Tag: European Union
No formula for success
The downsides of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal are all too obvious. But it behooves any conflict management type like me to consider the other side: what does the Administration think it will accomplish, and why do some allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia support withdrawal?
The Administration is saying that its main reason for withdrawing was the sunset clause, that is the expiration of parts of the agreement seven years from now. That sounds silly: why not wait until just before the agreement expires to threaten re-imposition of sanctions in order to negotiate a follow-on agreement? The answer is that Washington is trying to prevent Iran from gaining the economic benefits that will accrue during those seven years.
The Administration’s goal is to squeeze Iran through not only re-imposition of US sanctions but also through secondary sanctions that will dis-incentivize European, Russian, Chinese, and other companies from doing business with Tehran. Proponents of withdrawal believe this will at least limit Iranian capabilities–non-nuclear as well as nuclear–and make Iran less of a threat in the future. Some Americans seem to hope it will even bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, precipitating regime change.
These effects would depend on virtually universal adherence to the re-imposed sanctions. Why would the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese play ball? A well-informed Israeli put it this way, with respect to the Europeans: they fear war with Iran more than they fear re-imposition of sanctions. They will, in other words, go along in order to avoid an American attack on Iran. Even if you believe that–and I doubt it–it leaves Russia and China unconstrained. They are unlikely to be as easily cowed as the Europeans. They and many other countries will gladly do business with Iran, surreptitiously if not openly.
There is thus no reason to believe that sanctions can be made nearly as tight as they were in 2015 when the UN Security Council was unanimous and the nuclear deal was negotiated. Nor do I think the Europeans will buckle easily to American will. They are far more likely to try to sustain the agreement, which is what Iranian President Rouhani is saying he wants to do as well, so long as Tehran sees the consequent economic benefits.
If the Europeans withdraw, I suspect the Iranians will ramp up their enrichment activity and weapons research so as to reduce their breakout time to well under the one year the nuclear deal was designed to maintain. But Tehran will also want enough transparency through international inspections to ensure that the Israelis and Americans can be reasonably confident they are not actually producing nuclear weapons. It is not in Tehran’s interest for there to be any doubt on that score, since Israel can be expected to react or even pre-empt in kind if it perceives that it might be subject to a nuclear attack.
As for the hope that Iran may be constrained or even fatally weakened by re-imposed sanctions, that day is far off. It suits the Islamic Republic, especially its hardliners, well to have a foreign enemy it can blame for its own economic failures. The public demonstrations of the last year or so occurred precisely because the regime could no longer blame only the foreigners. Nor do I know of any regime that has wanted nuclear weapons that couldn’t find the financial resources to fund the program. North Korea has demonstrated how even a very poor country can do it. Iran will do likewise, no matter what sanctions are re-imposed.
As in many things, Trump has over-estimated his own power and underestimated his enemy. That is not a formula for success.
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More on Bosnia’s election law
Slaven Kovačević writes:
Still another meeting about possible changes of the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina has ended without agreement, which some will consider bad. I think this is the best solution at the moment, because it is not true that without agreement implementation of the future electoral results will be impossible.
That claim is based on the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) incorrect interpretation of the Constitutional Court’s Ljubić decision. The intention is to create pressure for changes to the BiH Election Law that advantage the HDZ, diminishing the basic human rights of a significant number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who live in environments beyond the HDZ’s direct political control.
In addition, the HDZ demands that the Election Law be amended to include election of members of the BiH Presidency, whereas the Constitutional Court of BiH rejected that part of the Ljubić appeal. The HDZ also abuses the Venice Commission, which at the end of its opinion made it clear that the current system for choosing members of the Federation House of Peoples is in line with the European electoral principles and standards.
The HDZ arguments are political in nature and not legal. The basic question is this: is the Federation formed from cantons or peoples, as HDZ claims? Under the Washington Agreement, the Federation of BiH is composed of federal units, later established in the Constitution as cantons. Here is an extract from the original Washington Agreement:
Bosniacs and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with others) and citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniac and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation, which is composed of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities.
The choice of delegates to the House of Peoples is based on the implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement (return of all expelled citizens to their pre-war homes). As long as this process is not completed, the 1991 census is to be applied, in order to avoid legalizing the results of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This is a constitutional provision that cannot be put out of force unless someone, like the High Representative (HR) or a competent state body, declares the return of expelled citizens ended. As this has not happened, this current legal norm remains in force. The current system under the FBiH Constitution is in line with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The BiH Constitutional Court cannot contradict the European Court.
All citizens of the Federation of BiH must fully enjoy their civil and political rights, more precisely to elect and be elected to all legislative organs. The HDZ wants a consociational democracy, but one not based on the proportion of Croats throughout the country but rather one based only on four cantons that the HDZ controls. The HDZ’s efforts to change the BiH Election Law were motivated by their wish to legally mark part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory as a “third entity.” Croatia and Russia support these efforts, in contradiction to the Dayton Peace Agreement, jeopardizing the entire political system.
The idea of blocking implementation of the election results is political, not legal. The earlier, 2011 HDZ effort to block implementation of electoral results led to the intervention of the High Representative. Annex 10 of the Framework Dayton Peace Agreement would still require the High Representative to intervene again to secure fair and democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that he would then be obliged to intervene again.
The elections last until the moment of implementation of the electoral results, which are an integral part of the electoral process. It is important to relieve the public of unnecessary fears about changes to the Election Law of BiH and devote efforts instead to announcing, holding and implementing elections. This would enable other, more important issues to be discussed, such as the motives of tens of thousands of young citizens of Bosnia Herzegovina who leave Bosnia every year and seek for their better life abroad.
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Stay the course
I spent last week visiting two allegedly dysfunctional states in the Balkans: Macedonia and Kosovo. Rumors of their incapacity or even demise are exaggerated. I visited with government officials, parliamentarians, NGOers, journalists, and old friends. I saw their presidents and prime ministers, but not their foreign ministers, as both were traveling. Despite their real problems, both states are functional and have made enormous progress over the past twenty years.
I started in Macedonia, which is saddled with two current issues: a law on language that the President refuses to sign and a dispute concerning its name with Greece.
The former raises constitutional questions, as the parliament has passed the law twice, after which the President is obliged to sign. He claims however that the law, which increases the required use of Albanian by state institutions, contradicts the constitution, which he is sworn to uphold. People get really worked up over this, but I just don’t see how it compares even remotely to the political crisis that enveloped the country in 2016 and 2017, when the opposition was publicizing wiretaps that demonstrated abuse of power. I’m betting Macedonia’s citizens and politicians will figure out how to get the constitutional court to decide who is right. That would be an institutional solution appropriate to the challenge. Not so bad.
The second problem is a congenital one. From the moment of independence, Athens challenged Skopje’s right to use “Macedonia” and has refused to accept Macedonia into NATO either as the Republic of Macedonia (its constitutional name) or as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM), the appellation Greece agreed in 1995 would apply to membership in international organizations.
This is the moral equivalent of the United States objecting to Mexico’s official name (Estados Unidos Mexicanos), or the Mexicans objecting to “New Mexico.” As in the rest of the Balkans, the real issues are territory and identity, not the name. Here too there are lots of solutions and an ongoing negotiation that appears to be making progress. Current betting is on “Republic of Upper Macedonia,” but precisely when and where that would be used is still uncertain. Any solution will have to pass muster in parliament and get approved in a referendum: again, institutional solutions.
Kosovo has also been through a rough patch, with two issues that created disorder in both the streets and parliament: demarcation of the border with Montenegro and creation of an Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM).
The former verged on silly, since only a few hundred hectares were involved and the agreement had already been concluded as well as ratified in Montenegro before it became controversial in Kosovo. It is now solved and the waters have calmed.
The ASM is still a problem, as it is part of the plan that got Kosovo its independence 10 years ago but risks making Kosovo like Bosnia, which is to say so ethnically divided as to be dysfunctional. The constitutional court has made clear within what parameters the issue should be solved, but some think it will be necessary to go further. That is going to be difficult, especially as the situation in Bosnia is worsening because the leader of its Serb 49% “entity” is using its power-sharing arrangements to block effective governance at the state level. Kosovo Albanians are right to want to avoid that kind of trouble.
Another recent incident has also roiled Kosovo’s waters: Turkish security officials were allowed to seize some of President Erdogan’s political opponents on Kosovo territory and deport them to Turkey, where they face a court system that is doing the President’s bidding. The proper court proceedings were not followed in Kosovo. A parliamentary committee has been commissioned to investigate.
The distinguishing characteristic of all these issues is that they touch on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states that are not yet consolidated, or self-confident (I’m grateful to Veton Surroi, a tough critic of Kosovo’s state-building process so far, for this realization). The result is a level of political (and occasionally physical) conflict that challenges weak institutions.
America’s own early republic had quite a few such challenges to sovereignty (look up Whiskey Rebellion and Marbury v Madison) that had to be decided in the courts, and we are still capable of creating new ones. It would be a mistake to conclude from their existence that the state-building process in the Balkans is a failure. The citizens’ preference for institutional solutions in both Macedonia and Kosovo is clear, even if the politicians don’t always abide by it.
Sovereignty is not yet complete, and territorial integrity not yet ensured. Reassurance on those scores is critical. In the 21st century Balkans, the US and EU need to continue to play their vital roles in ensuring that borders are not moved, minorities are treated in ways that make loyalty to the states in which they live appealing, and governance is not only fair but also functional and effective in producing services and prosperity.
I would guess Kosovo and Macedonia are a lot more than midway between independence and EU membership. Completing that trajectory is the shortest distance to regional peace and stability. We and they should stay the course.
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The US, EU and Kosovo: can they sync up?
Here are the speaking notes for the talk I gave this morning under the auspices of KIPRED in Pristina, Ambassador Lulzim Peci presiding:
- It’s great to be back in Pristina, and an enormous privilege to talk with you here at the Swiss Diamond, though I hope next time to have a Marriott at our disposal as well. Don’t tell your foreign minister I said that!
- I’d like to discuss with you the triangle that has so often driven progress in the Balkans in general and in Kosovo in particular: the US, the EU and of course you.
- When those three are in sync, nothing stops us. When they are out of sync, little progress is made on big issues, including those that can threaten peace and stability.
- Let me start with the US. Its circumstances have changed dramatically since the 1990s and early 2000s, when relatively small American interventions—military and diplomatic—ended and prevented wars in the Balkans, including the 2001 conflict in Macedonia.
- That was the unipolar moment, when Yeltsin’s Russia was on the ropes and China had not yet started to show its financial muscle.
- In the 1990s, the US was not yet tired of playing the role of global policeman and it was confident of its own strong democratic tradition.
- The 17 years since 9/11 have changed that. The attack on the World Trade Center prompted a justified US invasion of Afghanistan and an unjustified US invasion of Iraq, both of which seemed to go well at first but bogged down into quagmires that sapped American finances, strength and confidence.
- Now we live in a multi-polar world, one in which President Putin is trying to reassert Moscow’s claim to great power status and President Xi doesn’t even have to try.
- The financial crisis of 2008 sent the world’s economy into a tailspin. Though the American recovery was relatively steady and even fast compared to Europe’s, a large portion of the relatively uneducated, white, male working population still hasn’t recovered.
- It was their discontent, especially in the Midwest, that led to President Trump’s election in 2016. He lacked a majority of the popular vote but gained a modest margin in the electoral college, which gives less populous states greater weight in determining who wins the presidency.
- The Trump Administration is not a conservative one: it has abandoned a central conservative tenet—concern about the budget deficit—in favor of a massive tax cut for the wealthy and an unprecedented boost in military spending as well as sharply increased military activities focused on Islamic extremism, especially in the Middle East and Africa.
- It has also been sometimes belligerent towards North Korea and always towards, while abandoning both the Trans-Pacific and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnerships and throwing down the gauntlet on trade and investment as a challenge, especially to China.
- The Administration’s initial hostility towards NATO has been corrected, but the President has little use for the EU, whose sharing of responsibilities is anathema to an America First attitude.
- I need only mention briefly that the Administration is also preoccupied with a series of dramatic scandals that involve Russian tampering in the US election, the President’s many sexual affairs, and his financial and other legal improprieties. This is a confused White House under siege.
- As a consequence, Trump focuses on keeping his big money donors and his white working-class base happy. He explicitly states that he has no interest in how others govern themselves and has warmed to autocrats like Presidents Duterte, Putin, Xi, and Sisi.
- The kind of liberal democracy “of the people, by the people and for the people” that many in Kosovo aspire to is under threat in America and out of fashion in much of the rest of the world, as ethnic nationalists and kleptocratic elites feel unconstrained by Trump.
- So you shouldn’t be surprised when I say that the Balkans and their governance failures are one of the last things on minds in Washington. Even if he is married to a Slovene, President Trump hasn’t spent more than a few minutes on the Balkans since taking office.
- Instead, career officials in the State and Defense Departments have thankfully kept US Balkans policy on their previous course, and Vice President Pence as well as former National Security Adviser McMaster have intervened constructively.
- But it is going to be difficult to match even the low Obama-level interest in Balkans democracy with President Trump in the White House.
- The situation in Europe is better. The Europeans were for years preoccupied with their own financial crisis, the Greek debt debacle, and their consequences for the euro and for growth.
- Europe was also deeply scarred by the refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa and its implications for terrorism. More than 100,000 illegal border crossings occurred here in the Balkan, putting economic, logistical and political strain on the region.
- Some Europeans even within the EU have turned to demagogic leaders who promise to protect nativist groups from foreigners, while the British made the enormous mistake of voting narrowly to withdraw from the EU, in large part due to xenophobia.
- But Europe’s economy is now slowly recovering, and the Europeans have become much more alert to Putin’s trouble-making since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, and this year’s attempted murder of defectors in Britain.
- To my delight, the European Commission, alarmed by Putin, seized an opportunity in February to reopen the political window for EU accession in 2025, saying that those who qualify by 2023 will be welcomed in two years later. They did not say when the window would close.
- For good reasons, many doubt the sincerity, and even the feasibility, of this promise to enlarge once again. It is explicitly conditional on internal reforms to strengthen the Union, and it will require ratifications by current members that may prove difficult to elicit, including referenda in France and maybe the Netherlands.
- This is nevertheless an extraordinary opportunity. It is my hope that as many Balkan countries as possible will take advantage of it. Most of the benefits of EU membership come in preparing for accession.
- Montenegro and Serbia lead the regatta, as they have achieved candidacy status and are making their way as quickly as they can through the chapters of the acquis.
- But others are not so far behind: the Commission has recommended candidacy status for Albania as well as Macedonia, and Kosovo has approved border demarcation with Montenegro and will now I hope get the visa waiver. That will be an important milestone in synching up with the US and the EU.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it has applied for candidacy, is in many respects the laggard, as its governing system is based on the awkward constitution Americans wrote at Dayton.
- Nevertheless, a process that has been frozen pretty much since Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013 has restarted. Opportunities like this one don’t come often.
- That brings me to the Commission’s Progress Report on Kosovo and its implications for your government, parliament, and civil society.
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The US, the EU and Macedonia
Here are the notes I used speaking in the Macedonian Parliament yesterday with Prime Minister Zaev, EU Ambassador Zbogar, and representatives of the governing and opposition political parties, under the chairmanship Artan Grubi:
- It’s great to be back in Skopje, and an enormous privilege to talk with you here at the Parliament.
- My thanks especially to Artan Grubi for suggesting this occasion, to Samuel Zbogar for tolerating an American’s comments on Europe’s business, and to all of you for being here.
- I’d like to discuss with you the triangle that has so often driven progress in the Balkans in general and in Macedonia in particular: the US, the EU and of course you.
- When those three are in sync, nothing stops us. When they are out of sync, little progress is made on big issues, including those that can threaten peace and stability. The Ohrid agreement is Exhibit 1, but this was also true at Dayton, in the leadup to the fall of Milosevic, and in Montenegro’s successful bid for NATO membership.
- Both the US and the EU have been through a difficult decade. But despite many difficulties, they have maintained their policies on the Balkans
- Career officials in the US State and Defense Departments have kept their previous course, while Vice President Pence and National Security Adviser McMaster have intervened clearly and constructively.
- Washington wants the Balkans peaceful and secure. The best way to ensure that is membership in NATO for those who want it as well as in the EU.
- The situation in Europe is analogous. The Europeans were for years preoccupied with their own financial crisis, the Greek debt debacle, and their consequences for the euro and for growth.
- Europe was also deeply scarred by the refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa and its implications for terrorism.
- Some Europeans have turned to demagogic leaders who promise to protect nativist groups from foreigners, while the British made the enormous mistake of voting narrowly to withdraw from the EU, in large part due to xenophobia.
- But Europe’s economy is now slowly recovering, and the Europeans have become much more alert to Putin’s trouble-making since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, and this year’s attempted murder of defectors in Britain.
- To my delight, the Europeans, alarmed by Russia, seized an opportunity in February to reopen the political window for EU accession in 2025, saying essentially that those who qualify by 2023 will be welcomed in two years later. They did not say when the window would close.
- For good reasons, many doubt the sincerity and even the feasibility, of this promise to enlarge once again. It is explicitly conditional on internal reforms to strengthen the Union, and it will require ratifications by current members that may prove difficult to elicit, including referenda in France and the Netherlands.
- This is nevertheless an extraordinary opportunity. It is my hope that as many Balkan countries as possible will take advantage of it.
- A process that has been frozen pretty much since Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013 has been restarted. Opportunities like this one don’t come often.
- That brings me to the Commission’s Progress Report on Macedonia and its implications for your government and parliament.
- The Progress Report is positive for Macedonia, which has clearly overcome a difficult and prolonged political crisis and is now pointed in the right direction.
- But I won’t worry too much about the Commission’s compliments. I’ll focus instead on the missing pieces of the Macedonian part of the puzzle.
- First and foremost is rule of law. Many of you will know the details of what the Europeans want better than I do, so I won’t bore you with those.
- I prefer to underline how truly fundamental an independent judiciary is to good governance. The essence of liberal democracy is individual rights.
- If I am unable to rely on the justice system to protect my rights as an individual, I’ll look elsewhere for security: to my family, my clan, my neighborhood, my language group, my ethnicity, my race, my religion, or my political party. We all have those identities, but when threatened with insecurity one or the other of them becomes dominant, or even exclusive.
- The result is a political struggle for power among different groups that all consider themselves victims. That struggle has degenerated in post-Communist Yugoslavia into war at least five times. You were witnesses to how bad that is when it happens.
- But what may not be so apparent is the role of an independent judiciary in making sure that it doesn’t.
- If I can expect to be treated fairly and objectively by the courts and hence also by the police and the rest of the public administration, I’ve got precious little to fight about, or grievances with which to rally others.
- There is nothing more important to Macedonia’s future as a state than establishing a judicial system that treats, and is perceived to treat, Albanians and Macedonians, women and men, members of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE as well as DUI and DPA, equally and fairly.
- This is especially important when it comes to high-level corruption and abuse of power. It isn’t easy. You are watching in real time as the American judiciary tries to establish whether there were abuses during our last election. We’ll get through it, but not without a lot of problems.
- You’ll get through it too, again not without lots of problems.
- One further point: the kind of liberal democracy I am talking about requires a viable, constitutional opposition with a real possibility of alternating in power. That possibility should never evaporate, because it keeps politicians honest and alert to the needs of their constituents.
- VMRO-DPMNE fell from power in a terrible scandal, but it or some other party that represents its constituency has to have the real possibility of returning to power, as does DPA or some other group now in opposition.
- Balkan politics need to adjust to the notion that opposition is a vital part of democracy. Being out of power is hard, but just as important as being in it.
- Someone will say, what about the external factor? Even if we get an independent judiciary, even if alternation in power is a real possibility, even if our opposition is a viable one, Greece is blocking our path not only to the EU but also to NATO. Even if we meet all the EU accession requirements, won’t Athens still be a problem?
- Yes, is the short answer. You have a choice.
- There are two directions: a downward spiral of resentment that rejects EU and NATO conditionality and makes Macedonia vulnerable to Russian inducements, leading eventually to violence and partition, as the Russians will of course back the Greeks and those Macedonians who aren’t committed to a real democracy with equal rights.
- That is the direction you were headed in just a year ago.
- The other direction is a virtuous spiral that accepts tough NATO and EU conditions and keeps the country intact, leading eventually to a much higher standard of living and elimination of hard borders with Greece and Kosovo.
- I know of course what I would choose. But what does it mean to accept NATO and EU conditionality?
- With respect to NATO, I think it was a mistake for the US to say that Greece and Macedonia would have to come to an agreement before membership could be considered. That essentially delegated the US veto to Greece, which has not hesitated to use it, albeit informally.
- But that deed is done. Now the only way to sync up effectively with the Americans is to reach an agreement with Greece.
- I know that is painful, but the moment has come. You need to meet Athens somewhere in the middle, with a solution that emphasizes civic and not ethnic identity. Only then can NATO and EU become realities.
- Let me underline one other point: no matter what formal solution to the “name” issue you decide on, now or in the future, guys like me will continue calling you citizens of Macedonia and your language Macedonian until you ask us to stop, even if the formal agreement is ergo omnes.
- A Balkan friend whom I asked for advice on this talk wrote back: “The question is how we maintain the EU path with all these problems [throughout the Balkans and in the geostrategic environment]. How do we keep it as a value system and not just as a quick carrot? Can we hold with our institutions and economy until things will get more stable in the EU?”
- Those are the right questions. It is up to you to answer.
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Pragmatism, not ideals
The United States and France look back on a steadfast relationship. Providing support during the American War of Independence, France became the first ally of the nascent United States in 1778. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the Franco-American relationship was strong, despite minor tensions during World War II and the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. In the early 2000s, disagreements over the Iraq War cooled down relations, but cooperation between both states has flourished again in the last decade. However, Donald Trump’s election victory in 2016 and the President’s confrontational rhetoric towards Europe raises questions whether this positive trend will continue.
On April 12, the Atlantic Council hosted a panel discussing the implications of the upcoming state visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Washington in mid-April. H.E. Gérard Araud, Ambassador of France in the United States, and Pierre-Andre Imbert, Social Policy Advisor to President Macron, offered their perspective along with Frances Burwell, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Jeff Lightfoot, whose recent publication “The French-American Alliance in an America-First Era” provides a broad overview of the current state of US-French relations. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President at the Atlantic Council, delivered an introductory statement and Susan Glasser, staff writer at the The New Yorker, moderated the discussion.
President Macron has been able to establish a fruitful working relationship with President Trump, according to Ambassador Gérard Araud. As the other European heavyweights Great Britain and Germany have been preoccupied with internal problems during the past year, Macron was able to position France as the primary European interlocutor for the United States after coming to office in May 2017.
Both Washington and Paris are pragmatic. President Macron has decided that France needs to maintain a good working relationship with whoever is in power in Washington. The US administration respects Frances’s international engagement, particularly in combating terrorism in the Sahel and the Levant. Disagreements exist—for instance on the nuclear deal with Iran and trade policies—but are not fundamental. Both Presidents acknowledge each other’s position and remain invested in addressing common challenges with joint forces. The United States and France share similar interests and values and must thus solve global problems together, stresses Araud. The Franco-American relationship will remain strong in spite of Trump’s aggressive foreign policy rhetoric.
Jeff Lightfoot highlights that the French public opinion of Trump is very low and Macron could easily define himself in opposition to the US president. If Trump decides to snub Europe, for instance by revoking the Iran nuclear agreement or imposing tariffs, Macron’s popularity might suffer. Yet Araud argues that the French are able to differentiate between Trump’s personality and the need to maintain a good working relationship with any US president. The ongoing positive dialogue indicates that there exist no fundamental disagreement The problem is rather the US press, which is using Macon against Trump. We should not expect any spectacular outcomes from the state visit.
Whether Macron will be able to maintain his role as Europe’s spokesman largely depends on the outcome of his domestic agenda. Pierre-Andre Imbert underlines that Macron is pursuing fundamental reforms in France. His successes in both the presidential and parliamentary elections have transformed the country’s political landscape. Now the president seeks to utilize his standing to deliver on his promises to prepare France for the future. The overall goal is sustainable, inclusive growth. To achieve this, fundamental reforms—for instance of the labor market— are needed.
Frances Burwell also stresses that the French president needs to maintain his strong domestic standing to be able to both shape the European Union and maintain his role as the primary European interlocutor for the United States. So far, Macron has pushed through his economic reforms with relentless effort. Even though domestic opposition is currently mounting, he still has time to reap the fruits of his policies ahead of the next elections schedule for 2022.
In the meantime, France will continue play a central role in global affairs, says Araud. On the micro level, Paris will in particular seek to revive the international dialogue on Syria to initiate a political transition in the country. Only by doing so, can Syrian be stabilized and vital threats like terrorism and mass migration tackled. On the macro level, Macron will address the crumbling of the Western-dominated world order and seek to reform the current system. The United States remain a crucial partner in taking up this challenge.
In a period of global turmoil, the United States and France depend on strong bilateral relations. Both Presidents are aware of the need for cooperation. In spite of Trump’s antagonistic rhetoric and other gloomy signs, we can expect this bilateral transatlantic relationship to remain strong.
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