Tag: ISIS
My magic wand
Someone asked for my views on whether Kosovo is equipped to deal with nationalist and Islamist extremism, as well as the best ways to counter violent extremism and the recruitment of foreign fighters. Here is how I replied:
1. The first thing that needs to be said is how different the two topics you’ve given me are.
2. When it comes to Kosovo, nationalism is endemic among both Serbs and Albanians. It was the clash of these two nationalisms that brought us war in the 1990s and prevented consolidation of the peace until recently.
3. The April 2013 Brussels agreement is as close as we’ve gotten to a peace treaty between Serbian and Albanian nationalists. It recognizes the authority of the Pristina-based institutions on the entire territory of Kosovo and implies that Kosovo will enter the European Union as a sovereign entity on its own bottom. In exchange it gives the Serbs of Kosovo a large measure of self-governance, in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan that Belgrade rejected eight years ago.
4. I’m reasonably sure that with international guidance and pressure that peace will hold, though I also believe it will not be consolidated until Belgrade bites the bullet by recognizing Kosovo and exchanging ambassadors with Pristina.
5. I’d like to see that sooner rather than later, though the inclination in Belgrade and the international community, including Washington, is to let it slide for now.
6. Delay encourages nationalist responses in Kosovo, right now in the form of support for Vetvendosje! and its promise of a referendum on union with Albania. It also encourages Kosovo to plan for larger security forces than it would otherwise need and/or burdens NATO more than otherwise would be the case.
7. So much for nationalism. It’s there, and an obstacle when we would like to see a special court created. It is also a law enforcement issue when ethnic nationalists take up weapons and insert themselves into Macedonia. But it is unlikely today to generate the kind of violence that seems to be necessary to get the international community to react.
8. Violent extremism—if by that you mean non-nationalist extremism of the Islamist variety—has in the past been rare in Kosovo. Takfiris do not grow naturally there. I have rarely met a less religious people than Kosovo Albanians, whose dominant faith during most of the last two decades has been Albanianism, not conservative Islam.
9. That is changing. The reasons are many:
• Frustration with slow economic progress,
• The languid pace of international acceptance and recognition,
• Ill-educated, unemployed, often criminal and disappointed youth,
• Takfiri propaganda stemming mainly from Saudi Arabia,
• A limited number of militant mosque leaders,
• Recruitment of fighters for Syria and Iraq.
These have combined to spawn and grow a small but notable Muslim extremist coterie.
10. It would be a mistake to exaggerate Islamist extremism in Kosovo, which is ideologically inconsistent with the kind of national liberation struggle the Kosovars conducted in the 1990s.
11. That’s what the government did when it arrested dozens and released more than half because of lack of evidence.
12. But it would also be a mistake to ignore it.
13. The good news is that the current government and more generally the ruling elite in Kosovo dislikes religious extremism and regards it as a threat to them, not just to us.
14. They sincerely would like to rid themselves of that threat and have passed legislation aimed at doing just that.
15. But legislation and law enforcement will not be sufficient in Kosovo any more than they would be sufficient elsewhere on their own.
16. In my view, the most important antidote to recruitment is the one that has worked elsewhere: community efforts, based on former extremists and their families.
17. But that will not suffice. At the risk of stating the blazingly obvious, what Kosovo needs to prevent radicalization is what any of us would wish for it even if radicalization were not an issue: more rapid progress towards the EU, formation of its army and entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, effective implementation of the Brussels agreement, more capable and less corrupt institutions, better education, more jobs and security services both alert and cautious to avoid making matters worse.
18. Now, where did I leave that magic wand….
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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Shore-up Jordan before it’s too late…
Ambassador Oded Eran (Senior Research Fellow, INSS, former Israeli ambassador to Jordan, the EU and NATO, and former head of the Israeli negotiating team with the Palestinians) and Eddie Grove (Research Assistant Intern, MEI and former Research Assistant Intern, INSS) co-authored an article entitled Threats to Stability in Jordan in the July 2015 issue of INSS Strategic Assessment. The article describes the challenges that Jordan must overcome in both the short-term and the long-term to remain stable.
Despite persistent predictions of the imminent demise of the Hashemite regime, Jordan has remained stable, buoyed by international aid from the US and the GCC. Jordan faces a growing jihadi threat, fueled largely by a poor economy and high youth unemployment. In the short-term, Jordan’s stability will be aided by low oil prices and a temporary rise in patriotism after pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh’s murder by ISIS. In the long-term, Jordan needs to address water and energy scarcity issues to remain stable and serve the needs of a growing population, including its many refugees.
Jordan has high unemployment, including a youth unemployment rate of ~30%. A few key reasons for this include:
- Jordan’s education system doesn’t provide students with necessary skills for the workforce.
- Jordanian students often choose fields of study that aren’t in high demand in the workforce.
- Syrian refugees compete for informal sector jobs.
Youth unemployment, often long in duration, leads to frustration. This frustration is compounded by a lack of avenues for political expression among Jordanian youth. Little real reform occurred during Jordan’s relatively small-scale Arab Spring protests.
Some discontented youth see jihadism as attractive. Experts estimate that there are 5,000-10,000 jihadis in Jordan, and that this number may have doubled since the Arab Spring. Jordan’s jihadis were traditionally mainly Palestinian, but growing numbers of ethnic Jordanians (East Bankers) have been joining the movement. East Bankers have traditionally been regime loyalists and comprise the majority of the military and security services. Cracks in their loyalty pose a serious threat to the regime.
The government closely watches jihadis; it arrests those who post jihadi content online and preachers who deliver extremist sermons. According to one expert, the vast majority of Jordan’s jihadis now sympathize with ISIS. ISIS has grassroots support, if not an organized presence. YouTube videos have shown pro-ISIS rallies in Ma’an and Zarqa and there is also evidence of ISIS sympathizers in Irbid. As of fall 2014, there were 1000-1500 Jordanian fighters in Syria, and 8% of Jordan’s population sympathized with ISIS. Ten percent didn’t consider ISIS a terrorist organization, and opposition to Jordan’s participation in coalition airstrikes was widespread: #ThisIsNotOurWar was a trending Twitter hashtag.
When Muath Al-Kasasbeh was murdered, it prompted an anti-ISIS backlash and a surge in patriotism. A February 2015 poll showed overwhelming support for Jordan’s participation in coalition airstrikes, and that 95% of the population now considered ISIS a terrorist organization. Confidence in PM Ensour’s government also increased. King Abdullah urged Jordanians to “hold their heads high.” This became a trending hashtag on Twitter. The surge in patriotism was not universal, however, as a Jordanian MP and a high-ranking Jordanian diplomat publicly derided this new slogan. In addition, an ISIS cell was arrested in Mafraq in March 2015, a poor city with many Syrian refugees.
The wave of patriotism will fade and energy costs will increase, so Jordan needs to address its water
and energy scarcity issues. Water scarcity may have been a contributory cause of Syria’s civil war, and Jordan is one of the world’s most water-scarce countries. Additionally, ~40% of the inputs into Jordan’s water networks become Non-revenue Water (NRW). NRW is essentially water that is not accounted for when customers are billed, due to leakage, illegal use, faulty meters, incompetent meter-readers, and poor accounting. Israel provides Jordan with water from Lake Kinneret, and this quantity may increase in the future. Jordan also plans to desalinate water at Aqaba. However, solving Jordan’s water crisis requires progress on multiple fronts, including NRW reduction (with the help of the international community). Climate change could worsen Jordan’s water woes, and comparisons between Jordan and Syria are ominous. Water scarcity drove internal migration in Syria, which combined with other factors like corruption, unemployment and inequality to ignite the crisis. Jordan displays similar risk factors.
Jordan must also address its energy scarcity issues. Jordan used to import natural gas from Egypt, but repeated terror attacks on the pipeline through the Sinai halted the imports and damaged Jordan economically, forcing it to import costlier petroleum products. Low oil prices provide a temporary respite. Fortunately, Jordan has plans to diversify its energy sources by 2020, with the following breakdown:
- 10% from wind and solar.
- 14% oil shale.
- 6% nuclear.
- 29% natural gas.
- 1% imported electricity.
- 40% petroleum products.
Unfortunately, this won’t happen, at least not by 2020. Israel may import gas from Israel, but this is politically challenging and Israel’s gas companies are embroiled in an anti-trust dispute with the Israeli government. Gas from Gaza is more politically palatable for Jordan, but is unlikely to come online soon for political reasons. Jordan imports LNG from Qatar, but this is costlier than gas via pipeline. Little progress has been made on the wind and solar projects, and Jordan’s nuclear ambitions may never come to fruition because of high costs and international opposition. Oil shale (not to be confused with shale oil) has never before been extracted on a commercial scale and may not be viable at oil prices below $75/barrel.
Costly energy imports damage Jordan’s economy (and therefore its stability) as follows:
- High energy prices increase the cost of living for struggling Jordanians.
- Jordan’s remaining energy subsidies are a burden on the government’s budget and divert funds from key areas.
- Energy subsidies crowd-out private sector investment.
Energy diversification (with the help of the international community) would alleviate these issues, and help counteract the poor economic conditions that contribute to the rise in jihadism.
Israel has a strong interest in preserving Jordan’s stability, as Jordan is a buffer state. Jordan used to
export goods through Syria, but Israel has allowed Jordan to use Haifa’s port for exports, and is improving the facilities there. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is always a complicating factor in Israeli-Jordanian relations; the majority of Jordan’s population is Palestinian, causing a political climate in which Jordan requires at least a semblance of progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to ensure quiet domestically. Jordan’s 2014-2015 UN Security Council membership further complicates this balancing act.
To shore-up Jordan’s stability, Israel can:
- Increase bilateral cooperation (this has likely already happened).
- Expedite water and gas transfers.
- Allow for greater access of Jordanian products to Israel, but more importantly, the Palestinian market.
- Increase its use of Jordan’s port of Aqaba, which could produce mutual benefits.
In addition, the US and GCC must keep up financial assistance to Jordan, but ensure that this assistance addresses long-term issues. The immediate risk posed by ISIS is likely not a frontal attack. ISIS rather seeks to exploit pockets of poverty and unemployment within Jordan, including among East Bankers. Financial resources are needed to prevent this.
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Peace picks August 3-7
1. Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare: An Evolving Challenge | Monday, August 3rd | 11:30 – 2:00 | Hudson Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The U.S. government has established an arsenal of economic warfare tools aimed at weakening rogue actors, isolating illicit finance, and protecting the global economy. Washington’s playbook is filled with asset freezes, sanctions, trade embargoes, and blacklists. At the same time, the Information Age has led to a transformative development in the realm of economic warfare: the potential use of cyberattacks to cause the U.S. substantial economic harm and weaken its national security capacity. With the exception of cyberterrorism, cyberattacks on U.S. economic targets have been treated as vexing nuisances and a cost of doing business, but have not been viewed as a strategic national security threat. The changing nature and increased volume of cybercrime, espionage, hacking, and sabotage raises the question: Is there lurking a new type of action aimed specifically at undermining American economic power, destabilizing the global economic system, and threatening U.S. allies? What are America’s vulnerabilities and how can the U.S. government and private sector recognize, monitor, deter, defend against, and defeat such warfare? A new report, Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare: An Evolving Challenge, edited by Dr. Samantha Ravich seeks to address these questions. Leading experts will come together on August 3rd to discuss and debate the report’s critical findings in an event hosted by Hudson Institute and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Speakers include: The Honorable Juan C. Zarate, Chairman & Senior Counselor, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Congressman Mike Rogers, Distinguished Fellow, Hudson Institute, Former U.S. Representative, Michigan, and Former Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Steven Chabinsky, General Counsel & Chief Risk Officer, CrowdStrike, Dr. Michael Hsieh, Program Manager, DARPA, Mark Dubowitz, Executive Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Director, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Mark Tucker, CEO, Temporal Defense Systems. Dr. Samantha Ravich, Editor, Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare: An Evolving Challenge and Board of Advisors Member, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies will moderate.
2. The Role of IGAD: A Regional Approach to the Crisis in South Sudan | Tuesday, August 4st | 2:00-3:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Soon after it achieved independence in 2011, South Sudan erupted into civil war resulting in thousands of people killed and another 2.2 million displaced. There have been several international and national mediation efforts have done little to stem the violence and arrive at a viable solutions. One of the key actors in these efforts has been the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is one of the African Union’s eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This session will assess IGAD’s role in mediating the crisis in South Sudan, the challenges that IGAD has faced (including how regional dynamics and interests have impacted IGAD’s mediating efforts), and offer recommendatios and options for international actors and IGAD for more effective mediation of the South Sudan crisis. Speakers include: Southern Voices Network Scholar Dr. Getachew Zeru Gebrekidan, Lecturer at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia and Mr. John Prendergast, Founding Director, the Enough Project.
3. The State of Afghanistan and Prospects for the Future: A Discussion with General John Campbell | Tuesday, August 4st | 3:00 – 4:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While the combat mission in Afghanistan concluded in late 2014, U.S. involvement remains significant and critical to security in the country. In recent weeks, talk of a settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government has gained momentum. At the same time, however, increased U.S. air strikes against insurgents have taken place, and Afghan soldiers continue to take their heaviest losses of the war as intense fighting continues in a number of Afghan provinces. Additionally, concerns over ISIS moving into the region are also mounting. General John F. Campbell, commander of Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, will discuss the country’s security landscape. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, will moderate.
4. The Future of Naval Capabilities | Tuesday, July 21st | 10:00-11:00 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a discussion with Admirals Aucoin and Winter on the U.S. Navy’s efforts to develop new capabilities above, on, and under the sea. Speakers include: Vice Admiral Joseph P. Aucoin, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems and Rear Admiral Mathias W. Winter, USN, Chief of Naval Research, Director, Innovation, Technology Requirements, and Test & Evaluation. Moderated by: Andrew P. Hunter, Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS. The Maritime Security Dialogue brings together CSIS and U.S. Naval Institute, two of the nation’s most respected non-partisan institutions. The series is intended to highlight the particular challenges facing the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, from national level maritime policy to naval concept development and program design. Given budgetary challenges, technological opportunities, and ongoing strategic adjustments, the nature and employment of U.S. maritime forces are likely to undergo significant change over the next ten to fifteen years. The Maritime Security Dialogue provides an unmatched forum for discussion of these issues with the nation’s maritime leaders.
5. After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran | Wednesday, August 5th | 12:00-1:00 | Johns Hopkins SAIS – Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Roy Gutman, Middle East bureau chief of the McClatchy newspapers, will share his insights from Tehran, after which respondent Joyce Karam, Washington Bureau Chief for Al-Hayat Newspaper, an international Arabic daily based in London, will comment on reaction to the deal in the Arab press and concern about increased regional turmoil. SAIS faculty member and MEI scholar Daniel Serwer will moderate the conversation.
6. Beyond Afghanistan’s Dangerous Summer | Wednesday, August 5th | 1:3o-2:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As the one-year anniversary approaches for the inauguration of Afghanistan’s national unity government, the country is in the midst of a dangerous summer as its security forces battle an intensified insurgency. Despite these risks, the government in some ways has been transformative. President Ashraf Ghani’s outreach towards Pakistan has offered the possibility of a relationship based on mutual benefit rather than mistrust. Significant progress has been made by the Afghan government in its effort to open peace talks with the Taliban, after years of stalled attempts. Internal governance reforms have begun. Yet in an increasingly complex security environment, the government seems to be in a race against time. Ambassador Dan Feldman will discuss these developments and what the United States can do to help ensure these transformations lead to a stable Afghanistan that can act as a strategic partner for the United States in the region. Comments will also be provided by Stephen J. Hadley and Andrew Wilder, and then the discussion will be opened up to the audience. Opening remarks by Nancy Lindborg, President, USIP. Speakers include: Ambassador Dan Feldman, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State, Stephen J. Hadley, Chairman, Board of Directors, USIP and Dr. Andrew Wilder, Vice President for South and Central Asia, USIP.
7. Managing Tensions in Asia | Thursday, August 6th | 6:30 pm – 9:30 pm | PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As a rising China becomes ever more assertive over its claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea and beyond, regional tensions are rising faster than ever before in recent history. PS21 brings together a great panel of Washington-based experts to discuss how conflict can be avoided and where the risks really lie. Panelists include: Ali Wyne, Member of the Adjunct Staff, RAND Corporation, PS21 Global Fellow, Harry Kazianis, Executive Editor, The National Interest, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Center for the National Interest and Scott Cheney-Peters, Chairman, Centre for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC).
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Insider views on ISIS in Iraq
On Thursday, Stimson hosted a discussion in cooperation with the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS) entitled Threat Of ISIS In Iraq: Views From The Ground. Speakers included: Stimson Middle East Fellow Geneive Abdo, , Brookings Non-resident Fellow Christine van den Toorn, AUIS Director of the center for Development and Natural Resources Bilal Wahab. Three AUIS students, Noaf, Anas, and Khusai were featured in recorded videos. Lukman Faily, Iraqi Ambassador to the US, also spoke. Stimson President Ellen Laipson moderated.
AUIS was founded in 2006. Students come from many religious backgrounds and Iraqi regions, as well as from neighboring countries.
Van den Toorn, explained that Iraq is more complicated than the discourse in DC. The students from AUIS explained the situation in their regions.
Noaf is from Sinjar. He and his 6 brothers all finished college. He was supposed to study in Mosul after high school but had worked as a translator for US troops and is Yazidi, so he feared for his safety. He got a scholarship to study at AUIS and graduated with a degree in Business Administration.
ISIS still threatens Sinjar and tried to take back his village, Hanasour, two days ago. The northern part of Sinjar was liberated from ISIS five months ago and many different actors are defending the area. Military leaders believe a unified force could liberate the rest of Sinjar in 3-4 days. Noaf wants autonomy for Sinjar with NATO protection. The people of Sinjar have lost trust in both Iraqi and KRG security forces; an international force would allow the IDPs to return. Sinjar has agriculture and oil, so it could have its own economy.
Anas was born in Samarra, Saladin Governorate. His father had refused to join the Ba’ath Party, was forced into the military, and died. He graduated with an engineering degree from AUIS.
The economy in Samarra is bad because Samarra is controlled by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). Last year, ISIS entered half of the city, but left the next day. ISIS is now 20 km away. Samarra is 100% Sunni, but about 90% of the security forces are Shia. Some PMUs are good; others are criminals. Locals are hesitant to join the PMUs because some of those who fought Al Qaeda in 2006 were later arrested by the government. The PMUs should transfer control to the local police. Tikrit has been liberated, but most residents haven’t returned because the PMUs have arrested some returnees. The PMUs, not the government, decide who can and cannot return to liberated areas. Returnees to some villages have found homes and shops destroyed and Shia flags flying. There is a misconception that Sunnis support ISIS, but ISIS destroyed Sunni regions. ISIS killed two of his uncles. The problem is that Iraq’s central government treats Sunnis as enemies.
Khusai was raised in Baghdad, but his parents are from Najaf. He finished high school in 2008 when the security situation was terrible. He went to AUIS to study in a safe environment. He works in finance in Baghdad.
The security situation was very bad before Ramadan in Baghdad. During Ramadan, the situation improved and the curfew was lifted. ISIS will not invade Baghdad because it is protected by the PMUs. But Baghdadis fear the PMUs because they are armed criminals. Fortunately, their presence in the city center has recently decreased.
Southern Iraq remains safe, but some residents resent the costly war. Additionally, the IDPs in the south are causing higher prices and competition for jobs. But most southerners still believe in one Iraq, and want to liberate the northern cities, because of Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa.
Wahab said that centralization in Iraq has been a failure. There have been attempts to create an Iraqi identity, through both force and co-optation using oil wealth. The 2003 invasion offered the opportunity to decentralize, but centralization has been stronger. In response, the KRG is pushing for statehood. Basra is also looking for more autonomy and some in Kirkuk talk of a distinct Kirkuk region.
The government controls 50% of the economy. The economic power of the executive branch makes it hard to hold it accountable. The collapse of oil prices hurt the economy, which suffers if the government cannot inject enough cash into it. Government expenses have also increased because of military costs.
Without a comprehensive, international strategy to defeat ISIS, regional powers and domestic players will continue to use the crisis to their advantage, e.g., the PMUs. Kurdish society is less united than before as it argues over who deserves the credit for holding back ISIS. Within Iraq, both political and economic reform are needed.
Abdo spoke about how religious identity in Iraq has nearly replaced the identity of Iraqi citizenship. The fight for a united Iraq is true more in theory than in reality. Religion is being used for political gain in Iraq, as it has been in Lebanon and Bahrain. Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa asking his followers to take up arms is rare in Shi’ism and shows urgency, but Sistani can no longer control the PMUs. The Shia have been radicalized too.
Ambassador Faily noted that all sides in Iraq blame others. This is a vicious cycle, with no magic solution. Everyone has agreed to decentralization, but getting there necessitates a dialogue towards a common strategy. ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq and is a problem for all of Iraq’s communities. Dealing with ISIS will take time, but respect for the integrity of the state is key. Those who want power at the state’s expense will harm everyone. The US plays an important supportive role but should give Iraq breathing space to improve its politics.
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The Turkey/Syria conundrum
This discussion of Turkey and Syria on CCTV America yesterday went well. Mike Walter moderated with the following guests:
- Cale Salih, from Oxford, is a visiting fellow to the European Council on Foreign Relations focusing on the Kurdish people.
- Daniel Serwer is a professor in conflict management at Johns Hopkins University.
- Tulin Daloglu from Ankara is a Turkish journalist and opinion writer.
- Joshua Walker is a transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, a non-partisan U.S. think tank.
And part 2:
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