuela. A few days later, Paraguay broke diplomatic relations.
Silva stressed the commitment of Chile to the freedom in Venezuela. Although losing the resolution to recognize the interim government by one vote at the Organization of American States (OAS), Silva stressed the importance of more diplomacy to convince countries in the region and elsewhere to recognize Guaidó as legitimate. Venezuela needs humanitarian aid; pressure should be brought on Maduro to allow it in.
Royce painted the humanitarian situation as dire. Maduro’s military controls the importation of food and medicine. He also brought in the Chinese ZTE cooperation to run the social credit system, which makes Venezuelans rely on a card from the government to get food, pension, medicine, and basic services. ZTE, which belongs to Chinese intelligence, tracks people who write on social media through a database, and if you are against the regime, you will end up in jail. Jails are at over capacity. Out of 83,000 people in jail, 60% do not have potable water, leading to malaria and tuberculosis outbreaks.
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Make Plan A work
I’ve had several requests from Balkan publications for my end-of-year views on the situation in the region. I’ve so far passed them up, but a few words here seem appropriate.
The Balkans are at peace and far more prosperous than they were in the early 1990s, when war ripped apart former Yugoslavia. Now European Union members, Slovenia and Croatia were then fighting for survival as Serbia tried by force to hold the Federation together, or at least hold on to territory it regarded as “Serb.” Bosnia suffered three and a half years of war, ethnic cleansing, and eventually genocide. Kosovo endured less, but only because NATO was prepared to intervene sooner. Macedonia and Montenegro mostly escaped war, but only with difficulty and international help.
Things are much better now. Per capita income is markedly higher. Ethnic nationalism barks a lot but seldom bites. No army in the Balkans is capable of sustained warfare and no public would support it. All the region’s citizens except Kosovo’s can travel visa-free throughout the European Union. All the remaining non-members of the EU have been promised an opportunity to join the EU. All have signed agreements with Brussels that provide many of the trade and financial benefits of membership, along with ample pre-accession funding.
People in the Balkans are nevertheless dissatisfied. Resurgent ethnic nationalism plagues Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Economic growth is slow, corruption is endemic, and the prospect of European Union accession distant. Big issues remain unresolved. Approval of Macedonia’s far-reaching Prespa agreement with Greece is uncertain. Kosovo and Serbia are far from normalization of their relations, despite years of negotiations. Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is increasingly dysfunctional, due to a peace settlement that is difficult to change. Complaints rather than satisfaction are dominant 25 years after the Dayton peace agreements began to bring an end to the Balkan wars of the 1990s.
I think it is wrong to be discouraged. The post-war Balkans region is uniquely advantaged. Its proximity to Europe brought it far more attention and assistance than is typical after conflict. Think of Syria, which will get precious little Western help after far more destructive wars than anyone in the Balkans suffered. Each of the Balkan countries emerged from the 1990s with the prospect of democratic, even if illiberal and imperfect, governance. Only one of the Arab Spring countries, Tunisia, comes even close to that. Except for Iraq and Israel–each imperfect and illiberal in its own way–none of the Middle East can come even close to the freedom of expression and association Balkan citizens today enjoy.
So my message, argued at length in From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Ukraine, is that Plan A is far better than any conceivable Plan B.
The path into EU and NATO for those who want it is getting steeper. But neither has closed its doors. I can well understand those in Kosovo who are discouraged because Brussels has delayed giving the country visa-free status, even though it met all the manifold requirements. But 2020, when the EU says it will be ready to proceed, is just around the corner. It would be a colossal error not to stay on track. Montenegro, already in NATO, seems to understand that and is likely to qualify next for EU membership. Serbia needs to clean up its courts and free up its media, in addition to meeting the technical requirements of the acquis communautaire and normalizing its relations with Kosovo. Skopje and Athens need to maintain their agreement, even if it faces a setback in one of their parliaments. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be the last piece of the Balkans puzzle to find its proper place, but it will do so if it focuses on making the Sarajevo government capable of negotiating and implementing the acquis.
There is nothing insoluble in the Balkans. 2019 should be devoted to making Plan A work. There is no better Plan B.
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Between past and future
I spoke yesterday in Belgrade at a conference organized by the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation on “Serbia and Kosovo Between Past and Future.” It was run under Chatham House rules, but I regard my own remarks as suitable for public consumption:
- First a word of thanks to the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation as well as the Helsinki Committee for providing this opportunity, at a particularly fraught time, for this discussion of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
- First, on their relations right now: we are going through a difficult period, largely caused I think by exaggerated expectations.
- I don’t know who told President Thaci that he could get what he wants in southern Serbia without giving up vital interests in northern Kosovo. I also don’t know who told President Vucic that he could get what he wants in northern Kosovo without giving up vital interests in southern Serbia. Each was willing to take, but not to give.
- I’m fine with that, because however apparently rational to two ethnic nationalist presidents, the exchange of territories based on the ethnic affiliation of their populations is a bad idea.
- It would be an admission by both that neither can offer equal protection of the law to all his citizens. That is the essence of what they need to do to become EU, and if they want, NATO members.
- It would also destabilize Macedonia and Bosnia, and strengthen Vladimir Putin both there and in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
- It was foolhardy for both the EU and the US to entertain the proposition of land and people swaps, which are antithetical not only to EU and NATO membership but also to the Badinter principles laid down in the early 1990s that govern the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
- Now we need to deal with the consequences of the failed swap proposition. These include Pristina’s imposition of tariffs and its decision to convert its security forces to an army, as well as Belgrade’s opposition to Kosovo’s entry into Interpol and other international organizations.
- In my view, the tariffs are a CEFTA question and need to be dealt with there. I hope its mechanisms will be sufficient both to eliminate them and fix any legitimate problems Pristina has with treatment of its exports to Serbia.
- As for the army, I find it hard to imagine how anyone thought the Kosovo Albanians would do without one after what they suffered. KFOR will not stay in Kosovo forever. Pristina needs the means to defend itself at least for a week or 10 days, so long as Serbia presents a threat.
- That it does: its prime minister has made it crystal clear that an intervention into Kosovo under the guise of protecting the Serbs there is an option. Serbia’s concerted efforts to prevent Kosovo membership in international organizations and bilateral recognitions are also hostile acts.
- NATO needs to make it clear to Belgrade that such a move would lead to a military response. At the same time, Pristina needs to make it clear that Serbs in Kosovo are not threatened. Prime Minister Haradinaj has been trying to do just that.
- But managing the immediate threat doesn’t solve the longer-term problem.
- What is needed is normalization, so that Serbia doesn’t represent a threat to Kosovo and Kosovo does not represent a threat to the Serbs who live there.
- That will require much more extensive cross-border relations than exist today, including but by no means limited to diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives.
- But, some say, what does Serbia get? How can you expect Belgrade to accept Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence without a quid pro quo?
- If Serbia is seriously concerned with the Kosovo army, it might get some concessions on its size and capabilities.
- It will get nothing if it waits to just before accession to recognize Kosovo, since then all the leverage will be with the EU members.
- Let me remind you of a page from US history: our most threatening enemy for about 100 years after independence was Great Britain, whose Canadian territory had the longest border of any country with the US.
- Today, both Canada and Great Britain are two of America’s key allies.
- But 100 years is too long to wait in the 21st century. The time to end the enmity between Kosovo and Serbia, to the advantage of both, is now. It can be done, but only on the basis of mutual recognition and respect.
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