Tag: Iran
Stevenson’s army, March 24
– Remembering Madeleine Albright, first female secretary of state, whom I first knew when she worked for Sen. Muskie and on whose Policy Planning Staff I was privileged to serve.
– NYT says NSC set up Tiger Team to game responses to Ukraine.
– Politico details arms from many countries to Ukraine.
– Bill Arkin explains Russian air operations in Ukraine.
– Task & Purpose says CIA agents were in Iraq before US invasion.
– Paul PIllar says Revolutionary Guard doesn’t belong on terrorist list.
– AIPAC supports election deniers.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Madeleine was no madeleine
The French tarts are spongy and sweet. That would not describe Madeleine Albright. The first woman to serve as Secretary of State, in my experience she was remarkably similar in public and private. A bit stern but clear and forceful, she would push hard for her perspective on world issues.
Some liked her, some didn’t
Those who agreed with her were pleased. Ask any Albanian in Kosovo, where a bust of her stands in the center of Pristina. Those who disagreed found her flinty. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the Secretary General of the UN whose second term she vetoed in the Security Council, no doubt thought her unreasonable and inflexible. She strived to be tough but fair. She mostly succeeded.
My interactions with her in recent years were limited but positive. I was in Pristina when the Kosovars dedicated her bust a few years ago. Parading in the main street with Bill Clinton, the Kosovars gave her lots of applause. But she attracted far less attention than the much taller former President, whose statue in Pristina is full-length.
I testified with her in December 2020 at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. She was as sharp and clear as always, pushing hard for democracy and human rights in the Balkans. Generous to and engaged with students, she spent an hour with my SAIS class studying relations between Belgrade and Pristina. She spent childhood years with her diplomat father in Belgrade. But because of the 1999 NATO bombing, Serbs mostly dislike her.
I also ran into her at a dentist’s office, but she was uncoiffed, so I thought it best to steer clear and avoid embarassment. I think I got that right.
Her brand
Wherever you are in the world, Madeleine’s name is instantly recognized. This is unusual. There are lots of people named Madeleine. To me, in person she was always Madame Secretary. But everyone in the State Department called her Madeleine when she wasn’t present. She was unique. She projected a clear and compelling image wherever she went. Straightforward and determined, she didn’t waffle or prevaricate. She told you what she wanted and pursued it, with skill and finesse but no hesitation. “Madeleine” was a well-defined brand.
Tony Blinken uses the same approach, though a bit more understated. After the years of Trump’s wild exaggerations and outright lies, clarity and care has returned to high-level statements on foreign policy. The hyperbole and prevarication of Trump’s incompetent Secretaries of State are gone. You may not like what the incumbent says. But you know he isn’t exaggerating and intends to be clear and compelling, not emotional and ambiguous.
This is not the unipolar moment
Madeleine was Secretary of State during the unipolar moment. The United States she adopted as her motherland could do anything it wanted in the world. The Soviet Union was gone. Russia was a basket case. China was not yet an economic powerhouse. Iran and North Korea were relatively small clouds on the horizon. That has changed, dramatically. Russia, Iran, and North Korea are serious regional challengers. China is a serious global challenger. Madeleine has left us at a difficult moment.
We would be wise however to remember what she stood for. A determined liberal democrat committed to human rights, she believed the United States had a unique role and responsibility: to defend a world order based on those rights. A refugee from the Nazis, she disdained autocrats and supported their victims. She sought a peaceful world in which freedom could thrive.
She represented the best of us. May her memory be a blessing,
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Stevenson’s army, March 17
– FT reports 15 point draft peace plan for Ukraine war.
– NYT reports morale & other problems for Russian troops.
– NYT also reports Russian battle losses.
– WSJ reports Ukrainian counteroffensives.
– In best battle report of the war I’ve seen, WSJ tells about the battle for Voznesensk.
– British RUSI analyzes war.
In other news, poll finds US still pro-Israel.
– Axios says US may drop terrorist label for Revolutionary Guard as part of renewed Iran deal.
– CJR has report on Moldova, one of our upcoming exercises in class.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 14
– Talks and fighting over Ukraine.
– WSJ says US won’t exempt Russia from sanctions to save Iran deal.
– Various sources say Russia has asked China for military aid.
– NYT assesses how the war might end.
– WaPO reports return of earmarks.
– SAIS & WIlson Center have upcoming event on Ukraine & the Balkans.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Ukraine and Iran will make Syria harder
Ukraine may seem far from Syria. But it is not. Nor is Iran. What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine. What happens in Iran as well as Ukraine will affect the now more than decade-old war in Syria, through geography, markets, diplomacy, and politics.
The fighting and sanctions will hamper Russia in Syria
The Russians have been fighting insurgency in Syria since 2015, primarily with air power but also with some troops on the ground. The effort is not large, but Ukraine will take priority. Sanctions will severely limit Russian financial resources. This could affect not only military resources but also willingness to invest in reconstruction. The state-owned companies that might take such a risk are not going to have the cash to do it.
In addition, Russian relations with Turkey, the US, and possibly Israel will be strained. Cooperation with Turkey is important in northwest Syria, where Turkish troops and proxies are in control. Cooperation is important with the US in northeast Syria, where American troops are supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel depends on Russian restraint when its aircraft attack Iranian forces and shipments inside Syria.
Moscow will have little reason to segregate the diplomatic and deconfliction issues in Syria from Ukraine. A weakened Russia may well seek pressure points in Syria to respond to international pressure in Ukraine.
Iran will be emboldened
Russia and Iran both support the Assad regime in Syria, but they also compete for influence there. Assuming the Iran nuclear deal revives, Tehran will have a lot more money with oil at around $100/barrel. Some portion of that will find its way to military and financial support for Assad. Even if the JCPOA remains moribund, Iran will find itself strengthened in Syria relative to Russia. It will try to use that strength to embed itself more strongly into the Syrian regime, in particular its security forces (which have grown closer to Russia in recent years).
An emboldened Iran will be less likely to compromise on Syria issues than a weakened Russia, but Moscow has the vital veto in the UN Security Council. Tehran might be even more inclined than Russia to shut off vital cross-border humanitarian assistance to Syrians, but in the end Moscow will decide.
The West’s stake in Syria will increase
The Ukraine war increases the West’s stake in Syria. Abandoning its anti-regime fight there would raise serious doubts about American and European resolve to continue support for Ukraine. Credibility isn’t everything, but it is something. The Biden administration had already tacitly recommitted the US to its continuing presence in northeast Syria supporting the Kurds and allied Arabs, if only to avoid a second Afghanistan debacle and to continue the counter-terrorism fight.
Net net
Syria has not been going anywhere anyway. The UN-sponsored constitutional talks are stalled, humanitarian relief is falling short, terrorism threats are growing, and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is limited for now to gathering of documentation and the German courts. Russian weakness, Iranian strength, and Western resolve are going to make things harder, not easier.
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What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine
Here are the speaking notes I prepared on the Balkans and Middle East for this noon’s event on “What’s Next for Russia, Ukraine, and the World?” It featured Johns Hopkins/SAIS faculty:
Balkans
- American policy since the end of the Cold War has aimed at “Europe whole and free.” That isn’t going to happen so long as Putin or someone of his ilk rules Russia.
- Serbia claims neutrality, but its current leadership advocates a “Serbian world” akin to Putin’s “Russian world.” Belgrade also refuses to sanction Moscow. De facto Serbia is siding with Russia.
- That puts Bosnia, Kosovo, and NATO member Montenegro at risk from Serb irredentism.
- The line between democracies and autocracies will therefore also be drawn through the Balkans unless Belgrade changes its inclinations.
Countering Russian ambitions and Moscow’s Serb proxies needs higher priority:
- Deployment of an additional 500 EU troops to Bosnia is a good first step. But more are needed. The UK should augment that deployment. The US should beef up the military presence in Brcko and move some troops to northern Kosovo .
- The EU should tell Serbia that continued adherence to neutrality in Ukraine will result in a halt to the EU accession process.
- The US, UK, and EU should end bilateral and multilateral assistance to Republika Srpska and threaten likewise to Serbia.
Middle East
In the Middle East, the situation is more ambiguous. The interests at stake are less compelling and US policy more accepting of autocracy:
- Syria backs Russia and Iran is attempting the Chinese straddle (for peace but against Ukrainian membership in NATO). Egypt, the UAE, and other small Gulf monarchies are ducking for cover. Saudi Arabia so far has decided to enjoy high oil prices.
- Israel has backed Ukraine, but cautiously to avoid Russian retaliation against its interests in Syria and domestic political complications. Turkey has also backed Ukraine, less cautiously.
- Ultimately, the Middle East will go with the flow. If Russia is successful, no one in the Middle East will refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with a puppet government in Kyiv.
- OPEC+ will gain traction and Russian inroads in the Middle East will expand.
- But if Russia fails, the Middle East countries, democracies and autocracies alike, will claim they supported Ukraine, even if OPEC+ suffers irreparable damage.
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