Tag: Gulf states
Rouhani has his chips on a deal
On Thursday, the Wilson Center hosted a panel discussion entitled Rouhani at Two Years: An Assessment on the Cusp of a Nuclear Deal. Panelists included Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar, Suzanne Maloney, Interim Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Associate at the Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Haleh Esfandiari, the outgoing Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson 
Center, moderated. The panelists related how the Iranian people are largely motivated by economic concerns today. President Rouhani has staked his political future on improving the economy. A nuclear deal is the linchpin of his plan.
Wright has visited Iran three times in the past 18 months and has witnessed tremendous change. The political climate has become more stable because people are tired of years of oscillation between reformists and hardliners. Supreme Leader Khamenei has pushed back attempts by hardliners to scuttle a nuclear deal. No one in parliament wants to say that they are against a deal outright. However, the current climate of stability is unlikely to last; political divisions run deep.
Wright said that Rouhani has implemented bold economic reforms, including subsidy reductions that led to a 40% increase in gas prices. He has also fought corruption. His administration has carefully studied the potential aftermath of a nuclear deal and has been in talks with numerous international companies.
Rouhani has not tackled human rights abuses. Public expectations that he would do so have ebbed. Arrests of journalists continue. The judiciary is a hardline check on change. The public is no longer heavily motivated by the causes of the Islamic Revolution and cares more about material concerns like the economy and pollution. There are 14 million Tehranis, but only 100,000 go to Friday prayers and chant “death to America.” The public is looking ahead to the upcoming elections for both parliament and the Assembly of Experts. Ayatollah Khamenei is ailing, so the next Assembly of Experts will likely pick his successor.
Wright sees Rouhani as worried about the crumbling Middle East. The Iranian government may approach Syria with increasing realism, and will ultimately walk away from Assad. Rouhani had wanted to reach out to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council but tensions have only increased.
Maloney agreed that economic concerns are central for Rouhani. Government performance, not adherence to revolutionary ideals, is now key to legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Rouhani criticized former President Ahmedinejad or the effect of his policies on the economy. Rouhani believes that Iran’s political system must help the economy and has pushed back against the economic role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Rouhani does not face as much opposition to economic reforms as Khatami and Rafsanjani faced. When Rouhani took office, inflation was at 45%. The technocrats he appointed imposed greater fiscal discipline and cut inflation to 15%. Economic growth has gone from negative to slightly positive. However, the government has fed the people unrealistic expectations for sanctions relief, which is unlikely in 2015.
According to Maloney, a deal is unlikely to transform Iran’s relationship with the West because Khamenei views the deal as transactional, not transformative. Rouhani can improve the economy and get some sanctions relief, but we are unlikely to see a significant change in Iran’s regional posture.
Sajadpour concurred that Rouhani is putting all of his eggs in one basket: achieving a nuclear deal with the West. If improving the lives of Iranians is a priority, then sanctions must be removed. Thus Rouhani has focused on a deal and not improvement of human rights. In 2005, Iran had robust oil exports, as well as a stronger civil society and more press freedom than exist today. Ahmedinejad was responsible for the damage since then, and a nuclear deal would represent Iran digging itself out of this hole.
Rouhani will have difficulty effecting change in other areas, Sajadpour said. He will not be able to fight the IRGC because he needs it to enforce a nuclear deal. Khamenei is crafty and holds the real power. The Supreme Leader has outlasted both his former kingmaker, Rafsanjani, and the reformer Khatami. Khamenei wields power without accountability, with a president who has accountability but lacks power. Saying “death to America” is not helpful for improving the economy for average Iranians, but the smallish minority that chants this holds a monopoly on power and coercion.
Sajadpour stated that Saudis and Israelis have good reason to fear a nuclear deal, since it provide more money to support for Hezbollah. It could also open up an opportunity for US-Iranian cooperation against common enemies, but we have to ask ourselves if enlisting Shi’ite radicals to kills Sunni radicals only creates more Sunni radicals.
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Peace picks June 15-19
1. Calculating the Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict| Monday, June 15th | 12:00-1:15 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This event will explore both the economic and the non-economic factors surrounding the conflict that might influence the parties’ decisions and the long-term implications for Israel, the West Bank and Gaza and the international community. Speakers include: C. Ross Anthony, Senior Economist, RAND Corporation and Director, RAND Israeli-Palestinian Initiative; Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Director, Arab-Israeli, U.S. Institute of Peace; Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives, The Wilson Center; Ambassador Charles Ries, Vice President, International, RAND Corporation. Presentation by C. Ross Anthony and Ambassador Charles Ries.
2. Global Cooperation Under Threat: Adapting the U.N. for the 21st Century | Monday, June 15th | 1:30-3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host Susana Malcorra, Chief of Staff to the United Nations Secretary-General for a discussion exploring how the U.N. is adapting to new geopolitical, transnational, and sub-state challenges. Speakers include: Susana Malcorra, Chief of Staff to the United Nations Secretary-General; Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Fellow of Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution; Bruce Jones, Acting Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy program, Brookings Institution.
3. The Banyan Tree Leadership Forum with K Shanmugam, Foreign Minister of Singapore | Monday, June 15th | 2:30-3:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Mr. Shanmugam will discuss Singapore’s bilateral relations with the United States, regional relationships, and the opportunities and challenges facing Singapore. Speakers include: Mr. K Shanmugam, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Law.
4. Can Afghanistan Stabilize as U.S. Forces Plan Their Exit? | Tuesday, June 16th | 10:00-12:00 | United States Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The United States’ current policy in Afghanistan mandates a “responsible withdrawal” of U.S. forces by January 2017, when President Obama leaves office. With 18 months to go, a sense of crisis is mounting in Afghanistan as the economy sags, Taliban attacks increase, and the eight-month-old unity government remains deadlocked. Speakers include: Dr. William Byrd, Senior Expert in Residence, USIP; Ali Jalali, Former Minister of the Interior of Afghanistan, Senior Expert in Residence, USIP; Scott Smith, Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, USIP; Dr. Moeed Yusuf, Director, South Asia Programs, USIP. Moderated by Dr. Andrew Wilder, Vice President, Center for South and Central Asia, USIP.
5. Making the Case for Peace: 2015 Global Peace Index| Wednesday, June 17th | 9:30-11:00 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | What is the state of global peace in 2015? What are the main threats to peace and how can we prevent violence in the future? What are the implications of these trends for foreign policy and aid interventions? The 2015 Global Peace Index discussion will explore these questions, detailing recent trends in militarization, safety and security, and ongoing conflict, with a focus on analyzing the factors that underpin peaceful societies. Speakers include: Ambassador Rick Barton, Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations; Melanie Greenberg, Executive Director, Alliance for Peacebuilding; Matt Wuerker, Editorial Cartoonist and Illustrator, Politico. Moderated by Aubrey Fox, Executive Director, Unites States, Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Peace Index results presented by Daniel Hyslop, Research Manager, Institute for Economics and Peace.
6. Gulf Youth and the City | Wednesday, June 17th | 12:00-1:30 | The Arab Gulf States Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Gulf cities have followed similar paths of urbanization and architecture shaped by state planning and commercial development. Recent events across the globe, from the Occupy movements to the 2011 Arab uprisings, have brought the role of cities in political life to the forefront. However, with few exceptions, Gulf cities are known more as glittering global consumer capitals than places of civic engagement or political struggle.With a dynamic younger generation rising in the Gulf, what is the public’s role, especially youth, in the remaking of their cities? Speakers include: Farah Al-Nakib, Director, Center for Gulf Studies, American University of Kuwait; Diane Singerman, Associate Professor, Department of Government, American University. Moderated by Kristin Smith Diwan, Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute.
7. The New Politics of Religion and Gender in Israel | Thursday, June 18th | 2:00-3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This year’s Israeli elections provoked resurgent debates over religion and saw the emergence of powerful female voices in the political debate. Join the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings on June 18 to engage with three of these dynamic Israeli figures, as we launch a new agenda of research and events examining important changes in Israel’s politics and society. Speakers include: Adina Bar Shalom, President and Chairwoman, Haredi College of Jerusalem; Merav Michaeli, Member of Knesset; Rachel Azaria, Member of Knesset, Former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem.
8. Fighting Terrorism in the Age of ISIS | Thursday, June 18th | 5:00-6:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Smart Women, Smart Power initiative for a discussion of ‘Fighting Terrorism in the Age of ISIS’ with Fran Townsend, Former Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Adviser to President George W. Bush. Speakers include: Fran Townsend, Former Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Adviser to President George W. Bush. Moderated by Nina Easton, Senior Associate, CSIS, Editor and Columnist, Fortune, Chair, Most Powerful Women International.
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Yemen: bleak outlook
Last Thursday, the Wilson Center hosted Youth and Civil Society: The Missing Powers in Yemen with Mohammad Al-Shami, a Yemeni youth activist and advocacy trainer. Haleh Esfandiari, the director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, gave opening remarks and moderated a question and answer session.
Al-Shami presented a bleak picture of Yemen’s predicament. For years prior to the current conflict, Yemen suffered from poverty, water shortages, youth unemployment, inadequate healthcare, divisions along many lines, repeated conflict, and the absence of rule of law. The government was highly centralized, weak and corrupt. Citizens needed to come to Sana’a for basic administrative needs and officials there often required bribes.
The military was seen as only representative of a portion of Northern Yemen. The National Dialogue process that occurred prior to the most recent conflict called for restructuring the military. Soldiers from the North were angered that they could lose their jobs to Southerners as a result.
The current conflict reflects the complex divisions of Yemeni society. The rebels are comprised of disparate elements, some of which are not allied with each other. Al Qaeda has filled the power vacuum in some areas, including the major city of Al Mukalla. Al Qaeda is able to provide stability and services, making those who do not necessarily agree with jihadi ideology turn to them for safety. When the war ends, reconstruction will be long and complicated. The underlying factors that led to the conflict will still be present.
According to Al-Shami, civil society in Yemen is plagued by a lack of expertise and cooperation. International donors provided some training to Yemeni civil society organizations but not crucial capacity building. Civil society organizations did not collaborate on initiatives, and multiple organizations were often inefficiently working on similar projects simultaneously.
These organizations are nevertheless the primary providers of life-saving assistance on the ground. The conflict has forced them to focus on humanitarian rather than development work. They lack supplies and largely depend on Yemen’s weak private sector for materials. Despite these challenges, Yemeni civil society organizations are distributing food and water, finding people shelter, and setting up clinics. They are able to access villages controlled by different forces and serve as the best source of information regarding events on the ground.
In Al-Shami’s view, GCC airstrikes were not the only available solution to the upheaval in Yemen. The GCC does not value civil society and has neglected civil society in its initiatives. The National Dialogue provided an opportunity for a political solution and civil society could have played a role in a peaceful settlement. As the violence drags on, it makes reaching a solution increasingly complicated. The peace talks in Geneva will be more complicated than finding a political solution from the outset would have been.
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A snapshot of Sisi’s Egypt
I’ve spent the last few days in Cairo, where little has visibly changed since my visits in September 2011 (something like a revolution was still in progress then) and January 2014, when I observed the referendum that approved the current constitution (over 98% of those 39% who voted were in favor). The city still bussles day and night, the Nile flows gently, the traffic is only marginally better behaved then in 2011, the air is hot, dusty and polluted, the contrasts of rich and poor are still dramatic.
I haven’t spent any quality time talking to ordinary Egyptians. Mostly I’ve been hearing from the educated and sometimes wealthy elite that supports President Sisi’s efforts to restore order and improve the economy, without (at least for now) expanding civil liberties.
The predominant sentiment towards the US among those I talked with is resentment. Egypt, they think, deserves better and more than it is getting from the US, which was slow to recognize that former President Morsi had lost legitimacy and quick to suspend aid. Washington follows a “double standard.” It provides too much support to Israel and too little to the Arabs, especially the Palestine and Egypt.
The Americans are also failing to counter Iranian troublemaking in the region, failing to stop financing for the Islamic State, failing to bring down Bashar al Assad or support the intervention against the Houthi (sic), and failing to recognize the peril of the Muslim Brotherhood. The US government, some think, may even be playing a role in supporting one or more of these malign factors in the region.
Lack of confidence in official America is coupled with an all too apparent affection for American society and hunger for American culture, education, technology, trade and investment. Sisi’s Egypt is hoping to upgrade Egypt’s technical and educational levels and improve its economy, in part through cooperation with the US, while continuing its crackdown on nongovernmental organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood, street demonstrations and media.
The model is a technocratic one: use expertise and money effectively while blocking political challenges.
Some Egyptians characterize the Middle East today as “a Fascist moment.” They argue there can be no compromise with the Islamic State, or those in the Muslim Brotherhood or elsewhere who take up arms against state structures, anywhere in the region. The Arabs need to reassert themselves, resist the American intention of empowering Iran, and join together to counter foreign hegemony, including by forming the united Arab army Egypt has proposed.
The Egyptians I heard from welcome the upcoming bilateral “strategic dialogue” with the US, which is supposed to meet in July. They hope this will be an opportunity to reframe the relationship in a way that will be more satisfactory to Egypt and less dominated by the US. Cairo will try to convince the Americans that the Muslim Brotherhood is in fact a terrorist organization and that a broad crackdown is therefore justified. Some might be ready to give a little on NGOs and street demonstrations, though resentment of American “interference” in these internal matters is strong. Building an effective regional counterweight to Iran will be an important part of the conversation, as will be moving the relationship more definitively in the direction of trade and investment (a free trade agreement is one possibility).
While privatization and other structural economic reforms seem still far off, the Egyptians are reasonably pleased with what President Sisi has achieved so far, including reduction of subsidies and his flagship project to expand the capacity of the Suez Canal. They hope a more stable and prosperous Egypt will mean return to a leading regional role in the future, even without more political opening.
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A grand bargain, with the Gulf not Iran
Expectations for next week’s Wednesday/Thursday summit at the White House and Camp David with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) heads of state (or their proxies) vary greatly. Simon Henderson, who follows the Gulf from the Washington Institute, says
the definition of success for this summit will more likely be a limited agreement than an historic pact.
Joyce Karam suggests something more substantial: the summit may allow a bargain in which the Gulf states drop their opposition to a nuclear deal with Iran in exchange for the US allowing the Gulf a freer hand in countering Iranian surrogates in Syria and possibly Yemen.
The Americans have not seemed inclined in this more grandiose direction. They remain worried about who might take over in Syria should Asad fall. They have also leaned in favor of a ceasefire or humanitarian pause in Yemen, where the Saudi-led intervention has not done much to roll back the Iranian-supported Houthis while rousing nationalist sentiment among Yemeni civilians, who are suffering mightily because of the fighting.
Those concerns are serious ones, but events on the ground in Syria may not permit the Americans to remain aloof much longer. Rebel forces there have gained ground both in the north, near Idlib, and in the south, between Damascus and the Jordanian border. Regime forces seem unable to respond effectively, though Lebanese Hizbollah and Iranian fighters continue to prevent outright disaster for Asad. The divisions among Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (the three main financiers of the Syrian revolution) that in the past have hampered rebel effectiveness are diminishing. The Americans might prefer to await training of their vetted rebels to bring down Asad, but he is unlikely to last the years it will take to put a significant number of them back on the battlefield.
In Yemen, the Gulf protagonists have less reason for optimism. Intervention there against the Houthis has not done more than slow their advance south. In the meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining ground. The Houthis don’t like Al Qaeda any better than the Saudis do, but it is hard to picture a political solution at this point that allows them to combine to fight their common enemy. They are inclined to forget Ben Franklin’s admonition: either we all hang together, or we all hang separately.
A Gulf/American pact in favor of more concerted efforts to counter Iran’s regional trouble-making could be helpful to the Obama Administration at home, where it faces continued bipartisan opposition to the nuclear deal. Yesterday’s 98-1 Senate approval of legislation giving the Congress a 30-day opportunity to debate and vote on the nuclear deal sets up an important debate for early August, provided the nuclear deal is reached by the end of June. The strongest argument against the nuclear deal is likely to be the prospect of an emboldened Iran free of sanctions using its considerable wealth to subvert the Arab states of the Gulf and Levant. Freeing the Gulf to counter Iranian efforts in Syria and Yemen would be one way of responding to the Administration’s critics at home.
The problem is that it may not work. The Gulf states, which have armed themselves far beyond the Iranians’ wildest dreams, continue to bumble when it comes to military action and diplomatic weight. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has succeeded in building up effective surrogates in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In Yemen and Bahrain, the Iranians have taken advantage of local grievances to make a lot of trouble. The Gulf states fear the lifting of sanctions for good reasons. Even under sanctions, Iran has done well diplomatically and militarily. What might Tehran be able to do once sanctions are lifted and hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenue return to its coffers?
The summit next week is an unusual one. Whether your expectations are great or not so great, there are real issues to discuss between Washington and its Gulf interlocutors. An agreement that combines a nuclear deal with more effective action to stem Iranian regional trouble-making would be a serious outcome. Rather than the grand bargain with Iran the Republicans and Israelis fear, we may be seeing the emergence of a grand bargain with the Gulf.
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Bridging the Gulf
Cinzia Bianco, an analyst for the “Mediterranean and Gulf” programme at NATO Defence College Foundation whom I met on a recent visit to Rome, offers this guest post, based her “The Changing US Posture in the Gulf as an Opportunity for Regional Cooperation. The role of the EU,” paper presented at the Fifth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), University of Cambridge, 25-28 August 2014. Her full paper will be published with others from the GRM by the Gerlach Press.
The commitment of the United States in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as well as Al Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has silenced rumors about imminent American disengagement from the Gulf in order to pivot to the Asia Pacific. This commitment stems chiefly from the proliferation of terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, which poses a threat to the US national security.
Nonetheless it has become clear that the US shows fatigue in managing unilaterally this ever-boiling, resource-consuming region. In favoring a “leading from behind” approach, the Obama administration has demonstrated a lack of coherent leadership in navigating the regional challenges, which include state failures in Syria, Yemen and Iraq as well as the consequences of a nuclear agreement with Iran. The US needs to find a way to prevent leaving a hazardous vacuum by relying on an ally to try and build a more stable, long-term strategic outlook in the Gulf. Despite all of its well-known weaknesses, that ally might be the European Union (EU).
The EU has the the potential and interests to step forward. Despite ups and downs, the EU has been involved for decades in direct dialogue with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), made a big commitment in post-war Iraq and has almost uninterruptedly maintained communication open with Iran. Conflicts in the Gulf would directly affect Europe, whose geographic proximity raises the stakes. Europe is much more dependent than the US on the Gulf for oil and gas supplies. Its trade and investments volume could be hugely disrupted, as Gulf ports are Europe’s gateways to Asia. EU-GCC investments are far more significant than that involving the US.
These motives should be sufficiently compelling to encourage the EU to take on a more proactive role in the region, which would also consolidate its place as a global strategic player.
The presence of a heavy-weighted American military umbrella has not sufficed to protect the region from the emergence of the unconventional threats that are tearing it apart. The regional problems are, at their roots, not military but political and require courageous political responses. Since grievances and conflicts in the Gulf are mushrooming along sectarian fault lines – empowering Sunni and Shi’a extremism in a way that endangers internal as well as external stability of almost all regional countries–it is sectarianism that needs to be addressed head-on, by putting all Gulf countries around the same table. A truly effective dialogue on security in the Gulf needs active participation from Saudi Arabia, and cannot be built without or in spite of Iran and Iraq. Given the considerable distrust between the Sunni and Shi’a in the region, only the EU and the US together have enough political capital to entertain such a challenging enterprise.
The approach in the Gulf should start with limited cooperation on practical issues, in an incremental process of confidence-building focusing on many shared challenges and opportunities. All parties share critical resources, not only oil and gas fields but also water, whose management is strategic in such an arid region and needs to be coordinated. Joint patrolling of regional waters, under the umbrella of existing international initiatives, to fight the transnational criminal networks that engage in illicit trafficking and piracy, might be one step towards normalization.
Nothing can be done without a structured regional dialogue on the sociopolitical front, supporting existing fora of inter-sectarian dialogue and fighting extremist narratives. Tuning down the sectarian narrative at all levels, from leadership to population, might be the only way to prevent spillover from Syria, Iraq and Yemen into the broader region. The most concerned countries should in fact be Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Frameworks of this sort have failed to prosper in the past, but always in the presence of huge level of hostility between the US and Iran. The main GCC fear is that Iran always works to extend its influence in the Gulf, by playing the Shia communities against the Sunni rulers. Arguably, however, critical engagement rather than classic deterrence would the most effective approach to prevent this behavior.
As much as this idea may seem daunting, neglecting the challenge of sectarian-based extremism and allowing deep-seated conflicts to escalate would put national and international strategic interests at great risk. In order to return the Gulf to long-lost stability, bold steps are required, as well as the ability to adapt quickly to a changing strategic outlook, that might soon include the rehabilitation of Iran in the international arena. A visionary plan for a regional rapprochement based on shared challenges and shared opportunities might in the upcoming future become the best possible option.
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