Tag: European Union

Not a good year

Kosova Sot, a Pristina daily, asked for a year-end review, published in Albanian. Here is what I sent :

Today brought me the welcome news that Kosovo has been judged eligible for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a US government agency that focuses on supporting economic policy reform and good governance. That and European Union signature of a Stabilization and Association Agreement that provides substantial benefits to non-EU members are two important milestones for a country that has otherwise had a rough year.

The Kosovo government is under siege in parliament, where its opposition has several times attacked with tear gas, nominally to protest two international agreements: one with Montenegro demarcating the border with Kosovo and one with Serbia on the creation of an Association of Serbian Municipalities. The real motives lie deeper: the current Kosovo government was formed after a ruling party with the largest number of seats broke up a coalition that included its chief rival by surrendering the prime ministry and other key posts. The current rump opposition, which thought it had an unassailable advantage in forming a coalition to govern, found itself left out in the cold.

Still deeper is the existence in Kosovo of anti-constitutional political forces: on the Albanian side of the equation, Vetvendosje (Self-Determination), which insists on the right to a referendum on union with Albania excluded by the constitution; on the Serb side, most politicians, who deny Kosovo is an independent state, even if some are prepared to participate in its governance and acknowledge its laws. It is not easy for a state to accommodate political forces that deny its right to exist or insist on their right to end its existence.

Nor is life easy when your nearest and largest neighbor supports those who deny your right to exist and blocks your access to international organizations that pride themselves on virtually universal membership. Serbia, which has acknowledged in the Brussels talks sponsored by the EU the validity of Kosovo’s constitution and legal system on the entire territory of the country, nevertheless refuses to allow it admittance even into UNESCO. This has had the perverse effects of encouraging more virulent Albanian nationalism and Islamic extremism, both of which represent serious risks to Serbs and Serbian cultural and religious centers in Kosovo. So too does the recent EU decision not permit visa-free travel by Kosovars.

So I can’t count 2015 as a good year for Kosovo, despite its achievement of important milestones with Washington and Brussels. I can however hope that both anti-constitutional Serbs and anti-constitutional Albanians will come to their senses and realize that a stable, prosperous and democratic Kosovo is in their interest. That is certainly what concerned Americans wish for in 2016.

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What difference does Ramadi make?

Headlines today suggest that Iraqi security forces have retaken government buildings in the center of Ramadi, which fell to the Islamic State (ISIS) in May. Progress has been slow during the six months of the government offensive, which eschewed the use of Shia militias in a Sunni town 55 miles west of Baghdad that once had a population close to 200,000. The US has provided both tactical air attacks and trainers to support the government effort.

ISIS’s improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have made the liberation particularly treacherous, but ISIS did not make a concerted effort to hold on to Ramadi. Instead they tried to make the government’s advance as costly as possible. It still controls big neighborhoods. I’ve not seen any casualty figures, but they were likely significant, on both sides. The physical destruction is massive.

Now comes the hard part: early recovery and eventual reconstruction. While the past can’t be regarded as necessarily indicating future performance, it is worth a look at what has happened in Tikrit, a town of roughly the same size that was retaken from the Islamic State in April. The UN reported in October that

UNDP supported the efforts of the Government of Iraq to stabilize areas liberated from ISIL, particularly in and around Tikrit, through the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization. Several infrastructure projects identified by local authorities are under way in the sectors of water, electricity, health and education, targeting 85,000 beneficiaries among the 133,000 people who have returned to Tikrit. It is estimated that the previous population of Tikrit was 200,000. On
24 August, a cash-for-work project that through a UNDP partnership with local non-governmental organizations employs 200 persons daily for public infrastructure rehabilitation was begun.
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) is taking the lead on what it is calling “crisis response and resilience” in areas recovered from ISIL. Contributions are dribbling in: Denmark $3.3 million, Italy $2.72 million, Germany $33 million. These are small amounts, at least an order of magnitude if not two less than what will be required. Europeans clearly feel the Iraqi government should ante up the lion’s share. But with oil under $40 per barrel and extraordinary expenses associated with the fight against ISIS, Baghdad’s capabilities are limited.
It is unclear what the Americans are doing: the AID Iraq webpage is hopelessly out of date, but reports $172 in funding in 2014, more than half for democracy and governance. No doubt American humanitarian assistance has been generous, as it always is. But Americans certainly feel they are doing enough for the war effort and will hesitate to make any commitments to reconstruction, given the tremendous waste of resources that accompanied the occupation we indulged in during the first decade of this millennium.
The Gulf petrostates? Iraq’s relations with the Sunni Arab monarchies are simply bad. Baghdad has cozied up to Iran, especially during Prime Minister Maliki’s increasingly sectarian rule. Nor are the Gulf states feeling generous with oil prices less than one half of what they were last year.
I’d be the first to admit that too much money flowing into post-war reconstruction can be a bad thing. It encourages waste and theft. But I’m getting the feeling that resources may fall disastrously short as territory is retaken from the Islamic State. This will likely be true in Syria as well as Iraq, when and if the time comes.
The Islamic State is an insurgency: a brutal, totalitarian Sunni insurgency against sectarian governance. To win the war against it, you’ve got to provide stability, some measure of prosperity, and governance that shows respect for people who have been grossly mistreated, both under the Ba’athist dictatorship in Syria and under the illiberal democracy in Iraq. The Islamic State, or something worse, will be back wherever there is a vacuum. Without a serious reconstruction effort, the retaking of Ramadi (and Tikrit) may make no real difference.
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The end is nigh, once again

Two years ago I published a post with this title. Remarkably little has changed since then in many conflicts:

  • South Sudan is suffering even more bloodletting.
  • The Central African Republic is still imploding.
  • North Korea is no longer risking internal strife but continues its belligerence on the international stage.
  • China is still challenging its neighbors in the East and South China Seas.
  • Syria is even more chaotic, with catastrophic consequences for its population and strains for its neighbors.
  • Egypt continues its repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular human rights advocates.
  • Israel and Palestine are no closer to agreement on a two-state solution.
  • Afghanistan has a new president but the Taliban are stronger in the countryside and the Islamic State is gaining adherents; money and people are still expatriating.
  • Al Qaeda is less potent in many places, but that is little comfort since the Islamic State has risen to take the leading role in Salafist jihadism.
  • Ukraine has lost control of Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia, and risks losing control of much of the southeastern Donbas region.

The only issue I listed then that is palpably improved is the Iranian nuclear question, which is now the subject of a deal that should postpone Tehran’s access to the nuclear materials required to build a bomb for 10 to 15 years.

Danielle Pletka of AEI topped off the gloom this year with a piece suggesting there are reasons to fear Putin’s recklessness could trigger World War III.

Without going that far, it is easy to add to the doom and gloom list:

  • Europe is suffering a bout of right-wing xenophobia (the US has a milder case), triggered by migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.
  • Mali and Nigeria are suffering serious extremist challenges.
  • The Houthi takeover in Yemen, and intervention there by a Saudi-led coalition, is causing vast suffering in one of the world’s poorest countries and allowing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand its operations.
  • Civil war in Libya is far from resolution, despite some signatures on a UN-sponsored agreement to end it.
  • Turkey has re-initiated a war against Kurdish forces that had been in abeyance.
  • Even Brazil, once a rising power, is suffering scandals that may bring down its president, even as its economy tanks.

I’m still not ready to throw in the towel. Some successes of two years ago continue and others have begun: Colombia‘s civil war is nearing its end, Burma/Myanmar continues its transition in a more open direction (even though it has failed to settle conflicts with several important minorities), Kenya is still improving, ditto Liberia, which along with Sierra Leone and maybe Guinea seems to have beaten the Ebola epidemic, and much of the Balkans, even if Kosovo and Bosnia are going through rough patches.

I still think, as I said two years ago:

If there is a continuous thread running through the challenges we face it is this:  getting other people to govern themselves in ways that meet the needs of their own populations (including minorities) and don’t threaten others.  That was what we did in Europe with the Marshall Plan.  It is also what we contributed to in East Asia, as democracy established itself in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and elsewhere.  We have also had considerable success in recent decades in Latin America and Africa, where democracy and economic development have grown roots in Brazil, Argentina, Ghana, South Africa, and other important countries.  I may not like the people South Africans have elected, but I find it hard to complain about the way they have organized themselves to do it.

This is what we have failed to do in the Middle East:  American military support for autocracies there has stunted democratic evolution, even as our emphasis on economic reform has encouraged crony capitalism that generates resentment and support for Islamist alternatives.  Mubarak, Asad, Saleh, Qaddafi, and Ben Ali were not the most oppressive dictators the world has ever known, even though they murdered and imprisoned thousands, then raised those numbers by an order of magnitude as they tried to meet the challenge of revolution with brute force.  But their departures have left the countries they led with little means of governing themselves.  The states they claim to have built have proven a mirage in the desert.

If there is reason for doom and gloom, it is our failure to meet this governance challenge cleverly and effectively.  We continue to favor our military instruments, even though they are inappropriate to dealing with most of the problems we face (the important exceptions being Iran and China).  We have allowed our civilian instruments of foreign policy to atrophy, even as we ask them to meet enormous challenges.  What I wish for the new year is recognition–in the Congress, in the Administration and in the country–that we need still to help enable others to govern themselves.  Investment in the capacity to do it will return dividends for many decades into the future.

 

 

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The UN leans forward

The UN last week leaned forward on two important conflicts. The Secretariat went ahead with a Libyan peace deal, despite the refusal of the chairs of the country’s two competing parliaments and some armed groups to sign. A couple of days later, the UN Security Council passed a Syria resolution endorsing the so-called Vienna 2 road map for a ceasefire, negotiations, a new constitution, transition and elections. Neither move ends either war. Optimists hope they are first steps in the right direction.

The roads ahead will be difficult. In Libya, many armed groups seem unready to end their struggle, which is more about control of oil, the country’s substantial sovereign wealth funds and patronage than it is about religion or identity. But that is little comfort. It is not clear whether the Tobruk-based parliament, recognized under the agreement as a powerful lower house, will be able to move to Tripoli. Nor is it clear that the Tripoli-based parliament, which is to become a kind of advisory upper house, accepts its reduced role. Without a substantial deployment of peacekeepers, there is little the international community can do beyond the threat of sanctions against individuals to change their minds. In the meanwhile, the Islamic State is expanding its presence and aiming to control Libya’s vital oil facilities. Maybe that will get the attention of the warring factions.

Syria is no less difficult. The United States and Russia may nominally agree that it should remain united and become a state in which its citizens decide how it is governed, but they differ on whether and when Bashar al Assad should go, who is a terrorist and what should be done to fight the Islamic State. Washington thinks Assad has to leave in order to enable a serious fight against terrorists. Russia thinks he is fighting terrorists but might eventually leave, if and when the Syrian people decide. Russia is mostly bombing people the Americans thinks are moderates vital to Syria’s future, not the Islamic State. Washington is beefing up moderate forces, but refuses to give them the means to end barrel bombing and Russian strikes. Even a ceasefire in Syria will be difficult. The Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra (an Al Qaeda affiliate) won’t participate. Who will monitor the ceasefire, reporting on violations and who commits them?

None of this means the UN is wrong to try. What it means is that our expectations should be tempered.

A serious ceasefire in all of Syria isn’t likely. Some parts of the country may calm, but the international community will need to settle for “fight and talk,” a time-honored tradition. Agreement on transition isn’t likely either. The day Bashar al Assad agrees that at some future date he will be leaving power will be the day he leaves power. The notion that he will preside over a credible democratic transition is bozotic. He intends to remain in power and will likely be able to do so as long as the Russians and Iranians back him.

In Libya, it is unlikely that the UN-sponsored accord will be implemented without some sort of international peacekeeping presence, to secure at least Tripoli so that the united government the agreement foresees can safely meet and deliberate. That may be neccessary, but not sufficient, since the Islamic State threat is not in Tripoli (yet), but rather in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, and civilians in Benghazi need protection even more than those in Tripoli. Washington isn’t going to bother with Libya, except when it targets an Islamic State militant or two (or two dozen). If Libya is to be stabilized, the Europeans will need to step up to the task, or convince Arab countries to do it. Italy is attached by umbilical pipelines to Libyan gas production. France also enjoys Libyan oil and gas. Europeans with interests need to stop talking and start acting if they want their investments and energy supplies saved.

The UN is also leaning forward in Yemen, where the more or less Shia Houthis allied with forces loyal to former President Saleh are fighting the Saudi- and Emirati-backed effort to restore President Hadi to power in Sanaa. The effort to get a ceasefire and political settlement there is just beginning, without much initial success. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is expanding and enjoying relative immunity in Yemen’s vast hinterlands. The Islamic State can’t be far behind.

The seemingly shy and hesitant Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is proving to be a bold risktaker. The UN is doing the right things. If it didn’t exist, we would have to invent it. American politicians should be more appreciative.

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Normalization abnormalizes

Drilon Gashi* and Ard Morina** prepared the following post. It should not be understood to represent my own views.

As always, I am prepared to publish other well-reasoned posts or comments on this issue.

A recent decentralization agreement between Kosovo and Serbia has stoked fears that the process of normalization of relations between the two countries implies the abnormalization of Kosovo.

On December 3, Secretary of State Kerry seemed to make an unexpected stop in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, meeting briefly at the airport with Kosovo’s leadership. Kosovo’s parliament has been dysfunctional in recent months due to the opposition’s tear-gassing of the chamber in six separate instances, most recently on Monday, December 14. The opposition led by Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination), a political movement that originated as a social activist group, has said the tear-gassing is the only way to oppose two recent Kosovo government agreements. The first, and most contentious, is an agreement with Serbia to create an Association of Serb-majority municipalities (mostly concentrated in the north of Mitrovica bordering Serbia and in other enclaves throughout Kosovo). The second is a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro to Kosovo’s west.

The use of tear gas has been widely condemned by the Western backers of Kosovo’s independence, with the European Union recently stating: “This kind of violent obstruction is neither acceptable nor will it solve any problem for the citizens of Kosovo.” The people in Kosovo, though, seem to offer a mixed reaction to the incidents. While many influential Kosovars have spoken out against the use of tear gas and against recent opposition protests, Vetëvendosje has seen growing support—a recent poll suggests the party is the second most favorable. The November poll results state that if elections were held today, 28% would support Vetëvendosje (up from 14% in June 2014) while 33% would support the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the leading party in current coalition government.

This reaction highlights the people of Kosovo’s anxiety regarding the latest agreement resulting from the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Apprehension about the agreements from the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is not new, but an Association of Serb municipalities stokes fears of a dysfunctional Kosovo. Worse, Kosovars fear it may lead to the country’s division. Doubts on the agreement have also been cited by Kosovo experts. Commenting on the Association of Serb municipalities, Daniel Serwer stated: “It is ethnically–not politically or geographically–defined and could become the kernel of separate Serb governing structures in Kosovo. That of course is the fear: a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered that country dysfunctional.” Serwer, however, believes that the Association could be implemented without compromising Kosovo’s territorial integrity.

Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, the Serb federal entity in the country, showcases an example of a failed territorial division based on ethnic lines, creating a legitimate cause for concern. Rather than trudging forward with the dialogue process, Kosovo, Serbia and the EU should focus more on sincerely addressing concerns raised and a deep crisis that could emerge from the agreement. Not doing so risks destroying the prospect of European Union membership for both Kosovo and Serbia, with the agreement leaving too many loose ends.

One important loose end is Serbia’s position towards Kosovo. Belgrade has not only shown its unwillingness to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but has aggressively campaigned to undermine it. The latest example was Kosovo’s attempt to join UNESCO, the UN science, education and cultural heritage body, where it lost the bid by two votes—due at least partly to Serbia’s active diplomatic affront to the candidacy. Serbia’s current foreign minister, Ivica Dacic, claimed that UNESCO membership for Kosovo was equivalent to “ISIS being admitted to the United Nations,” a statement that prompts the authors to mention that Dacic was a former political ally of Slobodan Milosevic, and is now one of Serbia’s most prominent leaders involved in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.

The objective of the dialogue led by the EU is “the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.” The process is largely open to interpretation. While the Kosovo government’s position is that the endgame of the process is Serbia recognizing its independence and both ending up in the EU, Belgrade sees the dialogue as an opportunity to maintain and deepen influence in Kosovo. Foreign Minister Dacic declared in 2013, “We expect Pristina to agree to our proposal for establishing a Union of Serb Communities, and we would like the European Union to act as a safeguard. This would provide us with a viable provisional solution, until we arrive at some sort of final decision on the status of Kosovo.” Read more

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The Balkans in perspective

I’m taking off for the Middle East this evening, so rushing to put my affairs in order. I don’t know if I’ll get an opportunity to write today, but in the meanwhile here is an interview I did for Kosovo Radio and Television with Janusz Bugajski. It was broadcast on December 8 but recorded a few days earlier:

It seems to me Janusz, who knows the Balkans well, does a great job trying to get past the immediate headlines to deeper and broader issues.

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