Tag: European Union
How Tillerson can turn it around
Ed Joseph, my colleague at the Johns Hopkins School of Advance International Studies, writes:
Can Rex Tillerson save his job? Even after his striking, defiant statement last week, reaffirming his loyalty to Donald Trump, the odds are against him. He committed the cardinal sin of publicly distancing himself from his boss (over Charlottesville). The President has repeatedly needled and undermined his Secretary of State in tweets. Aside from his travails with the White House, even Tillerson’s admirers have criticized his weak, rudderless performance at Foggy Bottom.
Though time is running short, it’s not too late for Tillerson to turn it around. To do so, he needs a clear, unadulterated victory – a smaller, more modest version of what Dick Holbrooke got at Dayton or what Madeline Albright achieved in Kosovo. As long as Tillerson cedes the credit to his boss, all will be forgiven (though not forgotten) provided he brings the Administration a triumph – particularly one that allows Trump to claim he prevailed where his predecessors failed.
And there is one international dispute tailor-made for Tillerson’s keen attention – an issue that has defied the efforts of prior Administrations, that confounds major European capitals, and that can be resolved swiftly, provided Tillerson is willing to expend political capital and take some risk: Greece’s longstanding objection to Macedonia’s name.
Since Macedonia’s independence in 1991, Greece has insisted that its northern neighbor’s name, ‘Macedonia’, is infringement upon Greek patrimony (stemming from Alexander the Great), and an affront to the Greek region which carries the same name. Athens imposed a punishing embargo on its fledgling neighbor for three years after independence. In 1995, the legendary Holbrooke negotiated an end to the blockade and extracted Athens’ formal commitment not to block Skopje’s membership in international organizations — provided Macedonia entered under its temporary name ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’
But in 2008, Greece blocked Macedonia’s entry into NATO as ‘fYROM.’ In 2011, the International Court of Justice ruled (by a fifteen to one majority) that, by doing so, Athens had violated its obligations. Greece has ignored the ruling. Macedonia – which has been willing to join NATO under its temporary name — remains marooned in the southern Balkans. Without a NATO or EU perspective, the country is left weakened and prone to crisis. A violent conflict that would draw in its neighbors is a clear possibility, particularly now that Russia is engaged in the country and poised to exert malign influence.
In short, solving the name dispute is a significant US interest. However, no envoy since Holbrooke has managed to make any progress on the question. George W. Bush and his State Department tried, and failed, to get Macedonia into NATO at the Alliance Summit in Bucharest in 2008. The Obama Administration ignored the issue, largely consigning the entire Balkans to indifferent Europeans who likewise failed to make any effort to resolve the name dispute.
Fortunately for Tillerson, circumstances are as favorable as they’ve ever been for a breakthrough. Both Greece and Macedonia are emerging from exhausting, multi-year crises that have sapped their countries’ respective appetite for drama. Neither country’s Prime Minister – Alexis Tsipras in Athens or Zoran Zaev in Skopje – is facing elections just yet. And while both leaders must inevitably cast a wary eye on the opposition, their real focus is on achieving the demonstrable progress needed to stay in office. What’s more, relations between the two capitals have improved. The Greek and Macedonian foreign ministers recently and cordially discussed the name issue — a clear sign the matter is potentially ripe for resolution.
The key to a deal is Greece, by far the more powerful party. Skopje has the law and international opinion on its side; otherwise, it is small, weak and the only side suffering from the dispute.
Thankfully, Washington has leverage over Athens. After three searing international bailouts obtained at the price of draconian reforms, Tsipras is desperate to rid Greece of the harsh financial supervision that has been imposed at the behest of its nemesis, Germany. However, the just-completed German elections have complicated that aspiration. Disappointing results for Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party mean that she is now likely to bring hardliners into her government who adamantly oppose relaxing conditions on Greece.
Effectively, Washington has become a key player in this Greek drama. There is no chance for Greek debt relief unless Washington maintains its current level of funding to the IMF — something the Administration has yet to confirm. At the same time, Tsipras also wants a ‘Strategic Partnership’ with the US as another sign that the country has paid its dues, implemented difficult reforms and now deserves to be treated with respect. All this makes Tsipras desperate for a full-fledged summit with Trump this year, a topic already raised with Washington last month.
Tillerson needs only to convince his boss, Trump, author of ‘The Art of the Deal’, to exploit his leverage and insist on full resolution of the Greece-Macedonia name dispute as the price for the meeting and terms that Tsipras seeks. Tillerson should make it clear that the credit will rest with the President, while Tillerson does the heavy lifting.
And there is every reason to believe that Tillerson can succeed, as long he learns from the mistakes of his predecessors:
o Bush and his State Department failed to exploit the deadline of the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit. Tillerson can make it clear to Greece and Macedonia that ‘this is it’, i.e. that this issue will be resolved by the end of this year, full stop.
o Bush’s envoys failed to threaten Athens and Skopje with any credible penalties. Tillerson must make it clear to Athens that if it balks, Tsipras gets no meeting – and Washington will make Macedonian membership in NATO a core Administration priority, while giving Skopje privileged standing with Washington. If tiny Skopje dares try to take advantage of the situation, then the Secretary must threaten vulnerable Zaev with publicly naming and shaming him for screwing up Macedonia’s best chance to end its isolation.
o Tillerson should consult with the long-time UN negotiator on the issue, Matthew Nimetz, but make it clear that after more than two-decades, it’s time to bring the matter to a close. As long as Tillerson is personally invested – and agrees to meet with the parties personally –coordination will be easy. Nimetz will share the full range of solutions available to resolve the entire matter; Tillerson needs only to select one and sell it to the parties.
o Most of all, Tillerson should ignore the US Ambassador to Athens, or any former US Ambassador to Athens, or Greek officials or others who plead that that “this is not the time to press for a solution.” That attitude is precisely the reason this problem has festered for so long.
After a career in the oil business, few know better than Rex Tillerson that taking calculated risk can bring handsome rewards. To save himself from a humiliating return to Houston, it’s time for the Secretary to take some risk in the pursuit of a worthy, and plausible, objective.
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What to do about aid to Syria
My colleague and friend Geoff Aronson argues that
- Assad and his Russian and Iranian allies are not only winning the war in Syria but will gain from participating in the country’s reconstruction;
- The U.S. and Europe should not refuse reconstruction assistance in an effort to encourage regime change but should instead pitch in.
This perspective is mistaken on factual, political, and moral grounds.
The facts:
Both Russia and Iran, while welcome in Syria, lack the at least $200 billion Syria requires for reconstruction and have told Damascus so. They will no doubt ante up something in an effort to ensure Assad stays in power and is beholden to them, but their contributions will fall far short of even the minimum needs.
Assad has made it clear that only friendly states will be welcome. For the moment, that seems to mean China as well as Russia and Iran. But is China willing to pay the bills Russia and Iran cannot? The gains to Beijing from doing so are not at all clear, since Syria has limited oil and gas resources, much of which remain for now outside the government’s control.
Let’s assume that the U.S. had a few billion for Syria, beyond the $6.5 billion or so it has already spent on humanitarian relief there. How precisely would we force Assad to take the money, when he has made it clear we are not welcome?
Bottom line: Assad is going to fall far short of what he needs without U.S. and European contributions, which he does not want.
The politics in Europe and the United States:
What would the U.S. and Europeans gain from providing the massive assistance Syria needs, either bilaterally or more likely through the World Bank and IMF? Assad has made it clear not only that we are not welcome in Syria but that he will not be interested in realigning Syria with the West. He intends to remain tightly tied to Iran, which is the big regional winner from the Syrian war.
The politics in the U.S. are inhospitable to foreign aid in general and even more negative with respect to Assad, whose accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is apparent. It can of course be argued that Assad is a reality we need to accept, but that is quite different from putting cash in his pocket, especially as ever dime would be a dime less Assad needs to get from Iran, Russia, or China.
In Europe, things are a bit different, because some Europeans will want to be able to send refugees back to Syria. Assad will tell them he can only accept them back if Europe pays to reconstruct their houses. But we know that reconstruction in Syria so far has been done on a strictly political basis: the only things that get rebuilt are things that enhance Assad’s political control. Even humanitarian assistance has been channeled to Assad supporters, not to civilians in opposition-controlled areas. Let the donors beware.
Bottom line: It isn’t going to be possible to follow Geoff’s advice, and if we did we would be enhancing Assad’s hold on power.
The politics in Syria
Geoff is confident that withholding aid will not bring down Assad. My experience in post-war situations is that it is difficult to predict what might happen. Ask Winston Churchill whether the fruits of victory include staying in power.
Of course Assad will not make the mistake of holding free and fair elections. But he shows every sign of making the mistake of trying to restore the dictatorship to the status quo ante, after having killed several hundred thousand of the country’s citizens. Will Syrians related to those killed, deprived of the resources needed for reconstruction, and used to governing themselves for the last few years tolerate the restoration of the dictatorship? I don’t know, but I don’t know how Geoff knows either.
Bottom line: Assad is far from secure and no one should assume he will remain in power.
What should we do?
We should not be ungenerous. We should continue humanitarian aid to the refugees in neighboring countries but end it for those who live in Syria in areas controlled by Assad. Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to areas that remain outside Assad’s control and are governed in inclusive ways is the right course of action. If Syrians start seeing some successful governance outside the control of the dictatorship, there is no telling how clever they might be in getting some for themselves. Even if they don’t, the money won’t be wasted supporting a brutal, anti-American dictatorship.
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Too clever by half
Mark Dubowitz, an opponent of the Iran nuclear deal, outlined the strategy he is advocating on NPR this morning:
This trial balloon amounts to decertifying Iranian compliance but not re-imposing sanctions connected to the Iranian nuclear program while ratcheting up other sanctions and seeking a renegotiation of the deal. What could go wrong?
First, there is simply no basis on which to decertify Iranian compliance. The basis Dubowitz cites is moot, as the US has not actually presented any evidence that an inspection of Iranian military facilities is warranted. The Iranians have said they won’t allow it, but the burden of initiating the process is on Washington, not Tehran. The International Atomic Energy Agency has otherwise confirmed Iranian implementation of the deal.
Second, decertifying will trigger a reaction in other capitals, even if nuclear sanctions are not reimposed. The Europeans, who have to be brought on board if new, non-nuclear sanctions are to create any pressure on Iran, oppose their American ally undermining an agreement they helped negotiate. Tehran will try to convince the Europeans not to join the US in ratcheting up non-nuclear sanctions, which from their point of view are just like nuclear sanctions. The North Koreans will be watching closely and conclude that no agreement with the US on nuclear questions is reliable, so they should go hell-bent for more nuclear weapons.
Third, re-negotiation requires that we not only demand something but also give something. The only serious objection to the Iran nuclear deal I’ve heard so far is that aspects of it expire (sunset is the term of art). Opponents of the nuclear deal are right when they argue that a follow-on agreement is needed.
But what Dubowitz is proposing a bad way, destined to fail, of opening that issue. The way to open a negotiation on extension of the deal is to acknowledge Iranian compliance and get the Europeans on board for preliminary discussions of what we want to see extended and what we and they are prepared to do to make that appealing to the Iranians (either with carrots or sticks). Only after that discussion with allies would we then proceed to discussion with the Iranians, likely several years from now.
Trump and his Administration are proven bad negotiators. I can’t think of a single success in this department so far, either domestically or internationally. Their consistent mistake is to consider only their own alternatives to a negotiated agreement. Negotiating well requires that you consider also your adversary’s alternatives. The Iranians will be delighted if US decertification splits off the Europeans, who have benefited significantly from lifting sanctions, from the Americans and effectively prevents an extension of the nuclear deal.
Decertification without reneging on the Iran nuclear deal is too clever by half. The Administration should not do it.
PS: This idea has gotten worse during the day: reports are that Trump will simply declare the agreement not in the national interest, dispensing with the need to show the Iranians have violated it. This is a spectacularly counterfactual idea: without the agreement, Iran could have nuclear weapons by now, so it is clearly in the US interest and will remain so as long as it is in force.
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What to do in the Balkans
I prepared these speaking notes for a briefing on the Balkans today:
- The US is responsible for three peace agreements in the Balkans: Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, leaving behind a web that has prevented war for more than 15 years.
- All the countries of the region have made substantial progress in political and economic reform.
- But progress has slowed and even stalled since the European recession.
- The Greek financial crisis, the massive flow of refugees from the Middle East and Africa, and Brexit have made it doubtful that the promise of EU membership can be fulfilled any time soon.
- EU charm is not working as well as it once did, despite Mogherini’s strong statements.
- This is a problem for the US because we have been depending on Europe to carry the burden in the Balkans, with US support when needed.
- But if Brussels fails, the peace agreements could unravel, with serious consequences: heightened migration not only through but from the Balkans, growing radicalization of Balkan Muslims, and increasing Russian troublemaking near and even inside NATO.
- What is needed is mainly a diplomatic, not a military, effort to complete Balkan peace processes so that all the countries of the region can join NATO and the EU, if they wish to do so.
- This diplomatic effort could include the following:
- Recommitment with Brussels to existing Balkan borders and states, including a planned response to any scheduling of a Republika Srpska independence referendum.
- Accelerated NATO and EU membership.
- Better carrots and sticks, including expanded trade and targeted sanctions.
- Refocus aid on rule of law, particularly anti-corruption and countering extremism.
- Increased emphasis on National Guard cooperation with Serbia, Kosovo Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia.
- Establish a region-wide truth and reconciliation effort.
- An enhanced effort to solve country-specific issues: Bosnia’s constitutional and electoral inadequacies, UN membership for Kosovo, Macedonia’s name.
- In addition, we need to counter Russian troublemaking by reducing Balkan dependence on Moscow’s gas, sanctioning those who finance Balkan leaders who threaten peace, beefing up our media capabilities, and consulting with Balkan governments on Russian election meddling.
- These are not expensive things, but important ones. Doing them would preserve peace and stability, avoid major costs, limit Russian troublemaking and give us a lot of secure and prosperous friends.
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A new low, but not the bottom
President Trump hit it this morning, when he tweeted from his golf weekend in New Jersey that the mayor of San Juan was only complaining about the slow Federal reaction to Hurricane Maria because Democrats had told her to do so. What’s more, he added, the people of Puerto Rico are expecting everything to be done for them rather than pitching in to help. Lest you think I exaggerate, here are the tweets in question:
The Mayor of San Juan, who was very complimentary only a few days ago, has now been told by the Democrats that you must be nasty to Trump.
…Such poor leadership ability by the Mayor of San Juan, and others in Puerto Rico, who are not able to get their workers to help. They….
…want everything to be done for them when it should be a community effort. 10,000 Federal workers now on Island doing a fantastic job.
Here’s that mayor reacting to the Acting Homeland Security Secretary claiming Puerto Rico is a good news story:
Words fail me: how can someone as crass and callous as Trump even pretend to be President of the United States?
The answer is that Americans voted for him. Fewer than voted for Hillary Clinton, but enough (by 70,000 votes in three states) to get him elected.
What is the cure? There is only one: the Republicans in Congress, who so far have proven unwilling even to begin to challenge Trump in a serious way. Despite harsh criticism from the White House, Senate Majority leader McConnell and Speak Ryan have lined up to salute repeatedly.
The only hope at this point is that a few Republicans outside the leadership will refuse to go along. That is what happened on the health care votes. There is still a possibility that a few of them will join with Democrats in fixing what ails Obamacare, rather than throwing it out with the bathwater. The odds may improve without Tom Price as Health and Human Services Secretary: he was a pernicious influence, aside from being a spendthrift with the public’s money.
On taxes, the Administration is proposing a massive cut for the very wealthy like himself and nothing for the poor, plus barely a smidgen for the middle class. That won’t pass, but it creates an uphill fight for those who would like to do something much more sensible. The process will be slow. Nothing is likely to pass this year, which pretty much guarantees that we will head into next spring with a president who has accomplished nothing beyond a single Supreme Court nominee, who admittedly will do a great deal of damage for decades to come.
This disastrous performance on the domestic front has implications for foreign policy. A president who can’t get a Congress with his own party in the majority in both houses to pass any significant legislation is one foreigners don’t feel much need to respect.The Canadians and Mexicans are busy with diplomatic offenses targeting the states, which are likely to resist the worst of Trump’s trade proposals. The Europeans are biding their time until he is gone, when they hope to take up the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership again.
Nor has Trump given either friend or foe any reason to go along with his harebrained schemes: withdrawing from a nuclear deal with Iran that is clearly in the US interest, threatening North Korea with “fire and fury” while trying to convince them everything will be just fine if they give up nuclear weapons, sending more troops to Afghanistan without any clear objective, doubling down on the drone wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere despite decades of evidence that won’t work. Even Vladimir Putin, who did so much to get Trump elected, is finding him a disappointment.
I can’t remember a time when we have been so ill-served by such obviously corrupt and ill-meaning people. But I suppose this new low is still nowhere near the bottom.
PS: This morning’s tweets about Rex Tillerson’s efforts to negotiate with Pyongyang illustrate how Trump can go lower: “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man…Save your energy Rex, we’ll do what has to be done!” Tillerson should resign.
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Trump is about to make a big mess
I find it hard to believe, but it looks as if President Trump is preparing to take the advice of John Bolton to decertify Iranian compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA or “Iranian nuclear deal”). This despite the complete lack of factual support for the notion that Iran is substantially violating the deal as well as European refusal to join the US in the reimposition of sanctions required even to begin compelling Tehran to renegotiate.
The consequences will be far-reaching. If Iran opts to remain in compliance, the Europeans will maintain their sanctions relief, at least until the US imposes so-called secondary sanctions against their banks and companies for continuing to do business with Iran. That will cause enormous resentment in Europe, where doubts about President Trump are already rife. Hard to see how our traditional allies will continue to support us on many issues if the Administration makes the mistake of undermining the JCPOA.
In the less likely event that Tehran decides to renege on the deal, the Europeans may back reimposition of sanctions, but Iran would soon (a year?) have nuclear weapons. That might precipitate an Israeli or an American attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, with no prospect however of delaying Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons by more than the eight years or more left on the JCPOA clock. It will be necessary to periodically attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, with devastating consequences for Middle East (and global) stability, as Tehran will strike back in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and possibly even the US.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the planet, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un will be confirmed in his view that only nuclear weapons and the capacity to strike the US will protect his regime from an American attack. Prospects for a negotiated freeze or other limitations on Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities would go to zero fast, if they are not already there.
Trump likes to overplay his hand, then distract attention so that he can cave. That won’t work well with Iran and North Korea, both of which understand perfectly well how lousy America’s alternatives to a negotiated agreement on their nuclear programs are. Both regimes, once upon a time two-thirds of the “axis of evil,” have understood the other third’s mistake: Saddam Hussein didn’t pursue nuclear weapons aggressively enough to forestall an American invasion.
Not that America today has the stomach for an invasion of either North Korea or Iran, even if they lack nuclear weapons. We are well into two decades of constant but far from completely successful warfare in many countries aimed at wiping out Islamist extremists. Are we really ready to take on two more adversaries, one or both of which might be nuclear-equipped by the time we do?
The alternative is not appetizing either. Basically, we need to content ourselves with deterring both North Korea and Iran from using their nuclear weapons, without pressing for regime change. Their own people will have to find a way to deal with their leaders, which is how things should be. Trump even said so in his UN General Assembly speech, which lauded sovereignty. That in my view comes from the people.
We can and should, however, push back against Iran’s and North Korea’s regional misbehavior, especially insofar as they seek to intimidate or undermine US allies. It is odd indeed that Trump has done nothing to counter Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria, where Hizbollah and Shia militias are reshaping the political landscape. Japan and South Korea could also use less bombast and more real support.
But Trump is president, as he so often reminds us. He seems disinclined to maintain the traditionally effective multilateral approaches to Pyongyang and Tehran and more likely to make a big mess.
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