Tag: Iran
Cold comfort is better than none at all
“Above all,” he says (at 18:49), “Iran must face a credible nuclear threat.” This is Prime Minister Netanyahu implicitly acknowledging, whether intentionally or not, Israel’s own nuclear weapons and stating against whom they are targeted. At the same time, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is making it clear that he intends to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities:
Turkish President Erdogan has made a similar pledge.
This raises the disturbing question: are we at the brink of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? I had a look at this question last spring with two Middle East Institute interns. Our conclusion then was that the situation needs monitoring. I can say a bit more now.
Can a Saudi nuclear capability be blocked?
While it is rarely mentioned in public, an amped-up Saudi non-proliferation commitment is likely a key part of the Biden Administration’s current negotiations with Riyadh for a bilateral security agreement. That wouldn’t be a popular proposition on its own in the U.S. Congress. But if it comes with a Saudi commitment not to develop sensitive nuclear technology (especially enrichment, reprocessing, and weaponization), it might be more attractive on both sides of the aisle. American security relations with both Japan and South Korea, on which the press reports the Administration is modeling a possible agreement with the Kingdom, include de facto commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. West Germany’s entry into NATO included such a commitment as well.
But the US/Saudi negotiations aim primarily at formal normalization of Saudi relations with Israel, for which in exchange the Saudis want concessions to the Palestinians. The Crown Prince is sounding soft on that score. He wants improvement in the life of the Palestinians. Netanyahu is not going to find it easy to get his ultra-nationalist coalition partners to offer even that. Nor is it clear he wants to. A substantial non-proliferation commitment from Saudi Arabia could however sweeten the deal from Netanyahu’s perspective. He won’t want some future, less friendly, Crown Prince to wield nukes.
The Saudis have indicated they intend to upgrade their non-proliferation safeguards agreement with the IAEA. That is a good step in the right direction, but it falls short of the strictest arrangement known as an Additional Protocol. That is where the U.S. should want the Kingdom to arrive.
What about Turkey?
Erdogan already has American nuclear weapons in Turkey. Were he to push for Turkey’s own nukes, those might be withdrawn, as they really don’t serve much military purpose. But Ankara is taking risks these days in many directions, exercising its right to a far more independent foreign policy than in the past:
- Participation with Iran and Russia in managing the conflict in Syria.
- Purchase of Russian air defenses, even if now mothballed due to the American reaction.
- Mediation of the grain deal between Russia and Ukraine.
- Opposition to Finland’s and (still) to Sweden’s membership in NATO.
- Support for Azerbaijan’s military operation to take back Nagorno-Karabakh.
It would not be surprising if Erdogan concluded that nuclear weapons would be an appropriate bulwark for this more independent course.
Could Egypt be far behind?
Likely yes, as things stand today. President Sisi has stated that he wants Egypt to be like Germany: a great power without nuclear weapons. Neither Egypt’s economy nor its army are currently in a position to resist American and Israeli pressure against Egypt acquiring nuclear weapons. But if Riyadh and Ankara were to get them, Cairo would want to follow suit. When would then be the question.
Iran sets the pace, but might stop short
Israel’s nuclear weapons, which have existed for more than 50 years, did not ignite an arms race. Iran’s nuclear capabilities, which have been advancing rapidly, could well do so. Israel kept its nuclear program behind a (sometimes thin) veil of secrecy. Iran is unable to hide its progress, as even hindered IAEA inspections provide a good deal of transparency. If Tehran decides to build a nuclear weapons, the world is going to know it, sooner rather than later. Ignoring that development would be difficult for both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the Middle East, Iran is the nuclear pace setter.
But Tehran might stop short of full weaponization. Its own national security is the reason. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, the slightest doubt in Israel about whether a missile is being prepared for launch with a nuclear warhead could lead to Armageddon. It would be far wiser for Tehran to make it clear that it has stopped short of weaponization. Being a few weeks from becoming a nuclear power would give Iran most of the benefits of becoming one without all of the risks.
That is cold comfort. But cold comfort is better than none at all.
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Stevenson’s army, September 18
– Senate has changed its dress code. I think that will lower decorum and seriousness.
– Senate Democrats need 67 votes to suspend the rules [in this case rule XVI on appropriations] to package 3 spending bills.
– Jake Sullivan and Wang Yi spent 2 days in important talks
– There’s a Sahel security pact
– Intercept says US got arms from Pakistan for Ukraine in return for IMF bailout
– WaPo says deal with Iran could lead to more. Brett McGurk explains and defends deal
– Trudeau accuses India of killing Canadian Sikh
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 18
-NYT says administration is consulting closely with Senate on possible Saudi-Israeli deal.
– WaPo says intelligence report doubts Ukraine will achieve key target
– WaPo has interview with Gen. Milley on that and more
– NYT explains how Tokyo and Seoul have come together
– ECOWAS military chiefs confer about Niger
– North Korea said to prepare missile tests
– FP says Iran has shifted tactics, more carrots for neighbors
-FT columnist warns of AI hype — citing this guy
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 17
– The Commission studying reform of the DOD budget process has an interim report.
– AEI summarizes the issues in the NDAA conference.
– CNAS has a big report on civilians in national security.
-WSJ notes the big problems facing the Russian economy.
– NPR summarizes China’s stumbling economy.
– NYT sees Russia helped by Niger coup
– WaPo says Iran helped Russia’s drone industry
– David Ignatius praises Biden foreign policy
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 12
– WSJ says Iran has slowed its uranium buildup
-New Zealand reports Chinese political interference
– CNAS analysts assess executive order on investment in China
– FP sees problems in Northern Ireland.
– FP also says Sisi ruined Egypt.
History lessons: Rich Lowry compares Trump to Huey Long.
Atlantic writer notes early US gun control laws.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Travel is getting riskier
On the plus side is the release of five Americans. That is good, but what is to prevent Tehran from taking five more hostages? Thousands of Americans visit Iran every year, despite State Department warnings. Many are dual citizens with family there. Tehran isn’t likely to scoop more up right away, but eventually it may return to lucrative hostage-taking. The slippery slope is real.
The US will release some Iranians, so far unidentified, from US prisons. Exchange for them is not a fair deal, as they have all been tried and convicted in a court system that guarantees a lot more rights than the Americans arrested in Iran. But the exchange is understandable and even laudable. If Iran wants a drug dealer or sanctions breaker back, he will only add marginally to the miscreants already there. And the exchange will save the US taxpayer a few dollars.
The problem is the money
$6 billion is a lot of money. The agreement allowing the dollars to go to Iran may require Tehran to use it for humanitarian purposes (food and medicine), but cash is fungible. It is easy enough to shift the money you might have spent on food (but no longer need) to purchase weapons. You can be pretty sure the ultimate beneficiary will be something the United States doesn’t like: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or a drone factory whose main customer is Russia.
The money is not American. It is Iranian, frozen in South Korea at Washington’s behest. It derives from South Korean payments for Iranian oil. So the American taxpayer is not footing the bill, but the cash will relieve Iran of some financial pressure. If that leads to other agreements–in the nuclear talks, for example–it may be worthwhile. But that factor is hard to weigh before it materializes.
It’s not only Iran
Iran is not the only hostage-taker. Russia, China, Venezuela, Syria, and others also indulge. Each will now hope for a billion or so in addition to the prisoner exchange in negotiations on American hostages. We likely have sufficient frozen funds from some of the hostage takers. It will not be good if today’s deal whets hostage-taker appetities.
There is already an International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 17 December 1979), but it foresees individuals as the perpetrators, not states. It has 176 state parties, including the United States. While it has been argued that Iran’s use of arbitrary detention constitutes hostage taking, holding individuals responsible is unlikely to prove much of a deterrent when it is a state that decides to detain someone. The existing convention is inadequate to deal with a situation where a state is the hostage-taker. Something more is needed.
Easily said, hard to do
What is needed is a policy that will prevent states from resorting to arbitrary detention/hostage taking. Easy to say, but difficult to institute. A convention requiring multilateral sanctions against states that detain foreigners arbitrarily might be an attractive proposition in theory, but in practice it will prove difficult to get agreement on which detentions are arbitrary. And in many instances the miscreant states will already be subjected to extensive sanctions.
In the absence of more effective measures, international travel has already become more hazardous. There are today more countries where I would hesitate to travel due to the threat of arbitrary detention than ever before in my lifetime. This latest agreement is going to make it even more risky. That may be no real loss to the hostage takers, who don’t really want nosy foreigners observing the way they treat their own citizens. But it is definitely a loss for those of us anxious to see and experience the world beyond our own shores.
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