Tag: European Union

From war to peace

Posted in Daniel Serwer - December 19, 2018 - 0 Comment

I spoke at the Media Centre in Belgrade yesterday about my recently published Palgrave MacMillan book, From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine. Here are my speaking notes for the occasion:

  1. It is a pleasure to be back in Belgrade, and a particular pleasure to give my first talk about this book here in a Media Center that witnessed so many of the pivotal events of the 1990s wars in the Balkans. Many thanks to Dusan Janjic for providing the opportunity!
  2. Many of you will remember that period: the US and Europe fumbling for years in search of peaceful solutions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo only to find themselves conducting two air wars against Serb forces, first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo.
  3. But Americans have mostly forgotten this history. Europeans too often believe there were no positive results. Here in the Balkans, many are convinced things were better under Tito.
  4. I beg to differ: the successes and failures of international intervention in the Balkans should not be forgotten or go unappreciated.
  5. That’s why I wrote my short book, which treats the origins, consequences, and aftermath of the 1995, 1999 and 2001 interventions that led to the end of the most recent Balkan wars.
  6. In my view, conflict prevention and state-building efforts thereafter have been partly successful, though challenging problems remain in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia.
  7. The book examines each of these on its own merits, as well as their prospects for entry into NATO and the EU, whose doors are in theory open to all the Balkan states.
  8. Bottom line: I believe all states that emerged from Yugoslavia as well as Albania are closer to fulfilling their Euroatlantic ambitions than they are to the wars and collapse of the 1990s.
  9. They were making decent progress when the financial crisis struck in 2007/8. The decade since then has been disappointing in many different respects:
  • Growth slowed and even halted in some places.
  • The Greek financial crisis cast a storm cloud over the EU.
  • The flow of refugees, partly through the Balkans, from the Syrian and Afghanistan wars as well as from Africa soured the mood further.
  • Brexit, a symptom of the rise of mostly right-wing, anti-European populism, has made enlargement extraordinarily difficult.
  1. The repercussions in the Balkans have been dire:
  • Bosnia’s progress halted as it slid back into ethnic nationalist infighting.
  • Macedonia’s reformist prime minister became a defiant would-be autocrat.
  • Kosovo and Serbia are stalled in the normalization process.
  • Russia has taken advantage of the situation to slow progress towards NATO and the EU.
  1. Now the question is whether the West, demoralized and divided by Donald Trump and right-wing populists, can still muster the courage to resolve the remaining problems in the Balkans and complete the process of EU and, for those who want it, NATO accession.
  1. I think Plan A is still viable. I also don’t see a Plan B that comes even close to the benefits of completing Plan A. Only three big obstacles remain.
  1. First is ending the Macedonia “name” issue. Skopje and Athens are on the verge of doing just that. New leadership was required to make it happen.
  1. For those who claim the West is prepared to tolerate corruption and state capture, I suggest a chat with Nikola Gruevski. If there is a viable liberal democratic option, the West will support it.
  1. Second is normalization between Belgrade and Pristina, the subject of the conference that will open within the hour.
  1. I’ll have more to say then, but let me say here that Serbia has already abandoned its claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo, both in the April 2013 Brussels agreement and in opening the question of partition along ethnic lines.
  1. I think that is a terrible idea, for many reasons I will outline later, but it confirms that Belgrade has no intention of ever again governing the Kosovo Albanians.
  1. The third issue that needs to be resolved in the Balkans is the dysfunctional state structure that the Americans imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina at Dayton.
  1. It has kept the peace for close to 25 years, but it needs reconfiguration to enable the Sarajevo government to negotiate and implement the acquis communautaire.
  1. These three are serious problems, but not insoluble ones. The road ahead is shorter than the road already traveled. Doubling back is a bad idea.
  1. My book proceeds after the Balkans to apply lessons learned to the Middle East and Ukraine, which also face identity-based conflicts challenging sovereignty and territorial integrity, lie close to the Balkans, and share more Ottoman history than is generally acknowledged.
  1. The lessons are these: leadership is key to starting, preventing, and ending wars; early prevention can work, with adequate resources; ethnic partition will not; international contributions can be vital; neighborhood counts; power sharing and decentralization can help.
  1. This accessible treatment of what makes war and how to make peace will appeal to both scholarly and lay readers interested in how violent international conflicts can be managed. It is available free, worldwide, courtesy of my generous employer, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. To get it, click on the book cover at www.peacefare.net
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Brexit is broken

Posted in Daniel Serwer - December 10, 2018 - 0 Comment

UK Prime Minister May today delayed a parliamentary vote to approve the allegedly temporary deal she negotiated with the European Union to allow Britain to begin to leave the Union without creating a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The contradictions should not be lost: she is trying to prevent a parliamentary vote from defeating her Brexit plan in order to ensure implementation of the referendum result without all the consequences that Brexit referendum necessarily entails.

The simple fact is that Brexit is a bad idea. It will make the UK poorer than it would otherwise be, cost billions of pounds to replace European services of many different sorts, cause international companies to relocate, and diminish the UK’s clout world wide. Popular sentiment has turned against withdrawal from the EU as the costs have become clearer. The Russian role in promoting the #leave campaign has also become clearer. President Putin set out to weaken Europe, America’s strongest ally, and has come close to succeeding. 

Meanwhile Brussels has sent a gesture of friendship: a court decision that gives the UK leeway to suspend the process and return to the status quo ante.  President Trump, as is his wont, sent the opposite signal: that the US would negotiate a quick free trade agreement with the UK once Brexit was finalized. There are no quick free trade agreements, and it is unclear how the UK could get as good a deal with the US as the EU, which has far more leverage due to its market of 500 million people, almost 10 times the population of the UK. Nothing about the Trump Administration trade negotiations with Canada and Mexico as well as China would make anyone think Britain could get a good deal quickly. 

At this point, May’s options are grim. She can try to get some concessions from the EU that will convince Brexit supporters that her “back stop” will not be permanent and then put the deal to a vote in parliament that she could still lose. Or she can opt for a new referendum on the deal she has negotiated, the options being a “no deal” Brexit, which has predictably catastrophic consequences, her still unappealing “back stop” with whatever concessions she can squeeze from the EU, and no Brexit at all.

I would prefer that “no Brexit” win in a referendum, though admittedly defeat of May in a parliamentary vote would point in the same direction. Either result would help to push back Putin’s efforts to divide the Western alliance, re-invigorate Europe, and undermine those who look to overwrought nationalism as a serious alternative to liberal democracy. President Trump is already on the ropes fighting an investigation that gets closer every day to demonstrating his criminal behavior. Brexit broken is a fitting accompaniment to Trump’s well-deserved nose dive.

For more on the “back stop”:

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The right medicine

Posted in Daniel Serwer - December 5, 2018 - 3 Comments

Serbia is threatening to intervene in Kosovo if its parliament votes to create an army. NATO is backing Belgrade.

This is ridiculous. The Alliance should be telling Belgrade to stuff it. NATO-led forces in Kosovo should be put on alert to underline the point. 

Kosovo has been without an army since the 1999 NATO intervention that saved it from Serbian President Milosevic’s efforts to reduce its Albanian population by force and its 2008 declaration of independence. NATO has provided the country’s territorial defense, though it governs itself and has been recognized as sovereign by about 110 countries. 

Pristina now wants to convert its security forces, which are only lightly armed, into an army. The US, UK and NATO have been thoroughly consulted. The process will take 10 years or more. If NATO forces are ever to be removed from Kosovo and sent on to higher priority missions, the country will have to have the means to defend itself at least for a few days. NATO should be supporting those who want to lighten its burdens, not those who threaten aggression. 

Belgrade’s agenda has nothing to do with any threat from a Kosovo army, which is non-existent, now and in the future. What Serbia is trying to do is deprive Pristina of one of the vital elements of sovereignty. It is also trying to find an excuse to intervene and occupy the Serb-majority portion of Kosovo’s north, where organized crime figures aligned with Belgrade’s ruling authorities reign supreme. 

NATO backing for these objectives is a serious mistake. So too is Europe’s refusal to give Kosovo a visa waiver program, despite its assiduous and successful efforts to meet the criteria that the European Commission set. Citing domestic political pressures, France and others are saying Kosovo will need to wait until at least 2020. While the EU has consistently lowered the bar for Serbia’s progress on its EU agenda, Brussels seems determined to raise the bar for Kosovo.

Kosovo makes its mistakes too.  The 100% tariffs it recently imposed on Serbian imports is a violation of its international obligations under the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), so far as I can tell. But that mistake will be corrected through the normal CEFTA process. The NATO and EU mistakes are far harder to correct and will leave serious scars on their relationship with an admittedly small country with no near-term prospects of accession.

But that is precisely the reason the EU and NATO should rethink what they are doing. Kosovo as much as Serbia needs Euro-Atlantic prospects if the two countries are to escape the negative spiral they are currently locked in. A visa waiver program for Kosovo, a strong NATO warning to Serbia, initiation under NATO guidance of the evolution of its security forces into an army designed mainly for international deployments, and an end to prohibitive tariffs on Serbian goods are the medicine that can cure the current fever. 

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Peace Picks November 26 – December 2

Posted in Rory Coleman - November 26, 2018 - 0 Comment
  1. How to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremists | Tuesday, November 27 | 10 am – 12 pm | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here

As the loss of ISIS territory drives thousands of “foreign terrorist fighters” to return home, and hundreds of people convicted of terrorism-related offenses are scheduled for release over the next several years, communities worldwide are faced with rehabilitating and reintegrating people disengaging from violent extremism. Often returning to the same environments and social networks that facilitated violent radicalization initially, significant psychosocial and other support will be key to addressing trauma, reducing stigma, and guarding against recidivism.

The trauma- and stigma-related barriers to help-seeking behavior, prosocial interactions, and social healing are new challenges to preventing and countering violent extremism. While there is increasing consensus on the urgency of systematic rehabilitation and reintegration programs, a realistic or concrete proposition of just what such mechanisms might look like, and how they might operate, has not been put forward. Join USIP for a discussion of how policies and programs can address trauma and reduce stigma to foster cross-cutting affiliations and social learning, enable rehabilitation, and ease reintegration for people disengaging from extremist violence.

Panelists

Jesse Morton
Founder and Co-director, Parallel Networks, and co-author of the forthcoming report, “When Terrorists Come Home: The Need for Rehabilitating and Reintegrating America’s Convicted Jihadists”

Dr. James Gordon
Founder and Executive Director, The Center for Mind-Body Medicine 

Dr. Sousan Abadian
Franklin Fellow, Office of International Religious Freedom, Department of State

Stacey Schamber
Senior Program Officer, International Civil Society Action Network

Colette Rausch, moderator
Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace

2. The Role of the Business Sector in Peacebuilding in Africa | Tuesday, November 27 | 10:30 am – 12 pm | Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here

Many traditional approaches to peacebuilding in Africa have emphasized the roles of government, civil society organizations, and multilateral international organizations over that of the private sector, specifically business. While the economic power of the business sector can help to reduce unemployment and increase economic opportunity—both key factors in conflict prevention—big business has also contributed to conflict and fragility in parts of the continent. However, there is an increasing awareness that businesses can play an important role in peacebuilding efforts, but the question of what this role is, and what it should be, needs further exploration. This event will examine the landscape of business sector efforts in conflict management and peacebuilding in Africa, including the key challenges and opportunities.

The discussion will explore the role that the business sector might play, including how to better and more effectively integrate the sector into peacebuilding frameworks and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In addition to assessing the role of international corporations, the event will also discuss the role of the African business sector—including small and medium-sized enterprises and the informal sector—in peacebuilding, address the possibility of reimagining corporate social responsibility initiatives to more effectively contribute to peace, and discuss the potential for effective private-public partnerships. The event will also provide policy-oriented options to the business sector, as well as policymakers and practitioners, to make the business sector a more effective partner for peacebuilding in Africa.

Speakers

Introduction

Moderator

Speakers

3. Europe in 2019 | Tuesday, November 27 | 2 pm – 3:30 pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

A multitude of challenges confront the EU in 2019. The Brexit deadline at the end of March, uncertainty over Italy’s economic situation, and the forthcoming European Parliament elections in May are key determinants shaping the direction of the European project. On top of these flashpoints, looming challenges such as the continued spread of populism and illiberalism, fragmentation of European cooperation, and a changing security landscape add further complexity. How European leaders address these developments over the course of the next year will have far-reaching consequences. Join a panel of experts to discuss the future of Europe and its wider implications. 

FEDERIGA BINDInonresident scholar in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace working on European politics, EU foreign policy, and transatlantic relations.

ERIK BRATTBERG director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He is an expert on European politics and security and transatlantic relations.

KAREN DONFRIED president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Before assuming her current role in April 2014, Donfried was the special assistant to the president and senior director for European affairs on the National Security Council at the White House.

PIERRE VIMONTsenior fellow at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on the European Neighborhood Policy, transatlantic relations, and French foreign policy.

JONATAN VSEVIOV Estonia’s ambassador to the United States since August 2018. This is his third diplomatic posting in Washington, DC.

4. Soft Power in a Sharp Power World: Countering Coercion and Information Warfare | Wednesday, November 28 | 9 am – 10 am | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here

Global adversaries, especially states like Russia, China and Iran, use sharp power tools of coercion, disinformation and proxy campaigns to achieve their geopolitical goals and weaken Western influence. This new way of doing business threatens the post-Cold War stability that fostered peace, freedom and development around the globe.

Former U.S. ambassadors Rep. Francis Rooney (R-FL) and Rep. Don Beyer (D-VA) will discuss their views on how soft power tools can and should be used to counter sharp power employed by global adversaries at USIP’s seventh Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue on Wednesday, November 28 from 9:00-10:00 a.m. Rep. Rooney is the vice chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and former U.S. ambassador to the Holy See. Rep. Beyer is the vice ranking member of the Science, Space and Technology Committee and former U.S. ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 

Speakers

Rep. Francis Rooney (R-FL)
19th Congressional District of Florida, U.S. House of Representatives
@RepRooney

Rep. Don Beyer (D-VA)
8th Congressional District of Virginia, U.S. House of Representatives
@RepDonBeyer

Nancy Lindborg, moderator 
President, U.S. Institute of Peace
@nancylindborg

5. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy | Wednesday, November 28 | 9 am | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

The Dean’s Forum has partnered with Strategic Studies to host the Commission on the National Defense Strategy’s presentation of its newly released, congressionally-mandated report. Established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the NDS Commission, co-chaired by Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead, is a panel of bipartisan national security experts appointed by Congress to review and evaluate the NDS, which Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced in January 2018 at SAIS.

The Commission’s final report offers recommendations for ensuring the U.S. maintains the strong defense the American people deserve and expect, taking into account current and prospective circumstances as well as the broader geopolitical environment. Following opening remarks from Dr. Mara Karlin, Dr. Eliot Cohen will moderate a discussion with the Commission’s co-chairs on the report’s observations and recommendations.

Keynote Speakers

Ambassador Eric Edelman

Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, appointed by Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX) to the NDS Commission

Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.)

Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished Military Fellow at the Hoover Institution, appointed by Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) to the NDS Commission

Moderator

Dr. Eliot Cohen

SAIS Vice Dean for Education and Academic Affairs and Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies

Opening Remarks

Dr. Mara Karlin

Acting Director of the Strategic Studies Program and Executive Director of The Merrill Center for Strategic Studies

6. Building Peace from the Bottom Up | Thursday, November 29 | 10 am – 11:30 am | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here

Do postwar peacebuilding interventions work to keep peace? How do we measure the effectiveness of such international interventions? Join former USIP Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow Pamina Firchow as she discusses her findings on how to measure the impact of local-level interventions on communities affected by war. 

Firchow shows in her book “Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation after War” that efforts by international organizations to implement peacebuilding interventions are often ineffective, overly focused on reconstruction, governance, and development assistance while paying significantly less attention to rebuilding local community relations.

Firchow presents empirical evidence from villages in Uganda and Colombia on local level peacebuilding effectiveness using community generated indicators that reflect how people measure their own everyday peacefulness. Firchow develops a new way of establishing accountability of international and domestic actors to local populations and opening more effective channels of communication among these groups.

Speakers

Kevin Avruch, Opening Remarks
Dean, The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

Kathleen Kuehnast, Introduction
Director, Gender Policy and Strategy, U.S. Institute of Peace

Pamina Firchow
Assistant Professor, The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

David Connolly
Director, Learning, Evaluation & Research, U.S. Institute of Peace

Roger MacGinty
Professor, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, United Kingdom

Anthony Wanis-St. John
Associate Professor, School of International Service, American University

7. China’s Power: Up for Debate | Thursday, November 29 | 8:15 am – 5 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

The challenges and opportunities presented by China’s rise are hotly contested. ChinaPower’s annual conference features leading experts from both China and the U.S. to debate core issues underpinning the nature of Chinese power.

8:15 a.m.      Opening/Greeting
Bonnie S. Glaser Director, China Power ProjectSenior Adviser for AsiaCSIS

8:30 a.m.      Morning Keynote: TBD
 
9:15 a.m.      Proposition: U.S. engagement policy toward China has failed. 
FOR: Ely Ratner Executive Vice President and Director of StudiesCenter for a New American Security (CNAS)
AGAINST: J. Stapleton Roy Former U.S. Ambassador to ChinaFounding Director Emeritus and Distinguished ScholarKissinger Institute on China and the United States, Wilson Center

10:25 a.m.    Coffee break
 
10:40 a.m.    Proposition: China is an illiberal state seeking to reshape the international system in its own image.
FOR: Pei Minxin Tom and Margot Pritzker ‘72 Professor of GovernmentGeorge R. Roberts FellowClaremont McKenna College
AGAINST:Wu Xinbo Professor and Dean, Institute of International StudiesDirector, Center for American StudiesFudan University

11:50 a.m.    Proposition: Made in China 2025 and China’s broader industrial program pose a threat to global innovation and the world economy.
FOR: Scott Kennedy Deputy Director, Freeman Chair in China StudiesCSIS
AGAINST:Mu Rongping  Director-General, Center for Innovation and DevelopmentChinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)

1:00 p.m.      Lunch
 
1:40 p.m.      Proposition: China is likely to be the leader of the coming artificial intelligence revolution.
FOR: Edward Tse Founder and CEO
Gao Feng Advisory Company
AGAINST: Samm Sacks
Cybersecurity Policy Fellow
New America

2:50 p.m.      Proposition: China has the capability to control the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.
FOR: Bryan ClarkSenior Fellow
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
AGAINST: Peter Dutton Professor and Director, China Maritime Studies InstituteU.S. Naval War College

4:00 p.m.      Coffee break
 
4:15 p.m.      Afternoon Keynote (VTC)
Admiral Philip S. Davidson 25th Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)

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Security and trade post-election

Posted in Tal Marom - November 23, 2018 - 0 Comment

The Center for Strategic and International Studies November 14 hosted two panels on the midterm elections’ implications for the trans-Atlantic agenda and trade policy. The first featured a discussion with Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) and the second a conversation between CSIS experts  Louis Lauter, Vice President for Congressional and Government Affairs, and William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair in International Business. Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and the Director of the Europe Program at CSIS, moderated.

President Trump’s current threat to leave the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty set the tone for the first discussion. Murphy framed the move as consistent with a broader agenda from the anti-institutionalists in the Administration to withdraw from multilateral organizations, with the spotlight on NATO after the President’s threatening comments last summer.

Murphy highlighted that there is a tendency in Congress to separate the President’s actions and statements from the Administration. While the President is launching rhetorical assaults against NATO, under the surface NATO cooperation continues. Many Republican colleagues have favored this approach, creating an atmosphere complacency. Murphy cautioned that the President should be taken at his word. Congress should prevent an executive withdrawal from NATO. The Senator introduced a failed bill back in July that would have required Congressional consent. There might be more interest in the Democratic-controlled House once Congress reconvenes.

Murphy warned that US foreign policy has become too sanctions dependent. There is a need to create and use alternative Congressional foreign policy instruments, a recommendation echoed by Lauter in his recent study on Congressional foreign policy preferences. The Senator recently introduced the European Energy Security and Diversification Act to finance energy infrastructure in Europe as a means to promote independence from Russia. He also pointed to the need to fund fragile democracies in the region.

Trump’s distancing the US from its NATO allies should be seen as part of a general trend towards isolationism and nationalism, in contrast to French President Macron’s vision for multilateralism and internationalism to solve global problems. Trump’s America First message still resonates with large swaths of the country, prompting Murphy to state that until we fix our domestic politics and economy, politicians will be able to sell Trump’s message in regions that have seen losses in jobs such as manufacturing.

While Reinsch pointed out that trade is low on the average voter’s motivations, Murphy underlined the connection between global institutions/alliances and the strength of the American economy and jobs. Trump’s threatening posture towards NATO does not exist in an economic vacuum. Macron has been urging Europe to become more militarily and technologically autonomous, in part by favoring European defense contractors over American ones, in response to Trump’s criticism of NATO. The steel and aluminum tariffs imposed on the EU make the situation worse.  

The political divide between skeptics and supporters of liberalized international trade rests more within parties than between them, according to Reinsch and Lauter’s recent studies. Lauter’s study of the pre-election Congress’ foreign policy preferences found that Congress was fairly internationalist, with Reinsch elaborating that trade was less a partisan issue and more a regional one. The coasts tend to be pro-trade while skeptics dominate the Midwest, as demonstrated in the mixed reactions to Trump’s tariffs on the EU.

A post-election survey of incoming Democrats looked at their public statements on the issue. Twenty-four of fifty-five surveyed said nothing about trade following the election. Twenty-one made pro-trade statements, and eight anti-trade statements. While Democrats may hold the USMCA (the NAFTA replacement) hostage for political reasons, Reinsch predicted that the new Congress will include many pro-trade representatives. It is too soon to write a general obituary for trade agreements.

China is the regional challenge that will likely continue to enjoy bipartisan support, evidenced in the reaction to the Administration’s 301 report on China. The question will be how this is handled moving forward in light of Trump’s relationship with the WTO.  While he has rejected appointments of new judges for its dispute appellate body and is willing to go beyond the WTO to achieve policy goals, Reinsch emphasized that the Europeans and Japanese want to address concerns over China within the context of the WTO.

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Midterms and foreign policy

Posted in Daniel Serwer - November 21, 2018 - 1 Comment

I gave a talk this morning at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on “The 2018 American Midterm Elections: What Do They Signify for the US and for Europe?” Here are my notes for the occasion, which I pretty much used as written:

  • It is a pleasure to be back at IAI, which has been kind enough to host my talks many times over the 25 years since I left Rome as Charge’ d’affaires ad interim of the American Embassy.
  • Let me start with some basics: the elections are “midterm” because they fall in the middle of a Presidential mandate. They are multiple, that is elections rather than election, because more than one institution is contested: all of the House of Representatives, about one-third of the Senate, and many governorships, state legislatures, and local positions.
  • They are also multiple in another sense: even elections for Federal offices in the US are run by the 50 states, not by the Federal government. While all the states elect members of the House from single-member districts with approximately the same population as well as two Senators (no matter what the population of the state), the rules governing who is eligible to vote, design of the ballot, polling procedures, opening times, counting, tabulating, and ultimately deciding the outcome vary quite a bit from state to state and even from county to county.
  • Quite a few of our states have trouble getting it all done, especially when the margins are narrow. There are still a few seats undecided.
  • Nevertheless, the general shape of the outcome is clear: Democrats have won control of the House of Representatives; Republicans have maintained control of the Senate, widening their margin by a couple of seats.
  • What does this mean for the future, especially for American foreign policy and relations with Europe, including Italy?
  • First thing to understand is that the election was not about foreign policy. The two biggest issues were health insurance for Democrats and immigration for Republicans. Trade, national security, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, the Middle East, Iran, China, Russia and all the other issues IAI and I care about were virtually absent from the pre-electoral discourse.
  • It was vigorous and led to a high turnout by American standards: about 50% of registered voters. That will sound very low to you, but it is not low in the US, where about 60% turn out for presidential elections and midterms generally draw about 40%.
  • There are many reasons for this. Americans move frequently and die pretty much at the rate of everyone else. There is no national procedure for updating registration lists, and virtually no one unregisters when they move out of a community to another one. So some of the low turnout is a statistical artefact.
  • The resulting anomalies have led to Republican claims that there is a great deal of fraudulent Democratic voting in US elections. There is no evidence for that. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates concerted efforts by Republicans in many states to suppress voting by their opponents with ID requirements, closing polling places, and other tricks of the trade.
  • The higher turnout this time around occurred among both Democrats and Republicans, but the Democrats have more to gain because their relatively young voter population normally turns out much less than the older Republican voter population.
  • What looked like a modest shift the day after the election turned into a considerable Blue Wave as more results are finalized. The shifts from the last midterms in 2014 are notable:

under 30, +11D to +35D
women, +4 to +19
Latinos, +26 to +40
Asians, -1 to +54
college grads, -3 to +20
independents, -12 to +12
single, +13 to +24
not white evangelical, +12 to +34

  • Rural areas voted heavily for Republicans. Suburbs, which have generally leaned Republican, turned bluer this time, mainly because of the votes of college-educated women.
  • In short: Americans are divided, perhaps more than they have been since World War II.
  • On one side, we have a modest, but bigger than normal for midterms, recovery of the Obama coalition, despite a House of Representatives gerrymandered in favor of Republicans and a Senate “map” that incidentally favored Republicans.
  • Some high-profile progressives like Beto O’Rourke—a challenger for Ted Cruz’s Senate seat in Texas—and Andrew Gillum—the black Democrat who ran for governor of Florida—lost, but their showings were respectable enough to make them serious future candidates.
  • On the other side, we’ve got a Trump-dominated Republican party, which will be more radical than in his first two years. Many of the relative moderates are not returning to Congress. The Republicans there will be whiter, more male, and more rural than before.
  • The big winners in this election were those who want America divided and immobilized. That includes Presidents Putin and Xi. America will be consumed for most of the next two years with the 2020 presidential election. The Mueller investigation and oversight hearings will increase the noise and divisiveness, perhaps even to the point of impeachment.
  • The Democrats, who are mostly moderates, have limited powers to influence foreign policy. Their main lever of power will be oversight: the power to convene House hearings and subpoena witnesses. The Senate will continue to rubber stamp Trump’s nomination of judges and ambassadors.
  • That said there has been considerable agreement in the current Congress between Democrats and Republicans on maintaining the foreign affairs budget and toughening up against China, Russia, and North Korea. There are disagreements on the Iran nuclear deal, which Democrats favor, and on the defense budget, which Republicans traditionally favor.
  • In the Middle East, we are likely to see a continued US effort in eastern Syria, some effort at rapprochement with Turkey, and Congressional pressure to stop the war in Yemen as well as sanction Saudi Arabia for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The Administration will resist that pressure but may give in on Yemen, which would bring Washington into closer alignment with most Europeans.
  • It remains to be seen whether the consensus in favor of funding defense, development and diplomacy that existed in Congress since 2016 will be maintained. The Administration itself has signaled an intention to cut defense. Many newly elected Republicans will want to cut development and diplomacy. Democrats will defend both, but compromises should be expected. There is nothing popular about the foreign affairs budget in the US, though most Americans do favor continuing commitments abroad.
  • On NATO and the EU, I don’t think much will change. Trump has made it clear he thinks little of NATO and less of the EU. The Congress and the American people are more favorable to both and will try to insist on maintenance of the Alliance. Trump’s hostility to the EU will, however, find some resonance among protectionist Democrats and Republicans. The steel and aluminum tariffs seem destined to stay, at least for now.
  • Macron and Merkel notwithstanding, there are of course many in Europe who are sympathetic to their own version of Trump’s nationalism: make Italy, Hungary, Poland, or Denmark great again by blocking immigration, protecting domestic industries, rallying anti-minority sentiment, and undermining the rule of law. Berlusconi after all was an Italian invention.
  • I’m afraid the only thing that will sober some of Trump’s American supporters will be a major economic downturn, and even then they may prefer to blame it on someone other than the incumbent, most likely minorities, immigrants, Europeans, and terrorists.
  • That said, I think we have passed the moment I would call “peak Trump.” Even without a recession, most Americans—3 million more of whom voted for Hillary in 2016 and haven’t approved of Trump since—are now fed up. Unlike 2016, that majority has spread into red suburbs and states and mobilized more effectively. Democrats won the popular vote for Congress by about 7%. That could be a landslide in a presidential election.
  • Trump has a difficult road ahead. But that should be little comfort. If I had to guess, his fall might be at least as painful as his rise. He will resist accountability and transparency to the last.
  • Europe has a tremendously important role to play during the next two years. Merkel and Macron have already done great work in maintaining the vision of a united and liberal Europe. So long as Germany and France remain on that line, I can hope the rest of Europe and the US will eventually find their way back from ethnic nationalism.
  • But they and those of you who agree with that vision are going to have to do much more. Here are a few concrete suggestions:

• The NATO allies really do need to meet the 2% goal by 2024. Failing to keep on the tracks plays directly into Trump’s malicious hands. If they do so by joining together to form Macron’s European army, I have no objection.
• A negotiated resolution of the trade dispute is highly desirable. Even better would be returning to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which offered big economic benefits.
• The US and Europe need to hang together on Russia and China or hang separately as Ben Franklin said to his fellow revolutionaries. US gas supplies should help on the Russian front.
• On Iran, I see no hope of a US/EU accommodation so long as the US stays out of the nuclear deal. But I don’t really see how it can re-enter under this president. Some issues will have to wait for 2021, when discussing a follow-on deal will be needed anyway.
• On Syria, prospects are better. The US and Europe seem to be on the same wavelength in withholding reconstruction aid until there is a credible and irreversible political transition under way. That is the way to succeed, but pressures on Europe will be great.
• On Libya, the Americans are hoping Italy and France will work together to end the civil war and put the country back on a sustainable path.

  • There are lots of other issues, but the overall strategy should be this: hang together where possible, help each other out, and hope to get to 2021 in good enough shape to return to the trajectory most of us would prefer: a Euro-Atlantic community whole and free, though wiser and better, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
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