Tag: European Union
Libya needs all the help it can get
I had an opportunity today to talk with Hill people about Libya. Here is more or less what I said:
1. It’s a pleasure to be here to talk about Libya, which is today a country in big trouble but with some hope of finding its way out.
2. I confess to a lot of sympathy with the revolution that started in February 2011. I visited Benghazi and Tripoli that September and again in July 2012, to observe Libya’s first national elections in almost 50 years.
3. I found Libya the friendliest Arab country I have ever visited. Libyans knew who saved Benghazi and appreciated it. They ran good elections in 2012 and were looking forward to a free and democratic future.
4. But the revolution began crashing in the fall of 2012. Three years later, Benghazi is chaotic, tribal tensions are causing sporadic violence in the south and only recently has the west begun to stabilize, due to exhaustion of the Misratan and Zintani militias.
5. The country has two parliaments and two governments. The internationally recognized one is based in Tobruk and Bayda, with support from militias gathered together in a coalition called Dignity. The other is based in Tripoli, with support from militias in the Dawn coalition.
6. The big change since I wrote “Libya’s Escalating Civil War” in May is the heightened prospect of a UN-brokered political agreement, hopefully to be signed before the end of this month.
7. The agreement would create a Government of National Accord (GNA) with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) elected in June 2014 as its legislature and an advisory State Council drawn mainly from Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC).
8. This would be a power-sharing arrangement that attempts to merge Libya’s two governments into one. That is a classic way for diplomats to try to resolve civil wars.
9. But it is not entirely symmetrical. The Tripoli-based GNC would become advisory.
10. That’s the main sticking point. The proposed GNC amendments to the draft agreement would make it a second house of a bicameral parliament, with virtually equal powers to the HoR.
11. That may be a deal breaker, but there is another way out of the current impasse. The GNC may be able to make up some of what it loses institutionally in the now ongoing bargaining over deciding who sits where: the positions of prime minister, deputy prime ministers and the two ministers who will be part of the Presidency Council are particularly important.
12. That the bargaining has gotten to this stage—the musical chairs phase of ending a war (who will get a good seat and who will be left standing)—is a good sign, though no guarantee of success.
13. But even success will be no more than what the State Department people are referring to as a “70% solution.”
14. Khalifa Haftar, who commands what he calls the Libyan National Army on behalf of the “Dignity” coalition, is not likely to sign on. Nor will some hardliners associated with the “Dawn” coalition.
15. A 70% solution without international peacekeepers is a dicey proposition. Thirty per cent is a lot of potential spoilers.
16. The key issue for success will be security arrangements, especially in Tripoli. Those arrangements have not yet been made, though I understand some of the militias have begun talking informally about them.
17. Even in the best of all possible worlds, that will take time, as building the confidence of HoR members required to get them to move to Tripoli will not be easy.
18. What about international peacekeepers, at least to secure Tripoli? The Italians have indicated a willingness to lead such an effort, but it will be vital that the initiative come from a legitimate Libyan government only after Tripoli is stabilized and the HoR has moved there.
19. Arab participation, which won’t be easy or quick to arrange, is vital.
20. That will leave a perilous transition period. The Islamic State affiliate in Libya is second only to the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in posing a threat to U.S. interests.
21. Though chased recently from Derna by other extremists, ISIS has established itself in centrally located Sirte, Qaddafi’s hometown. A rebellion there last month failed.
22. ISIS despises both Dawn and Dignity. It will try to destabilize a Government of National Accord.
23. So whatever forces back the GNA will need to be prepared to fight ISIS, in addition to other spoilers who refuse to acknowledge its authority.
24. What will the U.S. role be if the 70% solution goes forward?
25. First Washington has to be prepared to press the parties in Libya to adhere to the UN-brokered agreement. This will likely include sanctioning recalcitrants. It also needs to include support for those who are prepared to support the peace process, whether nationally or locally. It would be particularly important if the Misratan and Zintani militias can be convinced to come to a truce.
26. Second, Washington needs to help ensure Libya’s neighbors back the 70% solution to the hilt. The Tunisians and Moroccans, who have hosted some of the negotiating sessions, are on board.
27. The big question mark is Cairo, which under President Sisi has in the past backed Dignity and in particular Haftar. I am told the Egyptians are ready to abandon that support.
28. Third, Washington should support any international peacekeeping mission with air and sea logistics, intelligence and air strikes.
29. Fourth, Washington will need to train Libyan forces, especially for counter-terrorism.
30. This is more controversial than it sounds, because a previous U.S.-supported effort to train a General Purpose Force (GPF) came a cropper several years ago due to misbehavior of the Libyans involved. Some refused to return to Libya. Others did worse.
31. CT training and assistance will have to occur in Libya. It will be expensive and dangerous. Congressional support for the effort will be vital. I suggest we prepare to spend as much as the $600 million we planned for the GPF, over three to five years. That will be a hard sell.
32. But we have to decide whether we are serious about defeating the Islamic State or not. A failed UN political agreement in Libya could open the door to ISIS, which is still relatively weak there.
33. We know however how quickly and suddenly ISIS can expand and take over territory.
34. Libya is an enormous country with a small population–only 6.4 million when everyone is at home, likely no more than 5 million or so today. Its hinterland would be ideal as an ISIS safe haven, giving it strategic depth as it loses territory in Iraq and Syria.
35. The Libyans deserve better, in particular if they sign on to the UN-brokered agreement. I hope we’ll be prepared to support their efforts.
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Peace picks September 8-11
1. EES Distinguished Lecture Series: “Does the EU have a future?” with Professor Erik Jones and Sir Michael Leigh | Tuesday, September 8th | 6:00 – 7:30 | SAIS- Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The European and Eurasian Studies Program Distinguished Lecture Series invites you to kick off the 2015-2016 series with the Director of the EES Program, Professor Erik Jones, and Sir Michael Leigh as they discuss “Does the EU have a future?”
2. WEBCAST ONLY: Hillary Clinton addresses the Iran nuclear deal | Wednesday, September 9th | 9:00 – 10:00 | Webcast sponsored by Brookings | REGISTER TO WATCH | Next week, Congress will begin debate on a resolution to disapprove of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which will lift economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. This is probably the most significant foreign policy debate that Congress has been involved in since the Iraq war in 2003. On September 9, Brookings will live stream remarks from former Secretary of State Clinton on her view of the significance of the Iran nuclear deal and its implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the region. Hillary Clinton was sworn in as the 67th secretary of state of the United States in January 2009, after nearly four decades in public service as an advocate, attorney, first lady, and senator. During her tenure in the Senate, she served on the Armed Services Committee and worked to launch the government’s Vital Voices Democracy Initiative. She was also a commissioner on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Brookings President Strobe Talbott will provide introductory remarks and Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk will moderate the discussion.
3. Voices From Japan: National Security Speaker Series, with the Keynote Address – “Japan’s New National Security Policy” By – The Honorable Itsunori Onodera, the 12th Minister of Defense of Japan | Wednesday, September 9th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Stimson| REGISTER TO ATTEND | As the security environment surrounding Japan rapidly undergoes changes, Japan has sought to adapt alongside it. Since December 2012, the Abe government was pushed forward changes to Japan’s defense establishment, including new principles for arms exports, a reinterpretation of Article 9 for collective self-defense, updated US-Japan bilateral security guidelines, and now potentially new security legislation for the purpose of implementing these changes. The Honorable Itsunori Onodera, drawing on his long experiences in Japanese politics, most recently as the Minister of Defense between 2012-2014, will lay out his vision for Japan’s national security policy in this dramatic period. Moderator: Yuki Tatsumi, The Stimson Center.
4. East Timor Roundtable with Dr. John Blaxland | Wednesday, September 9th | 12:30 – 2:00 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies is pleased to invite you for a discussion with John Blaxland, senior fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. Blaxland writes extensively on military history, intelligence and security, and Asia-Pacific affairs. He will discuss his recently-published book East Timor Intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET, Southeast Asian security affairs, and Australia’s role in security and regional stability. Blaxland has served previously as director for Joint Intelligence Operations at the Australian military’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command, and before that, as defense attache to Thailand and Myanmar from 2008 to 2010. Blaxland earned his PhD in war studies from the Royal Military College of Canada.
5. The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Gulf War | Thursday, September 10th | 1:00 | Webcast sponsored by CFR | VIEWING LINK| Experts discuss the legacy of the Gulf War. Speakers include (and are listed with their titles during the war): Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council, Richard Kerr, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and Paul D. Wolfowitz, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Presider: Deborah Amos, International Correspondent, National Public Radio.
6. Women as Victims of Terrorism | Thursday, September 10th | 3:00-6:00 | Heritage | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Showing of PBS Frontline Documentary Escaping ISIS: gripping first-hand accounts of women who escaped the brutal reign of ISIS. ISIS barbarity against women, particularly those from religious minorities, is well-documented. Media reports about a codified system of sex slavery that involves ISIS fighters regularly raping pre-teen girls and young women from the minority Yazidi community has shocked the West. ISIS relies on acts of extreme violence, particularly the brutalization of women, to consolidate control over populations and as a recruitment tool. What should the U.S. do to end the ISIS atrocities against women and girls? Come view an acclaimed documentary and hear a panel of experts discuss this disturbing yet critical issue. Followed by a Panel Discussion with Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, Kurdistan Regional Government Representative to the United States, and Nina Shea, Director, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute. Moderated by Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation.
7. Nuclear Policy Talks: The Iran Nuclear Deal | Thursday, September 10th | 4:30 – 6:00 | Elliott School of International Affairs | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Iran Nuclear Deal: The Technical Debate Clarified The US Congress is currently debating the pluses and minuses of the Iran Nuclear Deal, approval of which would mark a new chapter in the relations of the US and Iran after a long cold stand-off. ; Will the Iran Nuclear Deal prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or establish and engrain their nuclear prowess? To shed light on the technical aspects of the Iran Nuclear Deal, currently under consideration by the US Congress, our distinguished panelists will present their views and answer questions from the audience. ; Panelists include noted physicist and arms control researcher Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, radiochemist and former head of the Office of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Olli Heinonen, a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and former ambassador Dr. Hossein Mousavian, a Research Scholar at the Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security.
8. Reischauer Seminar – Japan, China, and the Post-Sanctions Persian Gulf: Implications for the United States and Global Affairs | Thursday, September 10th | 4:30 – 6:00 | SAIS- Rome Building| REGISTER TO ATTEND | Professor Kent Calder will examine the relationship between East Asia and the Persian Gulf and how that plays into the United States’ relations around the world. China and Japan have been Iran’s largest trading partners before sanctions– they will likely play major roles in its economic future. Japan and China are also the largest importers of oil in the world from the Gulf– both the Iranian and the Arab sides of the Gulf. Their future interaction with the Gulf will in economic terms certainly be larger than those of Europe and the US– what will that renewed reality mean for the broader world?
9. Should the United States be the World’s Policeman? | Thursday, September 10th | 5:30-7:00 | Sponsored by the McCain Institute and located at the U.S. Navy Memorial Heritage Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Challenges to global security and U.S. interests around the world are mounting – from ISIS and a disintegrating Middle East, to an aggressive and authoritarian Russia, to China’s expansionism in the Pacific. But is it the role of the United States to take on all of these global challenges? Should America be projecting power, supporting international order, and countering opponents like these, because if not, the challenges will only continue to grow? Or should the United States stay focused on rebuilding its economy, and conserving its strength to face only truly existential challenges, rather than risking over-stretch in foreign adventures? In other words, should the United States be the world’s policeman? And if not, who will? Join @McCainInstitute for a lively debate as leading experts decide if the United States should be the world’s policeman. #MIDebate
Confirmed debaters:
Pro
Tom Donnelly
Resident Fellow and Co-Director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies, AEI
Julianne Smith
Senior Fellow and Director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program, Center for A New American Security
Con
Richard Burt
Chairman, National Interest Advisory Board
Elizabeth Cobbs
Melbern Glasscock Chair, Texas A&M University
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It all depends
People were asking me what I think almost before the ink was dry on the five pages agreed yesterday between Belgrade and Pristina on the general principles/main elements of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. The answer is: it all depends.
It depends on your frame of reference:
- If you want to know whether it is consistent with the Ahtisaari plan and previous agreements between Pristina and Belgrade, that is one frame of reference. It looks to me as if it is.
- If you want to know whether the general principles will ensure the Association/Community is formed consistent with Kosovo law, that is another frame of reference. It looks to me as if it will be.
- If you want to know whether it is consistent with practices in other situations where a minority in one country looks to a neighboring “mother” country for support, that is still another frame of reference. I think you likely can find precedents elsewhere.
- If you want to know whether allowing Belgrade to assist in providing education, healthcare and urban planning to Serbs in Kosovo is wise, that is another frame of reference. It at least might lower burdens on the government in Pristina that it would find difficult to carry.
But if you ask me whether it looks like a good idea that Kosovars will have no reason to regret, I confess to doubts. Those doubts originate with the Ahtisaari plan, not with this latest iteration of its most dubious provisions. Kosovo’s negotiators have done well to make it clear the Association/Community will be formed in accordance with Kosovo’s constitution and laws, verified by its constitutional court. It is also clear the Association/Community is supposed mainly to exercise overview and provide services only consistent with Kosovo law. On paper it looks like an ethnically defined version of the Democratic Governors Association (DGA) in the United States. How can I object to that?
I can, because it is ethnically–not politically or geographically–defined and could become the kernel of separate Serb governing structures in Kosovo. That of course is the fear: a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered that country dysfunctional. It is bringing up the rear in the regatta for European Union membership in the Balkans.
Unfortunately, Ahtisaari left the door open for that to happen in Kosovo too, specifically in article 9.1 of Annex III of his proposal:
Based upon the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, municipalities shall be entitled to cooperate and form partnerships with other Kosovo municipalities to carry out functions of mutual interest, in accordance with the law.9.1.1: Municipal responsibilities in the areas of their own and enhanced competencies may be exercised through municipal partnerships, with the exception of the exercise of fundamental municipal authorities, such as election of municipal organs and appointment of municipal officials, municipal budgeting, and the adoption of regulatory acts enforceable, on citizens in general;
9.1.2 Municipal partnerships may take all actions necessary to implement and exercise their functional cooperation through, inter alia, the establishment of a decision making body comprised of representatives appointed by the assemblies of the participating municipalities, the hiring and dismissal of administrative and advisory personnel, and decisions on funding and other operational needs of the partnership…
This notion of “partnerships” to carry out municipal functions might be perfectly sensible and workable in a normal European context. We’ve got some analogies in the US, like the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. But with due respect to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, it could be a nightmare in the Balkans.
Some colleagues have said there is not so much to worry about, because the divergent interests between large and small municipalities, and between those north and south of Ibar, will limit what the Community/Association is able to do. That could be correct, provided the municipalities are driven by their own interests.
But if Belgrade cracks the whip and insists that the Serb municipalities obey its lead–which the flow of its resources may be able to ensure–that argument could be moot. Combined with the disciplined clout of Serb members of the Kosovo parliament, the Community/Association could become a real hindrance to Kosovo’s further institutional development. It will almost certainly become a source of contention within the Albanian community, parts of which will see perfidy even if there isn’t any.
Might Belgrade recognize that a functional Kosovo state is in its interests and a dysfunctional one is not? After all, a weak or collapsed state in Kosovo could create real problems on Serbia’s southern border. I think that is true, but I wouldn’t want to bet on Serbian democracy to come to that conclusion easily. It has been a long time since Belgrade cared much about governance of the Albanians in Kosovo. America isn’t the only democracy that tries all the bad options before doing the right thing.
Do I think the other things agreed yesterday outweigh the risks associated with the Community/Association? No, I don’t. I wouldn’t surrender my kingdom these days for either a horse or an international dialing code, though I might trade a dialing code for allowing a Serbian telecomm provider to operate.
But really the Pristina government had no choice: it was obligated to implement the Ahtisaari plan. Too bad that plan wasn’t better articulated on this issue.
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დავითი and Голиаф (David and Goliath)
On Wednesday, USIP hosted a talk by the Defense Minister of Georgia, Tinatin Khidasheli, entitled Seeking Security: Georgia Between Russia and ISIS. William B. Taylor, Executive Vice President, USIP, moderated. Khidasheli made a forceful argument that NATO membership or at least a path to NATO membership for Georgia would help deter Russia and maintain NATO credibility.
In his introductory remarks, Taylor noted that Georgia is a strong US ally that has demonstrated its military and diplomatic capabilities. Georgia is committed to integration with the West and NATO.
Khidasheli said Georgia proves success for a former Soviet Socialist Republic is possible without Russia in charge. This is why Russia fights everything they do. Putin is trying to recover from the weakness of the Yeltsin era. He won’t let any country in Russia’s immediate neighborhood have a say without Russia’s permission.
The European Neighborhood’s Eastern Partnership started with six countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, at the 2015 Riga Summit, only Georgia was fully present. This was disappointing.
Khidasheli cited two motives for her trip to DC:
- To strengthen Georgia’s partnership with the US and achieve more tangible results and military cooperation.
- To seek advice on Georgia’s path to NATO membership.
NATO needs Georgia more than Georgia needs NATO, she said, in order to maintain its mission and credibility. The Alliance has been talking for years about its commitment to partners and its open-door policy. It must prove it is still a courageous organization. Some argue that expanding NATO will force Russia to act, but after NATO made it clear in 2008 that it wasn’t expanding, Russia invaded South Ossetia. By 2009, the West viewed Russia as a partner again, but Russia’s actions in Ukraine made it clear that is not true.
As soon as the Riga summit ended in disappointment, Russia started actions in Georgia. There are daily Russian movements on the artificial border with South Ossetia. The Russians sometimes advance up to a kilometer or two. Georgia won’t be provoked and won’t allow war on its territory. The checkpoints that Russia has marked are now just .5 km from Georgia’s main East-West highway. Is Russia targeting it or trying to distract Georgia?
NATO will hold its Warsaw Summit in July 2016. Georgia will hold parliamentary elections in October 2016. A bad outcome at Warsaw won’t make Khidasheli’s voters fall in love with Russia, but it could decrease their turnout, leading to a more pro-Russian parliament. The situation in Ukraine is adding to doubts about Georgia’s integration into NATO and the EU. There are two possible outcomes of the Warsaw summit:
- NATO allows Russia a veto over new members, rejects expansion and cedes additional areas to Russian dominance.
- NATO pursues enlargement, sending a clear message to Russia that partners matter as much as members.
NATO brings peace. It is the only reason the Baltics are currently safe. The current situation won’t deter Russia. The world hasn’t been able to stop the war in Ukraine.
The dominant argument from the Kremlin now favors a strong Russia. Putin has no trouble presenting the West as the enemy. But sanctions alone against Russia won’t help and will play into Putin’s “evil West” narrative. The West needs to understand that Russia is a country where people ate rats and cats in World War 2 and still won. Western notions of hardship and happiness aren’t relevant there.
Khidasheli recognizes that a realistic outcome of the Warsaw Summit won’t be NATO membership but an intermediate step towards membership. Georgia wants a statement that it is on a membership track.
While Georgia recently acquired an air defense system from France, Khidasheli did not specify how Tbilisi plans to deter Moscow or draw red lines. Georgia will make decisions about whether to shoot down a Russian plane violating Georgian airspace based on the threat level. With respect to Russia’s creeping annexation policies, Khidasheli reiterated that Georgia won’t be provoked. Georgia will not make a decision regarding countering Russia without its partners.
Russia is trying to use soft power to influence Georgia through NGOs and the media. There are political parties that openly align with Russia, including a former parliamentary speaker.
Khidasheli also spoke briefly about the problem of ISIS recruitment in Georgia, especially in the Pankisi Gorge. This poses a great danger. Georgia has failed to pay enough attention to the problems in this region. More integration, education and targeted employment programs are needed to decrease the feelings of isolation and abandonment among locals. The government must also examine other areas of Georgia where the demographics suggest future problems and address those issues now.
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Jeb, the anti-Trump
Jeb Bush’s foreign policy speech at the Reagan Library yesterday merits careful attention. In a campaign for the Republican nomination dominated so far by Donald Trump’s verbal antics, this speech ranks as the most serious effort yet to challenge Barack Obama’s approach to threats from the Islamic State and Iran.
I won’t quarrel much with the Governor’s analysis of the current situation. Yes, the Islamic State in particular and Islamic extremism in general are more of a threat today than they were in 2009, even if American civilian deaths from terrorist acts since 9/11 have been minimal. Iran is a bad actor likely to cause more problems in the Middle East once sanctions are lifted. The situation in Syria, which Iran has exacerbated with support to Bashar al Assad and Hizbollah, is catastrophic and needs a more effective approach.
But Bush confuses cause and effect in ways that make his policy prescriptions screwy. It is apparent that the mainly military approach both the Bush and Obama administrations have taken to fighting Islamic extremism in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen has made the situation worse, not better. Yet in Iraq Jeb suggests we only need to do more and better on the military front in order to fix the situation. I don’t see any reason to believe that will work well. Nor is his hand-waving confidence about Iraqis “coming through for their country” convincing.
The Iraq war is the basis for much of what Bush thinks Obama has gotten wrong. In Bush’s narrative, the “surge” was a military success that Obama squandered by withdrawing American troops. Only by showing more military resolve region-wide can the US reverse that mistake.
But that is a false account of what actually happened. Obama withdrew American troops from Iraq on a schedule negotiated and agreed by the George W. Bush Administration. Republicans neglect that fact, because it disrupts their portrayal of the Obama Administration as weak, vacillating and prone to ignore the importance of military power. When challenged, they claim that George W. thought the agreement would be renegotiated. Obama tried that and failed, not because he was weak, vacillating and prone to ignore the importance of military power but because political sentiment in both the US and Iraq leaned heavily against a continuing US military presence.
If anyone is to be blamed for the rise of the Islamic State’s takeover of Sunni portions of Iraq, it is Nouri al Maliki, who was hand-picked as prime minister by the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration compounded that error when it backed Maliki for a second term even though his party had lost its plurality in parliament. Maliki thereafter proved himself an aggressive Shia sectarian who alienated both Sunni and Kurds, thereby weakening the Iraqi state and setting the stage for the ISIS takeover. It is vital always to remember that the problems in Iraq and generally in the region are at their heart political, not military.
But that narrative is too complicated for Jeb Bush. He prefers a simpler one that echoes his older brother’s worldview:
What we are facing in ISIS and its ideology is, to borrow a phrase, the focus of evil in the modern world.
I can think of a lot of other foci of evil in the modern world, and I’d have thought that “axis of evil” was a Manichean phrase no one would want to echo, given its association with the catastrophic mistake of invading Iraq and the less catastrophic but still serious mistake by George W. of failing even to try to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran before it had installed almost 20,000 centrifuges and enriched enough uranium to make a nuclear weapon.
On that subject, Jeb takes up the prevailing Republican unequivocal opposition to the nuclear deal. He offers no idea what his alternative is. He promises to undo the alleged damage Obama has done if elected, but of course withdrawal from the deal at this point would also have consequences he fails to consider: either Iran will race for nuclear weapons or the Europeans, Russians and Chinese will implement the deal and lift sanctions. The US then ends up either 1) having no alternative to war (without any allies except Israel), 2) watching its European allies make common cause with Moscow and Beijing against American efforts to unilaterally enforce sanctions. This is no formula for restoring American leadership, which is what Jeb says he wants to do.
Only on Syria does Bush offer any substantial suggestions worth examination: protected zones in parts of Syria and a no-fly zone over the whole country. Assad, not just ISIS, would be his target. Those are propositions President Obama has resisted because they take the US down the slippery slope towards greater involvement in the chaos that the multi-sided Syrian civil war their has generated. But his refusal to get involved hasn’t improved the situation or made it easier to solve. We shouldn’t have to wait for a new president to correct course on Syria.
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Something is rotten
I had the satisfaction yesterday of sending around yesterday a paper (now available in the local language) by Srdjan Blagovcanin and Boris Divjak on How Bosnia’s Political Economy Holds It Back and What To Do About It. They have done something I have wanted to see for some time: a chapter and verse description of how politicians are ripping off the country’s citizens. They can’t of course name names, but they cite specific instances and elucidate the mechanisms used. The responsible parties know who they are. So does everyone else in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This paper should be read with the German/British initiative for “reform” in mind. That effort blocked a nascent American initiative to try once again to fix the Dayton constitution, which empowers ethnic nationalists and enables the rip-off. The Germans and British have convinced the European Union to focus initially on labor market reforms, in order to generate growth and presumably in preparation for privatization of state-owned companies. I’m not against it, but there are two obvious problems with that approach:
- Serious labor market reform will worsen social conditions, and privatization will eventually lead to redundancies that will worsen them more;
- Past privatization efforts have put state assets into the hands of crony capitalists, who manage not only to strip assets but also sell the shells back to the state.
It is only by acute awareness of the political/economic context and close international supervision that such perversities can be avoided. But it is definitely time to move ahead with serious reform efforts. Some political leaders are blatantly ripping off the citizens and enriching themselves. Citizens get little or nothing in the way of state services. I only ask that the Europeans not settle for Potemkin villages. It is time to build a state in Bosnia that serves the real needs of its citizens.
How do we get there from here? Srdjan and Boris suggest starting where the problems are: in the political parties and their leadership. They want internal democracy in the parties, which today are controlled by their leadership, without any serious input from the membership. In Italy this is called “partitocracy.” It isn’t any prettier in the Balkans. They also want to see red tape cut and serious judicial efforts mounted against corruption, including international asset freezes and travel bans for guilty parties, who should be pursued by the judicial system with international assistance. They are attentive also to the need for a broader civil society effort to create a context in which corrupt practices are not tolerated.
None of this in my way of thinking substitutes for constitutional reform, which however has failed at least twice (I am counting the close-call 2006 April package as well as the ill-begotten 2009 Butmir initiative), despite high-level international engagement. The EU is now very much in the lead in Bosnia, with the Dayton-created High Representative taking a backseat. Boris and Srjdan like it that way, as does Brussels. And Brussels is following the British/German lead. So constitional reform, essential though it may be, will have to wait a while.
If the current reform effort does anything useful, it shouldn’t have to wait long. Once the political economy in Bosnia is reconstructed and citizens can begin to expect some services, they won’t long put up with the ethnic nationalists who have stood in the way of progress for 20 years. I won’t hold my breath for that to happen, but we’ll know soon enough.
If the current reform effort fails, the country will return to demands for constitutional changes. I only hope they will be in the direction of strengthening the state government and its ability to negotiate and implement the requirements of EU membership. The route Milorad Dodik prefers–towards partition–is one that would set Bosnia back to wartime issues and block its road to the EU. That’s not the way to go.
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