Tag: Gulf states
Stevenson’s army, November 28
WaPo says the administration is giving career protections to political appointees and stripping it from careerists at OMB.
NYT has details of the confused effort to reform WHO.
Nimitz to the Persian Gulf. What next?
WSJ tells why Netanyahu-MBS meeting failed.
Politico has background on Jake Sullivan.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Biden’s Middle East won’t look like Trump’s
If Biden wins, what difference will that make in the Middle East?
- Iran: Biden will have the same goal as Trump: an expanded and extended agreement that prevents Tehran from getting nuclear weapons, limits its missile ambitions, and gets it to pull back from interference in the region, especially in Yemen and Syria. But the two candidates differ on means. Trump used only “maximum pressure” through sanctions, gray zone warfare, and threats of military action. Biden will add incentives through some sanctions relief and possibly security assurances, but he will be critical of Iranian human rights abuses.
- Israel/Palestine: Trump has sought, with his right-wing Israeli friends, to prevent the formation of a viable Palestinian state. Biden will differ on this goal and try to restore the prospect of a two-state solution by limiting Israeli settlement expansion on the West Bank while ensuring Israel’s security. Biden will not reverse Trump’s move of the US embassy from Jerusalem. He may consider renewed American contributions to Palestinian relief through the UN.
- The Arab Gulf states: Biden will differ from Trump on both goals and means. He will be prepared to raise human rights issues and will not shield the Saudis from international criticism, as Trump has done. Acting on the basis of a growing bipartisan consensus in Congress, Biden will seek to end the Trump/Obama policy of support for the Yemen war. Wanting to phase out fossil fuels, Biden will not intervene as Trump did to raise oil prices (when Moscow and Riyadh engaged in a price war last spring). Biden will be supportive of the “Abrahamic” agreements for recognition of Israel by the UAE and Bahrain (as well as Sudan).
Biden shares with Trump the conviction that the US needs to draw down in the Middle East and will look for opportunities to do so. But he won’t do it capriciously or unilaterally, as Trump did in Syria and threatened to do in Iraq. Biden will deliberate carefully in making decisions and consult with allies and partners before making dramatic moves. That is a far better way, as abrupt withdrawal could lead to a perilous nuclear arms race among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey that would be difficult to stop.
Here are two additional propositions for Biden to consider:
1. Cooperation with the Gulf’s biggest oil and gas customer, China, in providing security for the Gulf. The US takes little oil through the strait of Hormuz and no gas, so all of the Gulf’s Asian partners (including Japan and South Korea as well as India and China) are free-loading on gigantic US defense expenditures (12% or so of the Pentagon’s budget). It would be much smarter to get China and India to cooperate in a multilateral naval effort, as well as to join the IEA in holding 90 days of strategic stocks. China already patrols (for pirates) just outside the Gulf. Tehran will not be interested in menacing a multilateral effort to protect Hormuz that includes its main oil customers.
2. A regional security arrangement that includes the Gulf Arabs, Turkey, and Iran. Intervention in the Middle East hasn’t worked well for the US. Neither has withdrawal. We need to prepare the region diplomatically to ensure its own stability by helping its states to construct a regional security arrangement like those that exist in virtually ever other corner of the world. This diplomatic effort could be much more cost-effective than the last two decades of successful military interventions followed by governance failures.
The Middle East faces a daunting array of issues: unfinished civil wars, sectarian strife, youth bulges, climate change, water shortages, the oil curse, autocracy, state fragility, unemployment, economic underperformance, and growing geopolitical rivalry among China, Russia, and the US. No one should minimize the difficulties, but Biden can make a difference if he eschews unilateralism, seeks to consult all the countries of the region, and tries to get a minimum of agreement among the great powers on a course forward while encouraging the states of the region to stabilize their own neighborhood.
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Trouble in the Gulf will require more than arms
Here are the speaking notes I used yesterday at the Third Annual Conference of the Gulf International Forum:
- The Gulf today is engulfed with multiple dimensions of conflict and instability.
- Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are still at odds with Qatar as well as with Turkey and Iran about leadership in the region and the role of political Islam in the Muslim world.
- The US is pursuing a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran that has repercussions throughout the Gulf and the Levant, especially Iran and Iraq.
- Iran is responding with “maximum resistance,” which includes continued support for the wars on their own people by Bashar al Assad and the Houthis as well as shifting Iranian foreign policy in the direction of Beijing and Moscow.
- Global warming, declining oil prices, youth bulges, sectarian resentments, and COVID-19 are challenging the ability of Gulf states to maintain their social contract: authoritarian stability and material prosperity in exchange for political quiescence.
US Interests and Disinterest in the Region - US priorities in the Gulf have shifted. Oil is far less important economically and politically than it once was, and America’s main terrorism threat is domestic, not international.
- Higher priority in Washington now goes to countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction and limiting the influence of rival powers in the Middle East.
- The problem for the United States is that none of its interests in the Gulf are well-served by coercion, but neither are they well-served by withdrawal, which hurts partners and allies, even giving them incentives to develop nuclear weapons, while opening new opportunities for rivals.
- Whoever is elected President next month, the US interest in reducing its commitment to the Gulf will continue, but it needs to be done without endangering friends and encouraging adversaries or unleashing a regional arms race.
- Biden and Trump should be expected to behave differently in pursuing US goals.
- President Trump is impatient and transactional. He will likely pull the plug on US troops in places not prepared to protect or pay for them (Iraq and Syria). The “Abrahamic” agreements are transactional: Israel gets recognition in exchange for its help in sustaining Gulf autocracies.
- Biden did not invent this idea, but he isn’t opposed to it.
- Where the candidates differ is on Palestine and on governance in the Arab world. Biden continues to favor a two-state outcome for Israel and Palestine, whereas Trump and his Israeli partners seek to eliminate any possibility of creating a viable Palestinian state.
- While safeguarding Israel’s security, Biden would push for a better deal for the Palestinians than the one Trump has offered. He would also be less tolerant of Gulf human rights abuses.
- Biden and Trump also differ on the value of the Iran nuclear deal, but it is important to recognize that they share the same goal: to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Trump’s approach is “maximum pressure,” mainly through unilateral sanctions but also including the threat of kinetic action. He aims to force Iran back to the negotiating table to negotiate a “better deal” that would include regional issues, missiles, and extending and expanding the nuclear agreement.
- Biden wants to negotiate with Iran on the same issues but is prepared to lift some sanctions to incentivize a return to the status quo ante: Iranian and US compliance with the nuclear deal. Whichever candidate wins, Iran is unlikely to change course before its June election, if then.
A Much-Needed Regional Security Framework
- Neither Trump nor Biden rules out war with Iran, which would be catastrophic for the Gulf states. Doha has the most to lose.
- But war is not an attractive proposition for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama either. Israel and the Gulf states don’t want Iran to get nuclear weapons and will cooperate to prevent it, but the Arabs will not want to risk joining Israel and the US in an overt conventional war with Iran whose winner may be predictable but whose consequences could be catastrophic for the Gulf.
- President Trump has been a welcome figure in the Arab Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. He has shielded the Kingdom and its Crown Prince from accountability for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and continued the Obama Administration’s support for the Yemen war, despite growing bipartisan discomfort in the US.
- Because of his human rights commitments, Biden will be less favored in the Gulf. He will not be sword dancing in Riyadh or cheering the war in Yemen.
- But the differences should not obscure the similarities. The two candidates share the desire to reduce US commitments in the Gulf and the interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Several of their predecessors also had these goals and failed to achieve them.
- The reason is all too clear: the Americans have relied too heavily on coercion and too little on diplomacy.
- The United States has enormous destructive military, political, and economic power. But that alone cannot build what is needed: a regional security network that will reduce threat perceptions in all the Gulf states, Iran included, decrease incentives to develop nuclear weapons, and prevent encroachments by rival powers.
- This framework will require a stronger diplomatic nexus of mutual understanding, restraint, and respect. Continued low-intensity and gray zone conflict, or a real war, will make that much more difficult to achieve. The Gulf is not a military challenge, but rather a diplomatic one.
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The hurdle in Lebanon is political
Randa Slim and I published a piece on Beirut reconstruction today in Foreign Affairs today. As we focus in the piece on investigation of the explosion and reconstruction, it did not treat the heinous behavior of the Lebanese security forces towards demonstrators, hence my temptation to include the video above from Human Rights Watch.
Lebanon is a failing state. It was failing even before the August 4 explosion that devastated a large part of the city center near the port. Such states offer profit opportunities to whoever holds power, while impoverishing everyone else. It is no easy task to help such a country without helping its power elite.
Randa and I offer in the Foreign Affairs piece a combination of two ideas for rebuilding the destroyed area: a contractual relationship for reconstruction and an internationally controlled but Lebanese-staffed “authority” to set priorities and do most of the actual contracting. The “contract” idea has often been used in recent years, at various levels of operation: the Millennium Challenge Corporation we site does it at the project level. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund does it at a higher policy level. The European Union does it with candidate members. It amounts to conditionality: you get the money only if you do such and such.
The wise choice of “such and such,” and the willingness to follow through on the conditionality, are key elements of this approach. If our approach were to be adopted, the focus should be mainly on economic policy reform as well as transparency and accountability for government expenditure. But that creates an obvious problem: the international community would be asking for reforms from a central government that would not suffer any direct loss if aid were to be cut off. I think the importance of Beirut reconstruction to the government would be sufficient to mitigate this mismatch, but I’m in favor of examining downsides of any policies I suggest.
The idea of an International Beirut Reconstruction Authority is the more innovative of our propositions. Something like it existed in Sarajevo during the 1992/95 Bosnian war, but its capability was limited due to the siege and continued fighting. Randa and I cite the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, but the entity we have in mind is more hands-on than that. It would actually contract for and execute the reconstruction, as independently of the Lebanese government as feasible. Critics will say that proposition would weaken the Lebanese government. I would suggest the government has even more important things to do by way of economic and political reform.
We went light on the political reform piece, which is fraught. Lebanon is in form a democracy. If only technically competent people formed the government, they would likely have little connection to the political forces in the parliament, whose cooperation is necessary for many reforms. Meaningful political reform would give less weight to Lebanon’s sectarian political organizations, including Hezbollah, and more to its vibrant and competent civil society, including the demonstrators abused in the above video. Shifting power in that way is an enormous challenge, even in a small country. And it will have to be Lebanese who design a political system that delivers more to citizens and less to sectarian leaders.
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Good but…
The deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates on its face does good things. It prevents Israeli annexation of a big piece of the West Bank and will establish normal diplomatic relations and other ties between the two countries. Hard to object to any of that.
But in diplomacy the devil is in the details, especially the details of implementation. There are a lot of still unanswered questions. Is the bar on annexation permanent, or are the Israelis going to be able to threaten it over and over again in order to gain recognition by Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and maybe Qatar?* Or will those countries raise the ante and get further concessions for Palestinian interests in return for normalization?
On implementation, skepticism is in order. Egypt and Jordan have normal diplomatic relations with Israel, but their peace is not a uniformly warm one. Security cooperation is embraced, but economic and commercial relations are far from maximized. Even travel among the three countries presents serious bureaucratic barriers, not to mention the cultural inhibitions against Arabs going to Israel (and Israel’s Jews going to Arab countries).
There are three strong factors favoring UAE/Israel rapprochement.
First is Israeli security assistance. The UAE is concerned about homegrown Islamists, especially those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. You only need sit for an hour in a business class lounge in Riyadh or Dubai to meet Israeli males with square jaws and muscular physiques, along with a group of nerds. When I asked one in Riyadh why there were so many Israelis in the lounge, he replied with an icy smile, “If I told you I would have to kill you.” My impression is that Israel has bought a lot of good will in the Gulf by helping its autocratic regimes to ensure that nothing like the Arab Spring can succeed there.
Second is a lack of bad blood at the personal level. While the UAE has recognized and support Palestine, there is no decades-long history of war with Israel and subsequent occupation, as there was with Jordan and Egypt. Nor is there a history of Jews being expelled from the Emirates, so far as I can tell. There has been a synagogue in Dubai for decades that is now officially recognized. Ordinary Emiratis may not like the deal, but mass dissent inside the UAE is unlikely, as both its citizens and non-citizens are under tight control. Your traffic ticket arrives by text message within minutes of a violation. Any negative reaction in the “Arab street” will not be in Dubai or Abu Dhabi.
Third is the common enemy: Iran. The Israelis will no doubt want and get intelligence and military cooperation with the UAE, which is conveniently located just on the other side of the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Israel will presumably be glad to provide missile defense and other high tech weaponry. The UAE was never going to be able to stand aside if war happens between Iran and Israel, so it makes sense for Abu Dhabi to get what it can to defend itself, especially after the Iranian attacks on its tankers in 2019.
The Palestinians are objecting vigorously to the UAE/Israel deal, because it rewards Israel for not doing something it should never have threatened to do and gains nothing substantial for Palestine. But the Arab world has mostly been ignoring the Palestinians lately. Certainly the Trump Administration will be uninterested in their complaints. The Palestinians will need to hope that the next Arab country to recognize Israel drives a harder bargain.
*PS: I failed to notice yesterday when drafting this that the Israelis have only suspended their annexation, which means they will try to sell that concession again to the next Arab country wanting to establish normal relations.
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Peace Picks | July 20-26, 2020
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Russian Influence Activities in Europe | July 20, 2020 | 12:00 PM- 12:45 PM | CSIS | Register Here
Please join CSIS for a conversation on Russia’s influence activities in the UK, Europe, and Europe’s southern neighborhood featuring Dame Karen Pierce DCMG, British Ambassador to the United States, and Luke Harding, foreign correspondent and investigative journalist for The Guardian, on the occasion of a newly released CSIS report on Russian and Chinese influence activities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Introduced by Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and moderated by Rachel Ellehuus, CSIS Europe Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, this conversation will examine the objectives and tactics behind Russia’s influence activities in the UK, Europe, and beyond; discuss the activities which were and were not considered successful; and discuss steps that the United Kingdom has taken to be more resilient and less susceptible to Russian efforts at home and abroad.
Speakers:
Dame Karen Pierce DCMG: British Ambassador to the United States
Luke Harding: Foreign Correspondent, The Guardian
Rachel Ellehuus: Deputy Director, Europe Program
Heather A. Conley: Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program
- Sino-Indian Escalation: Blip or Lasting Strategic Shift? | July 21, 2020 | 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM | United States Institute of Peace |Register Here
Last month, Chinese and Indian troops came to blows in their deadliest border incident since 1967, culminating on June 15 with the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops. The Indian and Chinese governments have remained largely silent on exactly what happened along the disputed boundary. The two countries appear to have stabilized the situation by starting a disengagement process, but unlike prior dustups, this unexpected and deadly turn could portend a lasting and significant strategic shift.
Join USIP for an expert panel on the Sino-Indian border clash and its implications for regional and global security. The discussion will examine whether this conflict signals an emboldened shift in China’s posture toward disputed borders elsewhere, how this rivalry affects existing India-Pakistan tensions and other border disputes, and what the implications are for the United States and its allies as they push back on perceived Chinese aggression.
Speakers:
Tanvi Madan: Senior Fellow, Project on International Order and Strategy and Director of the India Project, Brookings Institution
M. Taylor Fravel: Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Vikram J. Singh: Senior Advisor, Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Jacob Stokes (Moderator): Senior Policy Analyst, China Program, Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
- One State, Two States, or None At All: Where Do Israelis and Palestinians Go From Here? | July 21, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
As Israelis and Palestinians confront the future, prospects for serious negotiations, or even a conflict-ending solution, look particularly grim. The prospects of a negotiated two-state solution are dwindling or already dead; the possibility of a bi-national state shimmers out in the distance like a desert mirage; and both the Trump peace plan and possible Israeli annexation offer either continued impasse or escalation.
Where do Israelis and Palestinians go from here? Join us as three veteran observers and practitioners of Israeli-Palestinian affairs assess the prospects for peace and the road ahead.
Speakers:
Shlomo Ben Ami: former foreign minister of Israel.
Nadeel Shaath: foreign minister of Palestine from 2003 to 2005, the former minister of Planning and International Cooperation, and a former member of Fateh Central Committee.
Tamara Cofman Wittes: senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where she focuses on U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Aaron David Miller: senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on U.S. foreign policy.
- The Next Era of US-Pacific Islands Engagement | July 22, 2020 | 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
In this Pacific Century, the United States is a Pacific nation that for three generations has anchored peace in this region of the world. The Pacific Islands include 24 jurisdictions ranging from independent states, to states linked to the United States and others through free association compacts, to territories and dependencies stretching throughout Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia—from Rapa Nui to Palau, from Hawai’i to New Caledonia. As the world turns its attention to the Pacific Islands, these countries are coalescing around a shared regional identity and bringing their economic, political, and security concerns to the global stage.
How do the United States and our allies and partners continue longstanding mutual interests and values with the Pacific Islands in the face of accelerating development needs and challenges to regional peace and security, sovereignty, trade and freedom of navigation, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law?
Join USIP as we host two co-founders of the bipartisan Congressional Pacific Islands Caucus for a discussion that outlines these challenges and opportunities, as well as their proposals to coordinate the next era of the United States’ engagement in the Pacific.
Speakers:
Rep. Ed Case: U.S. Representative from Hawaii
Rep. Ted Yoho: U.S. Representative from Florida
The Honorable Nancy Lindborg: (Moderator): President, U.S. Institute of Peace
- US Policy Towards Syria after the Caesar Act | July 22, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Arab Center DC | Register Here
This webinar focuses on the substance and ramifications of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which was passed by both chambers of the US Congress and signed into law by President Donald Trump in 2019. It went into effect on June 17, 2020. The discussion will provide details on the sanctions mandated by the act, an update on the implementation and targets of these sanctions, and the ensuing political and regional dynamics, including Russia’s reaction. The speakers will also address the next steps for the United States following the July 9, 2020 condemnation of Syria’s air force by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Speakers:
Joel D. Rayburn: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Levant Affairs and Special Envoy for Syria, US Department of State
Radwan Ziadeh: Senior Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC
Reema Abuhamdieh (Moderator): Presenter and Reporter, Al Araby Television Network
- Toward a Green Recovery in the Gulf States | July 23, 2020 | 9:30 AM – 10:30 AM | Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington| Register Here
As the Gulf Arab countries look to recover from the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic, climate-related challenges loom large over their economic revival plans. While urgent in their own right, climate-related challenges are a slower moving threat compared to the immediacy of a global pandemic; nevertheless, the economic consequences of, and solutions to, both problems present many parallels. As with climate change, the coronavirus crisis further emphasizes the importance of regional economic diversification programs aimed at reducing oil dependence and highlights lower carbon, technology, and human capital-intensive businesses as the sectors that are most sustainable and resilient to economic shocks.
Is this a window of opportunity for Gulf leaders to drive diversification policies further and faster? Will shifts in consumer and industrial behaviors reorient economic policy toward sustainable development goals? Couldaccelerating investment in renewable energy underpin economic recovery, or will rising public debt, combined with significant capital outflows and reduced exports, make financing green investments a challenge?
Speakers:
Samantha Gross: Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
Aisha Al-Sarihi: Non-Resident Fellow, AGSIW
Rabia Ferroukhi: Director, Knowledge, Policy and Finance Centre, International Renewable Energy Agency
Mari Luomi: Independent Expert, Sustainable Energy and Climate Policy
Grzegorz Peszko: Economist, World Bank
- Online Event: A Conversation with Dr. Anthony Fauci | July 24, 2020 | 1:30 PM – 2:00 PM | CSIS | Watch Event Here
Please join the CSIS Global Health Policy Center on Friday, July 24 from 1:30 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. EDT for a conversation with Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health and member of the White House Coronavirus Task Force on Covid-19 in the United States. The United States is in the midst of a worsening crisis, with Covid-19 cases and deaths increasing in the Sun Belt, the West, and many other parts of the United States. This begs the question: what is the strategy for ensuring that the outbreak does not spiral out of control in the United States? How can the United States strengthen the basic public health capacities – test, trace, and isolate – needed to slow the spread? What federal, state, and local actions may be necessary to protect the American people and safely reopen businesses, schools, and sporting events?
In this CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security event, J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director of the CSIS Global Health Policy Center, will discuss these difficult questions with Dr. Anthony Fauci. They will also discuss the development of a safe and effective Covid-19 vaccine, including the status and promise of Operation Warp Speed.`
Speakers:
Anthony Fauci: Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health and a member of the White House Coronavirus Task Force
J. Stephen Morrison: Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center
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