Tag: European Union
Peace picks, March 26 – April 1
- Will the Russians Meddle in Latin American Elections? | Monday, March 26 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) | Register here |
2018 will see presidential elections in several countries across Latin America, notably in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela. This event will discuss Russia’s strategic interests in Latin America, including how the region should prepare for potential Russian meddling in upcoming presidential elections. Featuring Javier Lesaca (Visiting Scholar, School of Media and Public Affairs, GWU) and David Salvo (Resident Fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, GMF).
This event will be webcast live.
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- The New Geopolitics of Turkey and the West | Monday, March 26 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union are under significant strain, and they are likely to remain difficult ahead of Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for 2019. Ankara and Washington remain at loggerheads over the way forward in Syria; several EU member states have been calling for an end to the accession process; and Turkey’s domestic politics are raising further questions about Turkey’s place in the trans-Atlantic alliance. Yet, there is much at stake: Turkey is facing threats from terrorism, struggling to manage 3.5 million Syrian refugees, and dealing with the aftermath of a failed coup. Europe and the United States have shared interests in addressing regional challenges with Turkey, especially as Russia seeks to expand its influence in the region. So how should the West handle this important but challenging ally? Featuring Eric Edelman (Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, SAIS), Kemal Kirişci (Director, The Turkey Project, Brookings), Amanda Sloat (Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe), and Stephen F. Szabo (Senior Fellow, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies). Lisel Hintz (Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies, SAIS) will moderate the discussion.
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- US in a Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria: Realigning Allies and Constraining Adversaries | Monday, March 26 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In the Post-ISIS Middle East, Iran, Bashar al-Assad, and Russia continue to pose challenges for the U.S. as the Trump Administration develops its policy for Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s expansion of its Syria operations has the U.S. and NATO allies concerned that Turkish actions in the region run counter to NATO goals. Additionally, cooperation between Russia and Iran continues to disrupt the balance of power in the region. Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore U.S. options to realign our allies with traditional NATO and U.S. positions, hold adversaries responsible for atrocities, and prevent security backsliding in the region. Featuring Hillel Fradkin (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Michael Pregent (Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute), Jennifer Cafarella (Senior Intelligence Planner, Institute for the Study of War), and Dr. Nahro Zagros (Vice President, Soran University).
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- Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria | Monday, March 26 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Widespread violence has plagued Nigeria over the years, with an epicenter of activity in northeast parts of the country. Much of this violence is related to the Boko Haram insurgency, although other battles between ethnic groups have also intensified, largely over land and partly due to a growing drought. Despite some success by Nigerian security forces in tamping down violence, lives continue to be lost and communities displaced. All of this is ongoing as the country prepares to hold elections next year. Featuring Alexandra Lamarche (Advocate, Refugees International), Mark Yarnell (UN Liaison and Senior Advocate, Refugees International), and Vanda Felbab-Brown (Senior Fellow, Brookings). Michael O’Hanlon (Senior Fellow, Brookings) will moderate the conversation, while adding his own perspectives.
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- Russian Influence in Moldova | Monday, March 26 | 3:30pm – 5:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Since emerging from the Soviet Union as an independent country, the Republic of Moldova has faced various challenges. Moldova, together with Ukraine and Georgia, were “captive nations” of the former Soviet Union; today, the three countries are still affected by Russian interference. For Moldova, the autonomous region of Transnistria raises questions regarding the state’s path forward with various international bodies, and the Kremlin still has clear influence in Moldovan politics. With Moldovan parliamentary elections approaching this year, the stakes are high for Moldova’s future as a free, whole, and secure European state. Featuring Ambassador John Herbst (Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council), Dr. William Hill (Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Professor, National Defense University), Dumitru Mînzărari (State Secretary for Defense Policy and International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Moldova), and Agnieszka Gmys-Wiktor (Program Officer, National Endowment for Democracy). Mark Simakovsky (Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council and Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies) will moderate the discussion.
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- Elections in Tunisia and Hope for Democratic Reform | Thursday, March 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Leading up to long-awaited municipal elections, Tunisia is at a crossroads. The beginning of 2018 saw widespread protests and social unrest in both cities and rural areas, as economic stagnation and unemployment continue to worsen. However, the vote currently set for May 6 signals an opportunity for Tunisian youth, women, and minorities to make their voices heard. How might the elections encourage confidence among Tunisians in a transparent democratic process? Could the results promote or undermine Tunisia’s fragile stability? How can the international community better support Tunisia and its government to address the rising social tensions? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Ambassador Fayçal Gouia (Ambassador of Tunisia to the United States) and Elie Abouaoun (Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, USIP) for a panel discussion to examine Tunisia’s political challenges—both local and national—ahead of the elections. Paul Salem (Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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- Securing Their Roles: Women in Constitution-Making | Thursday, March 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Women’s participation in drafting constitutions leads to more equitable legal frameworks and socially inclusive reforms, laying the groundwork for sustainable peace. Yet new research from Inclusive Security reveals that while 75 conflict-affected countries oversaw significant reform processes between 1995-2015, only one in five constitutional drafters in these environments have been women. As actors from Syria, Libya, and other countries marked by violence are taking steps towards building new constitutions, USIP and Inclusive Security are convening a panel to draw out lessons for policymakers by discussing women’s roles in constitution-making, gender equality in constitutional provisions – including in relation to constitutions developed with an Islamic identity—and their implications for long-term, inclusive peace and security. Featuring Palwasha Kakar (Senior Program Officer, Religion and Inclusive Societies, USIP), Marie O’Reilly (Director of Research & Analysis, Inclusive Security), Amira Yahyaoui (Founder, Al Bawsala), and Jason Gluck (Policy Specialist, Political Dialogues and Constitutional Processes, UNDP). Carla Koppell (Vice President, Applied Conflict Transformation, USIP) will moderate the discussion.
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- Ukraine’s Future Leaders on the Front-lines of Change | Thursday, March 29 | 4:00pm – 5:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
In the four years since the end of the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine has not answered its most important question: how will the country ensure democratic values in its future development? Much of Ukraine’s hope lies in its young leaders who will drive the country forward in the coming years. Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) has been fortunate to provide a year-long residency to some of these future leaders as part of the inaugural year of the Center’s Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program. This event will feature this year’s Ukrainian leaders Oleksandra Matviichuk (Chairwoman, Center for Civil Liberties), Dmytro Romanovych (Member, Reform Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), and Olexandr Starodubtsev (Head, Public Procurement Regulation Department, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine). They will each discuss their own perspectives on opportunities and challenges to democracy and development in their home country, as well as objectives for strengthening public administration, civil society, and economic reforms upon their return to Ukraine With introductory remarks by Ambassador John Herbst (Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council) and a keynote address by Dr. Francis Fukuyama (Mosbacher Director, CDDRL, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University). Melinda Haring (Editor, UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council) will moderate the discussion.
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- After Syria: The United States, Russia, and the Future of Terrorism | Friday, March 29 | 10:00am -11:30am | Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with EastWest Institute | Register here |
The collapse of Islamic State control in Syria has been hailed in both Russia and the United States as a victory over terrorism. Both credit their country’s military involvement with victory. But the war that continues in Syria also lays bare Moscow and Washington’s conflicting definitions and approaches when it comes to terrorism, insurgency, and combat operations. Moreover, even if a path to stabilization in that country is found, America and Russia will continue to face terrorism and terrorists at home and abroad. The ways in which these two crucial countries respond as the threat evolves will shape both their own polities and the world as a whole. Featuring Dr. Kim Cragin (Senior Research Fellow for Counterterrorism, National Defense University), Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova (Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of World Economy and International Relations), Dr. Irina Zvyagelskaya (chief research fellow, Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies), and Dr. Seth Jones (Harold Brown Chair; Director, Transnational Threats Project; and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS). Dr. Olga Oliker (Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS) will moderate the discussion.
This event will be webcast live.
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More pushback needed
This weekend, after winning a campaign against no serious opponents, Vladimir Putin celebrated winning his fourth term as President of Russia. With another six years leading Russia, what course will Putin follow? Given Putin’s increasingly aggressive tone since the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, will this continue with regard to Russia’s neighbors?
To explore that question, an American Enterprise Institute group of experts on post-Soviet states drafted To Have and to Hold: Putin’s Quest for Control in the Former Soviet Empire. The project focuses on six post-Soviet states that remain vulnerable to Russian influence: the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, Southeastern European states of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, and a lone state in Central Asia, Kazakhstan. The report includes two chapters on each of the six states, the first describing that nation’s importance to Russia, while the second describes the likely means by which Russia could press its interests.
On Wednesday, March 14, AEI debuted its report at an event featuring five of its authors: Leon Aron, resident scholar and director of Russian studies at AEI; Agnia Grigas of the Atlantic Council, who wrote a chapter on Estonia; Michael Kofman of the CNA Corporation and the Wilson Center, writer of a chapter on Ukraine; Mihai Popsoi of the University of Milan, author of two chapters on Moldova; and Paul Stronski from the Carnegie Endowment, whose chapter centered on Kazakhstan. Joining the authors was Representative Seth Moulton of Massachusetts, who opened the panel by speaking to his own observations on the Russian threat to the United States and allies in Eastern Europe, with Leon Aron acting as moderator. A video recording of the event can be seen here:
Takeaways:
Russia seeks to extend its regional influence by any means possible. Despite the nearly three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin views the USSR’s successor states as indisputably within Russia’s sphere of influence. Putin’s grand project is to reestablish Russian control over its former territories – anything less is inadequate. As in Ukraine, Russia approaches any state moving away from its hegemony as a Western-sponsored provocation. Though Grigas argued that Putin’s government doesn’t truly believe its own rhetoric, the effect is the same. Kofman warned that Putin still has not given up on Ukraine; he predicted the possibility of a larger Russian war against Ukraine if its attempts to manipulate politics there fail.
Russian overreach in Ukraine has hindered its influence across the region. Russia’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 opened a new chapter in Russia’s relations with its neighbors. The increased tension between Russia and the West has soured relations with even Russia’s closest allies. Belarus, whose president Alexander Lukashenko is Putin’s closest foreign ally, has sought to carve out a moderate role between Russia and Europe. To this Putin has responded coldly, introducing restrictions on trade and passport control on Belarussian travelers to Russia. With Putin’s aggressive reputation and Russia’s economic slowdown dragging on the social contract in Belarus and Kazakhstan, Stronski suggested that their respective governments are now searching for alternatives.
When Putin cannot win subservience, he seeks to destabilize. In Moldova, which holds only small symbolic or economic importance for Putin, Russia has instead achieved its aims by fracturing the small nation politically. Russian sponsorship of select Moldovan political parties and media companies has enabled Putin to engineer a Moldova that exists in a gray zone internationally – too chaotic to be a full Russian ally, too corrupt to be an EU member. As Popsoi noted, in Putin’s eyes, cultivating weakness in Russia’s neighbors is an alternative to building international friendship. Despite legal requirements, the Eurasian Union has not stopped Russia from blocking dairy products from Belarus and dumping cheap products in Kazakhstan.
What happens in Eastern Europe also affects America. Congressman Moulton described the Russian threat to America as “very, very real,” calling AEI’s monograph “required reading” for US policymakers. In Moulton’s assessment, the American government’s measures to defend its Eastern European allies have not kept up with Russian strategies – American money is going to buy too many tanks and missiles where cybersecurity is needed. Congress has started a few clear-sighted initiatives – Moulton spoke approvingly of the bipartisan Countering Foreign Propaganda Act, in particular – but those efforts have been too much “tinkering around the edges” to be effective.
Without decisive American pushback, Russian attempts to undermine its rivals will likely only grow bolder in the near future.
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Serious diplomacy needed
Turkish President Erdogan is wrong about many things: the post-coup-attempt crackdown, his flirtation with Russia, his inattention to widespread corruption, and his effort to rule Turkey without a serious opposition. Turkey has clearly moved away from the promising European path he started out on and turned instead to its Middle Eastern roots, which are much less salubrious for both its citizens and its leadership. Nationalism and despotism have bad records, even if they build nice palaces. Freedom and respect for minority rights has a far better record, even if they don’t always win elections.
That said, Erdogan is not wrong about everything. His concern about the Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey, and the assistance it gets from Syria, is well-founded. The insurgency’s main protagonists, the PKK and its PYD Syrian allies, have long frustrated the Turkish security forces and would be glad to do it again if given an opportunity. This is no peaceful uprising. The PKK is well-armed and kills lots of people. The US, as well as Turkey and the European Union, regard it as a terrorist group.
The United States has equipped and trained the PYD fighters (known as the YPG) to fight the Islamic State inside Syria, where the Kurds have been remarkably successful with American air, intelligence, logistic and other support. That fight, however, is now largely completed. The task now is to stabilize the areas taken from the Islamic State, many of which are predominantly Arab, not Kurdish. One is a particular bone of contention with Turkey: Manbij, which lies west of the Euphrates river less than 25 miles south of the Turkish border.
Secretary of State Tillerson spent the better part of the past two days talking with the Turks. He now has likely heard more about Manbij than he would want to remember, as did National Security Adviser McMaster on a recent visit. Ankara wants the Kurds out of Manbij, a mostly Arab town of about 100,000 before the war. That is what Vice President Biden promised the Turks in the summer of 2016. He said the Kurds would move east of the Euphrates and stay there, thus preventing them from moving westward to link up Afrin, a majority Kurdish enclave, with the rest of what the Kurds call Rojava, the PYD-dominated parastate that extends along the Turkish order from the Euphrates eastward.
The Turkish view is that the US made a commitment on Manbij to a NATO ally that has to be fulfilled. The American generals, to whom the President has delegated so much authority, aren’t interested in pushing too hard on their Syrian Kurdish friends, who want to control as much of Turkey’s southern border as possible. To add insult to injury, some of those Kurdish friends have been moving westward through Syrian government controlled territory to confront the Turkish forces in Afrin.
It is difficult for Americans to see Erdogan in a positive light these days, but restoring good relations with Turkey should now be a priority. Quite apart from any promises made about Manbij, the Turks are allowing the Americans to use their bases from which to fly the combat support they need in eastern Syria, including the planes that last week blunted an Iranian/Russian/Syrian attack on US forces and their Kurdish friends. Loss of access, or even new limitations on US use of Turkish bases, could change the military situation in eastern Syria dramatically.
Can we solve the Kurdish puzzle in a way that meets Turkey’s needs? We should certainly try, by getting the Syrian Kurds to leave Manbij, ending the flow of their fighters to Afrin, and extracting from them a serious commitment not to support attacks inside Turkey. The Turks would have to pitch in by ending their offensive in Afrin, which isn’t going well, re-establishing the ceasefire with the PKK, and restarting peace talks.
That’s a tall order. Tillerson needs to stop gutting the State Department and get busy trying to deliver some serious diplomatic results.
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Do it now
The German foreign minister this week gave Kosovo an early 10th birthday present (the date is February 17). Sigmar Gabriel said in Pristina:
If Serbia wants to move toward the European Union, the building of the rule of law is a primary condition, but naturally also the acceptance of Kosovo’s independence. That is a central condition to take the path toward Europe.
Everyone has known this for a long time, though Serbian politicians like to deny they have ever heard it. Dutch, Swedish and other EU diplomats have told me they have clearly and repeatedly made this point in private. Plus it is no secret that ratification of Serbian accession to the EU in the Bundestag and several other parliaments isn’t going to happen without acceptance of Kosovo’s independence.
The time has come to make the point loudly and publicly. Belgrade has already accepted that Kosovo will qualify for EU membership separately from Serbia, which certainly implies its de facto independence. But some in Serbia may still be imagining that the EU would be prepared to do what it did for Cyprus: allow a derogation for part of its “sovereign” territory. There is absolutely no European interest in doing that , but illusions die hard in the Balkans.
Now is the time to dissipate the illusion that Belgrade can continue to put off the issue, hoping it will somehow go away. It won’t. If Serbia has not yet accepted Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by the time Belgrade is completing its negotiations for EU accession, it can expect absolutely nothing in return. All the leverage then will be with Germany and the others who insist on acceptance of Kosovo’s status as an independent state. Slovenia and Croatia have already been through that wringer, and Montenegro is preparing itself: all prospective EU members have to cede on the last remaining issues before accession.
Kosovo will still then face the Spanish hurdle. Madrid has foolishly suggested there is a parallel between Catalonia and Kosovo, an analogy that only holds up if Madrid wants its treatment of Catalonia to be seen in the same light as Milosevic’s treatment of Kosovo. But Madrid is also saying that it can accept whatever Belgrade deems acceptable. That will also be true for the four other EU members that have not yet recognized Kosovo.
The time has come for as many EU members as possible to make it clear in public: Serbia cannot become a member until it completely normalizes its relations with Kosovo, which means diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives. Doing so now would be a major contribution to maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans.
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Frustrated expectations
Iran is in a state of upheaval. In January, a wave of nationwide anti-regime protests kept the country in suspense. These protests were more radical than prior demonstrations of discontent. They called often for the overthrow of the entire political system and occurred in areas considered to be strongholds of the regime. This challenge has upset the ruling cadre of the Islamic Republic, who reacted both with repression and confusion. The regime has brutally cracked down on dissidents, as the alleged murder of the prominent academic Kavous Seyed Emami exemplifies. Yet part of the regime has also signaled readiness for concessions, as President Hassan Rouhani’s proposal for a referendum on Iran’s political system demonstrates. A power struggle both on the streets and within the regime appears to be ongoing.
Where is Iran heading?
On February 12, the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative hosted a panel discussion on “Iran’s Political Future” in light of the recent protests. Moderated by the Initiative’s Director Barbara Slavin, panelists Nazila Fathi, an Iranian-Canadian journalist and author, Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings Institution, and Alireza Nader, researcher at Rand Corporation, offered their insights on the current state of affairs and prospects for political reform in Iran. (A full recording of the event can be seen here.)
Alireza Nader expects further instability in light of an increasingly agitated population but argues that the political system in Iran will remain in place. The Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) has become Iran’s key decision-maker and has a strong interest in maintaining the current order. President Rouhani, on the other hand, is weak and diminished. He is isolated among the establishment and has lost popular support, given his meager track record. Iranians are increasingly disillusioned. People are aware of widespread corruption and demand accountability as well as economic stability. The political establishment is however unable to deliver, and the deteriorating economic situation will only spur further discontent. The regime is in a “lose-lose situation” and a deeper crisis is merely a matter of time.
Nazila Fathi likewise stresses that the Iranian regime is facing a fundamental crisis. The recent protests have demonstrated that the Islamic Republic’s ruling cadre is losing its grip on even its core supporters. Corruption and mismanagement have devastated the economy and caused widespread unemployment, particularly in rural areas where strong support for the regime has suffered. Support for the Basij and the IRGC has dropped. The regime is unable to respond to this new challenge. In its search for scapegoats, it attacks environmentalists such as Kavous Seyed Emami and uses violence to distract attention. A change of the political system is still unlikely due to the IRGC’s political, economic, and military strength. The Islamic Republic will remain, though the structure of its top leadership might see modification. Fathi believes that there will not be another Supreme Leader after Grand Ayatollah Khameini; rather, a supreme council will take over.
According to Suzanne Maloney, Iran faces a trap of unfulfilled expectations. The country’s political system cannot be reformed since the unelected institutions are unwilling to give up power. The regime has consistently advocated social justice but failed on its promise. The latest episode of this story is the JCPOA and the unfulfilled peace dividend. This has caused great frustration among ordinary Iranians. Since the political system offers no accountability mechanism, they have begun to question the legitimacy of the regime.
The panel agreed that the United States must carefully chose its response to this uncertain situation. Maloney argues that the US government should scold Tehran over human rights violations. Yet Washington should not go after the JCPOA, but rather lift the travel ban. Nader emphasizes the need for tougher sanctions on the IRGC business empire. Fathi underscores Europe’s role in exerting pressure in Iran. Only if the United States and its European allies act in concert, will Tehran change.
The recent protests in Iran have highlighted the Islamic Republic’s fragility, but the regime is crisis-tested. It was able to survive the Green Movement of 2009, widespread student protests in the late 1990s, and the turmoil surrounding Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s succession. Iran’s current leadership has no Plan B. The downfall of the Islamic Republic would result in the demise of most of its current ruling cadre. The fight over Iran’s future is hence a battle for life or death. The regime will not give in easily. Those who expect swift or fundamental change, both in Tehran and abroad, will be frustrated.
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Completing sovereignty
Kosovo is ten years independent Saturday. It has a lot to be proud of: a functional, more or less democratic state built in less than twenty years, despite determined opposition from Serbia and Russia. Most people in Kosovo live the normal lives they were denied for 20 years prior to independence. They earn significantly higher wages than in the past, they are safe and secure in their homes and on the street, they enjoy at least rudimentary educational opportunities and health care, and they get to vote every few years for whomever they prefer. That’s the good news.
There is bad news too. While most of its citizens are pleased with independence, some are not. There are Serbs who prefer to be citizens only of Serbia and Albanians who would prefer to be citizens of a “greater” Albania rather than Kosovo. Kosovo’s political leadership too often enjoys a standard of living its salaries alone cannot support. While all vow to make Kosovo a European Union member, few are prepared to make the difficult choices required to hasten the day. Cronyism and nepotism too often determine who gets hired and contracted. Unemployment is the fate of far too many, even if some of them work in the informal sector.
The statebuilding project is still incomplete. Despite widespread bilateral recognition, Kosovo is not yet a member of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. NATO-led forces guarantee Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The four Serb-majority northern municipalities are not yet fully integrated with the rest of the country. International prosecutors and judges still ensure equity in Kosovo’s courts, including the special tribunal convened in The Hague to consider “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under Kosovo law which allegedly occurred between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000.” Pristina has so far failed to demarcate its border with Montenegro and to agree or demarcate formally its border with Serbia. Perceived official corruption is at regionally high levels.
Independence, sovereignty and statebuilding are too often confused, not just in the case of Kosovo. It is entirely possible to be independent but not fully sovereign. That is also Taiwan’s fate, since it does not even claim sovereignty but is an independent state. You can also have a state but not be independent or sovereign: witness Iraqi Kurdistan. You can also be sovereign and independent but lack a state: I’d say that is Somalia’s current fate, more or less. You can even be sovereign but not fully independent. I’d say EU members are in that category, since they adhere to a set of rules (the acquis communautaire) over which none of them have complete authority, having delegated sovereignty to the European Commission.
For Kosovo, the challenge of the next ten years is to complete its sovereignty in a way that enables the country to apply for NATO and EU membership. Anything that detracts from this goal threatens the welfare and safety of its citizens as well as regional peace and stability. In practice, this means building credible security forces that can take over the immediate defense of its territory, improving Kosovo’s judicial system so that it can equitably decide cases involving Serbs and other non-Albanian citizens, agreeing and demarcating borders, integrating the four northern municipalities, and ending impunity for corrupt and violent behavior.
I am reasonably confident all this can be done, but it will require serious commitment on the part of Kosovo’s citizens to ensure that the leadership moves in the right direction. Despite the current gloom and doom about the Balkans, Kosovo remains a singular and extraordinary achievement of international intervention combined with indigenous determination. It is hard to sustain such determination over decades, especially when Belgrade and Moscow are doing everything they can to complicate matters. But there is no substitute for citizens: they shape the state, determine what independence can achieve, and make completing sovereignty possible.
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