Tag: Iran
No easy call
Having written Tuesday that President Obama should be considering a no-fly zone in Syria, I was surprised but pleased to read this tactical level account confirming my view that this is preferable to safe zones or humanitarian corridors. They wouldn’t make much difference at this point because the opposition already control wide swaths of territory. But of course a no-fly zone over all of Syria would need to be strategically as well as tactically good in order to convince a president.
Steven Lee Myers and Scott Shane of the New York Times summed up the argument against any Western military intervention this way:
American military operations against Syria, officials reiterated on Tuesday, would risk drawing in Syria’s patrons, principally Iran and Russia, at a much greater level than they already are involved. It would allow Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to rally popular sentiment against the West and embolden Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups now fighting the Assad government to turn their attention to what they would see as another American crusade in the Arab world.
The risk is not only greater Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria, but also losing Russia’s cooperation on Afghanistan and on trying to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. These are serious risks involving important American interests.
But Iran and Russia are already heavily involved in Syria, and it is also an important American interest to prevent the war in Syria from “grinding on,” as Andrew Tabler puts it. That would increase the likelihood of Al Qaeda and other jihadi involvement. It will also increase the risk to Syria’s neighbors. Lebanon and Jordan are already in difficulty, the former from sectarian fighting provoked in part by the Syrian conflict and the latter from the burden of tens of thousands of refugees. Iraq could also be threatened. Kurdish extremists are increasing operations in Turkey, presumably egged on by the Syrian regime, but the Turks can counter that effort both diplomatically (by getting the Iraqi Kurds to restrain their Syrian brethren) and militarily.
A no-fly zone could significantly shorten the conflict in Syria, but of course a great deal depends on how it is authorized and who engages in it. There seems no possibility of UN Security Council authorization. Moscow won’t allow it. The Arab League would need to ask for it. That seems within the realm of possibility. The Americans would have to undertake the major military operation needed to defeat Syria’s Russian air defense system, giving the Iranians a pretty good picture of how we would go about a similar attack on them. A continuing effort to patrol the skies and strike occasionally afterwards might rely on Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The alternative, or possibly a supplement, to a no-fly zone is to supply the Syrian revolutionaries with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADs). The risk is that these would fall into the wrong hands, as they did in Afghanistan and Libya. Few however have been used effectively against Western targets. I imagine that our geniuses have managed to create MANPADs that don’t last long and are therefore useless after a few months, but I don’t actually know it (and Al Qaeda might be able to defeat any technological wizardry).
I don’t think a no-fly zone or giving the revolutionaries anti-aircraft capability is an easy call. But refusing to somehow redress the imbalance that Bashar’s air force is exploiting to kill civilians also has consequences. President Obama appears to have already made his decision not to intervene (I am less sure that we aren’t giving the revolutionaries some anti-aircraft capability), but the mounting toll, especially in Aleppo and Damascus, means that the issue will have to be revisited.
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On course for war with Iran
Ilona Gerbakher reports from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:
Yesterday’s Middle East Institute panel at SAIS presented a report on “Prospects for US-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Year Ahead.” The predominant mood was tempered pessimism. War is a real possibility, so it behooves us to redouble diplomatic efforts.
Alan Keiswetter (a scholar at the Middle East Institute, senior consultant at C&O Resources and an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland) thought the nuclear negotiations stalemated and likely to remain that way until after the U.S. election. The parameters of a possible agreement are clear: enrichment allowed up to a low level (3.5-5%) combined with strict safeguards and shipment out of Iran of its more highly enriched uranium.
But it is unclear whether Iran wants a negotiated solution or is just stringing along the negotiations to gain more time. Sanctions alone are unlikely to force agreement, as Iran is ready to hunker down as necessary. Some kind of meatier inducement is going to be needed.
Calls in the Israeli government for military action are growing louder and more strident. Israel perceives an Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat. The debate among Israelis is no longer “will we strike” but “will the strike be effective enough.” It would be a serious mistake to dismiss the possibility of a unilateral Israeli attack. Some Israel watchers say Prime Minister Netyanyahu thinks he can do what he wants without U.S. concurrence; others feel he is bluffing, to force the U.S. to take a hard line and scare Iran into concessions.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is more united in fear of Iranian pretensions in the Gulf than the Iranians imagine.
Next year will be a real turning point in US-Iran relations over the nuclear issue. Without significant diplomatic progress, the trajectory we are on will lead to military confrontation.
Geneive Abdo, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, contrasted the current tense diplomatic situation with Iran-US relations in 2003, when Tehran cooperated on Afghanistan and was more open to negotiation but Washington was not. Supreme Leader Khamenei sent a letter to then-President Bush proposing a diplomatic breakthrough. Today even a minimal goal of building trust with Iran seems hard to reach. Iranian leaders are convinced that the ultimate U.S. goal is regime change. Khamenei’s hardline conspiratorial beliefs about the U.S. are self-fulfilling prophecies.
The Revolutionary Guard, which has grown powerful under Khamenei, no longer bothers to hide its regional interventions in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. Although arguably they stand the most to lose from sanctions, a military attack on Iran would serve their interests by reaffirming their ideological position.
Also troubling is the decline of Iran’s educated middle class. Those who once called for reform and might have questioned the nuclear program are marginalized. They were our best hope for breaking three decades of hostility but their voices have been silenced. An attack led by the U.S. or Israel would stifle prospects for democratic reform even further.
Israel is not helping matters with its increasingly hardline rhetoric. The way is being paved for it to appear that all options except an Israel-led attack have been eliminated. Don’t expect President Obama to take action until after the election. The best diplomatic option for the moment seems to be to buy more time.
Roby Barrett, the president of a consulting firm specializing in defense and security technology applications, was dismissive of the possibility of a diplomatic solution because “Iran is not really interested in negotiation.” For Iranian leaders and citizens the nuclear program has become a point of national pride. Iran sees nuclear capability as a part of its destiny as a regional power in the Gulf.
The GCC has resigned itself to the fact that Iran will not give up nuclear weapons capability and that the U.S. will need to do something about it. The alternatives are either a nuclear Iran or war. Despite the consequent global economic disturbance, the GCC wants the Iranian nuclear program stopped by hook or by crook. The idea of a nuclear Iran is a redline issue for most Arab states.
We should “never say never,” but diplomatic efforts will probably not stop the march towards war. Given the calcifying hardline between the Israeli and Iranian positions and the distance between America and Israel on this issue, there is a high probability an Israeli attack will go forward. It is unlikely that the U.S. will initiate a strike or engage cooperatively with Israel.
Israel knows they don’t have the military capacity to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. If they strike, it will be in desperation, with the objective of bringing the U.S. into the conflict. That is possible if Iranian retaliation makes the mistake of striking back at the U.S.
In closing, Genieve Abdo raised a vital point: what will happen the morning after? What will be the economic and military fallout of an attack? Will an attack have to be repeated to prevent an intensified Iranian effort to gain nuclear weapons? What are the implications of repeated attacks on Iran?
Daniel Serwer, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a senior research professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, acted as moderator. He noted that some countries have stood back from nuclear programs, including Brazil and Argentina. Iran is a more difficult case, because Israel will not give up its nuclear weapons and there are several other potential nuclear powers in the region. But if Iran thinks hard about what nuclear weapons might mean for its own security as well as long-term regional and economic stability, it may conclude they are not a good idea.
PS: The video of the event can be downloaded from C-Span.
PPS: Bennett Ramberg comes to similar conclusions.
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This week’s peace picks
1. Prospects for U.S.-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Years Ahead, Tuesday August 13, 3:30pm-5:00pm
Venue: 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20036
The Middle East Institute is proud to present its new MEI Scholar Insight. Entitled ‘Prospects for U.S.-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Year Ahead,’ this publication draws upon the broad expertise of 20 Middle East Institute scholars and outside guest experts to examine three scenarios for Iran: diplomacy, containment, and military action. Over two roundtable sessions, participants analyzed U.S. policy, Iranian policy, Israel’s role in regard to the scenarios, reactions to prospective scenarios by the GCC states, Russia, and the other members of the P5+1, and the energy markets. The resulting report is a composite of MEI Scholar analysis on the above issues and seeks to capture points of substantial agreement as well as of divergence. Please join us for the launch of this MEI featured publication and a discussion with principal authors Allen Keiswetter and Roby Barrett and contributors Geneive Abdo and Melissa Mahle.
Register for the event here
2. Celebrating Future Sudanese Leaders, Wednesday August 15, 5:30pm-8:30pm
Venue: Elliot School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052602, Lindner Commons
Join Banaa.org for an evening ceremony: Celebrating Future Sudanese Leaders. The ceremony will honor Banaa Scholars, who will share their personal experiences, their motivations and their visions for peace and development in Sudan. The event will also feature interactive discussion about the Banaa Scholarship Program and its objective to leverage the energy at US universities to promote cross-cultural understanding and to foster leadership among talented young Sudanese. This will be the concluding event of the first annual Banaa Summer Summit held at the George Washington University in Washington DC.
Register for the event here
3. BBG Research Series: Nigeria Media Use 2012, Thursday, August 16, 9:00am-10:00am
Venue: Gallup World Headquarters, 901 F Street NW (Entrance on 9th Street), Washington, DC 20004
The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup invite you to attend the BBG Research Series briefing, Nigeria Media Use 2012. The BBG and Gallup will unveil new findings about media consumption habits in Nigeria, including strong growth of digital media and the continued popularity of radio.
The country’s longstanding digital media gap has largely disappeared as mobile phone use has exploded nationwide, and Nigerians in the northern regions are more likely than ever before to turn to TV (67%), the Internet (20%), and SMS messages (45%) for news and information. The new research also reveals that Nigerians remain avid radio listeners, with 88% listening to the radio for news and information weekly or more frequently. Additionally, a growing number of mobile phone users (39%) in the north have used phones to listen to radio in the last week. In terms of content, the vast majority (83%) of Nigerians indicate a strong interest in health and healthcare issues.
Speakers will include:
• Chris Stewart, Senior Managing Consultant, Gallup
• Bruce Sherman, Director of Strategy and Development, BBG
• Robert Tortora, Chief Methodologist and Regional Research Director for Africa, Gallup
• William Bell, Research Director, International Broadcasting Bureau
The event will include a presentation of the key findings from the study, as well as a methodological overview and a review of historical media trends in Nigeria.
Register for the event here
4. Iraq and the Politics of Oil, Middle East Institute, Thursday August 16, 3:00pm-4:45pm
Venue: 1800 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036
The Middle East Institute is proud to host a discussion about Iraq’s oil sector with Naufel Al-Hassan, Raad Al Kadiri, and Denise Natali. Iraq’s crude oil production is recovering, producing a significant jump in oil exports in 2012. And yet the growth in Iraq’s oil sector has exacerbated longstanding challenges, aggravating tensions between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurds and fostering accusations of patronage and corruption on both sides. How has the Iraqi government benefited from the recovery of Iraq’s oil industry? What hope is there of Baghdad and Erbil reaching an agreement over how to divide or share resources? What are the opportunities and challenges faced by international oil companies seeking to do business in Iraq? These are among some of the issues to be addressed by this distinguished panel.
Speakers:
Naufel Al-Hassan
Raad Al Kadiri
Denise Natali
Moderator:
Allen Keiswetter
Register for the event here
5. Religious Extremism in Africa: The Case of Nigeria, Thursday August 16, 2:00pm-3:00pm
Venue: Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Avenue Northeast, Washington, DC
Since his election to the position of Primate, the Most Reverend Okoh has seen a rising tide of violence throughout his home country of Nigeria. He has witnessed firsthand the damage and destruction caused by Boko Haram and has had to deal directly with their country-wide insurgency. Given the Archbishop’s leadership of the largest Anglican Province in the world – 22 million Anglicans in Nigeria (including President Goodluck Jonathan) – and his engagement with national and international governments and leaders concerning the religious conflict in Nigeria, Primate Okoh offers a unique viewpoint on the escalating violence that is occurring throughout Nigeria at the hands of Boko Haram. Primate Okoh will examine the major factors that are contributing to this violence, with a particular focus on the religious ideology that drives Boko Haram to target churches and civilians throughout Nigeria.
Register for the event here
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No lipstick for this pig
Yesterday’s Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)-hosted discussion about Iran’s Green Movement critiqued the movement’s leadership and condemned current US Iran policy as riddled with misconception and opportunism.
Allreza Nader, a Senior International Policy Analyst at the Rand Corporation, focused on the internal dynamics of the Green Movement. Since the unsuccessful 2009 protests, there is a widening schism between the movement’s leadership and the Iranian rank and file. Mousavi, Karroubi and Khatami (MK&K) have been effectively neutralized by the regime. The first two sit under house arrest, and Khatami does not represent what the Green Movement wanted. Many of the people who took to the streets seek an Iranian republic instead of an Islamic republic. MK&K don’t support this goal. They want to throw Khamenei out but keep the system enshrined by Khomeini. Khatami went so far as to deny a link between the Green Movement and other secular nationalist movements.
Iranians have lost faith in the Green Movement and in the reformist leadership, whom they don’t see as effective. Attitudes toward Khatami in particular have soured. People ask why he isn’t under house arrest. His advocacy of reform damages his reputation. People see him as belonging to the regime.
Most Iranians feel that the Islamic Republic is not reformable. They crave democracy and separation of religion from the state. This is the true Green Movement in Iran: not the leadership, but the rank and file who reject unreal reform and call for democratic norms to prevail.
Jamal Abdi, Policy Director at the National Iranian American Council, condemned Washington policymakers for forgetting the Green Revolution. Those who remember treat the revolution either as a nuisance or an opportunistic instrument to advance pre-conceived goals. The last time the Green Movement was invoked in the mainstream media, it was a Wall Street Journal article calling for more crippling sanctions on Iran. The thinking is that if we punish the Iranian people economically, they will join the movement.
This rhetoric, so common in Washington, shows a complete misunderstanding of the situation on the ground. The Green Revolution is not about angry bread mobs. It is about people demanding their civil rights. It is about the Iranian middle classes, fed up with eroding liberties. But the sanctions have weakened this same middle class, and distract them from demanding their civil rights. The net effect of US policy on Iran has been damaging. We can put lipstick on this “ugly failed policy” of sanctions, but it has eroded the very middle class that could bring about real change.
Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, echoed Jamal Abdi’s criticisms of the US and expressed confidence in Iran’s future as a functioning democracy. The fact that the event was not focused on nuclear war or sanctions against Iran makes it unique in Washington circles. Very few policymakers focus on what is going on inside Iran today. We are blind to the internal political realities. Our information is stale and limited. Inability to see what is going in Iran is a huge problem for good policy.
Why did the Green Movement fail? It was a historical moment, but it did not bring us the change we would like to see and that many Iranians would like to see. We need to understand what went wrong: why did Egyptians keep coming back to Tahrir square, but Iranians went to their homes? How does that change? How can Washington encourage that change?
The schism between the leadership and the rank and file is a good place to begin to understand what happened. Iranians want more radical change than people like Moussavi were willing to support. But the US doesn’t know how to advance real change in Iran any more, and the current nuclear-focused policy is opportunistic and doomed to failure.
Don’t just blame the Obama administration for this. It is doubtful that a Romney policy would be substantially different. Perhaps it would be worse. Perhaps the best thing the US can do in Iran is to recognize that we are not going to be the authors of change through sanctions or through any other policy mechanism. When change happens, we are probably not going to see it coming. Iran will become a functioning democracy long before almost all of its neighbors, but we can’t know when that will be.
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This week’s peace picks
Africa and India take the spotlight in this relatively quiet week:
1. Assessing Governance in Rwanda, 10:00am-11:30am, Tuesday, August 7
Venue: International Republican Institute
The International Republican Institute’s Democratic Governance Speakers Series and the Atlantic Council invite you to a discussion on governance in Rwanda with Professor Anastase Shyaka, Chief Executive Officer of the Rwanda Governance Board; and Dr. J. Peter Pham, the Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. Professor Shyaka and Dr. Pham will discuss Rwanda’s governance model and the successes and challenges facing Rwanda in terms of democratic governance.
Speakers:
Anastase Shyaka is currently Chief Executive Officer of the Rwanda Governance Board. Previously, Professor Shyaka was Director of the Center for Conflict Management at the National University of Rwanda. Professor Shyaka is a leading expert on governance and political development in Rwanda and the great lakes region, having worked on many studies and publications focused on peace and conflict analysis, democracy, governance, and international relations. His academic accomplishments also include being named a Fulbright Scholar in Residence at George Mason University and Nothern Virginia Community College. Professor Shyaka holds a Ph.D. in Political Science.
J. Peter Pham is Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. Dr. Pham was previously a tenured Associate Professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and African Studies at James Madison University, where he also served as Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs. A staunch advocate of robust American engagement with Africa, Dr. Pham has served on many of IRI’s election monitoring delegations to Africa, including Liberia (2005), Nigeria (2007, 2011) and Somaliland (2010). He is also a frequent guest lecturer on African affairs at the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Army War College, the Joint Special Operations University, the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management and other U.S. government professional educational institutions.
2. An Indian Perspective on US Strategic Goals in Asia, 6:00pm-7:45pm, Thursday, August 9
Venue: School of International Studies Kenney Auditorium
Much has been talked about the U.S.-India strategic relationship in the last few months in Washington D.C., but mostly from a U.S. perspective. The Obama Administration has begun to pivot US power more toward Asia, recognizing the growing economic importance of Asia to U.S. interests and the heightened threat posed by challenges and instability in the region. While India generally has a sympathetic view of U.S. goals, there are a number of important differences as well as an Indian determination to control its own foreign policy objectives.
Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan, a former senior Foreign Service officer of India, will lead a discussion of an Indian view of the growing U.S. presence in Asia and what that means for India and its interests. Ambassador Sreenivasan served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington D.C. during 1997-2000, and as India’s Ambassador to several countries including Austria and Slovenia. He also served as India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Governor for India to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
3. The Legacy of Iran’s Green Movement: Film Screening and Discussion, 6:00pm-9:00pm, Thursday, August 9
Venue: West End Cinema, 2301 M Street NW
POMED is pleased to host a public screening of the groundbreaking documentary The Green Wave (2010), which examines the 2009 protests in Iran against the fraudulent presidential elections that summer and the subsequent crackdown on pro-democracy activists, members of what became known as the Green Movement. The film – a collage of direct video footage, live interviews, Facebook and Twitter accounts, and animation – won awards in 2011 at the Hamburg Filmfest, IDFA Amsterdam, and the Sundance Film Festival, and it will be released in theaters in the U.S. on August 10th and available on Movies on Demand.
To provide context for the film, Iran experts Alireza Nader, Jamal Abdi, and Suzanne Maloney will provide remarks about the legacy of Iran’s Green Movement, what effect it has had across the region, and opportunities for international actors to constructively and peacefully support democratic change in Iran. Why is the Green Movement important now, three years after mass street protests garnered international attention? How are pro-democracy efforts in Iran viewed in the Arab world, particularly in light of the 2011 Arab uprisings? How did the emergence of Iran’s Green Movement affect U.S. interactions with Iran, and how can the U.S. relationship with the Iranian people be renewed and leveraged in a way that helps Iranians achieve their aspirations for a more representative government and freer country?
6:00-6:30pm
Drink reception, patio of the West End Cinema
6:30-7:15pm
Panel discussion featuring:
Alireza Nader
Senior International Policy Analyst, Rand Corporation
Jamal Abdi
Policy Director, National Iranian American Council
Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution
Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
7:30-9:00pm
Film Screening: The Green Wave
4. Ambassador of the Gambia to the US Discusses Food Crisis, 6:30pm-8:00pm, Thursday August 9
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Join us on August 9 for a discussion with the Ambassador of The Gambia to the United States Alieu Ngum as he addresses the bilateral U.S.-Gambia relationship in the context of regional economic, political, and social issues.
The Gambia is facing a severe food crisis due to water shortages and crop failure in the West Africa region. Ambassador Ngum’s remarks will open with his government’s response to the crisis and his diplomatic role with bilateral and multilateral policymakers in Washington, D.C. He will also touch upon prospects for economic development in the context of a food crisis, regional security concerns that arise in the short and long term, and civil society’s response to national disasters in The Gambia.
The Ambassador Series offers YPFP General Members the opportunity to have a frank and informal discussion with an important member of the Washington diplomatic community. As a premier organization committed to mutual understanding and dialogue, YPFP seeks to engage Washington’s diplomatic community on a number of issues related to U.S. foreign policy, international cooperation and public diplomacy through this highly successful series.
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Circling the square
Joyce Karam of Al Hayat yesterday asked me some interesting questions about Iraq, Iran, Syria and the United States. Here are her questions and my answers:
Q. Where does the US relation with Nouri Maliki stand today? Is he a valuable
ally or more of a necessary one?
A. Maliki is both a valuable and a necessary partner (rather than ally). Necessary because he holds power in Iraq, which is a key country in the Middle East, one that is increasing its oil exports rapidly. That is something the Obama administration greatly appreciates. Valuable because the Americans view him as at least partly cooperative on Syria and Iran, as well as on oil production.
Q. Where does Maliki himself stand inside Iraq? How much has the Barzani-Sadr-Allawi alliance damaged him?
A. I don’t think they’ve done him much real damage. He has outmaneuvered his
political opponents, who seem unable to win a confidence vote in parliament
and more unable to construct an alternative majority.
Q. How do you read Ankara’s rapprochement with Barzani? Should it make Baghdad nervous?
A. Ankara’s rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds is in my view the natural course of things. So long as Kurdistan is willing to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK, there is no reason for Turkey not to enjoy a good relationship with relatively secular (but still Muslim) Kurdistan. There is a lot of money to be made from investment opportunities in Kurdistan, and from trade across the border, including in oil. Baghdad has a choice: it can resist the development of close Turkey/Kurdistan relations, or it can jump on that
bandwagon and enhance its own relations with Ankara. I wish they would do the latter.
Q. Has Turkey miscalculated given the increasing armed Kurdish activity on
Syrian border?
A. I don’t think so. Turkey has known that opposition to the Asad regime would bring retaliation from Damascus in the form of encouragement to extremist Kurds to attack inside Turkey. That is one of the risks Turkey decided to run when it supported the Syrian opposition. Turkey will eventually want the Syrian Kurds to do what the Iraqi Kurds have done: help restrain the more radical Kurds and open up to Turkish trade and investment. There is no reason that can’t happen in a post-Asad Syria.
Q. The US wants the Arab states to engage Maliki, would that help in making him less dependent on Iran?
A. Of course the Sunni Arab states should engage Maliki, but I don’t think they are ever going to be completely comfortable with Maliki, whom they don’t trust. The most important factor in Iraq’s international alignment is the route by which its oil is exported. If it continues to be exported through the Gulf within range of Iranian guns, Tehran will have enormous influence in Iraq. If the Iraqis wisely begin to diversify and export more oil to the north and west, via pipelines that will have to be built in the future, then
Iraq will be tied more tightly to the West.
Q. If the Syrian regime falls, how do you see that impacting politics inside Iraq?
Any new regime in Syria will be less aligned with Iran and more aligned with the Sunni Arab states. That will create initially some strains with Maliki, but there will still be a lot of common interests, including I hope the prospect of exports of oil from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean.
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