Tag: European Union
The Greece-Macedonia name dispute
I spoke at Harvard Friday about the Greece-Macedonia name dispute, along with Matt Nimetz and Boshk0 Stankovski. Here are the speaking notes I used.
1. Thank you for that kind introduction. The opportunity to speak at Harvard Law School is truly an honor. Harvard’s Project on Negotiation is a mecca for all who would like to see disputes managed peacefully.
2. That is what Matt Nimetz has done for more than 20 years. I am honored to meet him. We should not minimize his extraordinary achievement: an issue that in the early 1990s threatened to throw Macedonia into the Balkans cauldron with Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo has steadily lost its saliency.
3. I confess that I’ve even referred to it as the most boring dispute in the Balkans and therefore promise to speak less than 20 minutes more about it.
4. Let’s start with the obvious: this dispute is not really about the name. If it were, Greeks would long ago have accepted my citing the 1257 places in the United States that use the name “Macedonia” as dispositive. They would celebrate, not denigrate, the compliment from their neighbor.
5. Washington, DC was founded explicitly as the “new Rome.” I’ve never met an Italian who objected. The Italian government has even donated a few statues to beef up that image.
6. There were, however, already a lot of Americans dressed in togas adorning statuary hall in the Capitol, a building that is a blatant 18th-century attempt to imitate the glory of the ancients. Not to mention the National Gallery’s rip-off of the coffered ceiling of the Pantheon.
7. No, if this dispute were about the name and the statues, Greeks would be pleased that a non-Greek people who have come to occupy land that was once ancient Paeonia have adopted Greek antecedents as their ideal.
8. But if it is not about the name, what is it about? Read more
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What’s wrong, and not, with the nuclear deal
I don’t know any honest analysts who don’t credit the “framework” agreement outlined in a White House fact sheet with going further than in restraining Iran’s nuclear program than most expected. It is truly unprecedented in several respects: it would reduce the amount of enriched uranium in Iran, limit the production (and prohibit the reprocessing of) plutonium, and put out of commission most of Iran’s enriching centrifuges for 15 years. It would also provide for intrusive inspections beyond those any other state is obligated to.
But there are still aspects to be questioned. It is at best unclear who has signed up to the items in the fact sheet. The Iranians deny they have, and the French have their differences as well. In light of the controversy following its publication, it is best to regard the White House version as an American wish list, based on the current state of the negotiations. I imagine the American negotiators had some basis for believing the Iranians would sign up to these things, because otherwise the White House has made John Kerry’s job extraordinarily difficult. But it is also fair to say that the fact sheet was intended to fend off calls in Congress for tighter sanctions and Congressional approval of any final deal. We’ll just have to wait and see whether the American negotiators can deliver what they have promised.
The single most glaring weakness in the fact sheet is the failure to make any visible progress on “possible military dimensions” (PMDs). The International Atomic Energy Agency has been asking for explanations of these apparently nuclear-weapons-related activities for years, without making significant progress. The Iranians are stonewalling, presumably because the explanations will suggest that Iran really did have a nuclear weapons program at one time. Proving that it no longer does is difficult. The IAEA questions are the nuclear equivalent of “have you stopped beating your wife? Can you prove it?”
It is difficult and embarrassing to reply, but the answers are important, as no nuclear weapons state has achieved that status in an overt, IAEA-safeguarded program, or by diversion of material from such a program. Clandestine is always the preference. Why would Iran be different? Secrecy is far more difficult if you have admitted cheating once before.
A third shortcoming of the framework agreement outlined in the fact sheet is time frame. The unprecedented constraints would expire, even if verification provisions do not. But this critique doesn’t hold up. Surely it is better to face an Iran that is unconstrained in a decade or more rather than one that is unconstrained right now and could produce the material for a single nuclear weapon within two or three months.
But critics of the framework don’t want to compare the agreement with no agreement. They want to compare it with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s imaginary “better agreement,” which would eliminate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure entirely. I admit it is possible John Kerry and his team could have negotiated a better agreement, but there is no reason to believe that anything like Netanyahu’s dream could come true. Iran has only amped up its nuclear program during the many years in which we insisted on its giving up its nuclear program and imposed sanctions. If the framework agreement fails, I expect them to continue in that direction.
Tightened sanctions are Netanyahu’s answer. What he and his supporters fail to explain is how sanctions can be tightened. Will Russia, China and the Europeans go along? Sanctions brought Tehran to the table because they were multilateral. Any unilateral sanctions move by the US at this point would destroy the negotiations and push the other members of the P5+1 in the direction of ending the existing sanctions, or at least failing to enforce them as fully as has been the case in the recent past.
Domestic critics want President Obama to threaten use of force. But overt threats of force don’t always help at the negotiating table, because they elicit responses in kind. Iran is already doing harm to US interests in the Gulf, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. Even the threat to do more would cause oil prices to rise (to Tehran’s own benefit and to the detriment of the US economy).
Even if the Iranians don’t believe Obama would ever use force, they can be pretty sure his successor (of either political flavor) will be more likely to do so. The US will be far better off if force is triggered some day by Iranian violations of something like the framework agreement, not by a unilateral decision undertaken in desperation as sanctions fray.
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Bridging the Gulf
Cinzia Bianco, an analyst for the “Mediterranean and Gulf” programme at NATO Defence College Foundation whom I met on a recent visit to Rome, offers this guest post, based her “The Changing US Posture in the Gulf as an Opportunity for Regional Cooperation. The role of the EU,” paper presented at the Fifth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), University of Cambridge, 25-28 August 2014. Her full paper will be published with others from the GRM by the Gerlach Press.
The commitment of the United States in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as well as Al Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has silenced rumors about imminent American disengagement from the Gulf in order to pivot to the Asia Pacific. This commitment stems chiefly from the proliferation of terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, which poses a threat to the US national security.
Nonetheless it has become clear that the US shows fatigue in managing unilaterally this ever-boiling, resource-consuming region. In favoring a “leading from behind” approach, the Obama administration has demonstrated a lack of coherent leadership in navigating the regional challenges, which include state failures in Syria, Yemen and Iraq as well as the consequences of a nuclear agreement with Iran. The US needs to find a way to prevent leaving a hazardous vacuum by relying on an ally to try and build a more stable, long-term strategic outlook in the Gulf. Despite all of its well-known weaknesses, that ally might be the European Union (EU).
The EU has the the potential and interests to step forward. Despite ups and downs, the EU has been involved for decades in direct dialogue with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), made a big commitment in post-war Iraq and has almost uninterruptedly maintained communication open with Iran. Conflicts in the Gulf would directly affect Europe, whose geographic proximity raises the stakes. Europe is much more dependent than the US on the Gulf for oil and gas supplies. Its trade and investments volume could be hugely disrupted, as Gulf ports are Europe’s gateways to Asia. EU-GCC investments are far more significant than that involving the US.
These motives should be sufficiently compelling to encourage the EU to take on a more proactive role in the region, which would also consolidate its place as a global strategic player.
The presence of a heavy-weighted American military umbrella has not sufficed to protect the region from the emergence of the unconventional threats that are tearing it apart. The regional problems are, at their roots, not military but political and require courageous political responses. Since grievances and conflicts in the Gulf are mushrooming along sectarian fault lines – empowering Sunni and Shi’a extremism in a way that endangers internal as well as external stability of almost all regional countries–it is sectarianism that needs to be addressed head-on, by putting all Gulf countries around the same table. A truly effective dialogue on security in the Gulf needs active participation from Saudi Arabia, and cannot be built without or in spite of Iran and Iraq. Given the considerable distrust between the Sunni and Shi’a in the region, only the EU and the US together have enough political capital to entertain such a challenging enterprise.
The approach in the Gulf should start with limited cooperation on practical issues, in an incremental process of confidence-building focusing on many shared challenges and opportunities. All parties share critical resources, not only oil and gas fields but also water, whose management is strategic in such an arid region and needs to be coordinated. Joint patrolling of regional waters, under the umbrella of existing international initiatives, to fight the transnational criminal networks that engage in illicit trafficking and piracy, might be one step towards normalization.
Nothing can be done without a structured regional dialogue on the sociopolitical front, supporting existing fora of inter-sectarian dialogue and fighting extremist narratives. Tuning down the sectarian narrative at all levels, from leadership to population, might be the only way to prevent spillover from Syria, Iraq and Yemen into the broader region. The most concerned countries should in fact be Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Frameworks of this sort have failed to prosper in the past, but always in the presence of huge level of hostility between the US and Iran. The main GCC fear is that Iran always works to extend its influence in the Gulf, by playing the Shia communities against the Sunni rulers. Arguably, however, critical engagement rather than classic deterrence would the most effective approach to prevent this behavior.
As much as this idea may seem daunting, neglecting the challenge of sectarian-based extremism and allowing deep-seated conflicts to escalate would put national and international strategic interests at great risk. In order to return the Gulf to long-lost stability, bold steps are required, as well as the ability to adapt quickly to a changing strategic outlook, that might soon include the rehabilitation of Iran in the international arena. A visionary plan for a regional rapprochement based on shared challenges and shared opportunities might in the upcoming future become the best possible option.
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Macedonia and Europe
In addition to the remarks of Ambassador Alexandros Mallis and me, last weekend’s conference of the Democratic Union for Integration in Skopje heard from Pieter Feith, now associated with the European Institute of Peace. Here are his speaking notes:
1. Salute President Ahmeti. Thank you for fourteen years of friendship and your responsible leadership following the signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Thank Artan [Grubi] for inviting us and for organizing the convention. We are together in the midst of national controversy and possible upheaval. Time for serious, but also constructive forward looking discussion. Ready to advise and help all political forces in the country.
2. Europe is facing serious, existential threats. We therefore have a collective responsibility to maintain stability and prosperity in this neighborhood. MK [Macedonia] not on top of the international agenda, which in a way is a good sign. But if anything, Europe doesn’t need another crisis in the Balkans right now.
3. After 23 years independence and thanks to the leadership of this party and its chairman, Macedonia achieved number of successes:
• Dealt with serious ethnic divide in 2001, successfully avoided sustained ethnic violence.
• Started with low socio-economic base, progressively applied reforms and was recognized as EU candidate.
The perspective of membership of NATO and EU is still open.
Now time for looking ahead in the interest of the country and the contribution the party can make.
4. Today, Macedonia faces number of challenges:
1. resolving the name issue hampering Euro-Atlantic Integration efforts. This is urgent and justified, but not an excuse to slow down domestic reform process; remind that in 2012 Štefan Füle proposed accession negotiations to start running in parallel to name dispute negotiations.
Opportunities to close the matter were missed in the past – by both sides. Given the internal situation in Greece and Macedonia, the outlook for making progress in the short term seems, realistically speaking, less than promising. Please do not link this issue with the reform process, in the interest of your country and people.
2. dealing with institutional weaknesses common to neighborhood;
3. improving inter-ethnic relations as tensions persist;
4. as of late, serious weaknesses in rule of law, democratic governance and parliamentary dialogue. The institutions of the country, in particular an independent judiciary and the Parliament, should deal with this.
5. Current political situation is:
• Followed with concern by international community, including the three EU institutions – Council, Commission and the European Parliament – and of course by the US; they are aware of the need for outside help.
• On the international side, there is willingness to facilitate an inclusive national dialogue in order to revamp the democratic process. Inclusive means with the participation of your party, DUI. The Parliament must resume its democratic functions without boycott or other forms of obstruction and, together with an independent judiciary, exercise democratic oversight over an accountable executive.
In the longer term, Brussels will expect from the Macedonian political leadership strong national commitment to integration and good neighborhood policies. This should be done, as a matter of priority, by removing remaining domestic challenges to accession talks. President Ahmeti’s remarks reassured me that he is ready to do so.
6. Let us look once again at the October 2014 EC Progress Report:
• Recognized high level of alignment with legislative acquis; and recommended opening accession negotiations.
• Outlined three serious challenges:
o “increasingly divisive political culture”;
o “fragile inter-ethnic situation”;
o “politicization” and government control over state institutions and media.
7. Under the present circumstances, removing technical obstacles to accession negotiations should be the strategic priority for the short and medium term;
Include particular attention to Copenhagen criteria:e.g. democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities and media freedom.
• Continue to secure the support of the international community.
• In so doing and tactically, Macedonia can narrow down the constraints to moving towards opening accession negotiations.
• Let me highlight two issues:
8. Gaps in implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement:
• Decentralization process requires funding and effort to strengthen administrative capacity of some municipalities:
• Education reforms require increased political support and state funding:
• Another census or administrative registry is needed, at the appropriate moment.
• The OFA Review – stocktaking of implementation of all requirements needs to be finalized and published.
• We, the European Institute of Peace (EIP), stand ready to assist the government, the communities and civil society in their efforts to improve the Commission’s assessment in its next Progress Report.
• We also need to prevent the current crisis spilling over into the ethnic divide. The EU has given EIP its full support in helping facilitate the inter-ethnic dialogue.
9. Good neighborly relations:
o Good relations with Western Balkan neighbors, but relations with Greece and Bulgaria remain strained.
o Positive developments towards finalizing the bilateral treaty with Bulgaria.
o Agreed are questions related to protection of minorities and use of languages;
o Outstanding is the issue of shared historic narrative.
10. In closing: Need for national unity and consensus:
As the president of DUI said just now: The party faces a dilemma. Co-governance in a coalition will help ensure respect for the Ohrid requirements. Justifiably, you are keen to preserve the Ohrid legacy. But it also imposes responsibility and accountability for the whole range of government policies. You cannot remain silent. Therefore I urge you to continue to speak up on the democratic values, norms and principles for which you stand. For inter-ethnic tolerance and reconciliation. And to make sure the government works on the basis of consensual democracy in accordance with the Constitution.
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A Greek in Skopje
As regular readers know, I spoke last Saturday via Skype to the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) conference in Skopje. Also addressing the conference were several Europeans. Here are the notes Ambassador Alexandros Mallias, a former Greek diplomat, used:
Ali Ahmeti builds bridges while others build statues
Ιt is an honour for me to be invited to the DUI first Thematic Congress and to such a fascinating and distinguished panel.
Allow me at the outset to thank Ali Ahmeti.
I will never forget our first meeting, 13 or 14 years years ago, somewhere in Tetovo, while he was still prohibited to leave his ”safe haven” and visit Skopje .
Since then, Baskimi Democratik per Integrim (DUI) managed to transform itself from a guerilla movement to a well established and performing political party .
Ali Ahmeti himself is much respected as an accountable and thoughtful political leader, in Skopje, in Brussels and in Athens as well .
While others are spending money, political capital, energy and time in building statues, Ali Ahmeti managed to build bridges, including with Greece. In fact, he is the only political leader from your country that has paid several official visits to Athens since 2007.
I have no intention of talking today about the 2001 events. My views and personal account have been published in the newspapers here in Skopje, in Tirana, in Prishtina and in a more detailed manner in the book I published in 2013 .
As modesty is not a flower often growing in Greek gardens, allow me to state that the fact that DUI included the then Balkan Affairs’ Political Director of Greece in today’s panel speaks for itself. It reflects the engagement and positive role played by Greece on stage and behind the scenes in 2001.
I want also to acknowledge here around this table the presence of personalities who by their word and by their sword, by their commitment and by their deeds shaped or influenced the political shaping and reshaping of the Balkans. They have also much contributed to the stabilization process of your country. To my regret, this is today deliberately forgotten. Read more
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Euro-Atlantic integrations and good neighborly relations
I did not make it to Skopje for the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) conference on this subject today due to a flight cancellation, but I did speak to the assembled by Skype early this morning DC time. Here are the notes I used:
1. Macedonia is a country of which I am very fond, not least because it has demonstrated its capacity to react effectively to crisis.
2. You are in the midst of a crisis today, one that has cast doubt on the integrity of the institutions your democracy has built over the past quarter century.
3. There is nothing unusual about political crises in democracies. The United States has enjoyed democracy for over two centuries. We still have political crises that revolve around abuse of power, some would say far too often.
4. Nor are we immune from publication of confidential communications.
5. The first resort in any crisis should be to your own institutions: your president, your parliament, your courts, your ombudsman, your press and civil society.
6. It is my hope you will use these institutions to the maximum degree feasible in clarifying, investigating, and eventually prosecuting those whose behavior is contrary to the law.
7. Parliamentary oversight is particularly important. Boycotts in a democracy really serve no purpose but to cut off those who boycott from making a contribution.
8. But there are situations that require more than a country’s own institutions. None of us live in a vacuum, but small countries need to worry more about how neighbors, friends and allies react.
9. You are not the United States, with centuries of a consolidated constitution, friendly neighbors north and south, a giant economy and two great oceans to protect your shores.
10. You are a small, land-locked European country with aspirations to join NATO and the EU.
11. I support those aspirations, which are not so far from realization.
12. Your soldiers have proven themselves, integrated with the Vermont National Guard, in combat in Afghanistan. The defense reforms you undertook after the Ohrid Agreement have put you on track for NATO membership.
13. The European Commission has repeatedly determined you are ready to open negotiations for accession to the EU. Economic reform starting about a decade ago boosted your prospects.
14. But your southern neighbor, Greece, had already blocked both the EU and NATO tracks before the current crisis struck. Countries, like bicycles, need forward motion, or else they fall over.
15. Now you have to pick yourselves up.
16. I am a friend of Macedonia, but I need to tell you frankly that the leaked telephone conversations, and the taping of those conversations, have damaged your international standing. They reflect shocking abuses of political and state power.
17. I doubt you can bank on either NATO or the EU even treating you as well as you have been treated in recent years, which was already unsatisfactory from your (and my) point of view.
18. You are going to need international help to recover. My understanding is that the European Parliament has offered, and your authorities have accepted, mediation.
19. That is good and even necessary, but not sufficient.
20. I wouldn’t of course want to prejudge the outcome of the mediation, but you need to think hard about how to restore both domestic and international confidence in your governing institutions.
21. Macedonia needs a parliament in which all the country’s political forces sit comfortably.
22. It needs a government that welcomes criticism and dissent.
23. It needs a presidency that represents all the citizens.
24. It needs independent courts that pursue malfeasance effectively and impartially, even when committed by the highest authorities, or by the political opposition.
25. No foreigner can tell you how to achieve these things. You know better than I do.
26. But let me offer two suggestions to restore international confidence:
a) End the winner-take-all political mentality that has prevailed in recent years;
b) Make your institutions more transparent and your politicians more accountable.
27. One possible approach would be a technocratic government to prepare new elections. But I don’t see how you can displace the existing one, which commands a wide majority. Even withdrawal of DUI would not guarantee fall of the government, which is not inclined to resign.
28. Another suggestion I’ve heard is to solve the “name” issue that has slowed your reform push, but I see little possibility of that in Greece’s current circumstances, much as I would like to see it.
29. Even entry into NATO as The FYROM seems a bridge too far, much as I would like to see it.
30. Any solution to your current crisis will need to ensure both that people cannot be taped illegally and that legal wire tapping will not be used for political gain. More generally, it will also need to ensure that political parties cannot abuse power or the state apparatus for partisan purposes.
31. That implies a far more independent judiciary and a far more active press and civil society than you enjoy today.
32. DUI is an important part of the picture and needs to think about how it can contribute to restoring confidence in government institutions. That means first and foremost making certain that its own behavior is impeccably clean.
33. DUI also needs to think about how it can collaborate with its coalition partners and the opposition parties to ensure transparency and accountability across the political spectrum.
34. A commission of inquiry into the wiretapping and its political exploitation is one possibility, perhaps with international participation. A white paper recommending political reforms could help Macedonia find its way through the current morass.
35. Your country is facing great challenges, but also great opportunities. You’ve gone a long way with economic reforms. Now you have to go the distance with political and judicial reforms. The things you are learning about your current system aren’t pretty, but they are real.
36. Fix them, and you can expect strong support from the Americans. I’ll let the Europeans speak for themselves.
PS: This is apparently what it looked like as I spoke:
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