Tag: Iraq
Shifting sands
Uncertainty is breaking out all over the Greater Middle East.
With Crown Prince Nayef’s death in Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud will soon have to look past its octogenarian leadership to the next generation, with all the uncertainties that implies. Will the next generation be as attached to religious and social Wahhabi conservatism as the current one? Will it open an era of serious reform?
The suspension of the UN monitoring effort in Syria presages an increase in violent conflict with a highly uncertain outcome. Russia seems determined to keep Bashar al Assad in power, though its Foreign Minister denies it. Iran will certainly exert itself in that direction. I doubt the armed rebellion can beat the Syrian security forces any time soon, but we could see a lengthy insurgency fed by Saudi and Qatari arms shipments through Turkey.
The only real certainty in Egypt is that the military is trying to hold on to power. Whether it can and what the consequences will be is highly uncertain, as are the results of today’s presidential election. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has arrogated to itself legislative power, which means it now has to deal with Egypt’s economy and social problems along security and law and order. I don’t know any military establishments equal to that task, but the risk of new parliamentary elections may be greater than the SCAF wants to run. It could end up forced to rule Egypt, likely badly, for some time to come.
Iraq‘s Prime Minister Maliki has faced down a parliamentary rebellion but Al Qaeda has renewed its murderous attacks against the country’s Shia. If they succeed in reigniting Iraq’s sectarian warfare, the promise of a relatively democratic society that produces a lot of oil will evaporate, leaving a bitter residue.
Iran‘s Supreme Leader Khamenei has concentrated power as rarely before in the Islamic republic’s history, but American and Israeli threats of military attack against it nuclear program make prediction even a year out difficult.
After ten years of rule by Hamid Karzai, even Afghanistan faces the uncertainty of an election (to be held no one knows when in 2013 or 2014) in which he will not be running and an end to the NATO combat role shortly thereafter.
I needn’t mention next month’s elections in Libya or the aging leadership in Algeria, where military success in repressing Al Qaeda in the Maghreb seems to have pushed the militants into the Sahel, where they are destabilizing several other countries.
A region that enjoyed decades of stability–some would say stagnation, much of it autocratically imposed–now registers high volatility. Of course volatility can move in either direction: there are possible positive developments as well as negative ones. Tunisia has pushed the envelope in the positive direction. Yemen seems to be making progress against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates, though some think the government offensive and U.S. drone attacks are creating more extremists than they are killing. Morocco and Jordan have attempted some modest reforms that seem unlikely to suffice, but they may stave off open rebellion.
It is not easy to deal with uncertainty. Most experts would recommend triage and prioritization. Triage happens naturally. There are only a few Middle East problems that will make it to the President’s desk: Iran and Egypt most frequently, Afghanistan because of the American troops, and we can hope Syria when Obama meets with Putin this week at the G-20 in Moscow.
Prioritization of issues is harder. Even those who recommend it muddle exactly what they mean. Colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment recommend in a recent overview of the situation in the Middle East:
international actors should focus on a few, very specific issues for special emphasis, such as international human rights standards, the maintenance of existing treaty relationships, and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.
But then they go on to recommend economic cooperation aimed at job creation, a non sequitur virtually guaranteed to disappoint expectations given limited U.S. resources and a track record of failure. Not to mention the difficulty of meeting human rights standards, since these require equal gender treatment not readily available in the workplace in many of the countries in question.
Shifting sands will make navigation in the Middle East difficult for a long time to come. I recommend to all my international affairs students that they learn Arabic, or another of the regional languages (Farsi most of all). Even if American oil production continues to reduce already low U.S. dependence on the Middle East, the global oil market and the extremist movements the region has spawned will ensure we remain engaged there for a long time to come, triage and prioritization notwithstanding.
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Is Iraq coming apart?
No, in a word. Not yet. While the press waxes alarmist, what is happening resembles nothing more than the usual government “crisis” in a parliamentary system: once the government loses its majority, it is supposed to fall. I’ve been through dozens of these in Italy. There is no reason to get too excited about it in a country that has a parliamentary tradition.
Of course Iraq is not such a country. This makes everyone–Iraqis and foreigners alike–a good deal more nervous about a government crisis than would be justified elsewhere. We all fear that in Iraq crisis will mean violence, which does not yet seem to have been triggered, and autocracy, which Maliki’s opponents were warning of even before the latest events.
What has certainly happened already is that Maliki has turned to Iran to help shore up his hold on power. This bodes ill, as it exacerbates sectarian tensions in Iraq by underlining Maliki’s Shia base and pitting it against Kurdish and Sunni forces. We can only guess what Maliki now owes Tehran for its timely effort to unite Shia political forces in his favor.
There is an additional problem in Iraq: constructing a new majority. Prime Minister Maliki has long governed with changing majorities, depending on the issue. This makes it very difficult for his opponents to construct a stable alternative. Maliki is not likely to want to leave office until they do so. In the event of a successful vote of no confidence, this could lead to lengthy caretaker status, with his opponents claiming of course that he is no better than a dictator who doesn’t leave office when he is supposed to.
Early elections are another possibility. Maliki’s opponents are not likely to want them. Maliki might do well–polls show him gaining approval everywhere but in Kurdistan. His opponents could end up losing cushy jobs and perqs. It may just be bravado, but Maliki is behaving with the confidence of a prime minister who doesn’t fear a new election.
Some Americans may claim that Maliki’s turn towards Iran would never have happened if Washington had only left troops in Iraq. The trouble with this idea is that Iraq’s democratically elected government did not want them. Insisting would have strengthened the Iranians and deprived the U.S. of its current stance, which is that of an interested but not involved outside power. That ultimately is a much better posture than the one the Iranians have got, which is deep involvement in Iraqi internal politics that is bound to cause resentment.
No, Iraq isn’t coming apart yet. But it could. We should be doing everything possible to prevent that outcome. Most important in my view over the long term is working with Baghdad to make sure that a substantial portion of its increased oil and gas production is exported to the north (to Turkey) and west (to Jordan and some day Syria) rather than through the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz. It was a mistake not to have made this happen during the eight years of American military presence in Iraq. But clever diplomats should be able to make it happen even now.
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Memorial Day for all, again
I have little to add to what I said last year on Memorial Day, so I am republishing what I said then:
I spent my high school years marching in the Memorial Day parade in New Rochelle, New York and have never lost respect for those who serve and make sacrifices in uniform. Even as an anti-war protester in the Vietnam era, I thought denigration of those in uniform heinous, not to mention counterproductive.
It is impossible to feel anything but pride and gratitude to those who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Kosovo, Bosnia, Panama and Somalia during the previous decade. Nor will I forget my Memorial Day visit to the American cemetery in Nettuno accompanying Defense Secretary Les Aspin in the early 1990s, or my visit to the Florence cemetery the next year. These extraordinarily manicured places are the ultimate in peaceful. It is unimaginable what their inhabitants endured. No matter what we say during the speechifying on Memorial Day, there is little glory in what the troops do and a whole lot of hard work, dedication, professionalism and horror.
That said, it is a mistake to forget those who serve out of uniform, as we habitually do. Numbers are hard to come by, but a quick internet search suggests that at at least 1000 U.S. civilians have died in Iraq and Afghanistan. They come in many different varieties: journalists, policemen, judges, private security guards, agriculturalists, local government experts, computer geeks, engineers, relief and development workers, trainers, spies, diplomats and who knows what else. I think of these people as our “pinstripe soldiers,” even if most of them don’t in fact wear pinstripes. But they are a key component of building the states that we hope will some day redeem the sacrifices they and their uniformed comrades have endured.
I spend my working hours worrying about how to improve the performance of the pinstripe soldiers, but that should not reduce by one iota appreciation for them. These are people who sometimes go places before they are safe enough for the troops, and they stay long after the troops are withdrawn. I hope my readers will add a minute to their Memorial Day reflections for those who serve in mufti. And count the many non-Americans who support our people also in your appreciation.
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Ramifications of an Iran nuclear deal
Optimism is breaking out in some circles for tomorrow’s nuclear talks in Baghdad with Iran. Tehran Bureau hopes for a win/win. Stimson projects possible success.
This hopefulness is based on the emerging sense that a quid pro quo is feasible. While the details people imagine vary, in general terms the deal would involve Iran revealing the full extent of its nuclear efforts and limiting enrichment to what the amount and extent it really needs under tight international supervision. The international community would ease off on sanctions.
What is far less clear than the shape of a deal is whether politics in either Tehran or Washington will allow it to happen, as Zack Beauchamp speculated on Twitter last week. Europe, which leads the p5+1 (US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany) talks with Tehran is useful to the process but will go along with whatever the Americans and Iranians decide.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has been a major stumbling block in the past. He scuppered a deal a few years ago that would have supplied Iran with the enriched uranium it needs for a research reactor in exchange for shipping its own stockpile of 20% enriched uranium out of the country. Unquestionably more in charge than in the past, Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards who support him need hostility with the West to maintain their increasingly militarized regime. A resolution–even a partial one–of the nuclear standoff may not be in their interest.
It might not please hawks in the U.S. Congress either. They want a complete halt to enrichment in Iran and don’t want to rely on international inspections that might be suspended or otherwise blocked. Improvement in relations with Iran would hinder their hopes for regime change there. It would also make it difficult to criticize Barack Obama in the runup to the election for his diplomatic outreach to Iran, which failed initially but with the backing of draconian international sanctions seems now to be succeeding.
The smart money is betting that both Tehran and Washington will want to string out the negotiating process past the U.S. election in November. This would be a shame if a deal really is possible before then. The world economy would look a lot brighter if oil prices, pumped up since winter by Iranian threats to close the strait of Hormuz, sank well below $100 per barrel. Improved relations with Iran could also have positive knock-on effects in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Iran (which neighbors both countries) has sought to make things hard for the Americans.
A nuclear deal could also free the American hand a bit in Syria, where Washington has been reluctant to act decisively because it needs Russia and China on board for the P5+1 effort. Of course it might also work in the other direction: Washington could decide to give a bit in Syria in order to get a nuclear deal with Iran. That would not be our finest moment.
PS: Julian Borger is, as usual, worth reading, in particular on how low the bar has been set for the Baghdad talks.
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Iraq watchers, watch this
The National Democratic Institute (NDI) April 2012 Iraq polling sheds expected but clear light on the political situation there: especially among Shia Iraqis and in Baghdad, Prime Minister Maliki is a hit. Among Kurds in the North and Sunnis in the West, that is far less the case. While commentary in Washington has been mostly negative since completion of the U.S. withdrawal at the end of 2011, an increasing percentage of Iraqis appreciate Maliki and think the country is heading in the right direction.
There are of course things that could upset the trends, and NDI explicates those:
- Failure to address jobs and basic services concerns
- Sunni insecurities intensify
- Disaffected Shias shifting support
- Ability for opposition groups to emerge and build a strategic campaign
- North’s divisions with Baghdad intensify
But so far, Maliki has a lot to stack up to his credit. Chosen prime minister because he looked weaker than the alternatives, he is proving that he has the vital requirement of a democratic politician: approval (and presumably votes at the next election). The big question is whether he will use his improved position to consolidate democracy in Iraq or undermine it.
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Is the Arab awakening marginalizing women?
The short answer is “yes,” judging from Monday’s discussion at the Woodrow Wilson Center. I missed the beginning but watched the rest on webcast. Since I haven’t seen any other reports of this interesting event here is what I learned:
In Tunisia and Egypt women are suffering setbacks when power is distributed or equality is at issue. They are nevertheless voting for Islamist parties that deal these setbacks, apparently because they believe the Islamists will be less corrupt.
Since 2005, women have also been suffering setbacks in Iraq, which like Egypt had an earlier history of recognition of women’s rights. Tribal forces and Islamist parties are the cause. Illegal practices like child and temporary marriages, honor killings, female genital mutilation and gender based violence are on the increase. The 25% quota for women in parliament has been important to keeping women present in the public sphere.
In Kuwait, the Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood are in power together. They are fierce on social issues and trying to separate women’s issues from other questions, in order to keep them distinct.
In Saudi Arabia, Arab spring has encouraged women to work for change and the King to make some limited moves. The Arab spring inspired the driving campaign, in which about 60 women defied the ban. Activism has increased both on line and at universities. The government is generally trying to look the other way. Religious police will not enforce face covering. The King has authorized women to participate in municipal elections in 2015 and has announced he will appoint women to the Majlis. These are symbolic steps. More important is the government push for women’s employment and campaign against child abuse and domestic violence. Nonviolent progress in Egypt and other places would encourage changes in Saudi Arabia.
Overall, not a pretty picture. When things in Saudi Arabia seem to be progressing more steadily than elsewhere, you know you are in trouble!
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