Tag: European Union
Slaying the partition vampire
Serbian President Vucic’s speech in northern Kosovo on Sunday has attracted a lot of attention because of this nauseating line:
Miloševic was a great Serbian leader; his intentions were certainly the best ones…
That’s too bad, because this unfortunate passage obscures the main thrust of the speech, which is represented better in this passage:
Serbia fought honorably and bravely against NATO in ’99, protecting itself. And we lost. They were much stronger, richer, much bigger cowards and they could drop many bombs from the sky on our people. And we lost, just like we had lost 610 years earlier. We were left without significant territories; Serbs abandoned many of their thresholds not wanting to live under the Albanian authority.
When you lose a war, you pay a price for it. A high one; the highest. And we, Serbs, even today pretend as if nothing had happened. We pretend that it was not us, with our own stupidities and under the pressure of the western world, who participated in proving our own guilt also for the conflict in Kosovo and Metohija.
Absent from this speech is the President’s partition proposal that has mobilized so many electrons lately. On borders, Vucic suggests they will not be easily changed:
Because when they tell you how I want to change borders- they’re not telling the truth, because where are the borders today, where are they, does anybody know where they are? We think one thing, the Albanians, bigger in numbers and stronger in Kosovo, think differently. One part of the world thinks one thing, the other thinks other. Actually, I want to change your rights and I want us to do everything we can, to preserve everything we can in Kosovo and Metohija, because our situation is not the same like the situation thirty, fifty or sixty years ago. I want us to gain for you all those rights you are entitled to, and which are the part of what is called the civilized world.
Admittedly I am reading between the lines, but this sounds to me much more like abandonment of the partition proposal than advocacy of it. He is telling Serbs who live in Kosovo that he will advocate for their rights within Kosovo, not for them to leave it.
That message is also implicit here:
I’ve come to tell you what we will concretely do and what I brought to our people in Kosovo and Metohija. We came with a comprehensive investment plan for ten Serbian municipalities, all ten. All four north-Kosovo municipalities: Zvečan, Leposavić, Zubin Potok and Kosovska Mitrovica. But also for Novo Brdo, Gračanica, Ranilug, Parteš, Klokot, Štrpce…for each place where Serbs are majority, but also for all Serbs, where they live, and where they are in a huge minority.
And there is this:
And there are no mythical borders. I want ones within which live people who have rights belonging to them. I want the ones because of which no one will be humiliated, and certainly not Serbia.
And when I say that we want agreement, we want compromise, not a dictation. We want to hear everything, but we also want to be heard. Finally and first of all, I want you to live here and to make it yours.
Throughout the peroration, Vucic underlines that the future of the Serbs in Kosovo needs to be settled by negotiation, not arms, and that it will take time–it will not be settled soon.
All of this suggests to me that he has given up on partition, at least in its more dramatic form. Why? I suspect an ethnic map of southern Serbia tells much of the story (the map comes to me through Sinisa Vukovic):
Once Kosovo President Hashim Thaci suggested the majority Albanian municipalities of southern Serbia (in blue) would have to be ceded to Kosovo if Serbia wants the northern Serbian majority municipalities, the partition proposal looked a lot less appetizing. How would that get through Serbia’s parliament? The thin yellow line, which bisects both Albanian and Serb municipalities (the latter in red), is Belgrade’s north-south route to Greece and Thessaloniki, Serbia’s main outlet to the sea. You may not care about that, but the Serbian Army definitely does.
I don’t imagine the partition proposal is completely dead, as no one has yet pounded a wooden stake into its heart. No doubt someone will suggest ceding only the Albanian municipalities west of the road to Kosovo, while someone else may push the idea of only some of the northern municipalities (not including North Mitrovica, which was Albanian majority before the war) joining Serbia. But vampires can also be killed by sunlight. That I hope is what is happening in this case: open discussion of the implications of partition has certainly weakened the idea, if not killed it.
I do hope people will not waste any more time and political energy on it. Serbia has a legitimate concern with the welfare and security of Serbs in Kosovo, just as Kosovo has a legitimate concern with the welfare of Albanians in Serbia. No democratic country can ignore its co-ethnics across a border, but none should want to move the border or the people. It is time to discuss how best to protect both Serbs in Kosovo and Albanians in Serbia, allow them a reasonable and symmetrical degree of self-governance, and enable them to prosper. That can and should be done without new ethnic entities and vetoes.
If those requirements can be met, both countries will want to ensure stability through the mutual recognition required for current EU members to ratify any new accessions. Then the vampire really will be dead, and coincidentally the border will for most purposes disappear.
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No swap is a good swap
Here is the long interview I did this week with Jeta Xharra, Director of the Balkans Investigative Reporting Network in Kosovo:
The transcript is available as well.
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Tragedy impends
Pristina daily Koha Ditore has given me permission to republish in English Besnik Krasniqi’s in-depth interview of Ambassador Lulzim Peci, published Sunday:
Lulzim Peci has insisted that “the correction” of borders, for which the president Hashim Thaçi and his Serbian counterpart, Aleksandar Vučić, are being engaged, is a euphemism for the partition of Kosovo. He is against this option, becaues he thinks that it will cause human tragedies in the forms of masive expulsions and displacements.
Peci is the founder and the Executive Director of the Institute KIPRED, and in the past he has served as Ambassador in Stockholm, as well as the first Liasion Representative of Kosovo in Belgrade.
In an interview given to “Koha Ditore,” he spoke on the option of “the correction” of borders between Kosovo and Serbia, which was warned to be put in discussion in the final phase of the dialogue in Brussels. He told what the country will lose from this process, and he spoke on the effects that such a solution will have in the region and abroad. He argued that neither the supporters in Washington nor in Brussels will be able to manage the effects of such a solution.
Among other things, in this interview Peci has told why he considers this “innovative” policy of Brussels as a triumph of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans and in its surroundings, as well as the barriers which it will create for Kosovo in its rush to become a member of the UN and integrated into the EU.
Koha Ditore: Mr. Peci, what is the meaning for Kosovo of the fact that its President has already agreed to discuss the option of “the correction” of borders in the final phase of the dialogue with Serbia?
Peci: First of all, it should be clear to us that “the correction” of borders is a euphemism for the partitioning of Kosovo, with or without exchange of territories with Serbia. The accuracy of the borderline between Kosovo and Serbia was not contested at all, for enabling anyone to correct it, given that the borders between federal units of former Yugoslavia were determined with cadastral borders of the municipalities which were in the two sides of the respective borders. Serbia has demanded, and is demanding, the partition of Kosovo, but so far it has never contested the accuracy of the borderline. Also, based on these well-defined borders, the Mission of NATO (KFOR) was established, and the Kumanovo Agreement of June 9th, 1999 was enforced, including the Land and Air Security Zone.
On the other hand, we should keep in mind that interstate borders can be corrected only if the mistakes acceptable for all the sides in the process of demarcation of the borderline are ascertained, and such a thing can be done only between two independent and sovereign states which do recognize each other. In the case in which it explicitly does not recognize Kosovo, it is very likely that Serbia will not interpret this “correction” as a correction of interstate borders, but as a correction of administrative ones, which will further complicate the situation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Serbia will recognize Kosovo without taking the largest part of the North, as well as the territory of the Municipality of Raniluk in the Southeast of Kosovo, and, in the best case, it will give as a compensation to Kosovo a number of villages in the Valley, perhaps with the inclusion of the city of Preshevo. This option can have consequences not only for the Albanian population that has remained in the North – for which the political cynics can easily say that majority of them were already expelled – given that we can have further displacements, if not even the outright expulsions, of Albanians remaining on the other side of the border, as well as of the Serbs below the river Ibar.
If Serbia would accept to recognize Kosovo, by exchanging the Municipality of Preshevo with that of Leposaviq, which was appended to Kosovo in 1959, then this option could have been considered as a bilateral correction of the border, without any major consequences for both, the Albanian population in the North, and the Serbian population below the Ibar river, but we cannot believe that this option would imply the terminology of “the correction of borders” of Thaçi, or that of “razgraničenje” [delimitation] of Vučić, which was inspired by the ideas of Dobrica Čosić .
Consequently, the acceptance of Thaçi to discuss this issue in the dialogue with Serbia, does not have to do with any correction of borders between Kosovo and Serbia. It has to do with changing of borders and the partitioning of the country. Such a discussion will put in question for the first time the territorial integrity of the state of Kosovo, which was not contested by anyone until now. There is no doubt that this option will undo the results of Kosovar politics and of international support over the last two decades, including here the military intervention of NATO, and it will also pave the way for the partition of the country based on ethnic geopolitics, and, as such, it will mark the first case of change of interstate borders according to this principle in the post-Cold War Europe.
Koha Ditore: So, you are among those who oppose the negotiations on territory? What does really Kosovo lose from touching the borders?
Peci: First of all, I am against this option as a human being, given that I think that it will cause human tragedies in the form of masive displacements, of Albanians from the northern part of Kosovo, and of Serbs from the part below the river Ibar. Albanians and Serbs do not deserve something like this 20 years after the end of the war, as well as after the results which were achieved with so many difficulties – results that can, indeed, be modest, but which, nevertheless, cannot be ignored – in the creation of a democratic and multiethnic society.
Secondly, I think that countries that aim at monoethnicity end up as xenophobic and fascistoid, and this is in complete contradiction with my political convictions and trust in liberal democracy, and, thirdly, given that Kosova, with the option of the partition, will put in question the safety of its water and energetic sources, as well as its potential for economic development, if the Ujman (Gazivode) Lake passes under the sovereignty of Serbia.
After the proposal of Thaçi for “moratorium for the solution of Kosovo status” of the year 2003, the entry into the game of “the correction of borders” is undoubtedly his biggest political adventure, but this time this adventure can engender irreparable consequences.
Koha Ditore: More precisely, which are the borders in which you are afraid that Kosovo might end up, if the borders are put on the Brussels discussion table, and what Kosovo gains and loses from a solution based on the exchange of territories?
Peci: As I have mentioned above, I apprehend that Kosovo will lose four municipalities in the North, as well as the Municipality of Raniluk in the East of the country, in exchange for some villages inhabited with Albanian majority in the Valley, and, perhaps, the city of Preshevo. The cost of this option will be extremely burdensome, even if Serbia does explicitly recognize the statehood of Kosovo. On the other hand, we should not forget that without normalization of relations with Kosovo, Serbia cannot get membership in the EU. Therefore, we have no major reason for entering into the game of “the correction” of borders, in order to do a service to Belgrade, by working against Berlin, given that without Berlin’s approval neither Kosovo, nor Serbia, can have any European future.
Furthermore, I doubt very much that the EU’s five non-recognizers will recognize Kosovo, even if Serbia recognizes it explicitly, after the change of borders based on ethnic geopolitics, given that for the partition of territories in which their numerous minorities live, this can be interpreted as a precedent that is even more dangerous then the Kosovo’s independence itself. I can only imagine how can such a “historical agreement” be interpreted by Cyprus, Slovakia, or Romania, regardless of the fact that with their non-recognition of Kosovo they have contributed themselves for the opening of such an option, by emboldening Serbia, as well as by hindering Kosovo’s European future. Therefore, I fear that with “the correction of borders” Kosovo will lose both, the territory, and the perspective for the membership in the EU.
Koha Ditore: Does the President have the mandate to represent Kosovo in the final phase of the dialogue and to negotiate the borders of the state without the blessing from the Assembly? If not, do you see any actions that should be taken against him?
Peci: Nobody in Kosovo has the mandate to negotiate its borders, given that this is in contradiction with the Constitution of the country, from the point view of the territorial integrity, as well as of the territorial claims against any other country. On the other hand, I think that the President has no explicit constitutional obstacles to represent the country in the dialogue with Serbia, but he must represent the country and the unity of the people in this dialogue, first of all by building political unity – which he has abused and destroyed by bypassing the Assembly and the Government, as well as by talking, in opposition with the Constitution, for changing the borders of the country. So far as the opening of the issue of the changing of borders of the country in the dialogue with Belgrade is concerned, I think that there is sufficient space for treating the constitutionality of this Thaçi’s action by the Constitutional Court.
For me, it is very surprising how can Thaçi push with such a zeal his already common agenda with Vučić for “the correction of borders,” given that I assume that he knows how unlikely it is that it will be approved at the Assembly of Kosovo. But he is perhaps calculating exactly on the small-minded interests of the politicians from the position and opposition, which were shown so successful so far in the execution of the partition of Kosovo. We should not forget that with this type of political action Thaçi has kept himself effectively in power during the last 11 years. We should not exclude here Thaçi’s possible attempts to manipulate the passing of this option by bypassing the Assembly of Kosovo by asking for the opinion of the Constitutional Court. Regardless of the fact how difficult this is to be realized, it should not be neglected as a possible scenario.
On the other hand, the option of the approval of this agreement through referendum is absurd, given that this cannot be done, not only because Kosovo has no law on referendum – which Thaçi has a mandate to sponsor, but because the change of the Constitution of the country, including here of its borders, can be done only through parliamentary procedures which demand the approval of the two-thirds of the deputies, including the two-thirds of the deputies of non-majority communities. The epilogue of these actions leaves only two options to Thaçi: to be considered as the biggest Don Quixote of the Kosovar politics, or as a genius of political skills, and I don’t believe that there is any middle solution here.
Koha Ditore: How do you see the role of institutions and of political subjects regarding this development, and is there any danger that the Assembly will arrive in a stage in which it will deliver the North to Serbia, together with Ujman (Gazivoda), a part of Trepça, etc.? Read more
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Good enough for me
Those who favor a still ill-defined but all too real “border correction/land swap” between Serbia and Kosovo are justifying it on grounds that it would be legal. I think they are right: I don’t know of anything that prohibits sovereign states from exchanging territory and people, even if it has not been done a lot lately. But let’s be clear about two things:
- The swap would exchange human beings as well as the land they live on. That’s fine for the Serbs in northern Kosovo and the Albanians in southern Serbia. But there are also Albanians who live in the parts of northern Kosovo Serbia wants, and Serbs who live in the parts of southern Serbia that Kosovo wants. Tens of thousands are going to end up moving.
- Mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity would have to come before the exchange. A state not recognized as sovereign would be crazy to attempt a swap with a non-recognizer.
The arguments against the land swap are not legal. They are practical and realist.
Defenders of the proposition on the Pristina side are saying it would also have to include UN membership. That is something Belgrade cannot guarantee. Only the permanent members of the Security Council could do so. I haven’t heard anything yet that suggests Russia or China is prepared to let Kosovo’s UN membership through the Security Council. Russia will seek a quid pro quo, most likely US recognition of the annexation of Crimea as well as the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian puppet states inside Georgia. China will hesitate because of what it perceives as Tibetan independence aspirations. The only thing worse than Kosovo independence for Beijing would be rearranging its territory on an ethnic basis.
There are also good reasons inside Serbia and Kosovo to doubt that this swap is viable. Kosovo’s main water supply is in the Serb-controlled north. Would it be prepared to see that transferred to Serbia? Serbia’s main outlet to the sea is the north/south road through southern Serbia to Thessaloniki. The Serbian army has always wanted to keep not only the road but as much territory surrounding it as possible. Are the generals suddenly willing to give in?
Any land/people swap would also raise questions about the Serb population in Kosovo south of the Ibar river, where the majority live close by the most important Serb religious sites. That population is already aging. A land swap would undermine any confidence the Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar have in their future. It would also create temptations for radical nationalist Albanians, since they will see any land swap as prelude to union with Albania, which is what the political movement that got the second largest number of votes in the last Kosovo election wants. That movement has split, but a land swap will vastly increase the appeal of its more radical faction.
I hardly need rehearse again all the other arguments against the swap proposition: Russian President Putin would welcome it. The liberal democratic ideals of the EU and US would be weakened. Not to mention that it would put Bosnia and Herzegovina at serious risk: Republika Srpska President Dodik has made it clear he is prepared to declare independence if a land swap occurs. Serbia won’t recognize the RS as independent because that would destroy its EU ambition, but Dodik won’t care. He’ll be happy to rule a Russian-sponsored satrapy like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, so long as Moscow provides the needed rubles.
What is the alternative to a land swap? Kosovo and Serbia need to institute the political and economic reforms required for EU membership. That is far more urgent, and popular in both countries, than a land swap. The closer Serbia gets to EU membership, the greater the pressure it will feel to recognize Kosovo, without a land/people swap. That’s good enough for me.
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Diplomacy for drawdown
Marc Lynch, after describing well the security dilemmas and state fragility that are driving Middle East conflicts, concludes:
US hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.
The question is: should Americans worry about that? Marc doesn’t answer that question, but Steven Metz does.
American interests in the Middle East are usually defined along these lines:
- Countering international terrorism
- Ensuring oil and gas can flow without hindrance to world markets
- Supporting friends and allies
- Preventing nuclear proliferation
Steven essentially says the threat of international terrorism is overblown, US energy vulnerability is vastly reduced (“Petroleum will not be weaponized”), and US friends and allies can (mostly) take of themselves. He doesn’t deal with the proliferation issue, but he really doesn’t have to, because he is talking mainly about military commitments. Military action has never been a good option for dealing with nuclear proliferation, since it would provide a very strong incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Steven’s conclusion: the US should withdraw its military from the Middle East and rely instead on “off-shore balancing” to ensure that no rival hegemon is able to control the region and intervene only in the event that one threatens US interests. The savings could be gigantic: RAND estimated that in 2008 12-15% of the Pentagon budget was spent to securing oil from the Persian Gulf.
Washing our hands of the Middle East is an attractive proposition. Unfortunately it is one that President Obama tried, without a great deal of success. President Trump is tempted in the same direction. But withdrawal has left the many of the vacuums that Marc describes so well, generating security dilemmas and military responses that have left Syria, Yemen, and Libya in ruins and erstwhile American friends like Israel, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at odds and hedging.
It is difficult to see how the United States can withdraw from the Middle East without a focused diplomatic effort to ensure that the region can restore a modicum of stability,or at least remove some of the drivers of instability. Offshore balancing won’t work if there is no balance but only chaos. The Trump Administration is said to be preparing for a Summit to restore some coherence to GCC next month. That makes sense: there will be no serious effort to counter Iran’s behavior in the region so long as Qatar is feuding with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
But the Administration also needs to end its own feuding with Turkey and restore some balance to its policy on Palestine to make it more palatable to Sunni Arab friends. And it needs to reconsider its position on the Iran deal, which threatens to seriously undermine relations with Europe.
So yes, I agree that we should draw down, if not completely out, from the the Middle East. But there is a lot of diplomatic homework required to make that possible. And a very real possibility that the Administration will focus instead on countering Iran, leading it to increase rather than decrease its military commitments in the region.
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Thaci’s message to Serbia
Marija Stojanovic of Belgrade daily Danas has kindly provided permission for me to publish in English this interview with Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, which appeared today:
WE WILL NOT ALLOW CREATION OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA IN KOSOVO
Thaci: “We are in a critical period of dialogue between our two countries. As leadership responsible to well-being of our children, I think both President Vucic and myself are keen not to allow for past to block our future or to threaten peace in our region in five or fifty years.
I have entered politics at a very young age, as a student leader and I always said I have three political aims: firstly to liberate Kosovo from the Serbian military and police occupation; secondly to make Kosovo an independent and sovereign republic and thirdly to ensure we become equal members of NATO and EU” – has stated for Danas Kosovo President Hasim Taci, discussing about Brussels negotiations with Serbian President Aleksander Vucic on solution of Kosovo question.
Both Presidents of Kosovo and Serbia have in recent weeks started talking about a border demarcation or adjustment. Both of you have also indicated that the final agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, will be painful. Yet, public knows very little about the progress in your dialogue in Brussels, or event the framework of any such agreement. Can you tell us more about the expectations you have about the final agreement?
– Kosovo is already a moral and political victor because our people are free. They live in a free country, recognized by overwhelming number of UN members. But we now must move rapidly towards locking our place in NATO and UN. Dialogue with Serbia, regional cooperation and reconciliation are crucial conditions for this aim.
I am not talking to Belgrade because of some sort of nostalgia. I don’t suffer from Yugo-nostalgia like some do. Nor do I talk to Belgrade because I like spending time in corridors of Brussels, eating cold sandwiches until late hours of evening. No – I’m talking to Vucic and I’m keen to find a solution because I want to see us in NATO and EU, sooner rather than later. I’ll be very honest, I don’t think we will get there until we have undisputed and unquestioned border between two countries. We have to have a fully agreed border demarcation, so we don’t leave some open issues to become point of dispute in the future.
My aim is not some ethnic partition, nor is [it] creation of a second Republika Srpska in our territory – heaven forbid – my aim is to settle the 400km of border and that process may require creative solutions that will provide peace now and in the future.
Yet, you have stated recently that you want to help Presevo valley Albanians join Kosovo as part of this dialogue? Why open this issue now? Never before has this issue been opened in Brussels? Do you think Belgrade will allow to give territory without getting something substantive back?
– Presevo valley, people of these three municipalities have already expressed their desires and their political aims in a referendum in 1992. It’s clear that any border demarcation between two countries will matter to these families and these citizens. Their interests must be respected and taken into account. There is an old saying: “if there is a will, there is a way.” Well, I believe that if there is a will among leadership in Kosovo and Serbia to find creative solutions, we will find a way to accommodate people in these border regions to feel safe, secure and with economic and political future secured. Both Serbs in north Kosovo as well as Albanians in Presevo valley care most about jobs and economy. Who will invest in our countries if we have open border questions lingering for decades? How will we prevent our young people to leave if they have to face discrimination or fear every 10 years or every 20 years?
Mr President, if we may insist, we are still missing concrete descriptions of solutions? Are you and Vucic speaking on top of maps, with coordinates of the villages and borders like in Dayton or what is the process happening now?
– Rest assured, last thing in my mind is Dayton. I have declared independence of Kosovo as a sovereign, secular and civic republic. Civic it shall remain. Maps will not define the destiny of people. People will define destiny of maps. Former Yugoslavia has been dissolved and there are seven states that were created from that bloody process that was initiated solely in Belgrade – when people in some circles in Belgrade started obsessing with maps and memorandums. That obsession with maps brought mayhem and genocide.
The final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia will be European agreement. It will be endorsed by both Brussels and Washington. And it will be finalized with a new UN resolution in UNSC, to open EU perspective for both Kosovo and Serbia. Either this will be a European solution with EU and US support or there will be no deal.
What happens if there is no deal? Many people both in Serbia but also in Kosovo, have stated that it’s better to keep status-quo? Will there be violence?
– Status-quo is a long-term invitation for trouble. Criminals, populists, nationalists, third parties from outside our region – they are seeking status-quo to operate and to undermine Europe, NATO and overall Western establishment. Balkans is secure today, we even had some progress, like the fantastic deal between Greece and Macedonia as well as Montenegro accession to NATO; but we can’t stop without finalizing all open bilateral issues.
I don’t fear violence today. I’m worried by the propaganda in Belgrade that some sort of plan is being prepared by Kosovo police or army to enter into war, or “take over north”. This is stupid and dangerous. Kosovo police and Kosovo army are trained by NATO, by EU and they are respectful of Euro-Atlantic values. But if we don’t solve the relationships now, we are wasting the opportunity for another generation or two to have normal life.
Why to postpone solution, if both sides are ready to close painful chapter of past? Why to leave our children hostages of mythical, historic dreams? It’s clear that Kosovo and Serbia are separate countries. But it’s also clear that they are neighbors that must talk and resolve open disputes.
Do EU and US support your stance? There are mixed signals coming from EU capitals. London and Berlin have been vocal against border adjustments. Washington is staying silent. Moscow is following carefully.
– We are having in dialogue in Brussels and there are always representatives of US government in all stages of dialogue so both EU and US support a mutual agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, there is no doubt about it.
I could say that we have lacked [a] bit of focus – especially from Brussels – but the world is a difficult place and it’s becoming more difficult. I don’t have illusions like some people do, thinking we are center of the world and everyone has to listen to our wishes and our demands. No, we have a very narrow window of opportunity and very little bandwidth in major capitals to deal with Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. So we must use this opportunity while there is time and willingness with our allies to close the deal and support the final deal.
What will happen to southern Serbs in Kosovo if there is border adjustment? Many people fear exodus like in “Oluja” in Croatia?
– This is an orchestrated propaganda. No one will touch dear Serbs in south, north, west or east of Kosovo. There was also propaganda when we declared independence in 2008, that Serbs will leave in tractors but they didn’t. They stayed in Kosovo, and they even participated in the creation of Kosovo institutions, police, parliament, constitutional court.
Serbs are today integrated and I don’t see any reason for people in Strpce or Gracanica or anywhere to fear their future in Kosovo. A final deal between Prishtina and Belgrade will help them because it will diminish threats from nationalists and extremists from their own Serbian community that hang over their head. I’m using this interview again to call all Serbs, all minorities in Kosovo to rest assured that their country is Kosovo and they have secured future in this country.
Will Serbian Orthodox Church receive same assurances?
Serbian Orthodox Church is a constitutional category in Kosovo and receives constitutional protection. Unfortunately, it’s sometimes most politicized of organized religious communities in Kosovo as some bishops, especially some extremist ones from outside Kosovo, send very unfortunate messages. I never respond to these statements, as I don’t want to put the position of Serbian clergy in Kosovo in a political landscape. I try to protect them from their own.
I’m very proud of the diversity of heritage in Kosovo and I have promoted interfaith dialogue as a key component of reconciliation. Prizren, Decan, Orahovac are beautiful and touristic places also because of rich diversity, Albanian, Serbian, Turkish, Bosniak. The major communities in Kosovo, like Muslims, Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish, Sufi – they were here during Ottoman Empire, during Serbian occupation, during Yugoslavian dictatorship and they will be here in the future. Read more
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