Tag: Iran
Peace Picks April 25-29
- The security situation in Ethiopia and how it relates to the broader region | Monday, April 25th | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As Africa’s oldest independent country, Ethiopia has a history that is unique in the continent. The country has faced its share of conflict, including a protracted civil war from 1974 through 1991. A land-locked location in Eastern Africa, the country has also been witness to climate catastrophes—including the drought that killed a half a million people in the 1980s and the threat of a new drought today. Despite being one of Africa’s poorest countries, Ethiopia has experienced significant economic growth since the end of the civil war, and a majority of its population is literate. In addition, Ethiopia is a crucial U.S. security partner, particularly when it comes to counterterrorism, in a region plagued by threats. On April 25, the Africa Security Initiative at Brookings will host a discussion examining the security situation in Ethiopia, in broader political, economic, and regional context. Panelists will include Abye Assefa of St. Lawrence University and Terrence Lyons of George Mason University. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, will moderate. Following discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
- A Rage for Order | Tuesday, April 26th | 9:30-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A Rage for Order is a narrative account of the Arab Spring’s unraveling, from the euphoric protests of Tahrir Square in 2011 to the televised atrocities of ISIS four years later. It is a story that takes place across five different countries and many characters, but all are united by a single arc: the collapse of political authority in the Arab world, and the unveiling of social conflicts—of tribe, of class, of religion—that had lain mostly dormant during the decades of dictatorship. The book narrates these spiraling crises through the eyes of a group of people who looked to the 2011 uprisings as a liberation, only to see their own lives torn apart in the aftermath. The author is Robert Worth, Contributing Writer at the New York Times Magazine and former Public Policy Fellow, Wilson Center. Discussants include Hannah Allam, Middle East Bureau Chief, McClatchy Newspapers, and Joseph Sassoon, Associate Professor, Georgetown University, and former Fellow, Wilson Center.
- The Future of the Russo-Turkish Relationship with Congressman Gerry Connolly | Tuesday, April 26th | 12:00-1:00 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | When Russia annexed Crimea, the balance of power in the Black Sea region shifted, leading to escalating tensions between Russia and Turkey. The Kremlin’s intervention in Syria and operations along the Turkish border triggered Ankara’s shootdown of a Russian fighter jet. Today, relations between Russia and Turkey are at an all-time low. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent decision to reduce operations in Syria may once again transform foreign policy for the two states. Congressman Gerry Connolly and the panel will discuss the future of the Russo-Turkish relationship and implications of recent events on security in the region, NATO, and US policy. We hope you can join us for this important and timely discussion. Other panelists may be found here.
- The Changing Role of Egypt’s Private Sector | The Federal Budget and Appropriations: Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East | Tuesday, April 26th | 1:30-3:00 | Project on Middle East Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | POMED is pleased to invite you to the release event for our publication, “The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa.” This annual report, authored by POMED’s Executive Director Stephen McInerney and Deputy Director for Policy Cole Bockenfeld, provides a detailed analysis of U.S. funding and other support for democracy and governance in the Middle East over the past year and proposed assistance for the coming Fiscal Year. As the Obama Administration draws to a close with the Middle East experiencing widespread violent conflict and resurgent authoritarianism, speakers will reflect on the report’s key findings and on President Obama’s approach to supporting democracy and human rights in the region over the past seven years. How have the Obama administration and Congress responded, through aid and diplomacy, to the dramatic changes in the region since 2011? How has the United States reacted to Tunisia’s democratic transition, Libya’s struggle to establish a unity government, and Egypt’s dramatic regression on human rights? What are the most significant trends in U.S. funding for democracy and human rights in the Middle East? Speakers include Hisham Melham, columnist for Al Arabiya, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, Stephen McInerney, Executive Director of POMED, and Cole Bockenfeld, Deputy Director for Policy at POMED.
- The Key to Nuclear Restraint | Thursday, April 28th | 3:30-5:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Why have some nations acquired nuclear weapons while others have refrained? In this seminar, Dr. Thomas Jonter will analyze Sweden’s Cold War plans to acquire nuclear weapons and explore why some states choose restraint. Sweden’s leadership nearly chose develop a nuclear weapon in the 1960s, but instead steered their country to become one of the most recognized actors in the disarmament movement. Drawing on recently declassified documents from Sweden and the United States, Jonter will present a comprehensive analysis of the Swedish nuclear weapons program—and why it was abandoned. Speakers include Thomas Jonter, Director of the Stockholm University Graduate School of International Studies, and Christian F. Ostermann, Director of the History and Public Policy Program.
- Special Event on Human Rights in Iran: Iranian Revolutionary Justice Film Screening and Panel Discussion | Thursday, May 12th| 6:00-9:00 | Bahai’s of the United States and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | May 14, 2016 marks the eighth anniversary of the imprisonment of seven Bahá’í leaders in Iran. Join us for a screening of the new BBC Persian documentary film Iranian Revolutionary Justice, which includes never-before-seen footage of the secret trial of eight Bahá’í leaders in Iran in the 1980s – all of whom were executed following the trial. The screening will be followed by a panel discussion with experts on human rights in Iran. Panelists include Salim Nakhjavani, University of the Witwatersrand; former prosecutor at Khmer Rouge tribunal Dokhi Fassihian, Freedom House, and Roxana Saberi (invited), author of Between Two Worlds: My Life and Captivity in Iran. The moderator will be Geneive Abdo, Atlantic Council.
- 5th Annual Transatlantic Symposium on the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy | Friday, April 29th | 9:00-3:00 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us on Friday, April 29 from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. for the 5th Annual Symposium on the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This EU/US flagship security and defense symposium is organized by the Delegation of the European Union to the United States, in partnership with the Atlantic Council. The Symposium will take place at the United States Institute of Peace located at 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC. We are delighted to announce that Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Minister of Defense of the Netherlands will launch the 5th edition of the annual Symposium on the EU’s Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP). The Minister will be joined by a number of other high-level military and civilian speakers from the EU, the United States, and NATO. Topics to be addressed this year include: New Threats and Challenges to European Security, Crisis Management in the EU’s Neighborhood, and Technology Capabilities and Readiness: The Way Forward. The agenda may be found here.
- After Hub-and-Spoke: US Hegemony in a New Gulf Security Order | Friday, April 29th | 9:30-11:00 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Regional transformation and chaos resulting from the Arab uprisings, the rise of the Islamic State (or ISIS) in the Middle East and beyond, shifting US global priorities, and the increasing influence of outside powers in the Gulf have created a new geopolitical context for the United States’ commitment to the security of the Gulf. How will the region’s new strategic trends and security dynamics impact US interests, priorities, and future force posture? Does this changing strategic environment herald a new approach to Gulf security that looks beyond a US-controlled hub-and-spoke model toward a new, multilateral approach? How can the United States best minimize risks and capitalize on the heightened engagement of European allies in the Gulf? Please join the Atlantic Council on Friday, April 29 from 9:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. for a discussion of a new report by Brent Scowcroft Center Senior Fellow Bilal Saab, entitled After Hub-and-Spoke: US Hegemony in a New Gulf Security Order and a debate on US global defense posture in the next decade and how it might affect future US designs in the region. Other panelists may be found here.
- Women’s Leadership in Conservation and Peace | Friday, April 29th | 9:30-11:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Women often play a critical but under-realized role in peace, prosperity, and the management of natural resources. Join us in a discussion of the cross-cutting benefits when women are leaders in natural resource management and conservation, with access to jobs and political participation. Panelists will explore current and emerging trends in programming to further empower women in conservation and peacebuilding. This event is cosponsored by Conservation International and the Wilson Center’s Women in Public Service Project. Speakers include Mayesha Alam, Associate Director, Georgetown Institute for Women Peace and Security, Georgetown University, Eleanor Blomstrom, Program Director, Head of Office, Women’s Environment and Development Organization, Roger-Mark De Souza, Director of Population, Environmental Security, and Resilience, Wilson Center, Melanie Greenberg, CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding, Milagros Sandoval, Manager, Environmental Policy, Conservation International.
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Fight and muddle
It took longer than anticipated, but it appears now that the cessation of hostilities in Syria is ending, mainly due to regime attacks on relatively moderate opposition forces in the center of the country. Fighting has also erupted in the far northeast, where Kurdish and regime forces had long divided the turf between them but are now going after each other.
The opposition’s High Negotiation Council has been leaving the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva, disappointed that in the minimal progress on humanitarian access and release of detainees, as well as the regime’s refusal to discuss political transition. I suspect they stayed long enough to avoid any American backlash, but we’ll have to wait and see. Technical level talks on some issues are said to be proceeding.
On the regime side, President Assad is feeling strong in the aftermath of Russia’s fall offensive, which succeeded in preventing the opposition from reaching the Alawite heartland it was aiming for. Both Moscow and Tehran have now doubled down on their support for Assad. No matter how often they deny being wedded to him, neither Russia nor Iran can hope for a successor regime even half as friendly to their interests as he has been. They know they are cooked in the long term if Syria becomes even remotely democratic, as the substantial Sunni majority will no doubt remember what they’ve done and seek eventually to exclude them from any substantial influence in the country.
What this amounts to for the US is a short term loss even if it can hope for a long term gain. The cessation of hostilities worked mainly by reducing Russian and regime attacks, which this fall were responsible for most of the violence, and freed the relatively moderate opposition to do what the Americans have long wanted them to do: attack the Islamic State (ISIS). They were somewhat successful, especially in northern Syria but also in the south. That was good news for Washington. So too were the demonstrations that broke out in some cities against Jabhat al Nusra, Syria’s Qaeda affiliate.
Now the big question is whether the Americans have done what is normally done during a cessation of hostilities: prepared its Syrian allies for the renewal of violence. If the relatively moderate opposition has been strengthened, it will be difficult for the regime to make further progress or even hold the territory the Russian offensive helped it to gain. Particularly important is whether the opposition has acquired antiaircraft weapons, which could tilt the military balance against the regime even if the still active Russians remain relatively unscathed. The regime uses vulnerable helicopters to drop so-called “barrel bombs,” which devastate civilian areas.
The situation in the region remains tense and confused. Turkey continues to be more concerned with countering the Syrian Kurds (as well as their own) than with fighting the Islamic State. Saudi Arabia still seems more focused on its support for what it considers the legitimate government in Yemen rather than support for the Syrian opposition or the fight against ISIS. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu took the opportunity of a cabinet meeting held on the Golan Heights to declare that they would never be returned to Syria, thus undermining the rapprochement between Israel and the Sunni Arab states even more than Israel’s growing cooperation with Russia.
President Obama remains determined to minimize American exposure in Syria and the Middle East generally, even as he beefs up aid and advising to both Baghdad’s security forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Iraq, where the jabber about an impending assault on Mosul belies the shortcomings of the Iraqi army. If his meeting with Gulf states this week produced a new approach in Syria or Iraq, it has not yet become apparent. Washington seems resigned to muddling through until the January end of this administration, when more likely than not Hillary Clinton will begin to serve Obama’s third term. She will then have to decide whether to follow through on her pledges to take greater risks in Syria not only against ISIS but also against Assad by imposing a no-fly zone over part of the country.
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The difference between Jews
I spent an hour today with two really smart guys: Dov Waxman of Northeastern University and Ilan Peleg of Lafayette College. The occasion was a Middle East Institute event we hosted at SAIS on Dov’s newly published book, Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel. I can’t review it, because I haven’t read it yet, but the two professors certainly gave me a good deal to think about.
I confess I was uncomfortable with the book’s title. I don’t regard myself as a member of a tribe but rather as an individual who has chosen to be what my parents were: Jews and Americans. Many years ago a co-worker referred to the Jewish owner of the factory we worked in as my Landsmann. That grates to this day. Of course I share with at least some Jews many things: history, culture, beliefs, norms, and support for the state of Israel. But I also share those things with many non-Jews. And I differ from many Jews on some of those things. I am not indifferent to the religious connection, just not willing to prioritize it over everything else and assume a familial tie to someone I had never met.
This turned out to be one of Dov’s main points: many American Jews, especially the millennial generation (of which I am definitively not a member), feel the way I do. We prioritize liberal values rather than ethnic connections. In so doing, we are increasingly at odds with an Israel that has returned to its 19th century roots as a Jewish national movement, especially but not only under Benyamin Netanyahu’s leadership. We want to see Palestinians treated in accordance with liberal values as equals endowed with inalienable rights. Bernie Sanders expressed this view last night in the debate with Hillary Clinton.
So why, I asked, do so many American politicians, like Clinton, support Israel so unconditionally? Even Barack Obama has been assiduous, more so than his predecessors, in protecting Israel from undesired UN Security Council resolutions. Part of the answer is that they get vital support and money from doing so. I’m not going to be able to match Sheldon Adelson as a political donor, but in addition I wouldn’t prioritize Israel as my top issue. He will. Passion counts and most of it is on the side of those who want unconditional support for Israel as the Jewish state. They don’t much care about how Palestinians are treated.
They even deny that they exist, saying they are really just Jordanians. If anyone argues that with you, tell them to talk with a Jordanian and ask what Jews who lived in the Holy Land were called before Israeli independence in the 1948. The answer will shock: they were called Palestinians, albeit Jewish rather than Arab ones. The term “Arab Jew” then applied to the many Jews whose native language was Arabic. Today many use the Hebrew term: Mizrahi Jews, which includes Jews from other than Arab countries.
More important is that Christians, in particular evangelicals, have lined up solidly in more or less unconditional support of Israel. Bernie of course doesn’t have to worry about them, because they will never support him. He is much more interested in that millennial generation, including the young New York Jews he wants to vote for him on Tuesday. So he grabbed the third rail of American politics with both hands and seems to have survived the immediate shock, though I won’t be surprised if Clinton beats him in New York on Tuesday.
Apart from the domestic political issues arising from the palpable split in the American Jewish community, there are potentially serious foreign policy issues. Ilan pointed to the split between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu over the Iranian nuclear deal and Dov mentioned Israeli opposition to the American role in the fall of Egyptian President Mubarak in 2011. On the Iranian nuclear deal, it seems to me the split is already partly healed: Netanyahu has become a cheerleader for strict implementation, since that is manifestly in Israel’s interest.
But the healing is only partial, because the President is inclined to allow at least a partial return of Iran to something more like its traditional role in the region (in exchange for postponement of its nuclear ambitions) while Netanyahu is increasingly aligned with the Sunni Arab states in actively resisting that. He has also begun to imitate some of their less liberal practices in cracking down on Israeli civil society and making life hard for those who speak out against excessive use of force against Palestinians. That really offends my liberal sensibilities.
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Heresies
The Middle East Institute today published my heresies concerning America’s future in the region. Essentially I agree with President Obama that American interests in the region are declining and shifting: the nuclear deal with Iran has postponed the proliferation threat and American dependence on Middle East oil is declining. Other interests like the fight against terrorism and maintaining relations with our allies require less military presence in the region and more attention to civilian functions like state-building, diplomacy to create a regional security architecture, and continuation of democracy support to those who desire it. Military assistance to allies in no way justifies the current massive US military presence in the Middle East, which attracts more problems than it solves.
This is not as different from Ken Pollack’s recent Fight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East as might be imagined. Ken also emphasizes the important civilian dimensions of stabilizing the region, especially once the civil wars are brought to an end. But he uses the oil issue as his trump card in arguing for continued US engagement and even re-commitment to the region, as he fears breakdown of Saudi Arabia.
I am perfectly willing to concede that is a possibility, but it is one the Saudis have every incentive to prevent. How redoubling American military commitment to the Middle East would contribute is not clear to me. I am confident that any future regime in the Kingdom will want to protect itself and its oil exports. A disruption of Saudi exports, should it occur, can be met more readily by drawdown of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, coordinated with other countries through the International Energy Agency as well as with China and India. Getting those two major importers of Middle Eastern oil to hold at least 90 days of strategic stocks would do much more for stability of the oil market than the Fifth Fleet, which is ill-suited to respond in any substantial way to internal disorder in Saudi Arabia.
Should an oil supply disruption last a long time, the consequent increase in prices will bring back a lot of “non-conventional” oil and gas. The technology for producing it is spreading around the world, so it is unlikely we’ll see a rise much above $70 per barrel during the next decade or more.
The Saudis could also do some things to improve the security of their oil exports. Existing pipelines that circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz are not used to full capacity. New pipelines could be built. The Kingdom would be wise to improve treatment of its Shia minority, many of whom live in oil-producing areas.
Some think Syria demonstrates that it would be better to fight wars in the Middle East than reduce our commitments there. I’d be quick to admit that President Obama’s inattention to Syria during the peaceful phase of its revolution was a serious mistake. He should have ensured that saying Bashar al Assad needed to step down was translated into action. It was clear from early on that his staying would lead to violence, that violence would lead to sectarian polarization, and that polarization would lead to radicalization.
But I disagree with those who claim the best way of ensuring that Assad left would have been to attack his chemical weapons facilities. That option did not arise until August 2013, which was well after the rebellion turned violent. Two years earlier would have been the best time to act, most likely through diplomatic and political means rather than military ones.
The failure to do so has created an enormous mess in Syria, but it is one that does not actually affect oil production and exports much. Even the humanitarian catastrophe should concern the Europeans more than the US, because of their vulnerability to migrants.
The big challenge in the Middle East today is creation of some kind of security architecture to channel competition into peaceful arenas. While American military capacity has a role to play in shaping the environment in which that is achieved, the task is essentially a diplomatic one requiring Iran and Saudi Arabia to come to terms and seek to reduce the threats that each perceives, stemming in part from the other. That should not be impossible. We did at least that well with the Soviet Union during a period of much greater threat to the US than any today. Detente is not a four letter word.
The Middle East today needs more diplomacy, state-building and democracy. It could do with a lot less saber-rattling and killing.
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Peace Picks April 11-15
- Egypt’s Former Foreign Minister on Regional Statecraft and Domestic Reform | Tuesday, April 12th | 12:00-1:30 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Nabil Fahmy, former foreign minister of Egypt, for a discussion about Egypt’s political and socioeconomic challenges and its role in regional politics and stability. Egypt’s government is under pressure to deliver economic development, good governance, and increased security in light of growing terrorist threats. These challenges come amid growing regional tensions- from the conflict in Syria to the war in Yemen. How can the state better meet its domestic objectives and how can Egypt play an effective role in brokering greater Middle East stability?
- The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Obama Doctrine | Tuesday, April 12th | 1:00-3:30 | Middle East Policy Council | Email info@mepc.org to RSVP | Our panel will address Jeffrey Goldberg‘s essay, “The Obama Doctrine,” and how it impacts U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Please RSVP promptly for limited space. Speakers include James F. Jeffrey, Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, Alireza Nader, Senior International Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation, and Fahad Nazer, Senior Political Analyst, JTG, Inc. and Non-Resident Fellow, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. The moderator will be Richard Schmierer, Former Ambassador to Oman and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Middle East Policy Council.
- The Fourth Annual Nancy Bernkopf Tucker Memorial Lecture: The Politics of Memory in East Asia | Tuesday, April 12th | 4:00-6:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II last year brought another round of contentious memory politics in East Asia. Despite the seeming sameness of the debates, in fact the practices and norms of public memory have substantially altered since the end of the war, creating what speaker Carol Gluck calls a “global memory culture.” Changes in the law, politics, society, criteria of knowledge, and concepts of responsibility have transformed our understanding of what it means to do justice to the past. How then do these changes relate to the politics of memory in East Asia today? Carol Gluck, George Sansom Professor of History at Columbia University, will speak.
- Outlook for Security and Integration of Albania and the Western Balkans | Wednesday, April 13th | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since the collapse of the communist regime more than two decades ago, Albania has undergone significant political, economic, and social reforms. Albania became a NATO member in 2009, a European Union (EU) candidate country in 2014, and signed a declaration of strategic partnership with the United States in 2015. Given the increasingly fragmented climate among EU member states over Europe’s capacity to overcome current challenges, the EU’s enlargement agenda has lost momentum. Meanwhile, instability in the Western Balkans has been fueled by unprecedented waves of refugees, and political and economic uncertainty to the South and East. As Prime Minister, H.E. Edi Rama plays a significant role in directing the path for Albania in EU accession negotiations and regional cooperation, particularly through the Berlin Process framework of annual summits in the Western Balkans. In his visit to Washington, DC, Prime Minister Rama will address Albania’s security priorities and goals for the NATO Warsaw Summit, and provide views on Albania’s reform progress.
- Supporting Tunisia’s Imperiled Transition | Thursday, April 14th | 8:30-12:15 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Tunisia remains the Arab Awakening’s last best hope. Its political transition is as remarkable as it is fragile—imperiled by both security challenges and significant socioeconomic obstacles. Join us for a discussion of how Tunisia and its international partners can forge a new and more constructive dynamic and reverse the country’s recent troubling trajectory. This event will launch a new Carnegie report entitled Between Peril and Promise: A New Framework for Partnership With Tunisia. Panels and panelists may be found here.
- Turkey, its neighborhood, and the international order | Thursday, April 14th | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Increasingly, there are concerns about the direction of Turkey’s politics, economy, security, and foreign policy. Debate is growing about the Turkish economy’s vibrancy, and its commitment to democratic norms is being questioned. Moreover, against the backdrop of the chaos in the region, its ability to maintain peace and order is hindered. These difficulties coincide with a larger trend in which the global economy remains fragile, European integration is fracturing, and international governance seems under duress. The spill-over from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq has precipitated a refugee crisis of historic scale, testing the resolve, unity, and values of the West. Will these challenges prove pivotal in reshaping the international system? Will these trials ultimately compel the West to formulate an effective collective response? Will Turkey prove to be an asset or a liability for regional security and order? On April 14, the Turkey Project of the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings will host a discussion to assess Turkey’s strategic orientation amid the ever-changing international order. Panelists will include Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Bruce Jones, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan of the University of Maryland, and Francis Riccardone of the Atlantic Council. Cansen Başaran-Symes, president of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) will make introductory remarks. Turkey Project Director and TÜSİAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci will moderate the discussion. After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
- From ISIS to Declining Oil Prices: Qubad Talabani on the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Challenges | Thursday, April 14th | 10:00-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Opening remarks will be made by Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace. H.E. Qubad Talabani, Deputy Prime Minister, Kurdistan Regional Government, will speak. Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center, will moderate. Please join us on April 14 for a discussion with Qubad Talabani, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG). Long an island of stability in a Middle East marked by conflict, the Kurdish region of Iraq now faces a perfect storm. Its finances have been severely affected by the dramatic decline in the price of oil, its main source of revenue. The KRG also faces a constitutional crisis because President Masoud Barzani’s term has ended without the Kurdish political parties finding a definitive way forward or agreement on succession. And the KRG’s Peshmerga military force is engaged with the United States and its allies in an extended offensive to rout the self-declared Islamic State extremist group and liberate the nearby city of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest. Amidst all of this, President Barzani also has indicated that the KRG will hold a referendum in 2016 on whether the region should seek independence from Iraq.
- A New Economic Growth Strategy for Pakistan: A Conversation with Pakistani Finance Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar | Thursday, April 14th | 2:30-4:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | When Pakistan’s current government took office in June 2013, the economy was under tremendous stress. Nearly three years later, estimates suggest that the economy could achieve 4.5 percent GDP growth in fiscal year 2015-16, which would be the highest rate in eight years. Inflation and interest rates have decreased, tax revenues have grown, and the fiscal deficit has shrunk. Additionally, foreign exchange reserves have crossed $20 billion for the first time in history. Meanwhile, the government recently had a successful 10th review from the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, however, the government confronts political, security, and energy challenges that have hindered a full economic recovery. At this event, His Excellency Mohammad Ishaq Dar, Pakistan’s finance minister, will unveil a new two-year strategy to place Pakistan’s economic growth on par with that of other emerging economies in South Asia. He will also speak about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Pakistan’s current security situation.
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Unworthy
I do talking head gigs for PressTV, Tehran’s official English-language service, every few weeks, thinking it is useful for Iranians to hear now and again an American perspective on the many issues that divide us. Most of PressTV‘s American commentators are unknowns who spout a pro-Tehran, anti-American line.
Yesterday’s broadcast included Mohammad Marandi, an articulate and distinguished professor at the University of Tehran. The program is for the most part self-explanatory. I recommend watching it: .
Towards the end Professor Marandi cites an interview by Al Jazeera with retired American General Michael Flynn. This interview is virtually unknown in the US, but plays an outsized role in Iran, where it is taken as crucial evidence that Washington knowingly and intentionally supported the Islamic State in 2012 and has continued to do so. I got little chance to respond on the air, and in any event the Flynn interview, sliced and diced by Russia Today, requires more than a brief comment on TV.
Flynn was head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) July 2012-August 2014. Al Jazeera starts the interview citing this apparently archived exchange from Fox News:
Michael Flynn (archive): I’ve been at war with Islam, or a, or a component of Islam, for the last decade.
Mehdi Hasan (VO): And bonded by a common enemy, can the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran finally work out their differences?
Michael Flynn (archive): I could go on and on all day about Iran and their behaviour, you know, and their lies, flat out lies, and then their spewing of constant hatred, no matter whenever they talk.
Funny thing: I never hear Tehran cite that opening line. Nor do they cite the parts of the interview in which Flynn blames “Islam” for extremist ideology.
He goes on to say that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake, but so too was the withdrawal:
Michael Flynn: [TALKING OVER Yeah, ]I, I mean, I hate to say it’s not my job but that – my job was to ensure that the accuracy of our intelligence that was being presented was as good as it could be, and I will tell you, it goes before 2012. I mean, when we were, when we were in Iraq and we still had decisions to be made before there was a decision to pull out of Iraq in 2011. I mean, it was very clear what we were, what we were going to face.
Flynn is obviously inarticulate, so it is not very clear what he means, but I imagine he is claiming that he anticipated the rise of extremists. Then comes this:
Mehdi Hasan: – “declared or undeclared Salafist” – it’s not secret any more, it was released under FOI. The quote is: “There is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist Principality in eastern Syria and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want in order to isolate the Syrian regime.” The US saw the ISIL caliphate coming and did nothing.
Michael Flynn: Yeah, I think that what we – where we missed the point. I mean, where we totally blew it, I think, was in the very beginning. I mean, we’re talking four years now into this effort in Syria. Most people won’t even remember, it’s only been a couple of years: The Free Syrian Army, that movement. I mean, where are they today? Al-Nusra. Where are they today, and what have … how much have they changed? When you don’t get in and help somebody, they’re gonna find other means to achieve their goals. And I think right now, what we have allowed is we’ve got –
I think what Flynn is saying here is that we were slow to support the moderates and should have done more early in the game, because failure to do so allowed extremism to develop. But that is not what Tehran wants to hear, so they cite this:
Mehdi Hasan: Let me – let me just to, before we move on, just to clarify once more, you are basically saying that even in government at the time, you knew those [Salafist extremist] groups were around. You saw this analysis –
Michael Flynn: [TALKING OVER] Sure.
Mehdi Hasan: – and you were arguing against it. But who wasn’t listening?
Michael Flynn: I think the administration.
Mehdi Hasan: So the administration turned a blind eye to your analysis –
Michael Flynn: I don’t know if they turned a blind eye. I think it was a decision. I think it was a wilful[sic].
Mehdi Hasan: A wilful decision to go – support an insurgency that had Salafist, al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood?
That’s where Tehran and Moscow like to stop, but Flynn actually went on:
Michael Flynn: [INTERRUPTING] Well, a wilful decision to do what they’re doing, which, which you have to really – you have to really ask the President, what is it that he actually is doing with the, with the policy that is in place, because it is very, very confusing? I’m sitting here today, Mehdi, and I don’t, I can’t tell you exactly what that is, and I’ve been at this for a long time.
So Flynn said there was a willful decision, but he did not say it was a willful decision to support Salafists, Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. The interviewer asks that question and Flynn refuses to give an answer, saying he doesn’t understand what the Administration was doing and you’ll have to ask the President. Flynn is clearly an opponent of the Obama Administration and doing his best to suggest it is soft on terrorism, but it would have been foolish of him to suggest Washington supported it.
Of course even if Flynn had said what Tehran and Moscow allege, that would only be the view of only one retired general, one with distinctly anti-Muslim, anti-Iranian and anti-Obama views.
Let me be clear on my own view of what happened. The Islamic State of today has its origins in the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), as Professor Marandi correctly said in the PressTV program. It gained traction in Iraq, especially in 2006/7, due in part to Iran’s ally in Syria, Bashar al Assad, who allowed extremists and supplies to funnel into Iraq from Syria. But by 2010, the Americans had decimated ISI.
It was the chaos in Syria that allowed today’s Islamic State to rise from the ashes. That chaos was due to Bashar al Assad’s military crackdown on the nonviolent rebellion that started in Syria in March 2011. Tehran has supported Assad’s crackdown with oil and money, military advisers and commanders, and Hizbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops. Few of those efforts, however, have been directed against the Islamic State. That’s why Assad undertook the recent offensive to chase the Islamic State from Palmyra: in order to burnish his credentials as a fighter against extremists, credentials needed at the ongoing UN peace negotiations.
The US, by contrast, has targeted its efforts against IS, both in Syria and in Iraq. US airstrikes as well as assistance to Iraqi forces is entirely focused on IS. The US has also insisted that the rebels in Syria focus their attention on IS, notoriously to the dismay of those who would like the US to provide more support for the fight against the Assad regime. The US may have been much less discriminating in 2012, as General Flynn suggests in the interview, but it is wrong to suggest that Washington ever supported the Islamic State or Al Qaeda. Tehran should drop that line, which as I said on PressTV is unworthy.
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