Tag: Kurds
The toughest nut in the Middle East
The Middle East Institute held their 7th annual conference on Turkey last week, gathering regional experts to discuss Turkey’s turbulent domestic politics and regional role. This post focuses on the regional issues discussed.
Haim Malka of the Center for Strategic and International Studies focused on Turkey-Israel relations. The reconciliation agreement following Israel’s 2010 raid on a Turkish flotilla headed to Gaza is being implemented. This is a mutually-beneficial, low-cost measure. Strategic cooperation is likely to remain limited.
Syria will test the renewed relationship as it is an arena where both Turkey and Israel’s interests intersect. Israel’s policy on Syria has to date been confused and vague, perhaps intentionally so, but ultimately the Israelis want to see a Syria with minimal Iranian influence. The fall of Iran’s ally Assad may be assumed beneficial to Israel, but the Israelis seem to have followed a ‘better the devil you know’ approach so far and do not appear to be supporting alternative political actors in Syria.
Bill Park of King’s College, London discussed Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which saw marked improvement in 2009 and 2010 due to trade and energy connections, shared mistrust of Maliki’s Baghdad government, and President Barzani’s role as a potential partner in the peace process with Turkey’s own Kurds (the PKK). While these foundations for positive relations remain, Turkey’s refusal to support Syrian Kurds in the fight against IS, Turkey’s re-establishing a relationship with Baghdad following the replacement of Maliki by Abadi, and a change in perception of Barzani’s leadership record have undermined the rapprochement.
Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Karim Sadjadpour discussed Turkey-Iran relations. There are notable commonalities between the two states as they suffer both a superiority and inferiority complex – both do not see their current status in world affairs as reflecting their histories as great empires. There is also a strong shared cultural history. The Iran-Turkey border has proven stable in an otherwise turbulent region for centuries. Also important is their economic partnership, with shared gas projects and common concern with Kurdish independence.
Having suffered from terrorist attacks, Turkey is disappointed in Iran following Assad’s lead, especially in ignoring the radical Islamist threat in Syria. Upcoming events could exacerbate frictions between Turkey and Iran. These include the upcoming US presidential election, the May 2017 presidential elections in Iran, and whether the nuclear deal lasts ten years.
Presenting the complex relationship of Turkey, the US and Kurds was Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow with the Wilson Center. She believes the US has an opportunity to use its leverage with the Syrian Kurds (the PYD) and Turkey to revive the Turkey-Kurdish peace process. This will require the US to abandon the fiction that the PYD and PKK are separate groups. The PYD is not seeking an independent state but rather a subnational federal unit within Syria, which the Kurds term “Rojava.”
While Turkey is unable to determine a military outcome, Ankara holds considerable soft power, especially in assisting the moderate opposition.
It was agreed among all the panelists that the US must articulate its policy for the region, and Syria in particular, as Turkey and its neighbors are looking for US leadership and unwilling to pursue their own policies without clarification from Washington. That is proving the toughest nut to crack in the Middle East.
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In the box can be good too
I enjoyed 90 minutes today with SAIS’s Mike Lampton and CSIS’s Michael Green commenting on Amitai Etzioni’s Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box, a recent Chatham House publication. Here are my speaking notes, though I should note much of the event focused on China, which was not within my remit:
- First let me say it has been a privilege to be required to read this book. It is a model of precision and intelligibility. Professor Ezioni says what he means clearly and concisely, marshaling the evidence with skill and erudition.
- My doubts have to do mainly with the title: it advertises thinking outside the box, but much of the book is devoted to ideas I would regard as well inside the box, even if some of them might be labeled “new normal.”
- Take, for example, the chapter on “defining down sovereignty.” A good deal of it is spent pooh-poohing the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and arguing in favor of a more contemporary alternative: sovereignty as entailing rights as well as responsibilities.
- This leads naturally to Responsibility to Protect, which is well within the box these days, and another, new to me notion, “responsibility to counter terrorism.” If states fail or refuse to do this, intervention might be justified, Professor Etzioni says.
- It’s an interesting idea that even explains some current behavior, in particular the anti-ISIL intervention in Syria, which the host government has not unauthorized.
- The downsides are all too clear: the slippery slope that leads to an unjustified excuse for invasion or other intervention, as in George W.
- The chapter on spheres of influence is not so much outside the box as it is outside the realm of academic discussion, as Professor Etzioni himself documents. Spheres of influence are a well-established practice in international affairs, even if the concept has not attracted much scholarly attention.
- Professor Etzioni sees spheres of influence, Russia’s “near-abroad” for example or Iran’s influence in Iraq, as providing space for rising regional powers and buffer zones that bolster a feeling of security.
- The trouble with that notion is that it discounts the will of those who live in these buffer states. The limits of his approach are all to evident in Ukraine, where Etzioni admits Russia used force to try to prevent the Ukrainians from choosing their alignment with Europe.
- People just aren’t always content to serve the purposes of other powers.
- When it comes to self-determination, I would quibble with Amitai’s characterization of Kurdistan as more democratic than the rest of Iraq, but more importantly he ignores the negative regional and internal political contexts for any independence move by the Iraqi Kurds. I doubt it will happen, or that it will be democratizing if it does.
- I would agree however with Amitai’s main conclusion: decentralization rather than secession is far more likely to produce positive outcomes in democratic societies like Spain, where unfortunately the central government has been unwilling to concede even that. That however is a conclusion well inside the box, not outside it.
- One concluding thought: Professor Etzioni repeatedly doubts the applicability of liberal democratic notions outside the family of liberal democratic states.
- As an American, I feel condemned to believe in universal rights, as our founding documents are all too clear on this subject.
- But I would also say that I’ve virtually never met someone outside the liberal democratic world who didn’t aspire to those rights.
- We don’t need to export the notion that all people are created equal. We only need to help people find ways of institutionalizing equal rights in ways that are appropriate to their particular contexts.
- All in all, a good and interesting read, even if the novelty is overblown.
I made two points in the discussion period worth recalling:
- Liberal democracy is not congruent with secularism, since we have liberal democratic states (where rights are in principle equal) like Italy and the UK with established churches (not to mention the penetration of religion into government in the US).
- Russia’s behavior in Ukraine cannot properly be attributed to NATO expansion. Putin has made it clear that he is trying to re-establish Moscow’s hegemony in what he considers Russia’s near-abroad. That is not a reaction to NATO expansion but rather an aggressive program vital to his view of Russia’s historic and cultural role, as well as to his domestic political standing.
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Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence prospects
Yesterday, the Woodrow Wilson Center convened three experts to discuss the viability of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and to critique and elaborate on a report on Iraqi Kurdistan by Amberin Zaman. The panel on “From Tribe To Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan On The Cusp Of Statehood” featured Amberin Zaman, a Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Center, Abbas Kadhim, a Foreign Policy Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, and Aliza Marcus, author of Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence.
Zaman views the Kurds in Iraq as closer to independence than ever before. Their warming relationship with Ankara means that Turkey can assist the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in achieving independence. In exchange for access to Kurdistan’s oil reserves, Turkey would likely be willing to protect the Kurds from Iran’s ire and give them access to trade routes and ports. Though she believes that Iraqi Kurdistan is ready for independence, she noted that the KRG must resolve its internal disputes before any kind of sustainable independence can be achieved.
Kadhim listed four elements that Iraqi Kurdistan needs before independence can be realized. The KRG needs:
- a united front, which means its two main political parties, the KDP and PUK, must resolve their disputes;
- full cooperation from Baghdad, with which it must negotiate borders, financial matters, and future diplomatic relations;
- regional cooperation, since the new state will be short lived if one of their powerful and temperamental neighbors (namely Turkey or Iran) strongly opposes independence.
- reliable international alliances in order to have their statehood approved and recognized by international organizations such as the UN.
Without these four elements, Iraqi Kurdistan cannot achieve true and sustainable independence from Iraq.
More skeptical, Marcus explained that Iraqi Kurdistan’s trouble isn’t rooted in the chaos created by ISIS and the drop in oil prices. Rather, its problems are rooted in the lack of viable civil institutions within the KRG. Kurdistan is experiencing a brain drain, wherein many of the best and brightest are leaving because they see no room for advancement within the confines of the KRG.
She also disagreed with Zaman’s prediction that Turkey will assist the KRG in achieving independence. Ankara is actually quite suspicious of Iraqi Kurdistan due to the PKK’s positions there as well as the PKK’s alliance with the PUK. Given Erdogan’s militant opposition to Kurdish autonomy in Eastern Turkey and Northern Syria, it is unlikely that he would support Kurdish independence in Iraq.
During the Q&A session, Zaman explained that Iraqi Kurdistan has a small window of opportunity for independence, due to the KRG’s warm relationship with Turkish President Erdogan and the respectability of Iraqi Kurdistan’s President Barzani. Once Barzani is no longer in power, the KRG’s ability to achieve independence will be diminished.
Kadhim said that Iran is opposed to the formation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, since Iran does not want to deal with ‘two Iraqs’. They would likely be more amenable to a division of Iraqi Kurdistan into a Shiite region and a Sunni region, wherein Iran would be allied with the Shiite region and focus on keeping the Sunni region and Iraq-proper weakened.
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After Mosul: military victory won’t suffice
As the Iraqi military and its allies prepare for a campaign to take back Mosul from ISIS, it is important to examine the strategic importance of the city and how the dynamics in Iraq might change once it is back in the state’s possession. This was the topic of a September 9 panel at the Hudson Institute After Mosul: The Imperative of Bolstering US Allies.
The panel was moderated by Eric Brown, a fellow at Hudson, who explained that much of the conversation surrounding Mosul is concentrated on a military defeat of ISIS and overlooks the potentially chaotic aftermath. Iraq, the US and their allies have no plan for keeping the peace after Mosul is taken back. The power vacuum that ISIS will leave behind will give other extremist groups the opportunity to throw their weight around to the detriment of citizens of Mosul.
Michael Pregent, also a scholar at the Hudson Institute, agreed. The current US strategy of punishing ISIS-held towns essentially recreates the situation that made ISIS strong in the first place. The disproportionate US focus on military victory leaves potential Iraqi allies without the support they need to establish sustainable democratic institutions. Pregent suggests that we focus on taking out high ranking ISIS individuals in Iraq and concentrate the majority of our resources on empowering Iraqi communities. By doing so, ISIS will begin to fade and Iraqi civil society will grow stronger and more sustainable.
In regards to Mosul specifically, Dylan O’Driscoll, a research fellow at the Middle East Research Institute in Erbil, explained that Mosul is too fractured to survive any sort of power vacuum. While the liberation of Mosul would be an excellent political boon for both Baghdad and Washington, the Iraqi army isn’t militarily prepared to undertake the task. Without a strong political agreement, Mosul will not stay liberated for long, as it will likely be torn apart by factional violence, leaving room for a neo-ISIS group to take control.
Dlawer Ala’aldeen, the president of the Middle East Research Institute, echoed the sentiments of the previous two panelists. He predicts that once Mosul is liberated, the US will shift its focus to Syria and will totally disengage from Iraq, leaving ISIS and its descendants to flourish. He emphasized the importance of intelligent decision making in Iraq. If the US does not learn from the mistakes of its previous forays into Iraq, it and its allies will be paying for it for decades to come.
The final panelist, Bilal Wahab, the Soref fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agreed with the other panelists and offered insight specifically on Iraqi Kurdistan. While Kurdistan has largely been a safe haven for stability and freedom, the Kurdish moment for independence is slipping away as a result of internal fissures within the KRG. There is no force to unite the Kurds. Disunity makes it difficult for the US or Baghdad to work with them. Their lack of unity in combination with their rising debt, stalled income as a result of low oil prices, and lack of sustainable infrastructure makes the KRG a less-than-ideal ally.
During the Q&A, Ala’aldeen suggested that the US use its leverage over the KRG and Baghdad to encourage democratic institution building, humanitarian aid and reduction of corruption. Both governments financially depend on the US and will respond positively to American pressure. He concluded by saying that the only long term solution to terror is good governance. In Iraq, good governance requires Western pressure.
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Peace picks September 12-16
- US Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility | Monday, September 12th | 9:00am – 12:00pm | US Institute of Peace | Click HERE to RSVP |
For more than two decades, addressing fragility has been an evolving bipartisan priority for U.S. policymakers. Yet growing understanding and consensus about the problem has failed to generate the strategic, unified, and long-term policies required to achieve solutions. Despite some progress, the United States and its international partners still struggle to prevent and reduce fragility.
With the next U.S. administration and Congress taking office in January, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for a New American Security, and the U.S. Institute of Peace this year formed an independent, non-partisan Fragility Study Group to improve the U.S. government’s approach to reducing global fragility. The group was advised by more than 20 former U.S. government officials, members of Congress, academics, and private sector leaders. Its report concludes that the incoming administration will have to exhibit remarkable discipline and imagination in choosing where and how to exert U.S. leadership. The study group offers recommendations for the next administration and Congress on ensuring more coherent policy responses among U.S. agencies, strengthening international partnerships, and developing the capabilities required to help fragile societies build more resilient, and thus stable, states. Following the discussion of the report by the study group’s chairs on September 12, scholars from each institution will preview several of a series of policy briefs to be released in coming months on specific portions of the new approach.
On panel one, William J. Burns, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Michèle Flournoy, CEO, Center for a New American Security, Nancy Lindborg, President, United States Institute of Peace, moderated by David Ignatius, Columnist and Author, The Washington Post. On panel two, Rachel Kleinfeld, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Loren Schulman, Deputy Director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security, Maria J. Stephan, Senior Policy Fellow, United States Institute of Peace - African Politics, African Peace | Monday, September 12th | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | US Institute of Peace | Click HERE to RSVP |
More than 100,000 peacekeepers deployed in Africa make up three-quarters of such United Nations troops worldwide, and they illustrate the frequent response of the African Union to defuse violent conflict with military forces. But the AU has another strength: political power. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace with researchers Alex de Waal and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot of the World Peace Foundation on September 12 for recommendations from their new report on how the AU can harness its unique advantage to advance peace and security. Their new report for the AU argues that the Union must move away from its reactive approach to violent conflict and draw on its inherent political strengths. Their extensive research includes case studies of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan. The authors, joined by AU representatives, will share major findings and offer policy recommendations for how the African Union can best harness its political expertise to reduce violent conflict on the continent and advance its mission of lasting stability. Featuring Alex de Waal, Executive Director, World Peace Foundation; Research Professor, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Program Director of the African Security Sector and Peace Operations Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, moderated by Princeton Lyman, Senior Advisor to the President.
- 20 Years Later: The United States and the Future of the CTBT | Tuesday, September 13th | 9:00am – 7:00pm | The Stimson Center | Click HERE to RSVP
Twenty years ago, the United States took a leading role in negotiations for a verifiable ban on the explosive testing of nuclear weapons. The result was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for signature September 24, 1996. Although the treaty has widespread domestic and global support, the CTBT has not yet entered into force because the United States and seven other key states have failed to ratify the treaty. This month, the Obama administration, along with other U.N. Security Council member states, are considering a resolution that reaffirms support for the global norm against nuclear testing and the eventual ratification of the CTBT. Please join the Stimson Center and Arms Control Association for a briefing on the security value of the treaty in the 21st Century and the purpose and status of the U.N. Security Council initiative. Featuring Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Adam M. Scheinman, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna, Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States, Michael Krepon, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center, will convene the meeting. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, will lead the question and answer session following the presentations of our panelists. - Mitigating Electoral Violence: Lessons from Nigeria’s 2015 Election | Tuesday, September 13th | 12:00pm -2:00pm | School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University | Email Ernest Ogbozor at eogbozor@gmu.eduto RSVPUncertainties characterized the period before Nigeria’s 2015 election, with many people predicting a possible outbreak of the worst election violence in the country. This led to different initiatives to mitigate potential violence during and after the election. This included the signing of a peace pact, referred to as the “Abuja Peace Accord” by the leaders of the two largest political parties. The 2015 election is now history, but many African countries have not learned from the Nigeria’s experience. As some African nations prepare for elections in the coming months; like Somalia, Gambia, and Ghana, the events unfolding in Gabon where a presidential candidate declared victory in an unannounced result of an election and further asked his opponent to call and congratulate him is of concern. Professor Attahiru Jega, a former Chair of the Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission during the 2011 and 2015 elections, and a current visiting scholar at the George Mason University will share his experience from the Nigerian elections and its implications for other countries. Featuring Professor Attahiru Jega, Former Chairman, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and a Visiting Scholar at the George Mason University, Professor John Paden, Clarence Robinson Professor, George Mason University, Professor Terrence Lyons, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
- From Tribe to Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Cusp of Statehood | Wednesday, September 14th | 9:30am – 11:00am | The Wilson Center | Click HERE to RSVP |
There is growing recognition that after decades of dogged, if at times unorthodox, efforts to build their own state, the Iraqi Kurds are on the cusp of formally declaring independence. It is no longer a matter of “if” but “when.” And the United States, as much as Iraq’s neighbors—Iran, Turkey, and Syria, which have restive Kurdish populations of their own—needs to be ready when Iraqi Kurdistan, the first real Kurdish state in the modern sense, is born. Most importantly, so do the Kurds. Join us for the launch of Amberin Zaman’s latest paper “From Tribe to Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Cusp of Statehood.” Featuring Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center; Columnist, Dikenand Al-Monitor Pulse of the Middle East, Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, and President, Institute of Shia Studies, Aliza Marcus, Author of Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence and moderated by Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center
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No risk it will happen soon
The High Negotiations Commission (HNC), which represents the non-extremist Syrian revolution and opposition forces in UN-hosted talks to bring an end to the war, issued its “Executive Framework for a Political Solution in Syria” today. It lays out how the opposition foresees a political transition away from Bashar al Assad’s rule to the transitional governing body (TGB) with full executive authority foreseen in a 2012 UN communique, and eventually to a full-fledged democracy.
There is no risk any of this will happen soon. But it is good to see the HNC, which has taken over political leadership of the non-extremist opposition, articulating a plan that is an excellent response to those who claim there are no moderates in Syria. They start with a six-month truce to allow for humanitarian relief, lifting of sieges, release of prisoners, negotiations, and preparation of a temporary constitution. There follows a 1.5 year transition that starts with the exit of Bashar al Assad and proceeds with the formation of the TGB, preparation of new election laws, and writing of a new, secular and pluralist constitution. The third phase sees adoption of the new constitution and elections. The document is studded with reference to inclusion, human rights, a 30% set aside for women, independence of the judiciary, separation of powers, and lots of other good things.
Like many documents of this sort, it is the missing pieces that are most interesting. On the Syrian Kurds, the Framework says:
The Kurdish cause shall be considered a national Syrian cause and action shall be taken to ensure their ethnic, linguistic, and cultural rights in the constitution.
There is no promise of territorial separation or autonomy, as in Iraq. In fact, the first of its “general principles” is this:
Syria is an integral part of the Arab World, and Arabic is the official language of the state. Arab Islamic culture represents a fertile source for intellectual production and social relations amongst all Syrians of different ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs as the majority of Syrians are Arabs and followers of Islam and its tolerant message which is distinctly moderate.
That isn’t likely to please the Kurds, who have been trying to carve out their own sub-state entity called Rojava along the border with Turkey. But it will please the Turks, who have been resisting emergence of a new Kurdish state (or sub-state) on their border.
Also missing is any clear idea of what happens to Assad. This is a virtue, since the people who wrote this document would like nothing better than to see him held accountable in a Syrian court, where the death penalty is still available. But that wouldn’t serve current purposes. Even in the wildest dreams of the Syrian opposition, Assad is not going to agree to his own execution. Implicitly, the HNC is prepared to see him escape Syria to go to wherever someone will have him, most likely Iran or Russia.
The HNC is proposing that fighting “sectarian militias, mercenaries, and terrorist groups designated as such by relevant Security Council Resolutions” should continue even after the political transition begins. That means the fight against the Islamic State and al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra (and its successor Jabhat Fateh al Sham?), both designated by the UNSC as terrorist, would continue. But it leaves ambiguity about other Islamist groups. The reference to sectarian militias and mercenaries is presumably to various Alawite National Defense Forces as well as Lebanese Hizbollah and other imported Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The TGB would incorporate
…all components of the High Negotiations Commission, as the body responsible for managing the negotiation process…and representatives of the regime whose hands have not been stained with Syrian blood, in addition to ensuring the representation of all strata of Syrian society.
Therein lies a good part of the diplomatic trick: choosing who will have power, even if exercised collectively, after Assad. No one associated with the regime who doesn’t have Syrian blood on his hands will be acceptable to the regime, which has tried to ensure that as many people as possible have participated in the repression, one way or another. Representation of all strata of Syrian society is a nice sentiment, but what it means in practice is in the eye of the beholder. Witness the difficulties Libya has faced in forming and giving authority to its Government of National Accord.
So the overall message of this elaborate document is positive: the HNC understands what a transition to democracy entails and the need for broad inclusion. But for the moment its finely crafted document is a dead letter. The opposition will have to do better on the battlefield, with help from its friends, to impose anything like this admirable solution.
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