Tag: Iraq
This week’s peace picks
1. Prospects for U.S.-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Years Ahead, Tuesday August 13, 3:30pm-5:00pm
Venue: 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20036
The Middle East Institute is proud to present its new MEI Scholar Insight. Entitled ‘Prospects for U.S.-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Year Ahead,’ this publication draws upon the broad expertise of 20 Middle East Institute scholars and outside guest experts to examine three scenarios for Iran: diplomacy, containment, and military action. Over two roundtable sessions, participants analyzed U.S. policy, Iranian policy, Israel’s role in regard to the scenarios, reactions to prospective scenarios by the GCC states, Russia, and the other members of the P5+1, and the energy markets. The resulting report is a composite of MEI Scholar analysis on the above issues and seeks to capture points of substantial agreement as well as of divergence. Please join us for the launch of this MEI featured publication and a discussion with principal authors Allen Keiswetter and Roby Barrett and contributors Geneive Abdo and Melissa Mahle.
Register for the event here
2. Celebrating Future Sudanese Leaders, Wednesday August 15, 5:30pm-8:30pm
Venue: Elliot School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052602, Lindner Commons
Join Banaa.org for an evening ceremony: Celebrating Future Sudanese Leaders. The ceremony will honor Banaa Scholars, who will share their personal experiences, their motivations and their visions for peace and development in Sudan. The event will also feature interactive discussion about the Banaa Scholarship Program and its objective to leverage the energy at US universities to promote cross-cultural understanding and to foster leadership among talented young Sudanese. This will be the concluding event of the first annual Banaa Summer Summit held at the George Washington University in Washington DC.
Register for the event here
3. BBG Research Series: Nigeria Media Use 2012, Thursday, August 16, 9:00am-10:00am
Venue: Gallup World Headquarters, 901 F Street NW (Entrance on 9th Street), Washington, DC 20004
The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup invite you to attend the BBG Research Series briefing, Nigeria Media Use 2012. The BBG and Gallup will unveil new findings about media consumption habits in Nigeria, including strong growth of digital media and the continued popularity of radio.
The country’s longstanding digital media gap has largely disappeared as mobile phone use has exploded nationwide, and Nigerians in the northern regions are more likely than ever before to turn to TV (67%), the Internet (20%), and SMS messages (45%) for news and information. The new research also reveals that Nigerians remain avid radio listeners, with 88% listening to the radio for news and information weekly or more frequently. Additionally, a growing number of mobile phone users (39%) in the north have used phones to listen to radio in the last week. In terms of content, the vast majority (83%) of Nigerians indicate a strong interest in health and healthcare issues.
Speakers will include:
• Chris Stewart, Senior Managing Consultant, Gallup
• Bruce Sherman, Director of Strategy and Development, BBG
• Robert Tortora, Chief Methodologist and Regional Research Director for Africa, Gallup
• William Bell, Research Director, International Broadcasting Bureau
The event will include a presentation of the key findings from the study, as well as a methodological overview and a review of historical media trends in Nigeria.
Register for the event here
4. Iraq and the Politics of Oil, Middle East Institute, Thursday August 16, 3:00pm-4:45pm
Venue: 1800 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036
The Middle East Institute is proud to host a discussion about Iraq’s oil sector with Naufel Al-Hassan, Raad Al Kadiri, and Denise Natali. Iraq’s crude oil production is recovering, producing a significant jump in oil exports in 2012. And yet the growth in Iraq’s oil sector has exacerbated longstanding challenges, aggravating tensions between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurds and fostering accusations of patronage and corruption on both sides. How has the Iraqi government benefited from the recovery of Iraq’s oil industry? What hope is there of Baghdad and Erbil reaching an agreement over how to divide or share resources? What are the opportunities and challenges faced by international oil companies seeking to do business in Iraq? These are among some of the issues to be addressed by this distinguished panel.
Speakers:
Naufel Al-Hassan
Raad Al Kadiri
Denise Natali
Moderator:
Allen Keiswetter
Register for the event here
5. Religious Extremism in Africa: The Case of Nigeria, Thursday August 16, 2:00pm-3:00pm
Venue: Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Avenue Northeast, Washington, DC
Since his election to the position of Primate, the Most Reverend Okoh has seen a rising tide of violence throughout his home country of Nigeria. He has witnessed firsthand the damage and destruction caused by Boko Haram and has had to deal directly with their country-wide insurgency. Given the Archbishop’s leadership of the largest Anglican Province in the world – 22 million Anglicans in Nigeria (including President Goodluck Jonathan) – and his engagement with national and international governments and leaders concerning the religious conflict in Nigeria, Primate Okoh offers a unique viewpoint on the escalating violence that is occurring throughout Nigeria at the hands of Boko Haram. Primate Okoh will examine the major factors that are contributing to this violence, with a particular focus on the religious ideology that drives Boko Haram to target churches and civilians throughout Nigeria.
Register for the event here
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Circling the square
Joyce Karam of Al Hayat yesterday asked me some interesting questions about Iraq, Iran, Syria and the United States. Here are her questions and my answers:
Q. Where does the US relation with Nouri Maliki stand today? Is he a valuable
ally or more of a necessary one?
A. Maliki is both a valuable and a necessary partner (rather than ally). Necessary because he holds power in Iraq, which is a key country in the Middle East, one that is increasing its oil exports rapidly. That is something the Obama administration greatly appreciates. Valuable because the Americans view him as at least partly cooperative on Syria and Iran, as well as on oil production.
Q. Where does Maliki himself stand inside Iraq? How much has the Barzani-Sadr-Allawi alliance damaged him?
A. I don’t think they’ve done him much real damage. He has outmaneuvered his
political opponents, who seem unable to win a confidence vote in parliament
and more unable to construct an alternative majority.
Q. How do you read Ankara’s rapprochement with Barzani? Should it make Baghdad nervous?
A. Ankara’s rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds is in my view the natural course of things. So long as Kurdistan is willing to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK, there is no reason for Turkey not to enjoy a good relationship with relatively secular (but still Muslim) Kurdistan. There is a lot of money to be made from investment opportunities in Kurdistan, and from trade across the border, including in oil. Baghdad has a choice: it can resist the development of close Turkey/Kurdistan relations, or it can jump on that
bandwagon and enhance its own relations with Ankara. I wish they would do the latter.
Q. Has Turkey miscalculated given the increasing armed Kurdish activity on
Syrian border?
A. I don’t think so. Turkey has known that opposition to the Asad regime would bring retaliation from Damascus in the form of encouragement to extremist Kurds to attack inside Turkey. That is one of the risks Turkey decided to run when it supported the Syrian opposition. Turkey will eventually want the Syrian Kurds to do what the Iraqi Kurds have done: help restrain the more radical Kurds and open up to Turkish trade and investment. There is no reason that can’t happen in a post-Asad Syria.
Q. The US wants the Arab states to engage Maliki, would that help in making him less dependent on Iran?
A. Of course the Sunni Arab states should engage Maliki, but I don’t think they are ever going to be completely comfortable with Maliki, whom they don’t trust. The most important factor in Iraq’s international alignment is the route by which its oil is exported. If it continues to be exported through the Gulf within range of Iranian guns, Tehran will have enormous influence in Iraq. If the Iraqis wisely begin to diversify and export more oil to the north and west, via pipelines that will have to be built in the future, then
Iraq will be tied more tightly to the West.
Q. If the Syrian regime falls, how do you see that impacting politics inside Iraq?
Any new regime in Syria will be less aligned with Iran and more aligned with the Sunni Arab states. That will create initially some strains with Maliki, but there will still be a lot of common interests, including I hope the prospect of exports of oil from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean.
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After the battle of Dimashq
In response to a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll showing Americans mostly unsupportive of bombing Syrian air defenses or sending troops there, @MaydaySyria this morning tweeted:
We don’t’ care, we don’t need you and your coward #Obama.
Certainly the armed opposition is showing a lot of daring. Today’s attacks in Damascus include a bombing that killed the Syrian Defense Minister, his deputy and possibly other major figures in the Syrian security establishment.
The Syrian army today responded:
the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stresses resolution to decisively eliminating the criminal and murder gangs and chasing them out of their rotten hideouts wherever they are until clearing the homeland of their evils.
It added:
whoever thinks that by targeting some leaders they could twist Syria’s arms is deluded, affirming that Syria, people, army and leadership, is today more determined to counter terrorism with all its forms and cutting off the hand of whoever thinks to harm Syria’s security.
So it looks as if the contest between the Asad regime and its inchoate opposition will be settled (or not) by force, not negotation.
The escalating violence in Damascus is occurring–not incidentally–at just the moment the UN Security Council faces a decision on whether to extend its observer mission in Syria. The Syrian opposition has generally wanted it withdrawn, because of its ineffectiveness. The Russians and the Asad regime have been trying to keep it alive.
I’m entirely on the side of the Syrian opposition in their efforts to bring down Bashar al Asad, but I’d like to see the UN observers stay. They have played a useful role in reporting the various massacres Asad has indulged in as well as its flaunting of the Annan peace plan with the use of heavy weapons in populated areas. I don’t see how reducing the transparency of what is going on in Syria will be helpful to ensuring a successful transition there. If the Asad regime survives and continues the violence against its opponents, the observers could continue to play a limited but useful role in reporting on what they see.
But I confess to another motive as well: if Asad goes, Syria is going to need an international presence to help keep the peace. The UN monitors could form the vanguard of such a peacekeeping force. Where we will find the needed numbers I have no idea. Once Asad falls, Syria will have numerous armed forces still in motion. Keeping them separate and protecting the civilian population will be no easy task. Conventional back-of-the-envelop calculations based on Syria’s population and geographic size would suggest a peacekeeping force of 50,000 or so. I have no idea where such a number would come from, though I can well imagine that Moscow will be offering.
If the international community fails to prepare for post-Asad Syria, there is a strong likelihood of massive violence against the regime’s supporters and sympathizers. Some will be able to protect themselves in Alawite strongholds. Others will flee to Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. But some will be trapped and vulnerable. “Politicide,” the murder of a particular political group, often follows revolution. It would be a serious mistake for the international community not to anticipate the need to protect Alawites, Christians, Druze and Sunni who remained loyal to Asad.
Much as I might wish the fall of the regime, I’ve got to recognize that what comes then is just as important. Excitement about current events should not blind us to future risks. If Syria implodes in a violent spasm of sectarian violence, or even breaks up, the Levant could find itself in chaos for years. Getting Syria onto a path toward unity, stability and eventually democracy is not going to be easy.
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Iraq and its Arab neighbors: no port in the storm
Speakers painted a bleak picture of a lebanized Iraq, weakened by internal divisions and unable to craft coherent regional policies, at a Middle East Institute event today.
Ambassador Samir Sumaida’ie, former Iraqi ambassador to the United States, likened contemporary Iraq to a leaking ship, barely floating on the regional political waters as storms rage all around. The Ambassador bemoaned the lack of support for secularists after the American invasion and lambasted American support to Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a Islamists. This policy worsened sectarianism. The United States left Iraq with a constitution that forbids discrimination on the basis of religion, but with an unwritten political pact that “lebanizes” the executive branch, with the presidency Kurdish, the prime ministry Shi’a and the speaker of parliament Sunni. This built-in sectarianism weakens the Iraqi state.
These internal divisions are at the heart of Iraq’s tepid relations with its Arab neighbors, who are standoffish, especially towards the Shi’a and Kurds. The Kurdistan Regional government conducts its own foreign policy, including a representative in Washington. The Ambassador is pessimistic about Iraq’s immediate future in the region: “it is in a crisis, but the horizon seems to be more of the same.” Only if Iraq improves its internal cohesion and mends fences with Kuwait and Turkey can it avoid being engulfed by the ongoing political firestorms raging in Syria.
Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, focused on the “brightly burning” Syrian flame. Like Ambassador Sumaida’ie, he bemoans Iraq’s internal lebanization, especially with regard to policies towards Syria. There is no coherent Iraqi policy, but rather multiple Iraqi policies toward Syria. The complex interplay of internal factionalization within Iraq’s weak state muddles its external relations, as each faction approaches the region in general, and Syria in particular, with an eye towards its own interests. The Kurds see events in Syria as an opportunity, not a threat; Masoud Barzani is strengthening ties to Turkey, trying to reassure the Turks that Kurdish interests are aligned with their own in the case of Syria. Sunni tribal leaders also see Syria as more of an opportunity than a threat: Syrian Sunnis in their view are throwing off the yoke of an Iranian-backed Shi’a minority. If it can happen in Syria, the thinking goes, why not in Baghdad? Despite some sympathy for the Syrian opposition, Iraqi Shi’a associated with Moqtada al Sadr are still wary of developments there, which threaten a regime aligned with Tehran. Prime Minister Maliki fears spillover from Syria that may damage Iraqi stability and security. This multiplicity of Iraqi approaches to Syria is driven by internal Iraqi political divisions, and is emblematic of the larger foreign and domestic policy problems facing Iraq.
Gregory Gause, professor of political science at the University of Vermont characterized Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy toward Iraq as passive. The Saudi view of Iraq and the Maliki government is negative, because they view the prime minister as an agent of Iran. The Saudis have done little or no outreach to Kurds or Iraqi Shi’a, and even with the Sunnis they have made no real appeal to Arabism. Saudi policy toward Iraq is a policy of complaint, not outreach. Saudi elites are focused on what appears to them a losing struggle for influence in the Middle East against Iran. This struggle for influence in the region plays out not through armies, but through contests for influence in the domestic politics of weak Arab states. The Saudis find Sunni allies, and Iran finds Shi’a allies. This sectarian alignment is counterproductive for the Saudis, because it gives Arab Shi’a in the region no choice but to ally with Iran. Ultimately, this will cause long-term problems for Saudi Arabia, Iraq and America, as it creates an atmosphere where al Qaeda type ideas can flourish. Other GCC states have largely followed Saudi Arabia’s lead.
John Desrocher, Director of the Office or Iraq Affairs at the Department of State focused on the positive, in terms of Iraq’s relations to its regional neighbors: Iraq and Kuwait have made “considerable progress in terms of resolving disputes,” relations with Jordan have improved, Saudi Arabia named an ambassador to Iraq for the first time since 1990, and Qatar airways now flies to Iraq. However, internal political divisions in Iraq have led to “real political gridlock” both in terms of domestic policy and regional relations.
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This week’s peace picks
1. Front Burner: Al Qaeda’s Attack on the USS Cole, Heritage Foundation, 12-1 pm July 10
Event Details
- DATE Tuesday, Jul 10, 2012
- VENUE Lehrman Auditorium
More About the Speakers
Author
Hosted By
On October 12, 2000, eleven months before the 9/11 attacks, the USS Cole – with Commander Kirk Lippold at the helm – docked in the port of Aden in Yemen for a routine fueling stop. At 1118, the 8,400-ton destroyer was rocked by an enormous explosion. This bombing marked al Qaeda’s first direct assault against the United States and expanded their brazen and deadly string of terrorist attacks throughout the Middle East. In this first-person narrative, Lippold reveals the details of this harrowing experience in which seventeen sailors died and thirty-seven were wounded. Thanks to the valor of the crew in the perilous days that followed, the ship was saved.
Yet, even with al Qaeda’s intentions made clear in an unmistakable act of war, the United States government delayed retaliating. Bureaucrats and politicians sought to shift and pin blame as they ignored the danger signaled by the attack, shirking responsibility until the event was ultimately overshadowed by 9/11. In Front Burner, Lippold captures this critical moment in America’s battle against al Qaeda, telling a vital story that – until now – has been lost in the fog of the war on terror.
Commander Lippold retired from the Navy in 2007 and remains active in current events and national security affairs. His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, and Combat Action Ribbon, among others.
2. Chronic Kleptocracy: Corruption within the Palestinian Political Establishment, 2172 Rayburn HOB, 2 pm July 10
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Oversight Hearing
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Date
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
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Time
2:00 PM
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Location
Washington, DC
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Room
2172 Rayburn HOB
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Subcommittee
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Chaired by Steve Chabot (R-OH) |
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Witnesses
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3. Reform, Revolt and Revolution in Egypt and the Arab World, Embassy of Slovenia, 2410 California Street NW, 6-8 pm July 10
Egypt and the Arab World
Lisa Anderson
President, The American University in Cairo
H.E. Roman Kirn
Ambassador of Slovenia to the US
Reception and Program
Embassy of Slovenia
2410 California Street, NW
Washington, DC
Space is limited. Advance registration is required.
4. Libya’s First Elections: A Preliminary Look at Results and Outlook, Atlantic Council, 12-2 pm, July 11
| Date / Time | Wednesday, July 11 / 12:00pm – 2:00pm |
|---|---|
| Location |
Atlantic Council of the United States 1101 15th Street, NW, 11th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
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| Speakers | Gregory Kehailia, Fadel Lamen, Esam Omeish, Karim Mezran |
| Description | After four decades of dictatorship under the rule of Moammar Qaddafi, Libyans will go to the polls on July 7 to elect the nation’s first constituent assembly. With more than 4,000 candidates for the assembly’s 200 seats and nearly 2.7 million voters, all eyes are on the National Transitional Council to fulfill this final step in handing power over to the elected body. After delays due to security and technical reasons, how did the first election proceed? What do the results say about the desires of Libyans to move forward in their transition to democracy? Who are the major players that emerged through this election and how will government formation proceed? |
5. After the Summit: Assessing Iraq’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors, Middle East Institute, 12-1:30 pm July 12
Location:
The Middle East Institute is proud to host John Desrocher, Gregory Gause, Ken Pollack and Amb. Samir Sumaida’ie for a discussion about Baghdad’s complex relations with its Arab neighbors during a time of regional transition. As Iraq seeks to reclaim its role as a powerful player in the Arab world, what obstacles does it face as it attempts to project power and influence in a region still largely suspicious of Iraq’s motivations and alliances? What’s the view of Baghdad from the Arab Gulf and what influence does Iraq have on the unfolding crisis in Syria?
Bios:
John Desrocher took up his position as the director of the Office of Iraq Affairs in September 2010. He spent the preceding year at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad as minister counselor for Economic Coordination, responsible for U.S.-Iraq economic policy issues. He has extensive experience in international trade and in Middle East issues and has served as counselor for Economic and Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. He participated in Palestinian-Israeli economic negotiations while serving at the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem in the late 1990s and served as State Department desk officer for Iraq in the mid-1990s.
Gregory Gause is professor of political science at the University of Vermont, and was director of the University’s Middle East Studies Program from 1998 to 2008. In 2009-2010, he was the Kuwait Foundation Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He was previously on the faculty of Columbia University (1987-1995) and was a Fellow for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (1993-1994). He has published three books, among them The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Kenneth Pollack is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He is an expert on national security, military affairs, and the Persian Gulf. He was drector for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. He also spent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. He is the author of A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random House, 2008)
Amb. Samir Sumaida’ie was appointed Iraq’s ambassador to the United States in April 2006. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Sumaida’ie served as a member of Governing Council (GC) in Iraq. In the GC, he was chairman of the media committee, helped found the Iraqi Telecoms and Media Commission and the Public Broadcasting Institution, and held positions on the security, finance, and foreign relations committees. He then served as the minister of interior in Baghdad. In this capacity he managed a domestic security force of over 120,000. Prior to his appointment as ambassador to the U.S., Sumaida’ie served as permanent representative to the United Nations from July 2004 to April 2006.
Moderator: Phebe Marr is a prominent historian of modern Iraq. She was research professor at the National Defense University and a professor of history at the University of Tennessee and at Stanislaus State University in California. She is the author of The Modern History of Iraq (Third Edition, Westview Press, 2011). She is a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of The Middle East Journal.
6. Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Between Authoritarianism and Islamism, National Endowment for Democracy, 12-2 pm July 12
featuring
Mokhtar Benabdallaoui, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
with comments by
Samer Shehata, Georgetown University
Thursday, July 12, 2012
12 noon–2:00 p.m.
(Lunch served 12:00–12:30 p.m.)
1025 F. Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone: 202-378-9675
RSVP (acceptances only) with name and affiliation by Tuesday, July 10
About the Event
The outcomes of the recent Arab uprisings have confirmed the organizational superiority and widespread appeal of Islamist political parties in a number of countries in the Middle East. The new form of Islamism appears to be compatible with democracy, a free society, and a modern economy, and its ascendancy may foreshadow the political future of the region and the roles of domestic, regional, and international actors.
In his presentation, Mokhtar Benabdallaoui will explain why Islamists have embraced democracy instead of fundamentalism and why the appeal of Islamists exceeds that of leftists and liberals in the Arab world. He will assess the challenges of shaping Islamist political thought in a democratic direction, the prospects of Islamist governments accepting diversity and differences of opinion, and the ways in which Islamists may reconcile conflicting religious and political ideas from across the Arab world. Drawing upon the example of Islamist political parties in four countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon—Mr. Benabdallaoui will consider how ascendant Islamists have influenced societies across the Middle East and conclude with an assessment of the main stakeholders in the Arab Spring, their propensity for reform, and the prospects for further change in the region. Samer Shehata will provide comments.
About the Speakers
Mokhtar Benabdallaoui is a professor of Islamic studies and director of the Doctoral Center for Studies in Politics and Religion at Hassan II University in Casablanca, Morocco. He is also founding director of the Center for Humanities Studies and Research, a Casablanca-based nongovernmental organization that carries out a broad range of activities under the auspices of the Civic Forum, including civic education workshops, publication of the quarterly journal Rihanat, and conferences on democratic reform. During his fellowship, Dr. Benabdallaoui is studying the evolution, activities, and impact of Islamist parties in the Arab world and intends to publish his findings in the form of a book. Samer Shehata is an assistant professor of Arab politics at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University.
7. The Role of Central Asia in Afghanistan, Carnegie, 12:15-1:45 pm July 12
Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Martha Brill Olcott Thursday, July 12, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
12:15 PM – 1:45 PM EST
As Central Asia plays a fundamental role in efforts to develop a peaceful and stable Afghanistan as well as a secure and prosperous region, the United States must continue to actively engage with Central Asian countries.
Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake will discuss the prospects for developing Central Asia into a region of economic opportunity, which could help lead to regional integration.
Please note that the event will take place in the Saul/Zikha Room of the Brookings Institution.
8. View from the Ground in Syria, CSIS, 10:30-11:30 am, July 13
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Friday, Jul 13, 2012 | 10:30 am – 11:30 am
The Center for Strategic and International Studies invites you to a discussion on
View From the Ground in Syria
With Donatella Rovera Senior Crisis Response Adviser, Syria Amnesty International
With commentary by Aram Nerguizian
Visiting Fellow, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderated by Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies
Friday, July 13, 2012 10:30 a.m. – 11:30 a.m.
B1 Conference Room
1800 K Street, NW, Washington DC 20006
Seating is limited.
RSVP is required. Please RSVP (acceptances only) with your name and affiliation to externalrelations@csis.org
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Schizophrenic Turkey
The closing panel yesterday at the Middle East Institute’s Third Annual Conference on Turkey, on “Turkey’s Leadership Role in an Uncertain Middle East,” found plenty of uncertainty in Turkey’s role as well. Al-Jazeera Washington bureau chief Abderrahim Foukara opened the discussion with a look at the “schizophrenic” face of Turkey’s ascendancy in the Middle East. While many Arabs look to Turkey as a leader as well as a model of successful moderate political Islam, others see its rising profile in the region as a threat. This tension in Turkey’s regional role is evident in its relationships with Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Israel.
International Crisis Group’s Joost Hiltermann covered Turkey’s relations with Iraq, which appeared to be the most schizophrenic case. Turkey’s worsening relations with Baghdad and ever-growing partnership with Irbil are contributing to the centrifugal forces tearing Iraq apart, counter to Turkey’s stated objectives. Hiltermann’s recent trip to Ankara left him still confused about what Turkey hopes to achieve in Iraq, but he sees the current dynamic as negative.
Turkey wants a stable and unified Iraq as a way to provide regional stability, regional economic integration, a buffer against Iran, access to Iraqi oil and gas, and tempering of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. On the last point, Ankara hopes to harness the Kurdish Regional Government as a counterweight to the PKK, but its other main interests depend upon Iraqi unity and amicable ties with Baghdad. The current strain in relations stems from tension with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Syrian crisis. Turkey’s overt opposition to al-Maliki’s party in the 2010 elections backfired when he won the day. Ankara-Baghdad relations have broken down further with suspicion in Iraq that a Sunni (Turkey-Gulf) alliance is gunning for the Syrian regime and will come after the regime in Baghdad next. The best way forward would be a rapprochement between Ankara and Baghdad, particularly an exchange of envoys, in order to prevent mutual suspicions from becoming self-fulfilling prophecies.
Freelance journalist Yigal Shleifer had the simplest diagnosis: Turkish-Israeli relations are anywhere from “dead and frozen” to “completely dead and deeply frozen.” The Gaza flotilla incident was simply the nail of the coffin, and since then the two sides have painted themselves into a corner. Turkey wants nothing less than a full apology, restitution, and the lifting of the blockade, while Israel is only willing to apologize for operational mistakes and cover some damages. In dealing with the crisis Israel was looking to “make up after the breakup,” while Turkey was negotiating “the terms of an amicable divorce.” Indicators for the near future are discouraging, particularly as both publics have become deeply skeptical of the other. Strategic partnership with Israel simply does not fit into Turkey’s evolving sense of purpose in the region, one piece of which is to be more outspoken in support of the Palestinian cause.
The lack of high-level communication is a recipe for disaster; the flotilla incident would likely not have gone so sour if relations had not already been strained to the point of stymying communication. Shleifer’s recommendation is a concerted diplomatic push, which will have to be American. Restoring relations to a level of trust is imperative for both. For Israel, it’s a question of security, but for Turkey it’s necessary for the development of its role as regional mediator as well as political, economic, and religious crossroads.
Robin Wright of the Woodrow Wilson Center characterized Syria and Iran as representing some of the profoundest achievements and toughest challenges of Turkish politics in the last few years. The AKP has been fond of talking about 360-degree strategic depth, but Iran and Syria have called this approach into question. Iran has become an important energy source and trading partner for Turkey under the AKP. It has also provided an opportunity for Turkey to flex its diplomatic muscle, as the biggest player in nuclear negotiations outside the P5+1. But Iran’s recalcitrance has proven increasingly frustrating for Turkey, and Turkey may find itself having to choose between closer relations with Iran or with the emerging bloc led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Syria is an even starker challenge. Erdogan and Asad used to call each other personal friends, and the countries even engaged in joint military exercises. The rebellion has flipped the situation, with Turkey becoming the base for the opposition Syrian National Council and Erdogan calling Asad’s tactics savage and his regime a clear and imminent threat. Wright does not see the possibility of normalized relations anytime soon, especially under the current leaders.
The conflicts over Iran and Syria have pushed Turkey ever more toward the West, undermining its 360-degree diplomacy. What Turkey does in the next year in terms of its alliances in the East and the West will do a lot to determine the direction of its development as a regional and international player.
The overall impression was one of Turkey at a historical crossroads paralleling its traditional role as geographic and cultural crossroads. Turkey now has issues with most of its neighbors, yet its potential for political and economic growth is huge. It has successfully cast itself as the indispensible mediator. The political role it envisions is both regional strongman and regional middleman. It will also play an important role in helping the Arab world define a new order in the wake of the Arab Spring, as a model and as a political partner.
Turkey has been steadily strengthening its economic ties with its European and Middle Eastern neighbors, but the political realm will require more tradeoffs: between Europe and Asia, Iran and the Sunni powers of the Gulf, Israel and Arab states. Yigal Shleifer’s recollection of a Turkish airline ad touting Istanbul as a connection to both Tel Aviv and Tehran was illustrative.
The consensus on the panel was that even with these ambiguities of strategic direction, Turkey has carved an independent place for itself on the regional and international scene. Turkey’s clout will almost certainly increase with the rise of moderate Islamist governments in Arab Spring countries, but to navigate the new environment it will have to make tough choices about its alliances and its guiding foreign policy principles.
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