Tag: European Union
Things aren’t getting better
I’m back from 10 days in Piedmont (that’s Italy, not Virginia), where the inhabitants are far better at ignoring their politics than most of us in DC. I didn’t have a single serious conversation about the government crisis there, which after weeks of uncertainty has produced a coalition that is almost as weird as the Freedom Caucus combining with the Green Party in the US. My Italian friends don’t like it, but they know their governments are highly constrained by the European Union, market forces, and a tradition of compromise. So let’s have lunch.
Here things are less felicitous. The food isn’t as good and the politics are less constrained. Here’s a quick summary of some changes while we were away:
- The Dotard/Rocket Man Summit is back on for June 12, but with an important difference: the President says it is the beginning of a process, not the precedent-shattering agreement on denuclearization he advertised once upon a time.
- The US is levying tariffs on European steel and aluminum and threatening them on luxury cars. These will all eventually be found to violate our obligations to the World Trade Organization, but the current Administration doesn’t care about that.
- The Europeans are trying to figure out how to ensure Iran continues in the nuclear deal by allowing it to reap economic advantages, which will require them to block US “secondary” sanctions.
- President Trump has declared himself above the law, not only on Twitter but in a letter sent by his lawyers in January to the Special Counsel claiming he can end the investigation or pardon himself. The last president to make such a bold claim was Richard Nixon. We know how that ended.
- Trump has also issued pardons clearly intended to signal to his former minions (Michael Cohen, Paul Manafort) that he has their back if they keep silent.
- Just yesterday, the Special Counsel accused Manafort of witness tampering in a case pending against him for lobbying for a foreign entity (namely the Russia-backed president of Ukraine) without proper registration. The evidence includes wire taps.
Senate Democrats are warning that they won’t lift sanctions for a quicky nuclear deal with North Korea, but there is precious little they can do on the other issues. The Republicans are remaining united in backing Trump in both the House and the Senate. If Trump fires Mueller or pardons his minions, all indications are nothing will be done about it in Congress, but it is becoming harder to see how the judicial investigations can be entirely shut down.
In other news, the President canceled a meeting at the White House with the Superbowl champion Philadelphia Eagles because some of them want to continue their kneeling protest during the national anthem.* This from a president who himself had to be reminded by his immigrant wife to put his hand on his heart during the national anthem:
*PS: I was wrong about this. It turns out the Eagles had never knelt, but quite a few of them refused the invitation to the White House. Trump canceled the event in order to avoid being embarrassed, then scheduled another event at which he demonstrated he does not know the words to either the national anthem or “America the Beautiful.” Impossible to make this stuff up,
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Played
The Iran nuclear deal was an exchange: relief from sanctions in exchange for a halt and partial reversal of Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium capabilities. While President Obama made it clear the US would no longer actively seek overthrow of the Islamic Republic, there was no guarantee of that policy’s continuity. Nor was there a deal on Iran’s regional behavior, though Obama clearly hoped that would moderate as Iran’s economy recovered from sanctions and its people stopped rallying around the flag and instead sought rising living standards and more foreign contact.
That process had barely begun–with economic protests and criticism of Iran’s foreign adventures–when President Trump withdrew the US from the deal earlier this month. The protests are petering out as Iran seeks some way of continuing the nuclear deal with Europe, Russia, and China.That will be difficult because US “secondary” sanctions will force most major European companies to abandon business with Iran. But so far at least the EU seems determined to find a way. There is no reason to believe that Moscow, Beijing, and importantly New Delhi (India is a major importer of Iranian hydrocarbons) will not find a way of continuing to do business with Tehran.
Secretary Pompeo has announced the US list of demands to renew negotiations, with the aim of full diplomatic recognition, which is code for no more efforts to overthrow the regime. No one thinks Iran will even begin thinking about meeting those conditions. The US tried for decades to torpedo the Islamic Republic. There is no reason to believe the Trump Administration’s efforts in that regard will strike fear into the hearts of the ayatollahs. Quite to the contrary: the Supreme Leader thrives on American hostility. Trump is doomed to failure in dealing with Iran: either the nuclear deal will be maintained because the Europeans find a way to defy US sanctions, or Tehran will return to pursuing all the technology it needs to build and launch nuclear weapons.
He is heading in the same direction with North Korea. Once again, he is offering guarantees of regime survival and economic prosperity in exchange for “denuclearization.” The trouble is both National Security Adviser Bolton and Vice President Pence have hinted that without an agreement the US will pursue a Libya option, which the North Koreans interpret not unreasonably as Kim Jung-un meeting the same fate as Muammar Qaddafi, who was slaughtered after giving up his rudimentary nuclear program by Libyan rebels who had Western support. Not to mention one other difficulty: Kim is one of the most brutal dictators on earth. Does the US really want to be guaranteeing his permanence in power? Trump obviously doesn’t mind, any more than he minds offering the Islamic Republic the same deal.
Of course Kim would have no reason to believe any US guarantees, even with an American ambassador in Pyongyang. The change in US approaches to Iran and North Korea between Obama and Trump as well as the Trump Administration’s incoherence and inconsistency would make even a fool hesitate to rely on Washington. Kim is no fool. He will do nothing irreversible to his nuclear and missile programs, knowing full well that Trump can guarantee nothing. So when he yesterday blew up at least part of his country’s nuclear testing facilities in front of Western TV crews, you can be sure whatever was destroyed was now worthless to him.
Kim will propose a phased approach to “denuclearization.” If the phases include giving up his existing nuclear weapons, that will only be at the end of a long process, which he can ensure will never be reached. In the meanwhile, Kim will achieve many of his objectives. He has already put himself on a par with the President of the United States. Any early meeting, next month or thereafter, will confirm his equal status and legitimacy, both internationally and domestically.
While mumbling about a possible postponement, Trump appears desperate for a meeting to give him a chance to claim his first foreign policy success. Hence his touting rumors of a Nobel Prize that the Norwegians will not be interested in giving him. The North Koreans know a sucker when they see him. Kim is playing Trump, successfully.
PS: Somebody got Trump smart. Less than an hour after I published this, he withdrew from the Dotard/Rocket Man Summit. That was the best he could do: he was in way over his head.
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What to do about the Balkans
The European Union at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 affirmed its most powerful tool of democratization: enlargement. The Balkans had often been viewed until then as a ‘dark hole’ of Europe. The EU hoped that conditionality would pull the war-ravaged landscapes of the Western Balkans closer to the liberal democracies of its members states and ensure regional stability.
Fifteen years later and $20 billion from the European Union and $4 billion from the United States (excluding military aid), the post-Yugoslav countries of the Balkans have arguably created legal frameworks that resemble the liberal democracies, and there has been no war. Yet the region remains a space where endemic corruption and stagnation rule.
May 17 another EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Sofia, Bulgaria, bringing together heads of state or government from EU member states and leaders from the 6 Western Balkans partners: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. President of the European Council Donald Tusk announced that
the European Union is and will remain the most reliable partner of the entire Western Balkans. And in very concrete terms we discussed how to improve connections with and within the Western Balkans region.
Tusk underlined the EU’s “connectivity agenda” for the region and clarified that this is “
neither an alternative, nor substitute for enlargement. It is a way to use the time between today and tomorrow more effectively than before, so that our citizens and businesses are not waiting for the benefits of EU integration. Because I don’t see any other future for the Western Balkans other than the EU. There is no other alternative, there is no Plan B.
This reiteration calmed fears among local population and politicians that the EU was backtracking on its enlargement commitment.
On the same day, the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies hosted a discussion titled “The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans: Regional Challenges and Options for a Common EU-US Response.” The panel included:
- Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lord and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Marsaili Fraser, Former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stronebridge Group (ASG) and Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans
- Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS
The panelists discussed the current state of play in the Western Balkans and offered recommendations for a common EU and US response.
Ruge reiterated the challenges currently haunting the region arising from the tension between the EU agenda and political realities on the ground. The socio-political landscape in the Balkans 15 years after the Thessaloniki summit includes unresolved conflicts and bilateral issues, complex and muddled jurisdictions (as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Kosovo), irredentism (recent flirtations with the idea of changing borders and secession in Bosnia), and backsliding on crucial democratic institutions and norms.
Ruge stressed as well the effects of Middle East instability on the Balkans and the EU. In 2015, the flow of refugees reached unprecedented levels since WWII, with 764,038 border crossings through the Balkans route into the EU.
There are also successes in the region. Ruge cited the new government in Macedonia as building bridges rather than relying on divisive rhetoric, as well as Albania’s commitment to enhance the rule of law in line with EU standards by setting up internationally-supervised vetting procedures for the appointment of judges and prosecutors.
Ashdown stated that despite the transatlantic engagement in the region manifested through billions of dollars in aid and expertise, the Western Balkan states cannot operate at a level of functionality that would make them welcome EU members. Nor can they deliver to their citizens the benefits that justify loyalty to the state. The EU and the US have failed. Corruption remains endemic in the region, “as deeply embedded as when I went there in 2002 and not much has changed.”
Among the few successes, Ashdown listed the absence of war, and in some cases states that have shuffled a bit closer to the standards that would allow them to be members of EU. But overall, the Balkans pretend to reform, and the international community pretends to believe them.
Ashdown reminded his audience that you cannot save the maiden if you are not prepared to kill the dragon. The dragon we keep on failing to identify and slay is the dysfunctionality of the states. Brussels and Washington should sync their efforts and always act in a united fashion and employ muscular conditionality. The EU and the US should have a regional policy (and not different enlargement packages for each country) as a way to exploit regional linkages.
O’Brien spoke on US engagement in the region, emphasizing that Washington has a short-term focus on bigger wins, for example over the last year the Macedonia name issue and the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. These are efforts to put out fires and achieve outcomes within the 1-2 year lifespan of a deputy assistant secretary. O’Brien would prefer the US focus on institutions that allow for political competition and rotation of power as well as reach out to parts of society that do not feel represented.
Fraser believes that the prospect of membership is still necessary (although it may not be sufficient) to stabilize the region. Enlargement remains the EU’s most effective foreign policy tool. However, the enlargement process that happened in the countries of Eastern Europe should not be copy-pasted to the Balkans. The EU should be mindful that political elites were crucial to the process and were conforming to EU standards before being asked to do so.
In the Balkans, the most glaring problem is lack of political will. Political elites are reluctant to undertake difficult reforms that undermine their own interests. Nonetheless, enlargement can still drive progress in the region. The EU should get better at selling the benefits of membership not only to political elites but also to the general population of the Balkans. Furthermore, the EU should get better at naming-and-shaming politicians who are not implementing EU reform policies.
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Peace picks, May 21 – 27
- After ISIS, Will Iraq’s Elections be the Next Step to Stability? | Monday, May 21| 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
On May 12, Iraqis go to the polls to elect members of a new national parliament. This is the fourth election since the fall of Saddam Hussein, but the first since the military rollback of the Islamic State-declared caliphate. The country’s new leaders will be faced with the challenge of rebuilding, stabilizing, and healing their country as the United States and the West continue to decrease their military presence.
Join us on May 21 for a provocative town hall debate with foreign policy experts Kenneth Pollack, from the American Enterprise Institute, the National Defense University’s Denise Natali, and USIP’s Sarhang Hamasaeed, moderated by Joshua Johnson of the public radio program 1A. The discussion will focus on how Iraq’s leaders can overcome years of sectarian violence and find unity, as well as what a future alliance with the West may look like.
- North Korea and the Fine Print of a Deal: A View from Congress | Tuesday, May 22 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
The United States is engaged in high-stakes negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program as the White House prepares for the summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. But nuclear capabilities and missiles are not the only items on the negotiating table. An eventual settlement could include some difficult concessions and require significant oversight and legislative action on the part of Congress. In addition to a potential restructuring of U.S. forces in South Korea, a grand bargain could result in a range of due-outs for Congress, from sanctions relief and economic incentives to multilateral political arrangements.
Two Members of Congress and military veterans, Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Representative Steve Russell (R-OK), will examine the importance of this ongoing diplomatic effort, possible outcomes of negotiations, and the role they hope Congress plays in the coming months at USIP’s third Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue on May 22.
- What Lies Ahead for Afghanistan: The Various Scenarios | Tuesday, May 22 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | The Middle East Institute | Register Here
The way forward in Afghanistan seems as unclear as it has ever been. An outright military victory against the Taliban and other insurgent groups appears to be unachievable. The prospect of insurgents overrunning the country soon appears similarly unlikely. At the same time, a negotiated peace seems presently improbable. At least on terms outlined by the Kabul government and international community, the Taliban shows little interest in reconciliation. The long-term commitment of the United States and its coalition partners to an indefinite military presence and financial support cannot be taken for granted.
After nearly 17 years of fighting and state building in Afghanistan, we are still asking how conflict ends and what the endgame for Afghanistan looks like.
To discuss possible scenarios, the Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host an expert panel. MEI’s Director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, Marvin G. Weinbaum, will moderate the discussion with Javid Ahmad, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center; Courtney Cooper, an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Seth Jones, director of the Transnational Threats Project and a senior adviser for the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies.
- The Implications of the US Embassy Move to Jerusalem | Tuesday, May 22 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | The SETA Foundation at Washington DC | Register Here
On Monday, May 14, 2018, the US officially opened its embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. The move, which had been delayed by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, was announced by President Donald J. Trump on February 23. While Trump’s announcement was welcomed by Israel, it was condemned by Palestinian leaders and other US allies in the Middle East.
Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC on May 22 for a timely discussion on what the move of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem means for future US policy in the region, how US allies and adversaries will react to the move, and what it means for the Israel-Palestine peace process. Panel includes Geoffrey Aronson (President, The Mortons Group), Lara Friedman (President, Foundation for Middle East Peace), Ghaith al-Omari (Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute), Kadir Ustun (Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC). Moderated by Kilic B. Kanat (Research Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC).
- Can Power-sharing Arrangements Deliver Peace? | Thursday, May 24 | 10:00 am – 12:00 pm | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
Power-sharing arrangements are often touted as a means to address conflict between two parties. But practitioners and policymakers alike agree that the foundation for such arrangements requires considerable strategy and planning, including articulating clear objectives and expectations. Under what conditions do power-sharing arrangements work? What are the key ingredients to help unity governments succeed? Do power-sharing arrangements build political trust by delivering to citizens?
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a discussion exploring these critical questions. By exploring recent research in the Philippines, the panel will consider the effects a power-sharing peace agreement has on citizens’ trust in the national government, helping policymakers better understand how to build political trust in the aftermath of intrastate conflict. Panel includes Rosarie Tucci (Director, Inclusive Societies, US Institute of Peace), Susan Stigant (Director, Africa Programs, US Institute of Peace), Caroline Hartzell (Professor, Political Science Department, Gettysburg College), Matthew Hoddie (Associate Professor, Towson University), and Joseph Eyerman (Director, Center for Security, Defense and Safety, Research Triangle Institute International).
- America First, Europe alone? | Thursday, May 24 | 2:00 – 3:30 pm | Brookings Institution | Register Here
For the first 16 months of the Trump administration, European governments have sought to work closely with the United States, rather than opposing it publicly. However, differences over the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Climate Accord, trade, and the nature of sovereignty have led some observers to predict the end of the Atlantic alliance. On May 24, the Brookings Institution will convene an expert panel to discuss the trajectory of trans-Atlantic relations; whether the allies can bridge the gaps that divide them; how important Europe, and particularly the European Union, is to the Trump administration; and whether European states can and will fend for themselves.
The discussion will feature Brookings’s Robert Bosch Senior Fellows Amanda Sloat and Constanze Stelzenmüller, and Kenneth R. Weinstein, president and CEO of Hudson Institute. Edward Luce, Washington columnist and commentator for the Financial Times, will moderate the discussion.
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Up a creek without a paddle
A Wilson Center panel yesterday considered recent developments with Iran, particularly Trump’s groundbreaking decision to exit the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, aka Iran nuclear deal). With the Wilson Center’s Aaron David Miller as moderator, panel members Michael Singh of the Washington Institute, Tamara Coffman Wittes of the Brookings Institution, Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center, and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations discussed the JCPOA, the American departure from it, and future prospects.
Singh argued that Trump’s decision had both political and substantive roots. The President decided to use a problematic model of “maximum pressure” to create a new Iran deal. Where there was once convergence with foreign allies and partners on the way forward with Iran, with diplomatic efforts creating a multilateral sanctions campaign, there is now divergence, which makes Trump’s strategy of “maximum pressure” harder to implement.
Next steps, Singh believes, should include:
1. Heal the rift with European allies and reach a US-E3 agreement, at least an agreed roadmap on the way forward.
2. Nest the withdrawal from the JCPOA in a more comprehensive Iran strategy, as sanctions alone are not enough.
There is no real Administration strategy on Iran, Singh suggested. It talks tough but is reluctant to get dragged into the Middle East. Iran is a revisionist state and the only way to confront it is with commitment to the Middle East and the use of every policy tool.
Wittes understands Trump’s JCPOA decision as based on a desire to fulfill campaign promises and cater to domestic policy and interests. But it was reckless. Iranian influence, opportunities, and gains since 2011 have expanded as they compete with Sunni states and Israel for power. This unfortunately comes at a time of US pullback from the Middle East, which troubles US allies concerned more about Iran’s regional behavior than nuclear weapons, and a turn of foreign policy focus towards Asia. Wittes does not see how a new US-Iran agreement can happen. She does believe, however, that in the current Israel-Iran standoff, both sides are sending careful and calibrated messages as neither side seeks escalation, although it could still happen.
Litwak thinks the exit from the JCPOA is a departure from the US grand strategy of exerting power via international institutions. The US, not Iran, is being seen as the foreign policy issue and outlier state. America First is turning into America Alone. The JCPOA had a transactional, not transformational, basis as it sought to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, which has existed for over 40 years. Without the JCPOA, it is harder to address other Iran issues. The re-imposition of US sanctions could lead to a trade war with Europe should it take a defiant stance. It also strengthens Iranian hardliners and opens the door for Iran to leave the deal and restart its nuclear program. The exit from JCPOA could make it more difficult to negotiate a nuclear deal with North Korea. Trump’s transformational goal for a new Iran deal is over-reach. Litwak believes the US should be more pragmatic.
Takeyh anticipates that the US and Iran will eventually return to negotiations, considering the dearth of unofficial dialogues with Iran. The JCPOA was seriously flawed, especially the sunset clauses. A new deal with Iran must be permanent, a treaty approved in the Senate with minority party support. Ultimately, arms control will need to be an aspect of Iran policy, not the totality of it.
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Stop griping
Marija Jovicevic at the Montenegrin daily Pobjeda asked some questions. I answered:
- New elected president of Montenegro Mr. Đukanović said that he will work on better relations with Moscow. Can we expect improvement of relations because Mr. Putin congratulated victory to Mr. Đukanović for presidential elections and said that relations between two countries should be better? How do You read this messages? Does anything at all depend on Montenegro?
A: There is no harm in principle for a NATO member to seek good relations with Moscow, but it depends on what terms. I think President Djukanovic has demonstrated his fortitude in resisting Moscow’s worst behavior, which included a murder/coup attempt. If he can now improve relations with Moscow while remaining faithful to EU and NATO concerns, all to the better. I might doubt it can be done, but it is worth a try.
2. Representatives of non-governmental organizations wrote letter to European commission that Brussels should stop negotiations with Montenegro because we not do enough in the fields of judicial reforms .Do You think that it is a work of non-governmental organizations or they should help government in the process of European integrations?
A: Insisting on judicial reform will help with the process of European integration, and civil society should be free to do as it sees fit, within legal limits. Writing a letter to Brussels is certainly within those limits. Civil society may also want to help, but it is not the government’s handmaiden.
- EU and western Balkans will host a big summit in Sofia on 17 May. Do you expect any big steps in this partnership? Do You think that big summits are not enough that EU needs to do more for Western Balkans?
A: I think the Western Balkan countries need to do more for themselves. They’ve been offered a date for new accessions to the EU, which is also prepared to help them meet the requirements of the acquis. It’s time to stop griping and start performing.
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