Tag: Iran
Stevenson’s army, October 28
– Taiwan confirms US troop training.
– Iran will return to nuclear talks.
– Iran complains of hacking attack on gas stations.
– NYT says Iran now worries about Taliban.
– Language: a professor says we need new language for national security issues.
– A journalist decries the use of “snowclones.”
– Think about this: Dan Drezner raises serious doubts that Havana syndrome is an attack by outsiders. It may be a psychogenic illness.
– UVa researcher describes GOP path to power.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Syria: what’s missing is more important than doing what was done before
Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, the Secretary of State’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS until November 8, 2020, posted the following comment on peacefare.net, responding to my post on Syria yesterday. I am repeating it here, hoping it will be easier to find and more widely read:
Dan, you are right about the statement being the most extensive of the thin gruel we have gotten from Team B on Syria, and what they have announced that they will keep doing, what I will call operational activities “1,2,3….X”, is pretty much what we were doing up to a year ago (and with some minor mods what Kerry was pursuing). But I’m not sure we have a real policy towards Syria, or at least a policy similar to the one Pompeo and Kerry followed.
First, what the statement says is, we are doing all these operational things. Those cited and others we are doing have immediate purposes–help refugees, implement UNSCR 2254, support UN-led negotiating effort, fight ISIS, deal with CW threat, react to Iranian deployments, etc., but there is no clue to how these all fit together into a larger policy, especially one that deals with the underlying reason we have all the above problems to deal with–the Assad regime’s war on its own people supported by Iran and Russia including for their own regional expansionist goals. What the real US policy is in the larger sense remains under question, either it’s still being debated or the White House understands what they have decided on will be so unpopular best to conceal it.
There is thus no known ‘whole’ that is greater than the ‘parts,’ and what we have are just those ‘parts,’ “1,2,3,….X”. To illustrate what I’m driving at let me cite what I think (and drew on when I was doing Syria) is an analogous situation, one where the Biden administration is much clearer: Ukraine. Any policy has various elements (everyone has her/his own, I have four): (1) national interest in play; (2) specific goal to serve the interest, (3) operational strategy to achieve the goal, and (4) specific operational activities in support, i.e., the “1,2,3….X”. The Ukraine specific operational activities are remarkably similar to those being done with Syria: work through an international coalition, push for ceasefire, implement UN resolutions and support negotiations (in Ukraine case Normandie Process), provide arms to local partner, deal with humanitarian fallout.
But with the Ukraine policy there is a superstructure (elements (1)-(3) above) that explains and guides the specific operational activities. The national interest is preventing a major deterioration of European security through a Russian victory over and possible assimilation of Ukraine. The specific goal to advance that interest, given geography, balance of forces, other priorities, is necessarily limited: avoid a complete Russian victory, as opposed to rolling back or defeating the Russians or even the status quo ante. The operational strategy given the interest and the goal in the context of limited means is to create a stalemate, inflict costs on the aggressor with clarity that further aggression will generate more (hopefully counter-balancing) costs, while holding out a compromise resolution. Such a resolution is the best case scenario but a stalemate is ‘good enough.’ The operational activities, the “1,2,3,….X” are fluid, can be dialed up or down to signal resolve, and further the stalemate while holding open the chance for a compromise resolution.
This is essentially what our strategy was with Syria: national interest was preventing an Assad, Iran, Russian victory, the specific goal as our means were limited was to ensure through a stalemate that they could not win, the operational strategy was to increase costs, signal resolve and hold out a compromise solution, and the operational activities were geared to advance that operational strategy. This is what is now missing–we don’t know the larger purpose, i.e, the (1), (2) and (3) of the administration’s approach to Syria. As we have (4) we can through inductive reasoning postulate that they have some (1)-(3) and that it might be like the Trump or late Obama administrations’, but that’s just speculation. Jim
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Syria: no attractive propositions, so Biden is staying the course
Secretary of State Blinken at a press conference with the Israeli and UAE foreign ministers today said more about Syria than I remember since the beginning of the Biden Administration, in response to a question about normalization that other countries are indulging in:
…let me talk about Syria first and then come to the second part of the – the first part of the question second.
First, to put this in focus, these initial nine months of the administration we have been focused on a few things when it comes to Syria: Expanding humanitarian access for people who desperately need that assistance, and we had some success, as you know, with renewing the critical corridor in northwestern Syria to do that; sustaining the campaign that we have with the coalition against ISIS and al-Qaida in Syria; making clear our commitment, our ongoing commitment to demand accountability from the Assad regime and the preservation of basic international norms like promoting human rights and nonproliferation through the imposition of targeted sanctions; and sustaining local ceasefires, which are in place in different parts of the country. So this has been the focus of our action for these last nine months.
As we’re moving forward, in the time ahead, keeping violence down; increasing humanitarian assistance and focusing our military efforts on any terrorist groups that pose a threat to us or to our partners, with the intent and capacity to do that. These are going to be the critical areas of focus for us, and they’re also, I think, important to advancing a broader political settlement to the Syrian conflict consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
What we have not done and what we do not intend to do is to express any support for efforts to normalize relations or rehabilitate Mr. Assad, or lifted [sic] a single sanction on Syria or changed [sic] our position to oppose the reconstruction of Syria until there is irreversible progress toward a political solution, which we believe is necessary and vital.
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-israeli-alternate-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister-yair-lapid-and-united-arab-emirates-foreign-minister-sheikh-abdullah-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-at-a-joint-press-availab/
This is a restatement of well-established US priorities: humanitarian assistance, reduction in violence, counter-terrorism, and irreversible progress toward a political solution before reconstruction or normalization.
So nothing new. What’s missing? should always be the next question.
Tony fails to deal with the threat of a serious military clash between NATO ally Turkey and the Kurdish-led forces that are conducting the campaign against both terrorists and the regime in northeastern Syria, with American support. He is silent on concerns about Iran using Syrian territory to threaten Israel. Nor does he indicate that the United States opposes normalization by others, in particular Jordan and the UAE. And he is silent on brutality-laced Russian and Iranian support for the Syrian regime, which in due course may become capable of challenging the Kurdish presence in the northeast and the Turkish presence inside Syria’s northern border. So yes, continuity of a policy that is silent on important issues and has so far failed to produce substantial results.
Is there a better approach? We could certainly tighten sanctions so that jet-setting scions of the Syrian elite don’t roam Los Angeles in Ferraris, but that won’t change anything in Syria. We could help the Germans mount a “universal jurisdiction” case against President Assad himself, in absentia, but that would set a legal precedent that might boomerang on prominent Americans. We could try harder to mediate some sort of accommodation between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey, as we did once with a modicum of success between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey. Or we could try to negotiate autonomous status for the Kurds within Syria in return for US withdrawal, though the regime would be no more likely than the Taliban to stick to the terms of a withdrawal agreement. The Kurds would likely revert to attacking inside Turkey as well as Turkish-controlled Syria in order to curry favor with Assad. It suits the Kurds and Turkey to have the Americans remain in Syria.
I won’t even bother with military options against the Russians or the regime. The Americans take some shots against the Iranians and their proxies in Syria, but they aren’t going to risk war with Russia or the civilian casualties that taking on the regime would entail.
So no, there are not a lot of attractive propositions in Syria. Especially after the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Administration can ill afford a comparable mess in Syria, never mind an influx into the US of tens of thousands Syrian Kurds and Arabs who helped the US during the past decade and have legitimate claims to asylum. No wonder Biden is staying the course.
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Iraq’s election: a mixed bag is better than a mess
My Middle East Institute colleagues have already elegantly parsed the October 10 Iraqi election results and their implications. It’s a mixed bag: Moqtada al Sadr, who already controls more seats than anyone else in parliament gained, as did former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki; Shia militia politicians, more moderate Shia, and Sunni Islamists weakened; Sunni secularists, independents, regional advocates, and both the leading Kurdish party and a newish one gained. Turnout was low, due in part to a boycott encouraged by activists who had previously campaigned for the early poll. What it all means for election of the President, Parliament speaker, and Prime Minister won’t be known for weeks if not months.
Just as interesting to me is the process: it came off pretty well, with little violence and intimidation by Iraqi standards. Almost two decades after the American invasion, Iraqis have grown accustomed to something like a democratic regime, albeit more than a little tainted with lack of voter enthusiasm, corruption, patronage, sectarianism, and armed groups only nominally under state control. Politics is a rough sport in Iraq, but not now a deadly one, unless you are a demonstrator fired on by sectarian militias.
The main issues are now economic. The American presence, down to a couple of thousand troops plus contractors, is no more discussed than Iranian influence, exercised in part through the Popular Mobilization Forces and their politicians. Kurdistan’s independence aspirations have faded but still simmer. Even with oil prices at a 7-year peak, the new government will face big challenges in maintaining and growing oil and gas production while steering the economy towards non-hydrocarbon development and adjusting to global warming, which threatens to make parts of the country uninhabitable.
If the next government can even begin to meet those challenges, Iraq could play an important role in a Middle East that is adjusting to the prospect of reduced American attention. As a Shia and Arab majority country with a large Kurdish population and many other smaller minorities, a prosperous Iraq could be a multivalent force for stability and coexistence, helping to bridge divides among Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. The current Prime Minister has made some good but still tentative steps in that direction. It is no secret that the Americans and Europeans will hope he is able again to form a government, unlikely as that may seem in a volatile political environment. They also liked his two predecessors, both of whom are, at least for now, down and out.
It is hard to be optimistic about the prospect of serious economic reform in Iraq, which has so far failed to turn its oil wealth into benefits–or even electricity and water–for ordinary citizens. Moqtada’s minions have not governed in the past in transparent and accountable ways. The country lacks an independent judiciary and much of its press is under the control of major politicians. But if law and order prevail, the next government will have an enormous opportunity both domestically and internationally to enable Iraq to benefit both its own citizens and the region. A mixed bag is better than a mess.
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The angel sings, but the devils are in the details
President Biden today gave his first speech to the United Nations outlining his foreign policy priorities and approach more clearly than he has so far. He aimed to restore trust in American leadership, not only in the aftermath of the Trump Administration but also in the wake of the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and controversy surrounding the deal to sell nuclear submarines to Australia that shocked and annoyed France.
The priorities were strikingly different from Trump’s:
- Ending the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Slowing climate change
- Encouraging respect for human rights
- Rebalancing geopolitcs
- A level playing field for trade
- Ensuring benefits, and limiting harm, from technology
- Countering terrorism
The first three items would not have appeared on any Trump Administration list. Numbers 4-7 would have, but with a distinctly America First (i.e. alone) spin.
Biden’s means are at least as different from Trump’s as his priorities. He favors diplomacy over war, multilateralism over unilateralism, and the power of America’s example at home over American intervention abroad.
In my book, this is all well and good, but then come the difficulties in applying these methods to actual issues. Encouraging booster shots to Americans is likely not the best way to end the COVID-19 epidemic, but exporting vaccines to poor countries exposes the Administration to criticism, so Biden is trying to split the difference by doing both. Slowing climate change is a grand idea, but can Biden get the legislation through Congress to meet his own goals for limits on American production of greenhouse gases. Encouraging respect for human rights is fine, but what do you do about Saudi Arabia, whose Crown Prince is thought culpable for the murder of a US-based journalist? Rebalancing geopolitics is fine, but what if selling nuclear submarines to Australia requires you to blind-side and offend your longest-standing ally?
And so on: a level playing field for trade is hard to achieve when a major competitor is using prison (or slave) labor to produce manufactured good. Responding to state-sponsored cyber attacks is proving a particularly difficult challenge. Facial-recognition technology, with all its defects, is spreading rapidly around the world even though it is prone to misidentification and other abuses. You may prefer a less military approach to counter-terrorism, but if there is a successful mass casualty attack in the US the military response will be dramatic. Never mind that 20 years of military responses have not been effective and have killed a lot of innocent non-combatants.
As for methods, there too there are problems. The State Department is a notoriously weak diplomatic instrument. Can it carry the weight of additional responsibilities? Diplomacy may be preferable to prevent Iran and North Korea from getting a nuclear weapons, but will Tehran agree? A two-state solution would be best, but how can we get there from here? Multilateralism is often preferable, but not always possible. One of my mentors used to quote President Carter (I think) saying multilaterally where we can, unilaterally when we must. But that judgment is not a simple one. America should be a shining “city on the hill,” as President Reagan hoped, but what then about the January 6 insurrection and the anti-voting legislation in more than two dozen states?
Biden’s angel sang well this morning at the UN. But the devils are in the details. It isn’t going to be easy to get those right in a divided country and a competitive, if not downright chaotic, global environment.
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Stevenson’s army, September 18
– NYT has story about Israel’s killing of an Iranian nuclear scientist.
– NYT has more on secret diplomacy leading to AUKUS.
– And fascinating NYT story on how Russia manipulates its elections.
– FP says US wants regular bases in Australia.
-WaPo says Milley actions tend to politicize US military.
– Early examples of redistricting games.
– Good advice for writing policy memos and op-eds from Todd Rogers of Harvard:
1. Make it shorter.
2. Simplify the language.
3. Use formatting to direct attention.
4. Make key information obvious to skimmers.
5. Make the response as easy as possible.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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