Tag: European Union

Peace picks July 25 – 29

Posted in Rosemary Youhana - July 24, 2016 - 0 Comment
  1. Ten days after Quelling the Coup: Where is Turkey Headed? |  Tuesday, July 26th  | 11:30 AM |  The Atlantic Council  |  Click HERE to RSVP  |  Last week’s failed coup attempt in Turkey has raised serious questions about Turkey’s domestic political and security situation. The immediate aftermath of last weekend’s events will have significant implications for a range of Western interests, from the fight against ISIS to EU membership to Turkey’s role in the Middle East. To what extent did the attempted coup indicate an irreparable rift in the Turkish armed forces? How will the United States manage the fragile Turkish relationship in light of accusations of an American role in the plot and demands for extraditing Fethullah Gulen? How far will President Erdogan go to purge government institutions and how will this impact the country’s political and economic future? A conversation with: Elmira Bayrasli, Visiting Fellow at the New America Foundation, and Steven A. Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. The discussion will be moderated by Aaron Stein, Senior Resident Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, and an introduction by Ambassador Frederic C. Hof, Director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council.
  2. Israel and Hezbollah: The Prospect of Renewed Hostilities Ten Years after War | Tuesday, July 26th  | 11:45 AM – 1:30 PM |Hudson Institute |  Click HERE to RSVP |  On July 12, 2006, the Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah ambushed an Israel Defense Force patrol near the Lebanese border. Three IDF soldiers were killed on the spot and another two were taken hostage. Israel retaliated by bombing the Beirut airport and other key targets. Thus began what Israel refers to as the Second Lebanon War, a conflict that lasted 34 days and set the stage for much of what has happened in the Levant over the last ten years. Israel quietly secured the Israel-Lebanon border, and Hezbollah pivoted to fight in Syria. Ten years later, both sides face circumstances similar to those that led to war a decade ago. In recent years, Iran has dramatically increased Hezbollah’s weaponry capabilities by supplying Russian-made “Kornet” missiles, surface-to-air missile defense systems, and surface-to-ship cruise missiles. Israel’s concerns are compounded by Tehran’s increasingly assertive regional posture and ballistic missile tests conducted since signing the nuclear agreement. Hezbollah is still Iran’s most impressive export, but it is hemorrhaging fighters in Syria to a sectarian war in which it is outnumbered eight to one. Many throughout the Middle East and in the West believe that regional tensions and hot spots will necessarily drive Israel and Hezbollah to resume hostilities. On July 26, Hudson Institute will host a timely panel on the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War and the prospect of resumed conflict. Panelists include Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Israel Reuven Azar, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran, and Foundation for Defense of Democracies Research Fellow Tony Badran. Hudson Senior Fellow Lee Smith will moderate the conversation.
  3. Will North America become the next Saudi Arabia?  |  Tuesday, July 26th  |  12:00 PM – 1:15 PM  |  New America Foundation  | Click HERE to RSVP  |  Not long ago Washington policymakers spent a great deal of time bemoaning our ever increasing dependence on foreign (especially, alas, Middle Eastern) oil. Rarely has such pessimistic groupthink proven so misguided. North America is blessed with a number of comparative advantages when it comes to producing energy at a low cost, and Canada’s increased oil production, innovation in alternative energy research, Mexico’s historic energy reforms, and the shale revolution across the region have only accentuated North America’s potential to become the world’s dominant energy superpower. On the heels of the North American Leaders Summit, Future Tense and the Wilson Center’s Canada Institute invite you to join them for a conversation on what it will take for North America to fulfill its energy potential. People tend to obsess over the monthly gyrations of oil prices and the latest regulatory battle over shale or pipeline-building, but we want to look forward to 2050. With the new North American Climate, Energy, and Environment Partnership what concerted steps should Canada, Mexico, and the United States be taking to ensure that North America will become the world’s leading energy power for generations? And how can this region lead the world not only in output and economic growth, but also in setting new standards of environmental responsibility and sustainability? Panelists include: Hector Moreira, Director of Energy Model for Mexico Initiative at Arizona State University and Commissioner, Mexican National Commission of Hydrocarbons, and Former Under Secretary of Energy of Mexico; Laura Dawson, Director of the Canada Institute at the Wilson Center and Former Senior Advisor on economic affairs at the United States Embassy in Ottawa; and Sharon Burke, Senior Advisor for International Security and Resource Security at New America and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy.
  4. Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam is Reshaping the World  |  Wednesday, July 27th  | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM | Middle East Institute at the Carnegie Endowment’s Choate Room |  Click HERE to RSVP   |  The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Shadi Hamid (Brookings Inst.), Nathan Brown (George Washington Univ.) and Hassan Mneimneh (MEI) for a discussion about how Islam shapes public life, law, and the state. The conversation will explore and challenge the thesis behind Hamid’s new book,Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam is Reshaping the World. In Islamic Exceptionalism, Hamid argues that Islam is distinctive among the world’s cultural systems in how it conceives religion and politics as intertwined. In this exceptionalism he sees an intrinsic resistance to secularization, with profound implications for how the West can interact with the Middle East. The panelists will address Hamid’s provocative thesis and offer their own analyses of Islam’s relationship with politics. Sumaiya Hamdani (George Mason Univ.) will moderate the discussion. Copies of the book will be available for purchase and signing.
  5. French Leadership in a Post-Brexit Europe | Thursday, July 28th  | 10:00 AM  | Atlantic Council  | Click HERE to RSVP |  Europe faces historic challenges from the east and the south, at the same time as internal forces of fragmentation call into question the unity and direction of the European Union (EU).  In the wake of the Brexit referendum, horrific terrorist attacks, an unprecedented migration crisis, and a continually sluggish economy, the future of Europe is in play.  As a nation that combines strategic outlook, political will, military capabilities, and economic wherewithal, France is poised to shape Europe’s future. Since the end of World War II, Paris has played a leading role in advancing the European project.  Franco-German political cooperation set the terms for integration.  Franco-British military cooperation ensured Europe remained a serious security actor.  Today, France is the bridge between the EU’s northern and southern members.  France has the history, geography, and demography to help Europe navigate the confluence of challenges buffeting the continent. However, next year’s elections in France will likely determine whether France helps Europe hold together or succumbs to the challenges of economic stagnation, political fragmentation, and populism. Panelists include: H.E. Gérard Araud, Ambassador of France to the United States; Ambassador John Herbst, Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council; Ambassador Frederic Hof, Director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council; Ms. Laure Mandeville, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Future Europe Initiative, Atlantic Council. With an introduction by Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President of Programs and Strategy at the Atlantic Council.
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Stability rather than integration

Posted in Daniel Serwer - July 20, 2016 - 0 Comment

I was a fly on the wall yesterday and overheard a discussion of Libya. Here are some of my takeaways:

  1. The UN-sponsored political process has gotten about as far as it can get under current circumstances. The Presidential Council is in Tripoli and the country’s two expired legislatures are more or less defunct.
  2. General Haftar, who leads the so-called Libyan National Army headquartered in Benghazi, will not be able to displace the Presidential Council, but he also isn’t prepared to accept the subordinate role (as foreseen for the military chief in Article 8 of the UN-sponsored Libyan Political Agreement).
  3. So the most likely outcome is divided governance for now, superimposed on an elaborate array of municipal and tribal arrangements that are far more important to most Libyans than those claiming national authority.
  4. Legitimacy in Libya does not stem from elections but rather from effective and inclusive governance. The international community has to do what it can to help Presidential Council Chair Sarraj deliver the goods.
  5. Over the long-term, subnational dialogue and structures will also be vital to stability in Libya, which should be the international community’s relatively modest goal.
  6. The next step at the national level should be a Libyan/Libyan dialogue on security issues, mainly between the Misratan militia and Haftar. This should aim to determine practical arrangements for security, in particular in Sirte once the Islamic State is defeated there as well as for the oil fields and pipelines.
  7. Power-sharing is not as good an idea as defining the territory on which different militias will hold sway.
  8. The Egyptians and United Arab Emirates have provided support to Haftar, but they can’t “deliver” him, partly because if they try he will turn to Moscow. The Russians would like an opportunity to gain a toehold in North Africa.
  9. Haftar could be more of a problem if his sponsors abandon him than if they maintain their support and try to influence him.
  10. The Turkish role in Libya is in doubt in the wake of the coup attempt. Erdogan, who had already begun to reconfigure Ankara’s relations with Russia and Israel, may also revise his position vis-a-vis Syria and Libya.
  11. So long as the international community gives priority to fighting ISIS, it will be difficult to gain attention to the more fundamental and long-term problem of how Libya is to be governed.
  12. Prospects for a major international intervention in Libya have dimmed, though the threat of mass migration persists: as many as 800,000 people in Libya are thought to be intending to cross the Mediterranean.
  13. Europe is increasingly turning its attention to preventing sub-Saharan migrants from reaching Libya by strengthening economies and governance in Mali, Niger and elsewhere.
  14. US and European special forces engagement on the ground in Libya, which aims principally at fighting ISIS, could also be useful in informing international efforts at promoting Libyan/Libyan dialogue and stabilizing the situation.
  15. The key to success is gaining an improved understanding of what motivates different actors: how can they be incented or disincented?
  16. While Libya’s revolutionary aspirations have largely been dashed and its polity badly divided, the society still has indigenous tribal and civil society capacities that could prove vital in stabilizing its three main regions (east, west and south) now and eventually re-knitting them into a single state.

International goals for Libya should be modest. Resources are limited. The “international community,” often divided, has lost a lot of clout and credibility in Libya, even if the UN plan has gone farther than some might have expected. Stability rather than democracy should be the immediate objection. Deconfliction rather than integration.

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Peace picks July 18-22

Posted in Katie Preston - July 18, 2016 - 0 Comment

1) Zionism: The Birth and Transformation of an Ideal| Monday, July 18th | 5:30-6:30pm | The Middle East Institute | Click here to RSVP |The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host veteran journalist Milton Viorst for a discussion of his upcoming book, Zionism: The Birth and Transformation of an Ideal (Dunn, 2016). From Herzl to Netanyahu, Viorst follows the development of Zionism through the lives and ideas of its dominant leaders who all held one tenet in common: the Jewish people must determine their own destiny. He argues that while Israel has emerged as an economically prosperous and geopolitically powerful Jewish homeland, Zionism has increasingly been defined through military strength. Viorst asks how Zionism evolved from an ideal of Jewish refuge to a rationalization of occupation? Has this development altered the international community’s perception of Zionism as Israel’s founding doctrine? Matthew Duss (President, The Foundation for Middle East Peace) will moderate the event. Copies of the book will be available for purchase and signing. A wine and cheese reception and book-signing will follow the talk. 

2) President Obama’s Role In African Security And Development| Tuesday, July 19th | 10:00-11:30am | Brookings | Click here to RSVP | Barack Obama’s presidency has witnessed widespread change throughout Africa. His four trips there, spanning seven countries, reflect his belief in the continent’s potential and importance. African countries face many challenges that span issues of trade, investment, and development, as well as security and stability. With President Obama’s second term coming to an end, it is important to begin to reflect on his legacy and how his administration has helped frame the future of Africa.  Matthew Carotenuto, professor at St. Lawrence University and author of “Obama and Kenya: Contested Histories and the Politics of Belonging” will discuss his research in the region. He will be joined by Sarah Margon, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will partake in and moderate the discussion.

3) Iraqi Foreign Minister On Aid, ISIS And Reconciliation| Tuesday, July 19th | 1:30-2:30pm | United States Institute of Peace | Click here to RSVP | Iraq’s Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim al-Jaafari will address his country’s role in the Middle East, its battle against ISIS/ISIL, relations with the U.S., and the need for international assistance, in an event at the U.S. Institute of Peace on July 19. It will be his only public appearance during a trip to Washington for meetings with the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and an international pledging conference to raise funds for relief and reconstruction, as the Iraqi government works with allies to prepare for the massive undertaking of recapturing the country’s second-largest city, Mosul, from ISIS control.

4) Russia And Europe – Dangerous Times, Dangerous Continent?| Tuesday, July 19th | 3:00-4:30pm | Project for the Study of the 21st Century | Click here to RSVP | PS21 global fellow Ali Wyne talks to Fiona Hill, former US National Intelligence Officer for Russia and now head of the Europe program at the Brookings Institution. Where will Europe go in the aftermath of the UK referendum, what is motivating Vladimir Putin and how can the US influence events in a continent that has previously given the world some of the worst conflicts in human history

5) How to Defeat Terrorism in Iraq | Wednesday, July 20th | 10:30-12:00| The Institute for World Politics | Click here to RSVP | Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari will share his vision for his country: a political re-crafting of the existing government structure away from sectarianism and towards a new constitution based on Iraqi national citizenship and inclusive of participation from all sectarian communities.HE Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari is the Chairman of the Iraq National Project and President of Peace Ambassadors for Iraq (PAFI). One of the leaders of the al-Zoba tribe in Iraq, he is the nephew of the late Islamic scholar and religious leader.Sheikh Harith al-Dhari Jamal was born in the Abu Ghraib district of Iraq on July 16, 1965. He grew up within the al-Zoba tribe and in the 1970s he attended the Hafsa School. In the 1980s, Jamal was conscripted into the Iraqi Army to fight in the Iran- Iraq War. During his time on the frontline, he fought alongside both Sunni and Shia officers and friends, in the Iraqi Republican Guard. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by coalition forces, Jamal was a strong proponent of Iraqi nationalism and self-rule. In 2005, he and his family fought against al-Qaeda’s occupation of Iraqi territory and, as a consequence, Jamal lost 70 members of his family in the struggle. In 2014, Jamal helped to establish the nonprofit think tank Peace Ambassadors for Iraq, whose purpose is to advocate for a renewed system of government in Iraq, to determine the best policies to fully eliminate ISIS/Daesh and other terrorist forces from Iraq, and to build international support for an all-inclusive Iraq. Presently, Jamal is working for a renewal in Iraq by forging a non-sectarian and inclusive settlement for all Iraqis.

6) After ISIS: Politics, Deal-Making, and the Struggle for Iraq’s Future | Thursday, July 21st | 9:30-11:00 am | The Wilson Center | Click here to RSVP | As the Islamic State (ISIS) is rolled back and defeated in Iraq and Syria, the fight for Iraq’s political future will begin. On both a local and national level, a new political deal between the country’s parties and communities will be necessary to keep the country together. Liberated territories will need to be secured by forces acceptable to locals, populations will need to return, and towns must be rebuilt. In addition, intra-Kurdish politics and Baghdad-Erbil relations will need a new framework—whether the Kurds decide to stay or go. Underlying these dynamics is the poor state of the post-oil price decline economy of the Kurdish region. Akeel Abbas, Professor, American University of Iraq, Sulaimani; Mina al Oraibi, Senior Fellow, Institute of State Effectiveness; Christine van den Toorn, Director, Institute of Regional and International Studies, American University of Iraq, Sulaimani; and Bilal Wahab: Professor, International Studies, and Director, Center for Development and Natural Resources, American University of Iraq, Sulaimani will speak. Discussion will be moderated by Henri J. Barkey, the director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center.

 

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Liberal democracy at risk

Posted in Daniel Serwer - July 18, 2016 - 2 Comments

The handwriting is on many walls. Liberal democracy and the world order it has built since World War II are at risk. Equal rights, political pluralism and rule of law are being challenged from several directions.

We see it in Brexit, which aims explicitly to restore borders, reject immigrants and implicitly to end the liberal democratic establishment’s monopoly on governing power. We see it in Trump, who aims at similar goals. We see it in Putin, Erdogan and Sisi, who are selling the idea that concentrated power and restrictions on freedom will deliver better and more goods and services. We see it in China, which likewise aims to maintain the Communist Party’s monopoly on national political power while allowing markets to drive growth. No need to mention Hungary’s Orbán, Macedonia’s Gruevski, Poland’s Szydło and other democratically elected leaders who turn their backs on liberal democratic values once in power, in favor of religion, nationalism or ethnic identity.

Among the first victims are likely to be two bold efforts at freeing up trade and investment and promoting growth by removing barriers and encouraging globalization: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the US as well as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was intended to do something similar in the Pacific Basin. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have said they are opposed to TPP. It is hard to picture TTIP proceeding while the EU is negotiating its divorce from the United Kingdom.

We have seen assaults on liberal democracy and its associated world order in the past. Arguably that is what World War II was about, at least in part. Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and Mussolini’s Italy offered Fascist, autocratic responses to relatively liberal democracy in Britain, France, Germany and the United States. The Soviet Union, which fought with the Allies against Fascism, offered a Communist alternative that survived the war and engaged in the Cold War standoff with liberal democracies for almost 45 years thereafter, one that involved proxy wars, Communist and anti-Communist puppets, and the enormous risk of nuclear holocaust. The history of fights between liberal democracy and its antagonists is fraught with war, oppression, and prolonged authoritarianism.

It wasn’t that long ago, when the Berlin wall fell, that liberal democracy seemed overwhelmingly likely to win worldwide. The end of history didn’t last long. The two big challenges liberal democracy now faces are Islamist extremism and capitalist authoritarianism. These are both ideological and physical challenges. Putinism is an authoritarian style of governance that sends warplanes, naval ships and troops to harass and occupy its neighbors and adversaries. The same can be said of Xi Jinping’s China, which is making the South China Sea into its backyard and harassing its neighbors.

The Islamist extremist challenge comes above all from Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, which are competing with each other even as they destroy fragile states like Libya, Yemen and Syria. Iraq appears to be winning its fight, though it is likely to face a virulent insurgency even after it ends Islamic State control over parts of its territory. The outcome is unlikely to be liberal democratic. Many other states face that kind of insurgent Islamist threat: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Somalia, and Tunisia, to name but a few.

But the biggest threat to liberal democracy today comes from inside the liberal democracies themselves. Islamist terror has killed relatively few people, apart from 9/11. Popular overreaction to Islamist threats, immigration and globalization could bring to power people with little commitment to liberal democratic values in the United States, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and elsewhere. They will seek to reestablish borders, slow or end immigration, impose draconian laws to root out terrorists, and restore trade barriers in the hope of regaining lost industries.

Another challenge, peculiar to the US, seems to be emerging: black insurgents with guns who think they are retaliating against police for abuse of black citizens. This is bound to elicit a law and order response the could even bring a real threat to liberal democracy in Washington: Donald Trump in the presidency. If the protests in Cleveland this week are not disciplined and peaceful, it could put real wind in his sails.

The menace to liberal democracy is real. If we want pluralism, human rights and the rule of law, we are going to have to take some risks. I find it an easy choice, but many of my compatriots seem inclined to lean in the other direction.

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The difference Brexit makes in the Balkans

Posted in Daniel Serwer - July 16, 2016 - 0 Comment

I enjoyed a meeting today with Kosovo’s foreign minister, Enver Hoxhaj, some of Kosovo’s ambassadors stationed in European capitals and foreign ministry staff. They were concerned mainly about the implications of Brexit for their country. Here are the notes I used in my presentation:

Brexit makes no difference to some important things

  1. The EU isn’t going away. The single market that allows the free flow of goods, services and capital will continue, even if constraints on movement of people increase.
  2. Brussels will continue to try to coordinate foreign and security policy and will remain an important interlocutor for the US. Brexit may even make it easier for France and Germany to unify EU policy prescriptions.
  3. The EU is moving to close the gap with NATO, which was a luxury no one can afford any longer.
  4. Brussels will try to have a common policy on immigration, albeit one without the UK and much less welcoming than in the past.
  5. The euro will survive Brexit, though it may still face serious challenges from bank weakness in Italy and elsewhere.
  6. Even enlargement will continue, as promised recently at the Paris summit, since the Balkans are not a heavy burden and their cheap labor will be welcome, especially if it stays at home.

But Brexit will change some other important things

  1. The UK, or more likely England, will continue its relative economic and political decline, in particular if Scotland and possibly Northern Ireland leave.
  2. EU investment and growth will slow.
  3. All EU countries, seeing the political risks, will treat illegal immigration much more harshly.
  4. Standards for EU accession will be enforced more strictly, especially those pertaining to rule of law.
  5. Europe’s global political weight will continue to decline and its engagement abroad will decrease.
  6. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership the EU and the US hoped to conclude is likely in suspense, if not moribund.
  7. Putin’s Russia will gain and feel encouraged to expand its anti-EU and anti-NATO efforts, in particular in the Balkans.
  8. The world will continue to look to the US for leadership, especially as financial flows looking for a safe haven boost the US dollar (and maybe its economy).
  9. The Balkans countries will be expected to handle more of their own issues: clamping down on foreign fighters and illegal immigration, resolving the remaining interstate conflicts, and building up regional physical, financial economic and cultural infrastructure.

What does this mean for Kosovo? If I were a Kosovar, I would want to use the next 5-10 years, when the EU will be preoccupied with itself, to complete my country’s sovereignty and enable viable candidacies for both NATO and EU membership. This entails domestic as well as diplomatic efforts. I would want:

  1. The Kosovo courts to become fully independent and capable of providing a fair trial with due process to all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, without the participation of international prosecutors or judges.
  2. The work of the Special Court to try crimes that occurred after the war to be created and complete its work as quickly and competently as possible.
  3. To ensure that radicalization in Kosovo is reduced to a minimum through effective preventive (not only law enforcement) measures.
  4. To grow the economy, and in particular jobs, more rapidly through improvement in the business environment and reducing corruption to levels at least comparable to the average within the EU.
  5. To create an army with representation from all of Kosovo’s citizens, compatible with NATO standards and capable of contributing to NATO missions, whose chief of staff should meet regularly with those of all of Kosovo’s neighbors, including Serbia.
  6. To settle all issues with Kosovo’s neighbors, including in particular the demarcation of the Montenegrin border (which should enable the EU to liberalize its visa requirements) and the Serbian border/boundary as well as full implementation of all agreements already reached with Belgrade.

 

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Shape up, anything else is coddling

Posted in Daniel Serwer - July 10, 2016 - 0 Comment

I disagree with much of what two of my dearest SAIS colleagues and their associate say in a recent Foreign Affairs article advocating greater EU and US backing for the Balkans. They argue that in the wake of Brexit,

European leaders, and perhaps those in Washington too, need to roll out a bold new plan for Europe. Enlarging the union by finally extending a hand to the Balkans would be a good place to start.

That’s wrong on two counts.

First, the Union has been extending a hand to the Balkans for more than twenty years, with some positive results: Slovenian and Croatian membership above all, as well as progress in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. Even Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia, which are stymied by their own internal problems, have gained important access to EU markets and have begun adopting the acquis communautaire. None of the non-members will be ready before 2020, but some could hope for accession shortly after that.

Second, EU accession has in fact become more difficult due to Brexit, no matter what Chancellor Merkel (or my colleagues) say. The Brexit campaign unabashedly used immigration from the Balkans as one of its talking points. No one should imagine that ratification of an accession treaty with Albania, Montenegro or Serbia would be easier today than it was a couple of weeks ago. Brexit has consequences. The EU club has become harder to get into.

The only concrete advantage the Foreign Affairs article offers as an example of the advantages of additional Balkans membership in the EU is this:

For example, if the Balkans were incorporated into the EU, Brussels could help fund temporary shelters for Syrian refugees that land in the Balkans and facilitate better registration and processing.

But the EU could do what they suggest without adding any Balkan members, just as it has already done with Turkey. And the article suggests many good reasons why the EU should hesitate on accession: ethnic strife, corrosive politics, corruption, and organized crime.

The right lesson to be drawn from Brexit is not that the EU should open its arms wider. That isn’t going to happen, because EU members are all democracies that have to reckon with domestic political reactions. The right lesson is that non-EU Balkan countries need to shape up and meet the increasingly stringent requirements the EU has imposed since the arguably premature accession of Bulgaria and Romania.

The long pole in the EU membership tent throughout the Balkans is rule of law, which is weak and inconsistent. When a Serb can get a fair trial in a Kosovo court without international judges or prosecutors, when crooked politicians and their organized crime enablers are routinely prosecuted in Albania and Bosnia, when Serb politicians and generals answer for their 1990s war crimes in Serbian courts, then the Balkans will be ready for EU membership. If I were a citizen in one of the potential EU members, I would be doing everything I could to hasten the day, not pleading for special dispensation that is unlikely to come.

None of the non-EU Balkan countries is so big or problematic as Turkey. The largest is Serbia, at a bit over 7 million and declining (less than 10% of the population of Turkey). They will all be minor burdens on the EU budget and suppliers of needed cheap labor and taxpayers. Three are majority Muslim (Bosnia by a hair, Albania and Kosovo by more), but their Islam is fundamentally moderate. The Islamic State had a spurt of success recruiting in the Balkans, but that appears to have subsided in the wake of its military defeats and Balkan government crackdowns.

The best backing friends of the Balkans can give is to help them shape up for EU membership as soon as possible. Anything else is coddling.

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