Tag: ISIS
A war the military alone can’t win
Ashley Augsburger, a master’s student in my post-war reconstruction and transition class at SAIS, writes:
With the Administration’s submission to Congress of an Authorization for Use of Military Force against ISIS, debate is likely to continue regarding the nature, extent, and strategy of the conflict in Iraq and the region. Thursday’s panel discussion of these issues, “The Battle Against the Islamic State: Where Do We Go From Here?,” at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace featured Iraqi Ambassador Lukman Faily, Former Ambassador and visiting fellow at the Washington Institute James Jeffery, and Marwan Muasher, Vice President of Studies at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The discussion focused on Iraq’s challenges in facing ISIS, the larger public perception of ISIS in the region, actions that regional actors can take to address the larger ideological battle, and the necessary components of addressing the root causes of ISIS’s emergence and success over the past six months.
Faily addressed the question “where do we go from here” with an initial outline of the advances the Iraqi government has made in achieving a more inclusive and unified government, followed by three specific needs to create a more predictable and coherent policy to combat ISIS:
• Humanitarian concerns: With over 2.1 million displaced persons, primarily in the Kurdish region, affected communities need basic service provision and support.
• Military preparedness: The military requires appropriate training and equipment, complemented by allied forces intelligence sharing and technological support.
• Reconstruction assistance: Iraq is struggling with the “day after scenario” in liberated areas and needs to address governance and service provision for their populations.
While there must be a zero-tolerance policy toward ISIS in Iraq domestically, Faily said regional stability and the battle against ISIS also require a predictable and comprehensive policy towards Syria.
Jeffery focused on American involvement in the battle against ISIS and the challenges of defining a goal and appropriate methods moving forward. While uncomfortable, America has no choice but involve itself militarily in Iraq yet again. The challenge looking forward is to outline a strategy of engagement: “who will dig these guys out?” Jeffery asserted that a policy of containment is not sufficient, as ISIS is an extraordinary movement that is dangerous to the entire region.
Having just returned from six months in Amman, Muasher discussed the Jordanian perspective. He emphasized the broader context of the ISIS threat and the larger agenda needed to address underlying causes of ISIS’s emergence and appeal. While there is no public support for ISIS, many Jordanians are struggling with the question whether this is a war on their own values. While the murder of the Jordanian pilot has sparked demands for revenge, much like the US post 9/11, the larger commitment to a fundamental, values-based war is undecided. Regardless, regional stability is contingent upon a larger solution that includes a nonmilitary strategy alongside military engagements. Without addressing issues of economic opportunity and political inclusion, ISIS will not be defeated.
Questions and panel discussion focused primarily on how to combat the ideology behind ISIS and the extent to which the US should be involved. Jeffery emphasized the need for security first, but he was clear that an ideology will not be defeated militarily. Panelists agreed that it is the region’s responsibility to fight ISIS’s ideology. The United States should not wage an ideological war. Prompted with a question by Carnegie Fellow Jessica Matthews, Muasher highlighted the lack of “ground troops” to speak out against ISIS ideology, as so many of the governments fighting ISIS also suppress legitimate, liberal voices in their own countries.
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Hobbits will inherit the earth
Eric Rahman, a master’s student in my Post-war Reconstruction and Transition class this term, writes about Srdja Popovic’s appearance at SAIS yesterday:
Srdja Popovic is a Serbian political activist and executive director of the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS). He was a leader of the student movement Otpor!, which helped topple Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. He has taught at the Harvard Kennedy School, NYU, and the University of Colorado, among others.
There are few individuals with a history of working in such close proximity to conflict who exhibit quite the optimism and exuberance as Popovic. In an event held at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on the morning of February 10, the author of the recently published Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Nonviolent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World discussed his vision for effective social mobilization to execute non-violent revolution.
He relied on a metaphor drawn from J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings series:
it is the average individual, the person you would least expect, the hobbits, who
can have the greatest impact and transform their societies through non-violent means. Popovic pointed to the electrician Lech Wałęsa and the camera shop owner Harvey Milk to illustrate that it is not institutional elites who bring about change but rather it is hobbits, who rely on their creativity to build a movement and have a lasting impact.
In spite of humorous analogies and moments of levity, Popovic presented a sober
analysis of which conditions and methods are most conducive to fomenting a social movement that can truly effect change in repressive societies. He advocates non-violence even when pitted against a brutally violent adversary. Non-violence is preferable not because violence is morally unacceptable, but because non-violence is the most effective and efficient means to combat a growing menace, as illustrated by the statistics in Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan’s Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.
The threat of ISIS he likened to a swarm of mosquitos. The temptation is
to swat them. But to combat the infestation, one has to turn attention to the source: wet areas or the swamps. There is a confluence of pernicious factors that coalesced to create permissive conditions for ISIS’s rise, but one fundamental issue is the failure of states to deliver services and the resulting vacuum of credibility and legitimacy. This can only be countered by the actual provision of expected basic
services by governments. Service provision will undercut the ISIS narrative and shrink recruitment.
There is an alarming perception among many Iraqi youth that ISIS is ‘cool.’ This perception is destabilizing and arises from lack of alternatives. There is no Iraqi ‘Batman’ or ‘Superman’ young people can look to for moral-cultural education during their formative years, which leaves them susceptible to the sophisticated propaganda machine of an organization such as ISIS.
The Arab spring and the Ukrainian crisis illustrate in Popovic’s view the consequences when a movement lacks long-term vision. In Egypt for example, the
revolution achieved its expressed goal of unseating Hosni Mubarak within the first month of the protests (four years ago today!). But once the moment came to construct a new model of government and service delivery, there was a dearth of strategic planning and the movement began to disintegrate. A similar situation existed in Ukraine following the Orange Revolution in 2003, causing the intra-Ukrainian conflict to simmer and break out again into crisis last year.
Popovic summed up his argument with an apt analogy: “Non-violent struggles are like video games. They have levels and you need a new set of skills for each level.” Despite the challenges faced and the skills required, it is the hobbits who eventually carry the day.
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Bosnia’s muj
I did this interview yesterday for Amil Ducic of the Sarajevo daily Avaz:
1. What is your perception on the indictment of six Bosnians who have been charged with providing money and equipment to foreign fighters joining al Qaeda, Nusra Front and Islamic State in Syria and Iraq? Two persons were even accused of conspiring to kill and maim persons in a foreign country.
A: Innocent until proven guilty is my first reaction. But if proven it should not be such a big surprise. There are a lot of Bosnians in the U.S. Why would we think none of them would be sympathetic with the Islamic State? There are also non-Muslim Americans who support ISIS. Ours is a big country with many different strands of political thought.
2. Reading the indictment, it’s obvious that the charges are serious. Problem for BiH is that the money is transferred in our country to stimulate the foreign fighters. Your comment?
A: I expect BiH will cooperate as much as it can in trying to block financial transfers to support foreign fighters. That’s something on which all the political leaderships can agree.
3. Again, one of the charged persons Ramiz Hodžić is identified as a person who was radicalized in Bosnia during the war. He was member of the unit “El-Mudjahid”. Do you think this an issue which has to be solved in Bosnia. Radicalization of the Bosnian Army during 1992-1995 is, regarding some opinions, the root of problems…. What is your opinion.
A: I don’t think this is a gigantic problem. At Dayton, a Croat asked that we get rid of the foreign mujahedeen in Bosnia. I asked how many there were. He replied 700, which I took to be a maximum given the source of the information.
At least half of those were forced out after the war, in part due to American pressure. Many of the remainder are living peacefully with their Bosnian families. It is twenty years since the war ended. Some will be well above fighting age (and condition) now.
So yes, Bosnia should do what it can to block them from helping or volunteering for the Islamic State. But let’s not exaggerate the scale of the problem.
4. What about the Bosnian community in USA. Is there is a danger of being labeled?
A: What I’ve seen of the Bosnian community reaction in the US is universal condemnation of any support to the Islamic State or other extremists. There will no doubt be bigots who “label” all Muslims as terrorists. But most Americans know and appreciate that Muslims in the U.S. overwhelmingly oppose extremism.
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The courteous banality of evil
I won’t have much time to write today, due to meetings and my class this evening. But here for your edification is the full BBC interview with Bashar al Asad:
Listen and weep. Note not only the content, but the reasonable and courteous tone combined with incredible lies. The courteous banality of evil.
PS: The Syrian government is proud of this interview and published the text. I assume it is an accurate rendition, but I have checked.
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Drums don’t win wars
A president who was trying to extract America from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is now preparing to escalate the war in Ukraine and the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Yesterday, his nominee for Defense Secretary made it clear he supports sending lethal armaments to the Ukrainian government to fight off Russian aggression, a position also advocated by former officials. The White House is also preparing to send Congress a request for an authorization to use military force (AUMF in Washington parlance) against ISIS, something the administration is already doing.
Both these moves fall in the inevitable category. We’ve pretty much run out of alternatives.
ISIS is universally regarded as not only a threat to vital interests but also one with which it is impossible to negotiate. They seem intent on proving that with the immolation a month ago of a Jordanian pilot whom they then feigned being prepared to exchange for an Al Qaeda terrorist. If we are going to fight ISIS whenever and wherever, it is certainly proper that there be a Congressional authorization. Hawks will want it broad. Doves will want it narrow. But both will want it, even though it will make little difference to what the US actually is doing.
In Ukraine, the government is losing control of the southeastern Donbas region and could lose control of even more of its territory to insurgents fully backed by Russia’s substantial military might. I’ll leave to military experts assessment of whether American assistance with lethal but defensive weapons will have a serious impact at this point. It could take a year or more before any significant materiel and training is deployed on the battlefield. In the meanwhile, Moscow will use any American decision to arm the Ukrainians as an excuse to redouble its own efforts.
So neither of these noisy headline issues is likely to have any quick impact. Drums don’t win wars. And these two wars are not only conventional force-on-force clashes between organized military forces, even if they involve some battles of that sort. Both involve counter insurgency, the kind of war (known in the Pentagon as COIN) the US loves to forget.
I’ll leave to the COINistas the analysis and policy prescriptions on the military side. The important point for me is that COIN necessarily involves an important civilian component. You win the war against insurgency by protecting the civilian population. You have to win the peace over a decade or more by ensuring a continued safe and secure environment, establishing the rule of law, ensuring stable governance, growing the economy and meeting social needs. If you fail to do those things in the aftermath of war, you end up with Libya: a weak state that has collapsed now into civil war, leaving breeding grounds for extremists.
The civilian efforts required are in the first instance the responsibility of the governments involved. But their capabilities are at best limited and at worst nonexistent. In Ukraine, even a government victory would likely require peacekeepers to ensure stability in Donbas and avoid reignition of conflict. In Iraq, it is hard to picture the Baghdad government’s security forces welcomed in Anbar and Ninewa provinces. Some kind of local governance with its own security forces (the proposed National Guard?) will be needed. In Syria, Bashar al Asad has shown no sign of willingness to govern fairly or effectively in areas the government retakes. There too some kind of local governance will be needed.
The international capacity to contribute to these efforts is also limited. The State Department has shrunk its civilian conflict and stability operations capability, which was never substantial. The European Union has grown weary and leery of deploying its much more substantial capacity. The UN is stretched thin. OSCE is doing a yeoman job of observing the much-violated ceasefire in Ukraine, but it is a giant step from that to peacekeepers and monitoring implementation of a peace agreement.
We are embarking on another long period of war. We should be strengthening not only our military capacities, but also our civilian ones.
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Yemen: failed policy in a failing state
Speaking at Georgetown University on Tuesday, former ambassador to Yemen, Barbara K. Bodine, took a critical view of current U.S. policy in Yemen. While President Obama in September was praising U.S. successes in fighting Al-Qaeda in Yemen as a model for the ISIS campaign, Ambassador Bodine argued that US policy has largely failed to achieve its aims in the country, and has corroded its relationship with Yemen’s government and people. At a time when Yemen is once more teetering on the edge of disruption, Bodine called for broader US engagement on development and governance.
Yemen, argued Bodine, is a country that has wobbled on the margins of collapse for a long time. Historically, the country has been the host of other states’ proxy battles, from the war between Nasserists and Saudi monarchists in the 1960s to the ongoing war on terror. Domestic challenges have also been prevalent, with Yemen having the youngest population in the Middle East. It is severely lacking in natural resources, including access to water.
At the same time, Yemen has a tradition of pulling itself back from the brink. The former ambassador pointed out that in the aftermath of the 2011-12 uprising that ended the reign of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen emerged relatively successful. The crisis ended in the negotiated transfer of power, the confirmation of the new president (Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi) in a referendum and the establishment of a National Dialogue Conference that was broadly inclusive. Compared to the rest of the region, Yemen seemed to have fared relatively well in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
At the same time, challenges have haunted the Yemen transition, leading to the current collapse. The Houthis had been excluded from the political process in the GCC transition plan, along with a number of other political actors. The inability to proceed also led to extension of the terms of the feckless transition government, while criticism of government corruption grew louder within the country. In launching their campaign on the capital in September of last year, the Houthi rebels were kicking in an open door.
Initial steps taken by the Houthis were also largely constructive, including the establishment of a capable technocratic government that could implement the promises of the 2012 political transition agreement. Since then however, the political situation has been spiraling out of control, culminating in the Houthi occupation of the presidential palace and the resignation of president Hadi’s government two weeks ago. Yemen, on the verge of political – and financial – collapse, is now rapidly running out of options.
In light of the bleak political situation, the former ambassador called upon the US administration to alter fundamentally its approach to Yemen. Bodine lamented the use of drones “as a strategy rather than a tool” of Yemen policy, pointing out that since the use of drones was escalated in Yemen under Obama, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) numbers had swelled from the hundreds to the thousands.
Instead, the US needs to make a commitment to governance and economic development a more explicit part of the its strategy. This would not require a significant change in the resources at the administration’s disposal. Sadly however, neither Americans nor Yemenis seem to be aware of these efforts. Increased publicity abouit this aspect of American policy would be a cheap and effective way to support fragile transition efforts.
Bodine warned against accepting the Saudi narrative of the Houthi rebels as Iranian stooges. While Iranian support of the rebels is evident, the Houthi movement is in essence an indigenous movement, and should therefore be approached as local political actors first and foremost. The prospect of a failed Yemen, with the potential for AQAP expansion in the south, would be a far more threatening scenario to the Saudi monarchy and its Western allies than the specter of increased Iranian influence.
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