Tag: European Union
The snowball starts rolling
NATO has sent Montenegro its much-coveted invitation to join the Alliance, most likely at the Warsaw Summit July 8-9 next year. This is in many ways a small matter: Montenegro is a country of 620,000 people with a military force of fewer than 2000. It is no threat to anyone, least of all Russia, and no big addition to NATO capacities.
It is nevertheless significant. First because Russia saw fit to oppose NATO membership for Montenegro, first through bribery and later through support for unruly anti-government demonstrations. These efforts to block Montenegro’s NATO accession will continue, making it a test of will between Moscow and the West. If Moscow loses, Western spirits will be raised.
Those raised spirits will include people in other Balkans states who want their countries to join NATO. Moscow fears that Montenegrin accession will be a step onto a slippery slope that will lead to Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia all joining the Alliance. The Russians are correct, which makes the Montenegro decision a key one for the region.
Macedonia, though now stalled by its internal problems and long blocked by Greece, has already sent its troops to fight in Afghanistan integrated with US forces. It has recently decided to send a few more. Its eventual accession to NATO is inevitable. Ditto Kosovo, which still lacks a fully fledged security force and faces the hurdle of four non-recognizing NATO members. But Kosovo’s citizens are all but unanimous in wanting membership in a club that saved it from Serbian attacks.
Serbia and Bosnia are less obvious cases. Resentment of NATO bombing among Serbs in both countries is still strong. But sooner or later Belgrade and Banja Luka will come around the way Germans, Italians, Japanese and others bombed and even occupied by the United States have. Surrounded by NATO members, it will make little geopolitical sense for Bosnia and Serbia to align themselves with Russia or even to remain “neutral.” The Serbian chief of staff told me a decade or so ago that his country’s military, which already participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, would adapt itself to Alliance standards. Bosnia’s now unified army has been built from scratch with assistance from the US and NATO. The most secure place for Bosnia and Serbia will be inside the Alliance, not outside it.
None of this threatens Russia. Even taken all together the Balkans armies pose no serious challenge to Moscow. What Balkans NATO membership threatens are Russia’s efforts to divide and weaken Balkans states and limit Western influence in southeastern Europe. That for me is a good thing. Montenegro has started the snowball rolling. Dobrodošla, Crna Goro!*
*I’ve corrected a grammatical error made in the original posting. Apologies!
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Peace picks November 30 – December 4
- Renewed Violence in the Central African Republic: The Roots of a Political Crisis | Monday, November 30th | 12:30-2:00 | US Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Leaders and citizens of the Central African Republic, with the support of the international community, are currently focusing resources and energy on laying the groundwork for a peaceful constitutional referendum and elections in the coming months. But sustained peace in in the country will require longer-term efforts as well, because the recent crisis is rooted in decades of poor governance and persistent insecurity. After the elections, Central African Republic policymakers and the international community will be challenged to lay the groundwork for the new government by addressing the longstanding grievances that contribute to the cyclical nature of the violence in CAR. The panel will bring together some of the foremost experts on the Central African Republic’s recent history of rebellion and instability, including the two most recent coups, international intervention efforts, the country’s political economy, and the ongoing series of United Nations and regional peacekeeping efforts. The experts will draw on their contributions to Making Sense of the Central African Republic, published by Zed Books, to make policy recommendations for the crucial remaining steps in CAR’s political transition and beyond. Panelists include: Louisa Lombard, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Yale University; Tatiana Carayannis, Deputy Director Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF), Social Science Research Council (SSRC); Ambassador Laurence Wohlers, Senior Fellow, Meridian International; Ledio Cakaj, Independent Consultant, Expert on the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Séléka; Roland Marchal, Senior Research Fellow, National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), based at the Center for International Studies (CERI), Paris Institute of Political Studies; and Faouzi Kilembe, Independent Researcher, Expert on Central African Civil Society and Local Development. Nancy Lindborg, President of USIP, will moderate the discussion.Pose questions for the panel on Twitter with #CARUSIP.
- 3-D Printing the Bomb? The Challenge for Nuclear Nonproliferation | Tuesday, December 1st | 10:30-12:00 | The Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND |3-D printing has opened the world to a revolution in manufacturing. But this new technology may enable the most sensitive pieces of a nuclear weapons program to be more easily produced and transferred undetected around the globe. The United States should lead an international effort to prevent a 3-D printing-enabled cascade of nuclear weapons proliferation before it is too late. Tristan Volpe and Matthew Kroenig will launch their new article, “3-D Printing the Bomb? The Nuclear Nonproliferation Challenge,” and explore how the United States can adopt both top-down and bottom-up strategies to combat this threat to international security. Bruce Goodwin will moderate.
- Developmental Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism | Tuesday, December 1st | 11:00-12:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | RSVP to PPD@csis.org | Join us for an expert discussion on the role of development actors in addressing the drivers and manifestations of violent extremism. Although the events and aftermath of September 11, 2001 forced governments around the world to develop new counterterrorism tactics, the rise of ISIS and other violent extremist groups has focused international attention on the underlying risk factors and risk processes that make young people, in particular, vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment.
Development actors have invested significant time and resources into understanding the drivers of violent extremism and developing an evidence-based approach to address these factors. Yet, many questions remain about the most salient development-related drivers and the viability of taking a holistic, developmental approach to violent extremism. Panelists will discuss the contributions that development actors can play in preventing violent extremism and uncovering the limitations to these approaches. Daniel F. Runde, director of CSIS’s Project on Prosperity and Development, and William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, will give opening remarks, followed by a panel discussion featuring: Farooq Kathwari,Chairman, CEO, and President, Ethan Allen Interiors, Inc.; and Susan Reichle, Agency Counselor, U.S. Agency for International Development. The discussion will be moderated by Shannon N. Green, director of CSIS’s Human Rights Initiative. - Berets are OK, Headscarves are not | Wednesday, December 2nd | 12:30-2:00 | Georgetown University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Relations between the French state and public visibility of religion, particularly Islam, became openly confrontational in the late 1980s with the infamous “headscarf affair” in public schools, where Muslim students were expelled from school for wearing a hijab (Islamic headscarf). With respect to public displays of religion, the initial response of public authorities was a lenient application of laïcité towards the general public but a rigid one towards civil servants. In the 2000s, there were escalating public struggles between public manifestations of religious affiliation and politicians increasingly fighting for a restrictive application of laïcité that regards religious displays as a violation of public order. This increasing politicization of laïcité, where religious freedom was seen as an assault on cultural and republican values, has resulted in a toughening of the legislative speech on religious signs, particularly against Muslims who were seen as more openly violating French cultural norms. While restrictions of expression of religious affiliation of students began in public schools, we are now observing an extension of this control to people in public spaces. This expansion of repressive policies will end badly not only for Muslim minorities in Europe, but also the overall legitimacy and integrity of modern European liberal values. Rim-Sarah Alouane, Ph.D. candidate in Public Law at the University Toulouse-Capitol, will give a presentation on the subject, in the Intercultural Center, room 270.
- Examining the Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy | Tuesday, December 2nd | 12:15-1:45 | The Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Many people in non-Western countries say that they want a democratic system of governance—but just not Western-style democracy. Yet what is meant by non-Western democracy often remains unclear, and at times is merely a cover for non-democratic practices. A new book by Carnegie senior associate Richard Youngs, The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy, examines the growing search for variation in democratic practice and the implications of this search for Western democracy assistance providers. Youngs argues that it is most useful to focus on the common challenge of democratic renewal in both Western and non-Western countries, and he identifies areas of democratic variation that may help to productively channel efforts for such renewal. Richard Youngs will present the core arguments of his book in a roundtable event. Shadi Hamid, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Sandra Pepera, director for gender, women, and democracy at the National Democratic Institute, will offer comments on the different regional applications of these issues. Thomas Carothers will moderate the discussion.
- 6th Annual Conference on Turkey | Thursday, December 3rd | 9:00-4:15 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Center for Turkish Studies at The Middle East Institute and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation are pleased to present the Sixth Annual Conference on Turkey, held at the National Press Club. The conference will assemble three expert panels to discuss the country’s tumultuous domestic politics following recent elections, the future of democracy in the country, and Turkish foreign policy. The keynote speaker for the conference will be the co-leader for Turkey’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, in discussion with MEI’s Gönül Tol. The full program can be viewed here.
- U.S. and Western Policy Towards Russia: Cooperation, Containment, or Something Else Entirely? | Thursday, December 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Russian annexation of Crimea has led to over two years of debate regarding Washington’s strategy towards Moscow. Today, with Ukraine somewhat quieter and seeming progress towards cooperation on Syria, are more cooperative approaches possible? What should be Washington’s goals in engaging with Russia, or responding to it on the global stage? Are there tools that have not yet been tried, and what can they attain where other efforts have failed? Vladislav Inozemtsev, prominent Russian economist and visiting fellow at CSIS, will outline his views of what’s possible, what’s likely, and what should be done by the United States as it reevaluates its Russia policies. Olga Oliker, Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, will provide commentary. The event will be moderated by Jeffrey Mankoff, Deputy Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia.
- The State of Religious Freedom in the US and Europe | Thursday, December 3rd | 2:00-4:00 | KARAMAH | REGISTER TO ATTEND | It has become increasingly clear that even countries that champion international religious freedom still apply laws and regulations that restrict religious minorities’ rights with respect to many issues including their dress, their ability to have places of worship, and even the validity of their religious marriages.During this event, we will discuss how countries around the world, especially those that ostensibly defend religious freedom, can uphold these values and make sure they are fully reflected in their respective societies. Please attend and discuss with global leaders and advisers how violations of international religious freedom are impacting marginalized communities, especially the fundamental rights of Muslim women and girls. Speakers include David N. Saperstein, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom; Aisha Rahman, Esq., KARAMAH executive director; and Engy Abdelkader, Esq., Adviser with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The event will be held at The General Board of Church and Society 100 Maryland Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002.
- Building Regional Stability: Addressing Pakistan’s Conflict – Displaced Persons | Thursday, December 3rd | 3:30-4:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Given the recent international attention on global refugee issues, including the flow of Afghan and Syrian refugees to the European Union, efforts to keep conflict-displaced persons in their home countries and repatriate them quickly and effectively has become more significant. Pakistan has over 1 million people still displaced from the conflict in FATA that could join those refugee outflows if an effective and resourced strategy is not in place. Recognizing this, Secretary Kerry announced a $250 million US commitment to help resettle and sustain civilians displaced by the Pakistani military’s campaign against militant group, and this month a $30 million USAID-supported FATA livelihoods and education recovery program launched as part of that pledge. John Groarke, USAID’s Pakistan Director, will join us to discuss this challenge facing Pakistan and the region. Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, will moderate the discussion.
- Yemen between War and Political Solution | Friday, December 4th | 9:30-11:00 | The Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Yemeni conflict is in its 8th month with no end in sight. What are the prospects for a solution, military or political? If the conflict is nothing more than a proxy war for Saudis and Iranians, what are the prospects for third party solutions? Finally, what are the long-term consequences of this conflict down the road for the region and beyond? Speakers include Mohammad Al-Shami, a youth activist and advocacy trainer in Yemen, and former Leaders for Democracy Fellow, Maxwell School of Syracuse University; Amat Alsoswa, founder of the Yemeni National Women’s Committee, first Yemeni female ambassador, former Human Rights minister, and former UN Assistant Secretary General; and Barbara Bodine, Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, The Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and former Ambassador to Yemen. Henri J. Barkey, director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Middle East Program, will moderate the discussion. There will be a live webcast of the event.
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Dayton plus 20, again
Here are the conclusions I offered at the Dayton Peace Accords at 20 Conference in Dayton, Ohio, which ended yesterday:
- Context matters. Dayton was not just about Bosnia but represented a test of the West’s effort to achieve a Europe whole and free at the start of the post-Cold War era. That’s one reason it got the attention it did.
- US leadership was critical, but so too were the local, European and Russian contributions. Even when it leads, the US needs partners and has to work with whoever is available.
- Getting both the civilian and military elements of US power pointed towards a clear goal is extraordinarily difficult. Dick Holbrooke excelled at it.
- Negotiating with your own people and lining things up can be the hardest part of a negotiation. A lot was agreed before Dayton, both within the US government and within the international contact group, that was crucial to the ultimate agreement.
- Two subjects are often neglected, including at Dayton: economics and rule of law. They should not be left aside, the first because resources are always an issue and the second because it is vital and takes so long to establish.
- Dayton worked because it provided opportunities for powersharing and local autonomy.
- It is these vital characteristics of 1995 that are causing problems twenty years later.
- Inclusivity matters in ending a war, even if it makes statebuilding more difficult.
- Clear, shared goals are important, but so too is the process for getting to them.
- Timing is particularly important. It is not clear, for example, that Syria is ripe for a negotiated settlement. Bosnia was, largely due to the Federation offensive and Milosevic’s need for an end to the war.
The war did end but the ethnoterritorial conflict continues even today. Bosnia remains far from the ideals its young people, several of whom spoke at Dayton, cherish: tolerance, respect, equality and cooperation. The ways forward are clear, but precisely how to achieve them is not:
- The Reform Agenda the EU, IMF and IBRD are pursuing is part of the solution, in particular if privatization is conducted in transparent ways that prevent state assets falling into the hands of crony capitalists.
- Corruption is a major issue, but how to get it under control is not clear.
- An independent judiciary is vital to accountability. The referendum proposed in Republika Srpska would undermine the state judiciary and weaken prospects for accountability.
- Political reforms that go beyond the Reform Agenda will be necessary. This should include changes to the electoral system that encourage more accountability, like single-member electoral constituencies.
- Separate ethnic education is an unfortunate and persistent consequence of the war. Integrated education in magnet schools (offering, for example, science, technology, engineering and mathematics or education in English) is one possible path towards a solution.
- Increased respect for human rights–both of individuals and groups–is important for all.
While these needs are clear, the balance between international and Bosnian efforts is not. Some think the international community has to be more forceful than it has been in the last decade. Others think responsibility now lies principally with the Bosnians, who should get international support, principally through the European Union.
While progress in recent years has been slow and serious obstacles remain, I believe that 20 years from now Bosnia and Herzegovina will be an established member in good standing of both NATO and the European Union. That is a worthy objective that should motivate both the Bosnians and the international community.
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Reform without institutional change
The Center for Transatlantic Relations conference on Twenty Years after Dayton: Prospects for Progress in Reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina wrapped up yesterday. Here are ten of my main takeaways:
- The Reform Agenda the Europeans, the IMF and the World Bank are pursuing contains lots of good initiatives that Bosnian politicians of all stripes warmly welcome, hoping they will generate the prosperity so sorely lacking since the financial crisis of 2007/8 (or at least a large flow of IFI and EU funding).
- Focus on the Reform Agenda has driven political and institutional reform, without which it is hard to picture much improvement in the functionality of government in Bosnia, off the agenda, at least for the moment.
- The leadership of the two Bosnian sub-state entities, Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation, are happy with this, as it blocks any effort to strengthen the state and empowers them to collaborate in fulfilling the demands for policy reform from the EU and the international financial institutions in ways that don’t endanger the powers that be.
- Policy collaboration between the entities is frequent and substantial but unlikely to bring about any serious institutional change.
- Republika Srpska continues to try to use the threat of holding a vague and tendentious referendum on the High Representative and the state judiciary to extract concessions from the Europeans in the “structured dialogue” on the judiciary.
- Serbs (even within the RS) are however not united in supporting the referendum, though I imagine it will pass overwhelmingly if held (since many of those opposed won’t vote).
- The lure of eventual EU membership is unlikely to be strong enough to prevent the referendum from being held; RS President Dodik is aiming to neuter the Bosnian state judiciary, not to enter the EU.
- If the referendum passes, the Americans would want to respond with some vigor, but it is not clear the EU would join in.
- Referendum or not, the RS is progressing towards its goal of accumulating all the sovereign power it thinks itself entitled to under the Dayton constitution.
- The state government could end up lacking the authority required to negotiate and implement the acquis communitaire, making the EU accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina highly unlikely unless there is a serious effort at institutional reform and strengthening state competences, including the authority of its judiciary throughout the country.
Oh, how I wish I am wrong. But that’s how I see the situation.
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Bosnia’s way forward
Here are the remarks I prepared for the conference at SAIS today and tomorrow on Twenty Years after Dayton: Prospects for Progress in Reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
1. I want first to thank my colleagues at the Center for Transatlantic Relations here at SAIS—Sasha Toperich and Dan Hamilton—for entrusting me with a privileged place on the program and the most difficult question to answer.
2. This I suspect is my “reward” for twenty years of thinking I really did know the way forward but then proving beyond any doubt that I was unable to find it.
3. Before and at Dayton, I thought the way forward involved ensuring that the Federation, which Dick Holbrooke had entrusted to my care in October 1994, could govern effectively.
4. At the fifth anniversary in 2000, I thought it lay in applying the European Convention on Human Rights, which had been incorporated into the Dayton constitution.
5. By the time of the 10th anniversary in 2005, I was sure it lay in revising that constitution, an effort pursued by Don Hays, Paul Williams and Bruce Hitchner under my aegis at the US Institute of Peace.
6. They helped the Bosnians produce what became known as the “April package” of constitutional amendments that failed in parliament by two votes in 2006.
7. I don’t remember what I was thinking in 2010 at the 15th anniversary, when I was busy moving from USIP to SAIS.
8. None of my previous impulses have succeeded, so this time around I’m going to offer you three different directions for a way forward in Bosnia. I do hope one of them pans out, but hope is not a policy. I’ll try also, at the end, to enunciate a policy, after considering three additional propositions that are not ways forward.
9. The first way forward is that old standby: constitutional change. A constitution distributes power. In Bosnia it distributes power in ways that enable ethnic nationalists to control the country and exploit their position for personal rather than societal gain.
10. We imposed the Dayton accords, but we imposed what the ethnic nationalist warring parties told us they could live with.
11. It is therefore unsurprising that one way or another, ethnic nationalists have dominated Bosnia almost continuously, making it ungovernable, since 1995.
12. Kresimir Zubak, then President of the Federation, gave me my first lesson in ethnic nationalism during the war. Serwer, he said, one man one vote will never work in Bosnia.
13. Though by far not the most extreme of ethnic nationalists, Zubak was still determined to prevent Croats from being “outvoted,” something he regarded as anti-democratic.
14. There is nothing I might wish for more than recognition and protection of equal individual rights in Bosnia today so that people could be outvoted without feeling bereft of their identity, but even the application of equal individual rights to the Sejdic Finci case has been a bridge too far for Zubak’s successors.
15. I have to conclude that constitutional change is not looking promising, even though it is the most direct and compelling route forward. The failure in 2006 and the more dismal failure at Butmir in 2010 have poisoned the well.
16. The second way forward is what the Europeans are calling reform. There is a nice thick document written by non-Bosnians that you can read to see what that means: reducing the public sector, improving the investment climate and making the labor market more flexible would be my summary.
17. The Bosnian political leadership has pledged the political will to get on with it. Combined with conditionality from the EU, the World Bank and IMF, I hope it works, though I hasten to add that it is likely to make things worse for many Bosnians before it makes them better.
18. Moreover, politicians have been relentlessly clever in blunting European pressure for reform and converting it into new opportunities for expropriation of state assets and opportunities for individual and party enrichment, as carefully documented in a paper written by Srdjan Blagovcanin and Boris Divjak published earlier this year by CTR.
19. I therefore regrettably doubt the European reform program as much as I doubt the prospects for constitutional change.
20. The third possible way forward is for the Bosnian people to demand change, along the lines of what has happened recently in Romania.
21. That is what appeared to be happening in the aftermath of the 2014 floods, but the plenums produced little in the way of serious political pressure for change and generated significant nostalgia for a more state-administered economy. I wouldn’t count that as the way forward.
22. If my three ways forward won’t work, that doesn’t mean someone else’s ideas won’t.
23. Some Croats want a third entity, claiming that would re-establish equality and enable them to participate more fully in the Bosnian state.
24. I don’t buy that. At Dayton the Croats got a very good deal: one-third of the state and one-half of the Federation.
25. That was when they were in the driver’s seat, providing the military force that enabled the Federation offensive to succeed in the summer of 1995 and controlling the flow of weapons and everything else from the Adriatic into central Bosnia.
26. Croats are now a smaller percentage of the population than they were before the war, they have lost their wartime stranglehold and military prowess counts for little within the region.
27. The third entity idea is hard to kill, but it is going nowhere.
28. Milorad Dodik also has a proposition: detaching his Republika Srpska from the judicial system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the clear intention of preventing any prosecution of himself or his sidekicks and laying the basis for eventual secession, or if that is not possible a kind of complete autonomy like that of Taiwan. Read more
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Syrian refugees: beyond the numbers
Last week, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy explored the response of the international community to the Syrian refugee crisis in an event titled Beyond the Numbers: Inside the Syrian Refugee Crisis at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum. Cameron Hudson, director of the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum led the discussion.
Asked about what might happen now, Bassam Barabandi, former Syrian diplomat and co-founder of People Demand Change, said Syrians will continue to leave if Assad and ISIS remain because they feel as though nothing in Syria will provide a future. Those that have left are in search of a long-term solution with opportunities, which explains why they are choosing Germany over Egypt even though Egypt is less dangerous to reach and shares a similar culture.
Philipp Ackermann, Deputy Chief of Mission at the German Embassy, was asked about Europe’s response to the crisis and if pressuring the regime is possible. Ackermann replied that Russia’s aggression has complicated the situation. We should pursue a diplomatic path, even though that will be difficult because a new future for Syria is not possible with Assad. German society has been very welcoming, and 40% of Germans have volunteered in some way. However, the mood is going to change once the pressures kick in. What is needed is a European system to manage the influx with a distribution key for how many each country will take in so that everyone shares the burden.
Asked about the refugees’ overall sentiment, Margaret Brennan, a diplomatic correspondent for CBS News, replied that those in camps do not feel as though they have escaped. Life in the camps is not filled with hope. Nor is it sustainable. Many are leaving the camps in search of a future. Sadly, it took a little boy face down on a beach for the world to notice and to bring the human aspect into this humanitarian crisis. Media attention skyrocketed
David Pollock, Kaufman Fellow at the Washington Institute, was asked “how can we shrink the gap between rhetoric and reality?” He responded that the reputation of the US has and continues to suffer from insufficient action. Washington has not been generous in resettling refugees or in pursuing an end to the conflict. Pollock thought a military solution is the only option even though it is risky, messy, and may have unintended consequences. Certainly two years ago military action would have been appropriate. Now it is more difficult.
Barabandi added that sending money is not a solution, but instead fuels the problem. The US lost a key opportunity to befriend the Syrian people as well as the greater Middle East. Now an important direction we should be taking is to improve education for Syrians.
The Gulf attracted two comments. Pollock said the US will never put pressure on the Gulf countries to take refugees. That would be unproductive. Where they can be of assistance is financial aid for Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and maybe Europe. Brennan suggested deciding through whom to funnel financial aid is a problem. A solution for the refugees will require an even spread of responsibilities.
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