Tag: European Union
The end is nigh, once again
Two years ago I published a post with this title. Remarkably little has changed since then in many conflicts:
- South Sudan is suffering even more bloodletting.
- The Central African Republic is still imploding.
- North Korea is no longer risking internal strife but continues its belligerence on the international stage.
- China is still challenging its neighbors in the East and South China Seas.
- Syria is even more chaotic, with catastrophic consequences for its population and strains for its neighbors.
- Egypt continues its repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular human rights advocates.
- Israel and Palestine are no closer to agreement on a two-state solution.
- Afghanistan has a new president but the Taliban are stronger in the countryside and the Islamic State is gaining adherents; money and people are still expatriating.
- Al Qaeda is less potent in many places, but that is little comfort since the Islamic State has risen to take the leading role in Salafist jihadism.
- Ukraine has lost control of Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia, and risks losing control of much of the southeastern Donbas region.
The only issue I listed then that is palpably improved is the Iranian nuclear question, which is now the subject of a deal that should postpone Tehran’s access to the nuclear materials required to build a bomb for 10 to 15 years.
Danielle Pletka of AEI topped off the gloom this year with a piece suggesting there are reasons to fear Putin’s recklessness could trigger World War III.
Without going that far, it is easy to add to the doom and gloom list:
- Europe is suffering a bout of right-wing xenophobia (the US has a milder case), triggered by migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.
- Mali and Nigeria are suffering serious extremist challenges.
- The Houthi takeover in Yemen, and intervention there by a Saudi-led coalition, is causing vast suffering in one of the world’s poorest countries and allowing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand its operations.
- Civil war in Libya is far from resolution, despite some signatures on a UN-sponsored agreement to end it.
- Turkey has re-initiated a war against Kurdish forces that had been in abeyance.
- Even Brazil, once a rising power, is suffering scandals that may bring down its president, even as its economy tanks.
I’m still not ready to throw in the towel. Some successes of two years ago continue and others have begun: Colombia‘s civil war is nearing its end, Burma/Myanmar continues its transition in a more open direction (even though it has failed to settle conflicts with several important minorities), Kenya is still improving, ditto Liberia, which along with Sierra Leone and maybe Guinea seems to have beaten the Ebola epidemic, and much of the Balkans, even if Kosovo and Bosnia are going through rough patches.
I still think, as I said two years ago:
If there is a continuous thread running through the challenges we face it is this: getting other people to govern themselves in ways that meet the needs of their own populations (including minorities) and don’t threaten others. That was what we did in Europe with the Marshall Plan. It is also what we contributed to in East Asia, as democracy established itself in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and elsewhere. We have also had considerable success in recent decades in Latin America and Africa, where democracy and economic development have grown roots in Brazil, Argentina, Ghana, South Africa, and other important countries. I may not like the people South Africans have elected, but I find it hard to complain about the way they have organized themselves to do it.
This is what we have failed to do in the Middle East: American military support for autocracies there has stunted democratic evolution, even as our emphasis on economic reform has encouraged crony capitalism that generates resentment and support for Islamist alternatives. Mubarak, Asad, Saleh, Qaddafi, and Ben Ali were not the most oppressive dictators the world has ever known, even though they murdered and imprisoned thousands, then raised those numbers by an order of magnitude as they tried to meet the challenge of revolution with brute force. But their departures have left the countries they led with little means of governing themselves. The states they claim to have built have proven a mirage in the desert.
If there is reason for doom and gloom, it is our failure to meet this governance challenge cleverly and effectively. We continue to favor our military instruments, even though they are inappropriate to dealing with most of the problems we face (the important exceptions being Iran and China). We have allowed our civilian instruments of foreign policy to atrophy, even as we ask them to meet enormous challenges. What I wish for the new year is recognition–in the Congress, in the Administration and in the country–that we need still to help enable others to govern themselves. Investment in the capacity to do it will return dividends for many decades into the future.
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The UN leans forward
The UN last week leaned forward on two important conflicts. The Secretariat went ahead with a Libyan peace deal, despite the refusal of the chairs of the country’s two competing parliaments and some armed groups to sign. A couple of days later, the UN Security Council passed a Syria resolution endorsing the so-called Vienna 2 road map for a ceasefire, negotiations, a new constitution, transition and elections. Neither move ends either war. Optimists hope they are first steps in the right direction.
The roads ahead will be difficult. In Libya, many armed groups seem unready to end their struggle, which is more about control of oil, the country’s substantial sovereign wealth funds and patronage than it is about religion or identity. But that is little comfort. It is not clear whether the Tobruk-based parliament, recognized under the agreement as a powerful lower house, will be able to move to Tripoli. Nor is it clear that the Tripoli-based parliament, which is to become a kind of advisory upper house, accepts its reduced role. Without a substantial deployment of peacekeepers, there is little the international community can do beyond the threat of sanctions against individuals to change their minds. In the meanwhile, the Islamic State is expanding its presence and aiming to control Libya’s vital oil facilities. Maybe that will get the attention of the warring factions.
Syria is no less difficult. The United States and Russia may nominally agree that it should remain united and become a state in which its citizens decide how it is governed, but they differ on whether and when Bashar al Assad should go, who is a terrorist and what should be done to fight the Islamic State. Washington thinks Assad has to leave in order to enable a serious fight against terrorists. Russia thinks he is fighting terrorists but might eventually leave, if and when the Syrian people decide. Russia is mostly bombing people the Americans thinks are moderates vital to Syria’s future, not the Islamic State. Washington is beefing up moderate forces, but refuses to give them the means to end barrel bombing and Russian strikes. Even a ceasefire in Syria will be difficult. The Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra (an Al Qaeda affiliate) won’t participate. Who will monitor the ceasefire, reporting on violations and who commits them?
None of this means the UN is wrong to try. What it means is that our expectations should be tempered.
A serious ceasefire in all of Syria isn’t likely. Some parts of the country may calm, but the international community will need to settle for “fight and talk,” a time-honored tradition. Agreement on transition isn’t likely either. The day Bashar al Assad agrees that at some future date he will be leaving power will be the day he leaves power. The notion that he will preside over a credible democratic transition is bozotic. He intends to remain in power and will likely be able to do so as long as the Russians and Iranians back him.
In Libya, it is unlikely that the UN-sponsored accord will be implemented without some sort of international peacekeeping presence, to secure at least Tripoli so that the united government the agreement foresees can safely meet and deliberate. That may be neccessary, but not sufficient, since the Islamic State threat is not in Tripoli (yet), but rather in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, and civilians in Benghazi need protection even more than those in Tripoli. Washington isn’t going to bother with Libya, except when it targets an Islamic State militant or two (or two dozen). If Libya is to be stabilized, the Europeans will need to step up to the task, or convince Arab countries to do it. Italy is attached by umbilical pipelines to Libyan gas production. France also enjoys Libyan oil and gas. Europeans with interests need to stop talking and start acting if they want their investments and energy supplies saved.
The UN is also leaning forward in Yemen, where the more or less Shia Houthis allied with forces loyal to former President Saleh are fighting the Saudi- and Emirati-backed effort to restore President Hadi to power in Sanaa. The effort to get a ceasefire and political settlement there is just beginning, without much initial success. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is expanding and enjoying relative immunity in Yemen’s vast hinterlands. The Islamic State can’t be far behind.
The seemingly shy and hesitant Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is proving to be a bold risktaker. The UN is doing the right things. If it didn’t exist, we would have to invent it. American politicians should be more appreciative.
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Normalization abnormalizes
Drilon Gashi* and Ard Morina** prepared the following post. It should not be understood to represent my own views.
As always, I am prepared to publish other well-reasoned posts or comments on this issue.
A recent decentralization agreement between Kosovo and Serbia has stoked fears that the process of normalization of relations between the two countries implies the abnormalization of Kosovo.
On December 3, Secretary of State Kerry seemed to make an unexpected stop in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, meeting briefly at the airport with Kosovo’s leadership. Kosovo’s parliament has been dysfunctional in recent months due to the opposition’s tear-gassing of the chamber in six separate instances, most recently on Monday, December 14. The opposition led by Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination), a political movement that originated as a social activist group, has said the tear-gassing is the only way to oppose two recent Kosovo government agreements. The first, and most contentious, is an agreement with Serbia to create an Association of Serb-majority municipalities (mostly concentrated in the north of Mitrovica bordering Serbia and in other enclaves throughout Kosovo). The second is a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro to Kosovo’s west.
The use of tear gas has been widely condemned by the Western backers of Kosovo’s independence, with the European Union recently stating: “This kind of violent obstruction is neither acceptable nor will it solve any problem for the citizens of Kosovo.” The people in Kosovo, though, seem to offer a mixed reaction to the incidents. While many influential Kosovars have spoken out against the use of tear gas and against recent opposition protests, Vetëvendosje has seen growing support—a recent poll suggests the party is the second most favorable. The November poll results state that if elections were held today, 28% would support Vetëvendosje (up from 14% in June 2014) while 33% would support the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the leading party in current coalition government.
This reaction highlights the people of Kosovo’s anxiety regarding the latest agreement resulting from the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Apprehension about the agreements from the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is not new, but an Association of Serb municipalities stokes fears of a dysfunctional Kosovo. Worse, Kosovars fear it may lead to the country’s division. Doubts on the agreement have also been cited by Kosovo experts. Commenting on the Association of Serb municipalities, Daniel Serwer stated: “It is ethnically–not politically or geographically–defined and could become the kernel of separate Serb governing structures in Kosovo. That of course is the fear: a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered that country dysfunctional.” Serwer, however, believes that the Association could be implemented without compromising Kosovo’s territorial integrity.
Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, the Serb federal entity in the country, showcases an example of a failed territorial division based on ethnic lines, creating a legitimate cause for concern. Rather than trudging forward with the dialogue process, Kosovo, Serbia and the EU should focus more on sincerely addressing concerns raised and a deep crisis that could emerge from the agreement. Not doing so risks destroying the prospect of European Union membership for both Kosovo and Serbia, with the agreement leaving too many loose ends.
One important loose end is Serbia’s position towards Kosovo. Belgrade has not only shown its unwillingness to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but has aggressively campaigned to undermine it. The latest example was Kosovo’s attempt to join UNESCO, the UN science, education and cultural heritage body, where it lost the bid by two votes—due at least partly to Serbia’s active diplomatic affront to the candidacy. Serbia’s current foreign minister, Ivica Dacic, claimed that UNESCO membership for Kosovo was equivalent to “ISIS being admitted to the United Nations,” a statement that prompts the authors to mention that Dacic was a former political ally of Slobodan Milosevic, and is now one of Serbia’s most prominent leaders involved in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.
The objective of the dialogue led by the EU is “the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.” The process is largely open to interpretation. While the Kosovo government’s position is that the endgame of the process is Serbia recognizing its independence and both ending up in the EU, Belgrade sees the dialogue as an opportunity to maintain and deepen influence in Kosovo. Foreign Minister Dacic declared in 2013, “We expect Pristina to agree to our proposal for establishing a Union of Serb Communities, and we would like the European Union to act as a safeguard. This would provide us with a viable provisional solution, until we arrive at some sort of final decision on the status of Kosovo.” Read more
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The Balkans in perspective
I’m taking off for the Middle East this evening, so rushing to put my affairs in order. I don’t know if I’ll get an opportunity to write today, but in the meanwhile here is an interview I did for Kosovo Radio and Television with Janusz Bugajski. It was broadcast on December 8 but recorded a few days earlier:
It seems to me Janusz, who knows the Balkans well, does a great job trying to get past the immediate headlines to deeper and broader issues.
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What to do about Bosnia and Herzegovina
Here are the notes I prepared for my participation in a conference yesterday on Jahorina, a mountain outside Sarajevo, on 2020 Vision for BiH:
1. I want to say first how glad I am to be back in Bosnia and Herzegovina after being absent for a couple of years and to thank the organizers and the US embassy for making it possible.
2. I’m also delighted to hear the very real enthusiasm that Bosnians are expressing for the Reform Agenda promoted by the EU, the World Bank and the IMF.
3. Nothing I say should be taken to suggest that they are not doing the right thing. They are.
4. But I don’t expect it to be sufficient.
5. Bosnia runs on a political economy that limits political competition, especially across ethnic lines, and enriches not the state but whoever controls its elaborate apparatus at various levels through political parties in which cronyism is the rule rather than the exception.
6. I don’t believe that is a state that can govern effectively and in accordance with European standards, so sooner or later broader political reforms are going to be necessary.
7. Let me be clear: whatever is done will have to be done by and with Bosnians. I do not anticipate that the internationals can do anything more than support those who are interested in creating more effective and functional governance.
8. Let me tell you what I would be thinking about if I were a Bosnian. In fact, I am cribbing shamelessly most of what I am about to say from Srdjan Blagovcanin and Boris Divjak, whose paper on the Bosnian political economy published by the Center for Transatlantic Relations I recommend highly.
9. I would be thinking there is no silver bullet: no single thing that can fix all that ails the political economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10. I would therefore be thinking about trying several things and seeing if they can’t be woven into a coherent strategy.
11. First, I would be thinking about building a constituency against corruption and in favor of accountability, one that would demand internal democracy in political parties, preservation of the open-list electoral system, single-member electoral constituencies, an end to political appointment of executives in state-owned enterprises and privatization and procurement conducted in strict accordance with EU rules.
12. Second, I would be trying to get parliament to cut red tape, freeze government hiring, and require state-owned enterprises to publish budgets and financial reports.
13. Third, I would be trying to convince the Europeans to condition future assistance on appointment of judges solely on the basis of professional qualifications.
14. Fourth, I would be encouraging prosecutors to focus on large-scale and high-level corruption cases, with asset freezes and travel bans implemented by the Europeans and Americans where need be.
15. Fifth, I would be encouraging nongovernmental and media exposure of malfeasance by requiring an end to media subsidies, open competition for government advertising and civil society funding, and strengthening of the role of ombudspeople, auditors and regulatory agencies.
16. Sixth, I would be asking hard questions about the size and weight of the government structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a view to clarifying responsibilities and eliminating as many duplicative bureaucracies as possible. The central state has to have the authority to negotiate and implement the requirements of EU membership. The coordination mechanism between the two Bosnian “entities” in my view is no substitute for proper authority at the state level.
17. Ultimately, I think there is no avoiding fundamental constitutional reform. In order to become a member of the EU and NATO, Bosnia will require a shift away from the Dayton order of group rights to a more Western concept of individual rights. There is no escaping the broad implications of the Sejdic Finci decision.
18. How can these things be accomplished? We’ve seen in Romania what a motivated citizenry can accomplish in a remarkably short period of time.
19. Bosnians are less inclined to large-scale street demonstrations, but unless the politicians hear directly and loudly from voters, either in the streets or at the polls, they are unlikely to risk Sanader’s fate.
20. The Reform Agenda is a good start. But it is not the end.
I heard quite a few ideas from others during the day-long conference. Here is a sample:
- Public hearings on nominees to important government positions in order to emphasize merit over clientalism
- Evaluations of the effectiveness of legislation, either by civil society organizations or a parliamentary body
- Intensive voter education
- Mandatory electronic voting
- A more independent judicial system capable of quicker decisions
Towards the end of the day, one Bosnian emphasized big improvements since the war on two dimensions: freedom of expression and entrepreneuralism. The former is clear. I would add freedom of movement, which is now well-established throughout the country (or so Bosnians of all ethnicities tell me). The latter I still have my doubts about, but I hope it is true. More opportunity in the private sector and less focus on government would do wonders to improve the mood in a Bosnia at peace but still struggling with the issues that caused the war.
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Kosovo’s rough patch
Arbana Xharra of Pristina daily Zeri asked some questions. I answered:
Q: Mr Serwer, you were familiar with the political developments in Kosovo for the long time. What where your expectations 16 years after the war and 7 from declaring independence for Kosovo? How do you see the recent confrontation within the Kosovo parliament?
A: I don’t really remember my expectations in 1999, but I did not then believe that independence would necessarily be the outcome. It was Serbian failure after the war to do anything whatsoever to “make unity attractive” that made independence inevitable. For me, the failure to count the Kosovo Albanians on the voter rolls in its 2006 constitutional referendum, in order to meet the 50% threshold for voting by registered voters, was the final straw.
As for the situation in the Kosovo parliament, I deplore the violence and disruption, which has no place in a democratic institution.
Q: Where does this situation leads Kosovo? There is a barricaded opposition that seems is not going to resign from their requests?
A: The opposition is entitled to its opposition. But it cannot block the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.
Q: What do you thing about the Association of Serb Municipalities. Does this agreement define ethnically those municipalities? As we know a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to a dysfunctional state.
A: I am not a fan of the Ahtisaari provisions on the Association of Serb Municipalities. But Kosovo accepted the Ahtisaari plan as the basis for independence and needs to implement it faithfully. I think that can be done in a way that avoids the threat to the Kosovo state that a “Serb entity” would represent. The ethnic veto provisions in the Bosnian constitution are far more extensive than anything in the Kosovo constitution.
Q: Did Ahtisaari leave the door open for the Serbian government interference in Kosovo?
A: Serbia has a legitimate interest in the welfare of Serbs in Kosovo. The Ahtisaari package left the door open to ways in which that interest can be exercised. Kosovo should be aiming for analogous mechanisms by which it can ensure the welfare of Albanians in Serbia.
Q: How is Kosovo moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration? Kosovo remained the only isolated country in Balkans with no visa liberalization. Why?
A: You’ll have to ask the European Union why. I think it is clearly a mistake to leave Kosovo as isolated as it is. But of course Pristina needs to demonstrate its willingness to fulfill the obligations that come with visa liberalization and other EU privileges. The current refugee crisis will no doubt make the EU even more exigent than normal in requiring fulfillment of those obligations.
Q: How long it will be a journey of Kosovo to the EU?
I don’t think it needs to be long–look at Montenegro, which has made remarkable progress in a short time. Kosovo has the advantage of building EU-compliant governance from scratch. The big challenge will be implementation of the acquis communitaire. Rule of law is likely to take longer than many other things. But Kosovo could be well on its way within 10 years.
Q: Why has Kosovo failed to become a member of UNESCO? Is Belgrade pressure getting the support of international politics?
Belgrade wielded all the leverage it could to block membership in UNESCO, which required a two-thirds majority in the UNESCO assembly. That threshold proved too difficult. But there will be other occasions, including in other international organizations. Belgrade may have gained some leverage from what happened at UNESCO, but it lost an opportunity to solidify the considerable commitments Kosovo made during the process.
Q: Does Kosovo have an advantage of being able to build its security force from the ground up to meet NATO requirements’?
A: Yes, I think that is an enormous advantage, one that could lead to quick NATO membership once the security force is created.
Q: Corruption and organized crime is one of the biggest problem in Kosovo, also according to the international reports. Did EULEX mission failed on dealing with “big fishes” in Kosovo?
A: I have not been impressed with EULEX, but what is the alternative? I think it hard to argue that more “big fish” would be prosecuted if there were no international rule of law mission in Kosovo.
Q: There were rejections from most of the political parties regarding the establishment of Special Court. What are your expectations toward this additional international project?
A: I think the Special Court is a lot better than the alternatives: extending the mandates of either ICTY or the ICC. The fact is that crimes were committed against both Serbs and Albanians after the 1999 war in Kosovo. They need to be investigated and perpetrators prosecuted. Without individuals being held accountable, the blame falls on the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Q: Islamic radicals are seen recently as a great threat for the secular constitution of Kosovo. More than 300 people from Kosovo are believed to have joined ISIS or Al Qaeda in the Middle East. What is the US stance on the reason that lead to this big problem for the newest country in Europe?
A: I don’t provide a “US stance.” Speaking personally, it seems to me that we are seeing a dramatic increase in Kosovars willing to fight for a cause I find heinous but they find attractive. Lack of job opportunities, isolation, foreign funding of extremists, disappointment in the benefits of independence, disillusion with corrupt governance–all these play a role in inspiring Islamic State recruits.
Q: Kosovo used to be more secular state; do you notice the change of the society toward religion?
A: I haven’t visited Kosovo in a few years now. But Kosovars visiting me in Washington report a big change. Kosovars used to be very secular and even anti-religious. That is apparently changing. That doesn’t worry me–people are entitled to pursue whatever religion they want. It is the appeal of violent extremism that worries me.
Q: Kosovo was poor also during the Milosevic regime, is it believable to say that because of the economy bad situation Kosovars are joining this new Islam ideology?
A: Kosovo was also brutally repressed during the Milosevic regime, and the global environment did not present many examples of success by violent extremists. Then was then. Now is now.
Q: We hear recently that for the US, Russia poses the greatest threat….How do you see Russian attempt to gain ground in the Balkans? Do you think that Russia’s role in the Balkans is increasing?
A: Russia is doing in the Balkans what it is doing elsewhere: trying to block what it views as NATO expansion into its sphere of influence. It has good reason to worry about that: Slovenia, Croatia and Albania are already members of NATO, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo want to be members, and Bosnia and Serbia are likely to follow eventually. Many of Russia’s moves are counter-productive. The annexation of Crimea and the seizure of part of eastern Ukraine as well as the “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia illustrate all too clearly what happens to your country if it happens to lie near Russia and is not a NATO member.
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