Tag: Jordan
Eid mubarak!
Today and tomorrow mark the end of the month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast during the day. Tonight and tomorrow night they feast.
It has been a truly terrible Ramadan in Syria, where Kofi Annan’s peace plan has died (along with thousands of additional Syrians) and the Asad regime has intensified military action, especially in Aleppo. Prospects are not good: Asad refuses to step aside and the opposition refuses to negotiate with him. We are not yet at Bill Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate,” when both sides see no gain in continuing to fight and decide instead to talk.
Egypt has taken another unexpected turn, with elected President Morsy taking over by decree the executive and legislative powers that the military had previously reserved for itself. He did it with savoir faire: previous military leaders were retired with medals and new ones chosen from just below them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Morsy hails, and the military have reached a mutual accommodation, leaving Egypt’s secular revolutionaries out in the cold, which isn’t very refreshing in Egypt at this time of year.
In Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, the revolutions are looking a lot better. Libya‘s General National Congress, elected July 7, convened on schedule and chose as President Magarief, who promises to be a unifying figure. Tunisia is struggling to produce a constitution, with final approval delayed at least to April 2013 rather than October 2012. Yemen has made a start with military reform and is now embarking on preparations for its national dialogue, to be held in November and followed by constitution-writing.
Elsewhere counter-revolution is winning. Bahrain has sentenced human rights activist Nabeel Rajab to three years in prison. I wonder if he would have attracted more attention if his name were Pussy Riot. Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia have stifled any serious reform moves. In Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki has weathered political challenges and continues to accumulate power even as frictions between Baghdad and Kurdistan grow.
It looks as if the Arab awakening will continue mainly in North Africa, where it began in early 2011. While Libya has ample oil and gas resources, none of the other countries in which revolutions have come to fruition does. Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen all have serious economic challenges ahead. Syria will be an economic basket case the day after Asad is gone. If we want anything like democracy to prevail in these places, there is going to be a substantial bill to pay.
Marc Lynch has called this a cruel summer. It has certainly been that and worse in Syria. But those of us who have experience with transitions, especially in post-conflict environments, set the bar low. There has been progress elsewhere, even if halting and slower than hoped.
The big open questions are these: is Egypt getting back on track, or are we seeing a new, Islamist autocracy in the making? Can Saudi Arabia manage the succession to next-generation leadership without upheaval? Can the regional war that has begun in Syria be ended before it engulfs several other countries? Can Iran‘s nuclear ambitions be ended at the negotiating table, or will Israel or the United States attack?
No answers are needed today. It suffices to salute those who observe Ramadan with “Eid mubarak!”
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After the battle of Dimashq
In response to a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll showing Americans mostly unsupportive of bombing Syrian air defenses or sending troops there, @MaydaySyria this morning tweeted:
We don’t’ care, we don’t need you and your coward #Obama.
Certainly the armed opposition is showing a lot of daring. Today’s attacks in Damascus include a bombing that killed the Syrian Defense Minister, his deputy and possibly other major figures in the Syrian security establishment.
The Syrian army today responded:
the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stresses resolution to decisively eliminating the criminal and murder gangs and chasing them out of their rotten hideouts wherever they are until clearing the homeland of their evils.
It added:
whoever thinks that by targeting some leaders they could twist Syria’s arms is deluded, affirming that Syria, people, army and leadership, is today more determined to counter terrorism with all its forms and cutting off the hand of whoever thinks to harm Syria’s security.
So it looks as if the contest between the Asad regime and its inchoate opposition will be settled (or not) by force, not negotation.
The escalating violence in Damascus is occurring–not incidentally–at just the moment the UN Security Council faces a decision on whether to extend its observer mission in Syria. The Syrian opposition has generally wanted it withdrawn, because of its ineffectiveness. The Russians and the Asad regime have been trying to keep it alive.
I’m entirely on the side of the Syrian opposition in their efforts to bring down Bashar al Asad, but I’d like to see the UN observers stay. They have played a useful role in reporting the various massacres Asad has indulged in as well as its flaunting of the Annan peace plan with the use of heavy weapons in populated areas. I don’t see how reducing the transparency of what is going on in Syria will be helpful to ensuring a successful transition there. If the Asad regime survives and continues the violence against its opponents, the observers could continue to play a limited but useful role in reporting on what they see.
But I confess to another motive as well: if Asad goes, Syria is going to need an international presence to help keep the peace. The UN monitors could form the vanguard of such a peacekeeping force. Where we will find the needed numbers I have no idea. Once Asad falls, Syria will have numerous armed forces still in motion. Keeping them separate and protecting the civilian population will be no easy task. Conventional back-of-the-envelop calculations based on Syria’s population and geographic size would suggest a peacekeeping force of 50,000 or so. I have no idea where such a number would come from, though I can well imagine that Moscow will be offering.
If the international community fails to prepare for post-Asad Syria, there is a strong likelihood of massive violence against the regime’s supporters and sympathizers. Some will be able to protect themselves in Alawite strongholds. Others will flee to Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. But some will be trapped and vulnerable. “Politicide,” the murder of a particular political group, often follows revolution. It would be a serious mistake for the international community not to anticipate the need to protect Alawites, Christians, Druze and Sunni who remained loyal to Asad.
Much as I might wish the fall of the regime, I’ve got to recognize that what comes then is just as important. Excitement about current events should not blind us to future risks. If Syria implodes in a violent spasm of sectarian violence, or even breaks up, the Levant could find itself in chaos for years. Getting Syria onto a path toward unity, stability and eventually democracy is not going to be easy.
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Iraq and its Arab neighbors: no port in the storm
Speakers painted a bleak picture of a lebanized Iraq, weakened by internal divisions and unable to craft coherent regional policies, at a Middle East Institute event today.
Ambassador Samir Sumaida’ie, former Iraqi ambassador to the United States, likened contemporary Iraq to a leaking ship, barely floating on the regional political waters as storms rage all around. The Ambassador bemoaned the lack of support for secularists after the American invasion and lambasted American support to Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a Islamists. This policy worsened sectarianism. The United States left Iraq with a constitution that forbids discrimination on the basis of religion, but with an unwritten political pact that “lebanizes” the executive branch, with the presidency Kurdish, the prime ministry Shi’a and the speaker of parliament Sunni. This built-in sectarianism weakens the Iraqi state.
These internal divisions are at the heart of Iraq’s tepid relations with its Arab neighbors, who are standoffish, especially towards the Shi’a and Kurds. The Kurdistan Regional government conducts its own foreign policy, including a representative in Washington. The Ambassador is pessimistic about Iraq’s immediate future in the region: “it is in a crisis, but the horizon seems to be more of the same.” Only if Iraq improves its internal cohesion and mends fences with Kuwait and Turkey can it avoid being engulfed by the ongoing political firestorms raging in Syria.
Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, focused on the “brightly burning” Syrian flame. Like Ambassador Sumaida’ie, he bemoans Iraq’s internal lebanization, especially with regard to policies towards Syria. There is no coherent Iraqi policy, but rather multiple Iraqi policies toward Syria. The complex interplay of internal factionalization within Iraq’s weak state muddles its external relations, as each faction approaches the region in general, and Syria in particular, with an eye towards its own interests. The Kurds see events in Syria as an opportunity, not a threat; Masoud Barzani is strengthening ties to Turkey, trying to reassure the Turks that Kurdish interests are aligned with their own in the case of Syria. Sunni tribal leaders also see Syria as more of an opportunity than a threat: Syrian Sunnis in their view are throwing off the yoke of an Iranian-backed Shi’a minority. If it can happen in Syria, the thinking goes, why not in Baghdad? Despite some sympathy for the Syrian opposition, Iraqi Shi’a associated with Moqtada al Sadr are still wary of developments there, which threaten a regime aligned with Tehran. Prime Minister Maliki fears spillover from Syria that may damage Iraqi stability and security. This multiplicity of Iraqi approaches to Syria is driven by internal Iraqi political divisions, and is emblematic of the larger foreign and domestic policy problems facing Iraq.
Gregory Gause, professor of political science at the University of Vermont characterized Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy toward Iraq as passive. The Saudi view of Iraq and the Maliki government is negative, because they view the prime minister as an agent of Iran. The Saudis have done little or no outreach to Kurds or Iraqi Shi’a, and even with the Sunnis they have made no real appeal to Arabism. Saudi policy toward Iraq is a policy of complaint, not outreach. Saudi elites are focused on what appears to them a losing struggle for influence in the Middle East against Iran. This struggle for influence in the region plays out not through armies, but through contests for influence in the domestic politics of weak Arab states. The Saudis find Sunni allies, and Iran finds Shi’a allies. This sectarian alignment is counterproductive for the Saudis, because it gives Arab Shi’a in the region no choice but to ally with Iran. Ultimately, this will cause long-term problems for Saudi Arabia, Iraq and America, as it creates an atmosphere where al Qaeda type ideas can flourish. Other GCC states have largely followed Saudi Arabia’s lead.
John Desrocher, Director of the Office or Iraq Affairs at the Department of State focused on the positive, in terms of Iraq’s relations to its regional neighbors: Iraq and Kuwait have made “considerable progress in terms of resolving disputes,” relations with Jordan have improved, Saudi Arabia named an ambassador to Iraq for the first time since 1990, and Qatar airways now flies to Iraq. However, internal political divisions in Iraq have led to “real political gridlock” both in terms of domestic policy and regional relations.
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Playing chess with Mike Tyson
I might wish that were the name of William Dobson‘s book about how dictators are adjusting to contemporary pro-democracy rebellions, as the original text of this post said, but really it’s Dictatorship 2.0. I haven’t read it but intend to do so, as there was a lively discussion of it yesterday at the Carnegie Endowment with Karim Sadjadpour chairing, Dobson presenting, Otpor‘s Srdja Popovic and Marc Lynch commenting.
It is hard to be an old style dictator today, Dobson avers. Really only North Korea is left, as Burma has begun to adjust. The plug can’t be pulled on communications, which means dictators need to get savvy and use more subtle forms of repression: targeted tax inspections, contested but unfree and unfair elections (preferably with the opposition fragmented), control over television and the courts, big handouts to the populace. Dictatorships today do not aim for ideological monopolies but rather to prevent and disrupt mobilization.
Oppositions have to adjust as well. Srdja outlined the basics: they need unity, planning and nonviolent discipline. They must be indigenous. Internationals can help, mainly through education and help with communications. Protesters need to avoid confronting dictatorial regimes where they are strong and attack them where they are weak. You don’t challenge Mike Tyson to box; better to play chess with him. This means avoiding military action in Syria, for example, and focusing on the regime’s economic weakness. The contest is between opposition enthusiasm and the fear the regime seeks to impose. Humor and “dispersive” tactics that do not require mass assembly in the streets (work and traffic slowdowns, boycotts, graffiti, cartoons) are increasingly important in reducing fear.
Marc emphasized the sequence of events in the Arab awakening: Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia made people elsewhere realize what was possible, Mubarak’s overthrow in Egypt made it seem inevitable, Libya and Yemen were far more difficult, a reversal that has continued in Syria, where the regime has substantial support from Alawites and Christians afraid of what will happen to them if the revolution succeeds. The tipping point comes when perception of a regime changes from its being merely bad to being immoral.
So who is next? Saudi Arabia and Jordan are in peril, Marc suggested. Bahrain is living on borrowed time. Srdja suggested Iran, which is moving backwards towards an old style dictatorship after the defeat of its Green Movement, can only be challenged successfully if the protesters learn from their mistakes. They need better leadership and a focus on the state’s inability to deliver services. China, Dobson said, has been good at pre-empting large protests. Burma may not be adjusting quickly enough to avoid an upheaval.
I didn’t hear mention of Russia, Cuba, Algeria, and lots of other places that might be candidates, but no one was trying to be comprehensive. Wherever they may be, dictatorships will adjust to what they see happening elsewhere and try to protect their monopoly on power from those who challenge it. Their opponents will also need to adjust. It is thus in both war and peace.
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Shifting sands
Uncertainty is breaking out all over the Greater Middle East.
With Crown Prince Nayef’s death in Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud will soon have to look past its octogenarian leadership to the next generation, with all the uncertainties that implies. Will the next generation be as attached to religious and social Wahhabi conservatism as the current one? Will it open an era of serious reform?
The suspension of the UN monitoring effort in Syria presages an increase in violent conflict with a highly uncertain outcome. Russia seems determined to keep Bashar al Assad in power, though its Foreign Minister denies it. Iran will certainly exert itself in that direction. I doubt the armed rebellion can beat the Syrian security forces any time soon, but we could see a lengthy insurgency fed by Saudi and Qatari arms shipments through Turkey.
The only real certainty in Egypt is that the military is trying to hold on to power. Whether it can and what the consequences will be is highly uncertain, as are the results of today’s presidential election. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has arrogated to itself legislative power, which means it now has to deal with Egypt’s economy and social problems along security and law and order. I don’t know any military establishments equal to that task, but the risk of new parliamentary elections may be greater than the SCAF wants to run. It could end up forced to rule Egypt, likely badly, for some time to come.
Iraq‘s Prime Minister Maliki has faced down a parliamentary rebellion but Al Qaeda has renewed its murderous attacks against the country’s Shia. If they succeed in reigniting Iraq’s sectarian warfare, the promise of a relatively democratic society that produces a lot of oil will evaporate, leaving a bitter residue.
Iran‘s Supreme Leader Khamenei has concentrated power as rarely before in the Islamic republic’s history, but American and Israeli threats of military attack against it nuclear program make prediction even a year out difficult.
After ten years of rule by Hamid Karzai, even Afghanistan faces the uncertainty of an election (to be held no one knows when in 2013 or 2014) in which he will not be running and an end to the NATO combat role shortly thereafter.
I needn’t mention next month’s elections in Libya or the aging leadership in Algeria, where military success in repressing Al Qaeda in the Maghreb seems to have pushed the militants into the Sahel, where they are destabilizing several other countries.
A region that enjoyed decades of stability–some would say stagnation, much of it autocratically imposed–now registers high volatility. Of course volatility can move in either direction: there are possible positive developments as well as negative ones. Tunisia has pushed the envelope in the positive direction. Yemen seems to be making progress against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates, though some think the government offensive and U.S. drone attacks are creating more extremists than they are killing. Morocco and Jordan have attempted some modest reforms that seem unlikely to suffice, but they may stave off open rebellion.
It is not easy to deal with uncertainty. Most experts would recommend triage and prioritization. Triage happens naturally. There are only a few Middle East problems that will make it to the President’s desk: Iran and Egypt most frequently, Afghanistan because of the American troops, and we can hope Syria when Obama meets with Putin this week at the G-20 in Moscow.
Prioritization of issues is harder. Even those who recommend it muddle exactly what they mean. Colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment recommend in a recent overview of the situation in the Middle East:
international actors should focus on a few, very specific issues for special emphasis, such as international human rights standards, the maintenance of existing treaty relationships, and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.
But then they go on to recommend economic cooperation aimed at job creation, a non sequitur virtually guaranteed to disappoint expectations given limited U.S. resources and a track record of failure. Not to mention the difficulty of meeting human rights standards, since these require equal gender treatment not readily available in the workplace in many of the countries in question.
Shifting sands will make navigation in the Middle East difficult for a long time to come. I recommend to all my international affairs students that they learn Arabic, or another of the regional languages (Farsi most of all). Even if American oil production continues to reduce already low U.S. dependence on the Middle East, the global oil market and the extremist movements the region has spawned will ensure we remain engaged there for a long time to come, triage and prioritization notwithstanding.
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Ineffective solutions to the wrong problem
John Kerry’s renewed advocacy of safe zones and possible arming of the Syrian opposition provokes me to repeat what I’ve said before: these are ineffective solutions to the wrong problem. If you want to protect civilians, the worst thing you can do for them is to concentrate them in one place where Bashar al Assad can be sure he will be killing his opposition. And if you want to bring Bashar down, an armed opposition is one of the slowest and least effective ways to do it.
First, safe areas, corridors, or whatever you want to call them. They will not be safe because the UN Security Council declares them safe. Remember the safe areas in Bosnia and the UN protected areas in Croatia. They were target-rich environments, because that is where the enemies are. To make areas safe, you have to destroy the Syrian army’s capability to attack them, in particular with aircraft (including helicopters), missiles, artillery and armor.
In order to do that, you have to take down the air defenses. Think Libya times five or maybe ten, because Syrian capabilities are significantly greater. Libya was impossible without the jump start the U.S. gave the operation. And there is someone out there who thinks Jordan and Turkey will do Syria on their own? The EU and the U.S. are simply not going to engage in this effort–they have too much else on their minds, and the Americans want to keep the Russians on side for the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Second, arming the opposition. This is already happening to some extent–small arms circulate widely in the Middle East. But small arms aren’t going to stop armor, artillery and aircraft, or even mass arrests and torture. An assassin could of course get lucky, but armed rebellion has little prospect for overthrowing Bashar, whose army and other security services have remained cohesive. We can of course feed an insurgency in Syria, but that is no quick solution. Insurgencies typically take decades to succeed, and they more often don’t.
These propositions are not only ineffective. They would take things in the wrong direction. Safe areas would attract mainly Sunni Syrians, thus increasing the sectarian segregation that the civil war has already begun. Arming the opposition would also drive away from its ranks the relatively few Alawites, Christians, Druze and others who have joined its ranks.
Sectarian warfare comparable to what happened in Iraq in 2006-7 is just about the worst outcome imaginable in Syria from the American perspective. Odds are it would overflow to Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan.
If you want to intervene militarily in Syria, the United States should lead the effort and target the command and control of the Syrian armed forces, including Bashar al Assad himself. Talking about half measures that won’t work but instead make things worse is not helpful.
The consequences of a serious military strike on the regime are unpredictable. Would Bashar be killed? Who would take over? Would it intensify the civil war? How will Iran react? This too is a solution that could make things worse.
The Annan plan, even not 100% effective, starts looking like a reasonable proposition when you take a good look at the alternatives. We should stop talking smack about it and do our best to support it.
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