Tag: European Union

Peace picks, April 16 – 22

Posted in Adam Friend, Sebastian Gerlach - April 14, 2018 - 0 Comment
  1. Colombia Peace Forum: Elections & Peace Processes in Colombia | Monday, April 16 | 9:30am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

While threats of violence marred recent legislative campaigns in Colombia, the March 11 election was Colombia’s most peaceful in decades. Although the FARC’s new political party underperformed, its comprehensive demobilization was palpable and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country’s second-largest rebel group, respected a temporary unilateral ceasefire. For the first time in 50 years, ballots were cast freely throughout the country and not a single incident of violence was recorded. With the composition of Colombia’s next Congress set, jockeying and coalition-building among the main candidates is fully underway ahead of the May 27 presidential polls. The outcome will have important implications for the precarious implementation of the 2016 FARC peace accord. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a discussion on security and protection throughout the electoral process, analysis of the impact the outcome may have on the implementation of the FARC peace agreement, and the implications for the ongoing process with the ELN. Featuring Alejandra Barrios (Director, Electoral Observation Mission), Juanita Goebertus (Colombian Congresswoman and Former Member of the Government Peace Delegation with the FARC), Mark Schneider (Senior Advisor, CSIS), Jonas Claes (Senior Program Officer, Preventing Election Violence, USIP), and Steve Hege (Senior Program Officer, Security & Justice, USIP) as moderator.

This event will be webcast live.

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  1. Hidden Wounds: Trauma and Civilians in the Syrian Conflict | Monday, April 16 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

Seven years of conflict in Syria have exacted an enormous human toll and led to widespread physical destruction. The psychological impact of the war, although less visible, has been just as devastating. The levels of trauma and distress impacting Syrian civilians, especially children have been staggering with nearly 500,000 killed, half the population displaced and more than 13 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The traumatic impact of the Syrian conflict is less often acknowledged, but could significantly impair the ability of Syrian civilians to recover and build a more peaceful future. Syrian doctors and humanitarian relief experts have increasingly engaged on this issue and are developing new and innovative approaches to help address and heal these invisible wounds. Please join USIP and specialists from the Syrian American Medical Society, the U.S. State Department and Save the Children for a panel discussion, addressing an aspect of the Syrian conflict that often receives less attention than it deserves. Featuring Catherine Bou-Maroun (Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, DoS), Dr. Mohamed Khaled Hamza (Mental Health Committee Chair & Foundation Board Member, Syrian American Medical Society), Amy Richmond (Director, Child Protection in Emergencies, Save the Children), and Mona Yacoubian (Senior Advisor, Syria, the Middle East and North Africa, USIP) as moderator. With opening remarks by Nancy Lindborg (President, USIP).

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  1. US-Europe Cooperation and The China Challenge | Tuesday, April 17 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | The Heritage Foundation | Register here |

The U.S. and nations of Europe are allies across a range of issues that have kept much of the world free, secure and growing in prosperity for decades since the end of World War II. Is there a future for greater such cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – particularly in the face of challenges presented by China? In areas like international trade and investment, China presents American and European capitals a dilemma. It brings capital to the table, but capital laden with state ownership and support that distorts the global economic environment, sometimes to the detriment of domestic concerns. Politically, Beijing models a system of governance that runs contrary to centuries of Western political tradition, while its growing clout gives comfort to some of the world’s most repressive regimes. And in some areas, like international maritime law, Beijing threatens to overturn standards that have underpinned not only the region’s peace and prosperity, but its own. How can the U.S. and Europe promote their common values in the face of these challenges? What is the balance between cooperation with China and opposition to the negative byproducts of its rise, and can the U.S. and Europe agree on that balance? Featuring Theresa Fallon (Director, Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies), Philippe Le Corre (Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, HKS), Jamie Fly (Senior Fellow & Director, Future of Geopolitics & Asia Programs, GMF), and Walter Lohman (Director, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation) as moderator.

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  1. Democracies Under Duress: Are We Losing Central Europe? | Tuesday, April 17 | 11:00am – 12:00pm | CSIS | Register here |

Central Europe’s reintegration with the West and its commitment to democracy and the rule of law were signature foreign policy achievements in the post-Cold War era for the United States. Increasingly, European and U.S. policymakers question whether Central Europe is really committed to democratic values and principles. Corruption, nativism, anti-Semitism, and weak institutions and civil society contribute to the drift of some NATO and EU members in Central Europe toward illiberalism. Join CSIS for a timely conversation on what policy tools Washington and Brussels can use to address democratic backsliding in Central Europe. Featuring Dr. Charles Gati (Senior Research Professor of European and Eurasian Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS), David Frum (Senior Editor, The Atlantic), Radek Sikorski (Distinguished Statesman, CSIS), and Heather A. Conley (Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic & Director, Europe Program, CSIS).

This event will be webcast live.

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  1. Countering Russian Kleptocracy | Tuesday, April 17 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

Kleptocratic regimes use corruption and as a means of control at home and a weapon of influence abroad. Russian oligarchs and other Kremlin agents have become adept at exploiting the global financial system to launder illicit funds and convert them into new forms of power projection, including attacks on Western democratic institutions. The Kremlin’s attempts to influence elections have exposed a series of systemic vulnerabilities in the United States, whose national security now requires a sustained response. Hudson Institute’s new report, Countering Russian Kleptocracy, outlines policy that, if implemented, would provide a comprehensive and effective strategy to counter Moscow’s aims. Featuring Charles Davidson (Executive Director, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute), Clay Fuller (Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow, AEI), Jeffrey Gedmin (Senior Fellow, Georgetown University), Ben Judah (Research Fellow, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute), and Nate Sibley (Program Manager, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute).

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  1. Sustaining Growth in Africa: Economic Diversification, Job Creation, and Infrastructure Financing | Tuesday, April 17 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |

Improved economic and political governance, together with a favorable global external environment, over the past two decades or so, have set the foundation for Africa’s economic prosperity. Most economies across Africa responded with resilience to the 2014 commodity price shock, and the recovery is gaining momentum. However, obstacles, including jobless growth and increasing debt, loom in the distance. In its 2018 “African Economic Outlook,” the African Development Bank assesses these challenges and provides some policy recommendations, including economic diversification, development of labor-absorbing sectors, as well as investments in human capital, and in industries with high payoffs. It also recommends a focus on smart and catalytic debt management and infrastructure development. In particular, policymakers should consider institutional, regulatory and project-level challenges to infrastructure development and prioritize sectors and access given large infrastructure financing needs of $130-$170 billion, almost double the long-accepted estimate of $93 billion a year. Featuring Bongi Kunene (Executive Director, The World Bank), Alan Gelb (Senior Fellow and Director of Studies, Center for Global Development), Jeffrey Gutman (Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development), Louise Fox (Chief Economist, USAID), and Brahima Sangafowa Coulibaly (Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development & Director, Africa Growth Initiative, Brookings Institution) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Charles O. Boamah (Senior Vice President, AfDB), and a presentation by Abebe Shimeles (Manager, Macroeconomic Division, AfDB).

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  1. Politics and Policy of East Asia’s Economic Future | Thursday, April 19 | 1:90pm – 4:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |

The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the most recent, and a highly ambitious, step along a familiar road of international economic liberalization and integration through multilateral trade-plus pacts.  It promised to deepen and extend openness through commitments on trade in goods and services, investment, harmonization of national regulation on a wide range of economics-related matters labor and the environment, and robust protections for intellectual property and processes for transnational dispute resolution.

Panel 1: After the U.S. TPP “Opt-Out” 1:00 PM to 2:15 PM

Shortly after taking office, President Trump announced that the U.S. would be opting out of the TPP. Although less prominent in the U.S. and elsewhere in the West, domestic political pressures and policies favoring greater protectionism have been on the rise in some East Asian states as well. At the same time, the China-centered alternative to the once-U.S.-led TPP—the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—persists.  And the remaining members of the TPP have determined to go forward without the United States.  All of this has been occurring against the backdrop of the WTO’s fading as a force for global economic liberalization. What do these developments portend for economic relations within East Asia and U.S. economic relations with the region? Featuring Inu Manak (Visiting Scholar, Cato Institute), Derek Scissors (Resident Scholar, AEI; Chief Economist, China Beige Book), Bruce Hirsh (Principal and Founder, Tailwind Global Strategies), and Jacques deLisle (Director, Asia Program, FPRI; Professor of Law and Political Science and Deputy Director, Center for the Study of Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania) as moderator.

Panel 2: Looking to the Future 2:30 PM to 3:45 PM

The politics of international economic policy have created much uncertainty.  But this is far from the only, or potentially the most disruptive, force in play.  Technological transformation, the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and kindred developments pose additional challenges and impetuses for change.  These shifts are potentially especially significant in East Asia. The region is home to many of the world’s most dynamic economies, has long been a hub of technological innovation, and now faces the consequences of China’s ambitious agenda to create an “innovation economy.”  What do these trends and possible future developments portend for economies in East Asia? Featuring Eleonore Pauwels (Director of the Anticipatory Intelligence (AI ) Lab, Science and Technology Innovation Program, Wilson Center), Samm Sacks (Senior Fellow, Technology Policy Program, CSIS), Robert Atkinson (Founder and President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation), and Shihoko Goto (Senior Northeast Asia Associate, Asia Program, Wilson Center) as moderator.

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  1. China’s Growing Influence in the Indian Ocean: Implications for the U.S. and Its Regional Allies | Friday, April 12 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

For a long time, the Indian Ocean was considered a secondary concern with less strategic value than other parts of the region. This view is rapidly changing, driven in large part by China’s entry into the Indian Ocean. Recently, China signed an almost century-long lease of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, demonstrating its interest in establishing a long-term presence in the region. China is already deploying warships in the Indian Ocean and playing a more active role in regional conflicts. The Hudson Institute is delighted to host a panel to discuss the growing strategic relevance of the Indian Ocean and the implications for the U.S. and its regional allies. Featuring Toshi Yoshihara (Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments), Asanga Abeyagoonasekera (Director General, Institute of National Security Studies of Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence), Aparna Pande (Research Fellow and Director, Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, Hudson Institute), Satoru Nagao (Visiting Fellow, Hudson Institute), and Jonas Parello-Plesner (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute) as moderator.

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Delay can be good

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 12, 2018 - 0 Comment

Yesterday’s bravado has given way to today’s hesitation. President Trump tweeted this morning:

Never said when an attack on Syria would take place. Could be very soon or not so soon at all!

This kind of inconsistency creates confusion and uncertainty that can undermine US standing in the world and even contribute to crisis escalation. Flip-flops are no better in diplomacy than they are in domestic politics. In addition, the delay has given the Syrian government time to park its aircraft and other assets close by the Russians, whom the Americans will not want to hit.

But this particular delay could still be a good thing, if it gives Washington time to do three things:

  • Assemble unequivocal evidence that Syrian President Assad was responsible for the chemical attack last week on Douma;
  • Plan a serious combined military and diplomatic campaign to end at least the use of chemical weapons in Syria, if not the war itself;
  • Rally domestic as well as international support for that combined campaign.

I don’t see much sign that the US is working on any of these things, but it should.* This post is about what Washington should be doing now, before any military action.

First is to gather the evidence. Intelligence doesn’t flow instantaneously. Materials often have to be translated and analyzed, not the least for veracity. Many countries may have collected against Syrian targets. To put together an unclassified version of the evidence against the Syrian government, cleared by all those agencies and governments that have contributed something, takes time and concentration.

That material should then be presented publicly, first and foremost to the Congress. Members on both sides of the aisle are nervous about allowing the President to act without at least Congressional consultation, if not approval. They fear another exclusively presidential decision, like last year’s cruise missile attack on the Syrian base that had launched a sarin attack, would set an undesirable precedent for military action against North Korea and Iran. Some in Congress are also loathe to do anything that will get the US more involved in Syria, as the President has also been. Americans are not keen on taking on more responsibility for that devastated country.

Evidence against Bashar al Assad also needs to be presented internationally, both in classified and unclassified formats. France and the UK are thought to be considering participation in military action. Others, like Germany and Saudi Arabia, have good reason to be sympathetic with the US even if they are reluctant to participate. Russia de facto controls Syrian air defenses, which have mostly stood idly by while the US and especially Israel flies at will over and near Syria. If Moscow can be convinced to continue to hold its fire, Assad will be more chastened. It is not only cruise missiles that send a message.

A one-off strike, tightly targeted on those who launched the chemical attack on Douma, will do no more this year than last year. Assad is fighting not only to hold on to power, but also for his life. Only the prospect of a broad, sustained military campaign against his capabilities will affect his calculations about using chemical weapons, which are important to him because he is short of manpower after 7 years of war. The Administration needs to be asking whether targeting the presidential palace (with or without a warning) or the Syrian Air Force intelligence facilities that plan chemical attacks would send a stronger message than targeting just runways and aircraft.

The Administration also needs to consider what happens if Russians or Iranians or their proxies are killed, intentionally or unintentionally. Does the US have the capability to respond to escalation? Would it want to do so? Is it prepared for what Russia might do in Ukraine, the Baltics or the Balkans? Does it have the capability to respond to what Iran and its proxies might do in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, or even inside the US?

The Syrian conflict has widened from non-violent protests against autocracy to a civil war and now to a geopolitical contest between some of the most powerful states on earth. It behooves the US to think carefully about the many diplomatic, political, and military consequences that may follow from military action. Once it has carefully chosen a course of action, it needs to assemble as much support as possible and move decisively, not only in Syria but also defensively worldwide.

*Curt Mills at The National Interest attributes the hesitation to domestic, rightwing pressure. I suspect he is correct.

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Dare to dream

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 6, 2018 - 1 Comment

Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High  Strategy Conference, March 29 -30: 

A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem?  Madness,  or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:

Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences

The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.

The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.

The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.

Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making

The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:

  1. Defining the problem: what threat was Libya’ s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Europe’s security? Is today’s Libya a security provider for Europe?
  2. A clear political goal: what do we want to achieve? What does success consist of?
  3. A clear line between wishful thinking and what is possible: no early “mission accomplished” fireworks.
  4. Political objectives matched by appropriate economic, political, and military means.

Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors

The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.

Proposal:  a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean

The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.

Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.

Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a  regional security arrangement, no matter how  impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.

We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”

We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the  Helsinki Process. China should also participate.

Nuclear proliferation

The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.

Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good.  However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.

Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty

First : The elaboration and adoption of a  binding multilateral  treaty for  the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).

Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.

Ballistic missiles and conventional forces

Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.

Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”

This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”

We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international  inspections and observation of military exercises.

Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system

The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.

Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest.  Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.

Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated

Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global  risks, balance of power and capabilities.

Conclusion

We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.

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The R word in practice

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 4, 2018 - 0 Comment

Natasa Kandic yesterday sent around a policy brief on How the European Union Can Contribute to Reconciliation of Post-Yugoslav Countries. It starts with a review of judicial proceedings in the region and continues on to this account of RECOM, an indigenous effort at non-judicial reconciliation that merits more attention than it has gotten. So I have taken the liberty of publishing that part of the policy brief here:

An Extrajudicial Fact-Finding and Truth-Telling
Body (RECOM)

The regional intergovernmental commission for the establishment of the facts about victims and the circumstances of their death (RECOM), should by its seal prevent the political manipulations and interpretations that jeopardize connectivity and cooperation. This would reduce room for lies, denial, and the production of nationalist narratives about the wars, and contribute to the humanization of the other, the stability and security of the region and the sustainability of economic cooperation, and at the same time enable reforms of educational programs in those parts concerning recent history.

In 2008, non-governmental organizations from the former Yugoslavia established the Coalition for RECOM, which today includes more than 2,100 organizations and individuals and advocates the establishment of a Regional Commission for the Establishment of the Facts on War Crimes and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights Committed in the Territory the Former Yugoslavia (RECOM). The initiative for the establishment of the Commission has been supported by the signatures of over 580,000 citizens from the entire region, and, following a broadly inclusive, four-year consultation process (during which 128 debates were held with 6,700 representatives of civil society), the goals, tasks, competence, duration and procedures of the future intergovernmental commission have been formulated. Starting from this foundation, the final version of the Draft Statute of RECOM was agreed in 2014 by the Special Envoys of the Presidents of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, and the Bosniak and Croat members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the meantime, two new members of the Presidency (2014) were elected in BiH, with which the Coalition for RECOM has not yet managed to hold a meeting, while the Bosniak Presidency member has continued to support the establishment of RECOM. A new President was elected in Croatia in 2015 who believes that support for the establishment of RECOM is outside the scope of the competence of the President. In this situation, in which some newly elected politicians have ceased to support civil initiatives that enjoyed the support of their predecessors, the Coalition for RECOM has created a new strategy, which starts from the affirmation of the Berlin Process as being an appropriate platform for the agreement of post-Yugoslav leaders to launch an intergovernmental project for reconciliation. The first step is to be the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of RECOM at the Berlin Process Summit in London in July 2018, by which the post-Yugoslav countries’ Prime Ministers, whose support would remain unchangeable (independent of elections), would demonstrate the willingness of their states to initiate procedures for the establishment of RECOM, in accordance with Article 48 of the Draft Statute. An equally important step is to re-engage Croatia in the RECOM process, in which it played a leading role until the beginning of 2015.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The progress in the reconciliation of post-Yugoslav countries requires the following:

1. Strengthening of the domestic judiciaries and their cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes:
– Support for the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) becoming the engine of regional cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes – to assist in the creation of a regional prosecutorial strategy, to provide easier access to evidence and facts established before the ICTY, and to provide expert support in investigations and in the preparation of indictments against individuals who participated in the planning of mass crimes but today hold positions that protect them from criminal responsibility.
– Resolving bilateral disputes between Serbia and Croatia by signing a bilateral agreement on the prosecution of war crimes, according to which the trials would be held on the basis of the defendant’s domicile, thus in practice eliminating the possible harmful consequences of the application of the universal jurisdiction principle contained in the law of the Republic of Serbia and the Croatian Law on the invalidity of legal acts produced in Serbia.
– The relinquishment by the BiH Presidency of the principle of territorial jurisdiction and acceptance of the standard whereby each state holds trials of its citizens, since this approach contributes the most to critical re-examination within the society and facing its own responsibility towards others.

2. Signing a political agreement by which the post-Yugoslav countries will undertake to create the conditions for the establishment of RECOM within a reasonable time frame:
– Signing of the agreement under the auspices of the Berlin Process at the London Summit in July 2018. The agreement should include the possibility of later accession, as well as an invitation to the other countries in this regard.
– Increasing the visibility of the objectives and tasks of the future Commission, especially the importance of the list of war victims in the context of the humanization of the victims and the public recognition of all 130,000 victims.

3. The action plan of the European Commission’s Western Balkans Strategy for a credible enlargement perspective should provide for explicit measures:
– To support the establishment and operation of the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts on war crimes and other serious human rights violations in the territory of the former SFRY in the period from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2001 (RECOM), and to define the establishment and commencement of the work of this commission by the end of 2019 as an indicator of progress in the process of reconciliation;
– To support the cooperation of the domestic prosecutors’ offices with the MICT in the creation and implementation of the regional prosecutorial strategy, and define the development of the strategy by mid-2019 as an indicator of progress in establishing the rule of law and contribution to the reconciliation process.

4. The European Parliament should provide strong support to reconciliation in the region
through a resolution that would support the establishment and operation of the
regional intergovernmental commission – RECOM.

5. The European Commission and the European Parliament should organize a donor conference and the establishment of the Post-Yugoslav Reconciliation Fund, which would finance regional projects focusing on peace-building and common issues and include all post-Yugoslav countries.

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Next year in Jerusalem

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 2, 2018 - 1 Comment

Israel’s use of deadly force against mostly nonviolent Gaza demonstrators on Friday raises lots of questions: as none of the Palestinians succeeded in crossing the border fence, why did the IDF use live ammunition? They claim to have fired only on those using violence or trying to cross into Israel, but on the Gaza side there are lots of videos and eye witnesses contradicting that claim. Was the Israeli government focused on violent militants, or was it really trying to frighten masses of nonviolent Palestinians away from the demonstrations? “Violence” in this instance seems to refer to throwing of stones, but the Israelis present seem to have been well out of range. Burning tires and approaching the border fence are definitely not violent or terrorist acts. Why are they being referred to as such?

I suppose we’ll never know the answers to these questions, as the Israelis will not allow an independent investigation. They appear to me genuinely frightening by the prospect of thousands of Palestinian refugees walking peacefully into Israel and claiming their rights to land their grandparents left, or were compelled to leave, in 1948. The Israelis are determined not only to stop that kind of popular protest, even if peaceful, but also to scare Palestinians into submission. Doing so redounds to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s benefit in domestic politics: his supporters are unconcerned with the deaths of Palestinians and devoted to an expansive vision of Israel’s security needs.

During my visits to both Israel and Palestine in January, I was unable to visit Gaza, but talked with a nonviolent activist who lives there. Gaza is desperate. Even the White House recognizes that the conditions in which its two million people are living–without adequate clean water, little electricity, limited medical care, and few jobs–are unacceptable. Who would not want to demonstrate? The Israelis and the Palestinian Authority would like the refugees to blame Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2006. Hamas is supporting the demonstrations, trying to deflect criticism for its governance failures. It seems to be succeeding, not least because it too uses violence and brooks little opposition.

Of course Palestinian lives matter to the friends, families, and communities from which they come. The fifteen or more reported killed Friday will have hundreds if not thousands of relatives and personal acquaintances who will mourn them, in addition to a far wider circle who feel they are martyrs to the Palestinian cause. Will future protests attract more than the 30,000 or so who attended the first demonstration? The plan has been to repeat them until May 15, the day Israelis celebrate the country’s 1948 independence while Palestinians mark the nakba (catastrophe).

But Palestinian lives matter in other respects too. Israel may be an electoral democracy, but it is not a liberal democracy that treats everyone as having equal rights. This matters because its friends in Europe and the US shouldn’t settle for less. Either Israel needs to treat the Palestinians whose Gaza and West Bank territory it embargoes as equal to its own citizens, or it has to let them establish their own state and allow them to govern it as they see fit, so long as it doesn’t threaten Israel. For most American Jews, there is no acceptable in-between, as Ron Lauder recently pointed out. Most of us will not support an increasingly theocratic Israel in which Palestinian lives don’t matter.

It is ironic that the Jewish and Palestinian historical narratives are mirror images of each other. The Jews were exiled almost two thousand years ago and now feel it is time to reclaim their ancient lands. The Palestinians were exiled 70 years ago, from lands they had occupied for most of those two thousand years. “Next year in Jerusalem,” the cry with which Jews finished the Passover Seder Friday evening, could just as well be uttered by Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom do not have the permit required to reach the Haram al Sharif. It is time for all of us to acknowledge the others’ aspirations. Palestinian lives do matter.

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A more coherent approach

Posted in Sebastian Gerlach - March 27, 2018 - 0 Comment

Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union are under strain. In light of continuous US support for the Kurdish YPG, Washington and Ankara are split over the way forward in Syria. Due to President Erdogan’s hostile rhetoric and increasingly authoritarian governing style, policy makers in Europe have advocated a suspension or even end of Turkey’s accession process to the EU.

Still, Ankara and its Western partner need each other. Turkey depends on the EU as a market, and cannot adequately address the Syrian refugee crisis as well as conflict at its southern border without Western support. Washington and European policy makers rely on Turkey as a pivotal member of NATO to provide stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Where is the relationship headed?

On March 26, the Brookings Institutions convened a panel of experts to discuss how the West should handle its important but challenging ally. Eric Edelman, former US ambassador to Turkey and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Kemal Kirişci, director of the Turkey Project at Brookings, Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at Brookings, and Stephen F. Szabo, senior fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, offered their perspectives on the future of relations between Turkey and the West. Lisel Hintz, assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies, moderated the discussion. A recording of the event is available online.

 

 

Domestic politics in Turkey drive the country’s relations with its Western partners. Eric Edelman highlights that Erdogan’s domestic agenda of establishing a presidential system has determined Ankara’s stance towards Washington and Brussels. The Turkish president utilizes sentiments against the West to rally support for his political project. In particular, Erdogan has stirred up anti-Americanism to mobilize voters and will likely draw again on nationalistic rhetoric ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2019.

Edelman proposes that the United States should adopt a more transactional approach towards Ankara. Washington has so far remained silent about Erdogan’s political game and expected that “if Turkey is treated like an ally, it will behave like an ally.” This perception has proven false. Thus, the United States must increase pressure on Ankara. For instance, Washington could close one of Turkey’s consulates. This would both send a clear message to Erdogan and provide the United States with leverage.

Sloat counters that pressure alone cannot work. She stresses that a purely transactional approach has limitations as it could undermine the West’s efforts to promote the rule of law and good governance. Likewise, abandoning Turkey by either forcing it to leave NATO or ending the EU accession process is not a good option, as it would diminish US and EU leverage over Ankara. Rather, they should pursue a policy of constructive engagement. Washington has to address relations with Turkey from a broader perspective, which goes beyond security-related issues. Moreover, policy makers in both the United States and Europe should acknowledge the utility of engaging with a broad section of Turkish society and increase their outreach to civil society.

Kemal Kirişci highlights that the EU already has considerable leverage over Turkey. The EU is by far the biggest market for Turkish goods, absorbing almost 50% of the country’s exports. Likewise, there are significant Turkish communities in the EU that affect politics in Turkey. Erdogan, who relies on a good performance of the Turkish economy to maintain domestic supremacy, recognizes this dependency relationship.

Szabo hence argues that Western states should follow the example of Germany. Berlin has consistently emphasized the importance of the rule of law when dealing with Ankara. At the same time, the economic powerhouse of Europe has pursued a transactional approach, using its role as a major market for Turkish goods to press Erdogan for concessions. Moreover, Berlin has adopted a long-term view towards Turkey. Instead of simply formulating a rather reactive and shortsighted Erdogan strategy, Germany follows a comprehensive Turkey strategy that looks beyond the president’s time in power.

The West’s biggest challenge in handling Turkey is internal division and confusion. Szabo stresses that growing anti-Turkish sentiments among Germany’s population compromise Berlin’s foresighted approach. Kirişci points out that the erosion of the rule of law and liberalism within the EU has helped Erdogan to push his authoritarian agenda. Likewise, discrepancies in US policies have damaged Washington’s credibility among Turkish policy makers. Edelmann adds that any approach towards Turkey will fail as long as the US government does not sing from the same song sheet. Turkish consternation about conflicting statements concerning Washington’s support for the Kurdish YPG in Syria exemplifies this shortcoming, Sloat says.

Turkey under President Erdogan is certainly a difficult partner. Inconsistent policies in the West have aggravated this challenge. The United States and EU are advised to pursue a more coherent approach towards Ankara. This will ameliorate current strains and potentially bring about positive change within Turkey. The West should not waste this opportunity.

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