Tag: Iran
It’s not over until the Afghans decide it is
I thought Laurel Miller of the International Crisis Group got Afghanistan right on Morning Edition today:
Like many decisions that get to the President, withdrawal from Afghanistan is a close call. It could give terrorists a chance to return there and use the country as a safe haven, but more likely post-US Afghanistan will be too unstable and violent to be attractive Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. The Americans can act from outside the country, especially if they manage to preserve at least some of their intelligence capabilities. Certainly, as Eliot Cohen argues, we owe to Afghans wanting to escape Taliban rule an open door to allow them to immigrate to the US, as we managed to do for the South Vietnamese after the North took over there.
The risks of withdrawal are real. The analogy with Iraq is imperfect, but we would do well to remember that withdrawal from there in 2011 led by 2014 to ISIS takeover of about one-third to the country. There is little question but that a consolidated Taliban regime in Kabul like the one that ruled there during the 2001 US invasion would be inimical to US interests and open to hosting international terrorists. It will now be up to Afghans to prevent the Taliban from consolidating power, a task that should be easier than ridding the country of their presence in the countryside, but one that will ensure conflict continues for years if not decades more.
That said, the two-decade US and allied military and civilian effort to build a viable, democratic, and self-sustaining state in Afghanistan has failed. President Ghani literally wrote a book on state-building that I use in my SAIS course. It hasn’t helped in Afghanistan. Two key obstacles, noted by Laurel and Jim Dobbins years ago, were never overcome: the resistance of local elites and the hostility of neighbors, in particular Pakistan but also Iran. The US effort was mainly a military one, but with a pretty strong civilian counterpart from the mid 2000s, when George W realized he wouldn’t be able to get out of Afghanistan without a serious stabilization effort. But Afghanistan was too poor, too illiterate, too fractious, too large, too violent, too religious, too remote, and too traditional to respond to Western formulas.
Two decades of effort–even if at times insincere or ill-conceived–will have to suffice. Afghans may still surprise us with their resourcefulness, either in reaching an agreement that stabilizes the country or in defeating the worst of the extremists. More likely, chaos will prevail for some time, as it did in the 1990s after the successful rebellion against the Communist regime until the Taliban imposed draconian order. The American role may be over, but the conflict is not. Now it is up to the Afghans to decide when the time comes.
Stevenson’s army, April 13
– WSJ says Taliban pulled out of peace talks.
-G-7 expressed concern about Russia threats to Ukraine.
– Israeli openness about Natanz attack causes concern.
– GOP Senators say nominee Kahl disclosed classified information in tweets.
-Economist says war against money laundering is being lost.
– NYT profiles new CISA nominee.
– WaPo looks at cyber budget.
– Blinken talks about Taiwan, Russia
– Last week I sent around Ezra Klein’s analysis of Biden strategy, including his comment that the economists have lost power in the administration. Today I want to share Noah Smith’s careful parsing of administration economic thinking. He sees a big plan there.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Watch this space: 10 challenges Biden wishes he didn’t have
President Biden is preoccupied with domestic issues: the economy, COVID-19, race and inequality. But of course foreign policy waits for no president.
The current picture is gloomy:
- Russia has been threatening renewed hostilities against Ukraine. Moscow is claiming it is all Kiev’s faulty, but I suspect Putin is getting nervous about improved performance of the Ukrainian Army. Perhaps he thinks it will be easier and less costly to up the ante now. Besides a new offensive would distract from his domestic problems, including that pesky political prisoner and hunger striker Alexei Navalny.
- Iran and Israel are making it difficult for the US to get back into the nuclear deal. Israel has somehow crashed the electrical supply to Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Tehran has amped up the IRGC/Supeme Leader criticism of President Rouhani, making it harder for him to ease conditions for Washington’s return to the nuclear deal. A vigorous Iranian reaction to the Israeli sabotage would make the Americans hesitate.
- Peace talks between Afghanistan and the Taliban for a transitional power-sharing government are not going well. How could they? The Taliban want an Afghanistan in which President Ghani would have no place. Ghani wants an Afghanistan in which the Taliban would have no place. Powersharing requires a minimum of mutual tolerance that appears lacking.
- North Korea is renewing its missile and nuclear threats. President Trump pretty much poisoned the diplomatic well with Pyongyang by meeting three times with Kim Jong-un without reaching a serious agreement. Kim seems to have decided he can manage without one, so long as his nuclear weapons and missiles threaten South Korea, Japan, and even the continental United States.
- China is menacing Taiwan. I doubt Beijing wants to face the kind of military defense and popular resistance an invasion would entail, but ratcheting up the threat forces Taipei to divert resources and puts an additional issue on the negotiating table with Washington, which doesn’t want to have to come to Taipei’s defense.
- Syria’s Assad is consolidating control and preparing for further pushes into Idlib or the northeast. While unquestionably stretched thin militarily and economically, Damascus no longer faces any clear and present threat to Assad’s hold on power. He hasn’t really won, but the relatively liberal opposition has definitely lost, both to him and to Islamist extremists.
- Central Americans are challenging American capacity to manage its southern border. The increase of asylum seekers, especially children, presents a quandary to the Biden Administration: shut them out as President Trump did, or let them in and suffer the domestic political consequences. Biden has put Vice President Harris in charge, but it will be some time before she can resurrect processing of asylum seekers in their home countries and also get the kind of aid flowing to them that will cut back on the economic motives for migration.
- The Houthis aren’t playing nice. America’s cut in military and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE is giving their Yemeni adversaries a chance to advance on the last remaining major population center in the north still nominally held by President Hadi’s shambolic government. If the Houthis take Marib, the consequences will be catastrophic.
- Addis Ababa isn’t either. Africa’s second most populous country, Ethiopia, has gone to war against its own Tigray region, which had defied Addis’ authority on control of the military and holding elections. The Americans want Addis to ease up and allow humanitarian assistance and media in. Ethiopia’s reforming Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy is playing rope-a-dope with the Americans and keeping up the pressure on the Tigrayans.
- You haven’t heard much about it lately, but nothing good is happening in Venezuela, where President Maduro has survived efforts to oust him and now is enjoying one of what must be at least 9 lives.
Biden deserves a lot of credit for what he is doing domestically, and he is the best versed president on foreign affairs in decades. But the international pressures are building. It is only a matter of time before one or more of these ten issues, or a half dozen others, climb to the top of his to-do list. None of them are going to be easy to handle. Watch this space.
Stevenson’s army, April 11
– Suspicious blackout at Natanz site.
– More gloomy assessments of power struggles in Afghanistan –from NYT and from WaPO.
– FP has long profile of Jake Sullivan.
– WaPo has long story about Chinese use of US technology in its weapons.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, April 8
– FP says Philippines now willing to accept US troops.
– NYT says ISIS is linking to African militants.
– Israel may have attacked Iranian ship.
– NYT reports US divisions over Taiwan policy.
– Opponents of rare earths mine win in Greenland.
– FT has leaked audio of pressure on Jordan’s former Crown Prince
– Democratic majority in House down to 2. Death or even absence because of illness in Senate or House could thwart legislative plans.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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When long shots are worth taking, in soccer and foreign policy
The return to normal that started on January 20 is now palpable. America is administering more than 3 million COVID-19 shots per day, the economy is revving up, our days are not devoted to dealing with Donald Trump’s latest foolishness. Some things are noticeably better than before. The trial of the policeman who killed George Floyd in Minneapolis has featured testimony for the prosecution from his colleagues, including the police chief. That has rarely happened in the past. A Democratic-controlled Congress has passed a massive economic stimulus bill and is proposing to do more focused on infrastructure and health care. Republicans are fighting back by trying to limit voting state-by-state, most notably in Georgia and Arizona , but they are getting substantial backlash from the business community. Abusing minorities is no longer a winning market strategy.
In foreign affairs there is also a return to normalcy: the Administration is trying to negotiate its way back into the Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actiton or JCPOA) and appears to have decided not to withdraw US troops completely from Afghanistan by May 1, as the Trump Administration had agreed to do. Secretary of State Blinken has reaffirmed American commitment to NATO and the Administration has met with Asian Pacific allies Japan and South Korea as well as India. Biden has been explicitly critical of China’s treatment of its Uyghur population, a Turkic Muslim minority millions of whom have been put into reeducation camps. Trump had signaled no objection and even approval of this outrage. Biden has also signaled renewed support for a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians, but without reversing Trump’s relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem or for now withdrawing Trump’s recognition of Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights.
There are other areas of continuity between Trump and Biden on foreign policy. Trump’s tariffs on China are still in place, apparently as an incentive for Beijing to agree to beef up its respect for foreign intellectual property. Biden is continuing the Trump practice of more open engagement with Taiwan’s officials. So far, Biden, like Trump, has done nothing to respond to human rights violations by friends like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
A return to normal does not however guarantee success. The two biggest Biden foreign policy initiatives so far face long odds.
America was clearly better off with the JCPOA than without it. Return to the agreement will require not only complex choreography with Tehran but also with the US Congress, where even some Democrats are hardline. The US will need to provide sanctions relief while Iran will need to return its nuclear program to the status quo ante. Both will be difficult. Parsing which sanctions are “nuclear” and which were levied because of human rights and terrorism is not going to be easy. Nor will it be easy for Iran to give up the more advanced enrichment technology it has acquired. In both countries, domestic resistance will make the process more difficult, as will Iran’s June election.
Withdrawal from Afghanistan depends on an agreement between the Taliban and President Ghani, both of whom are notably consistent in pursuing maximalist goals. For now, the Taliban appear to have the advantage on the battlefield, but Ghani is not giving in to the American suggestion of a power-sharing government with some sort of Taliban participation. How can he? He advocates far more democratic, far less religious, far more inclusive, and far more normal governance than the Taliban do. They have no interest in a pluralist polity with equal rights for women and minorities. If there is no agreement, the Americans can of course still withdraw, but most of the smart money is betting that the consequence will be a Taliban takeover or, worse, a multi-faceted civil war. The experts are pessimistic. View this discussion Monday from the Middle East Institute:
That said, the experts are sometimes wrong. Long shots are worth taking when they are not costly and there is little or no alternative. That score against Spain is a fine example.