Tag: Kurds
Stevenson’s army, February 16
– CNN has a typical day.
– WSJ’s Seib says he’s blending economic and foreign policy.
– WSJ says DOD is going big on robotics.
-CNAS writer has good to-do list for SecDef Austin.
– Erdogan blasts US for support to Kurds.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The problem no one really wants to solve
Ten years after its internal conflict started, Elizabeth Thompson of American University hosted a panel on what the the Biden Administration might be able to do about Syria. Conditions there are dire. US policy has been disappointing. What can a new president do to establish a legitimate government able to rebuild? Mustafa Gurbuz, also of American University, moderated.
Hadeel Oueis of BBC Arabic reminded what has gone wrong in Syria. The Assad regime responded brutally to protests, which pushed them in the the direction of militarization and Islamicization, as militia groups and Islamists had advantages in financing and organization. Peaceful change was quickly ruled out. Today, the best prospects are in the Northeast, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control security and the autonomous administration governs in a decentralized way, with strong participation by women as well as checks and balances.
Amy Austin Holmes of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested we don’t know what to expect from Biden about Syria specifically, a subject neither he nor his people have addressed except for humanitarian imperatives, but if he wants to reclaim US credibility and moral authority bold steps are needed on three issues concerning vulnerable people:
- ISIS still a big problem, especially at the Al Hol camp. Washington should take back its own citizens from there for trial in the US and establish a timeline for other countries to take back theirs.
- Christians and Yezidis still under threat. Hundreds of thousands have fled the Turkish intervention in northern Syria intervention and should be enabled to return home.
- Kurds, and in particular Kurdish women, have been excluded from diplomatic talks on Syria. They play strong roles in northeastern Syria in both the SDF forces and in the civilian autonomous administration. Biden has given women important roles in his own cabinet, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that women’s participation in peace talks leads to improved outcomes.
US forces are likely to remain in northeastern Syria to work by, with, and through the SDF, which has demonstrated significant capacity to overcome Arab/Kurdish tensions.
Dafne McCurdy of CSIS underlined that Syria will not be a top priority for Biden but that its humanitarian crisis ranks high, especially with Samantha Power at USAID. The situation is dire, but the US can have a positive impact because it is the biggest donor. It will need to focus on two priorities:
- Renewal of cross-border assistance in western Syria: The UN Security Council will vote in July on whether to keep open the one remaining authorized border crossing for aid to Idlib. If it fails to do so, the US may still be able to use nongovernmental organizations to ship aid across the border, but not at the scale that the UN is capable of.
- Reform of aid to regime-controlled areas, which Assad has used to reward supporters.
Humanitarian aid is not political, but stabilization assistance is, especially in an area of geopolitical competition. The US needs to buttress local authorities who stand up to outside meddling. But US goals have not been clear, because they are limited to one part of Syria and therefore disconnected from a nation-wide strategy. President Trump’s erratic policy did not allow stabilization to play its proper role in geopolitical competition.
Aaron Stein of the Foreign Policy Research Institute agreed that Syria is not a high priority for the Biden administration. The Syrian opposition won’t be a strong factor in its decisionmaking. The main issues will be humanitarian assistance and counter-terrorism. Washington needs to be talking with the Russians, who are in a strong position in Syria. Sanctions work to impoverish the Syrian regime, but they have been ineffective in producing a sustained political outcome. Some eventual sanctions relief in exchange for release of political prisoners is a possibility. The proliferation of arms and the large numbers of fighters will be problems for many years.
Idlib is essentially a stalemate, with Russia and the regime on one side and Turkey on the other, along with the HTS al Qaeda offshoot who are trying to soften their image. The best outcome is the status quo from the US perspective, but it leaves the US dependent on designated terrorist groups in both northwestern (HTS) and northeastern Syria (the PKK, which is the core of the SDF). The US is stuck with bad options.
Joshua Landis, University of Oklahoma, views Assad as having won militarily, as he now controls 65-70% of Syria’s territory but he wants it all. Washington wants political change and has used aid as a tool to feed the opposition as much as regime has used it against the opposition. Assad will focus in the immediate future not on Idlib, which is hard, but on northeastern Syria, because it is a soft spot. He may go after Tanf, which is important to trade links with Iraq and Iran. The Syrian people are pawns in larger geopolitical struggle
Trump used Turkey against Iran and Russia, thus limiting what Assad could do in the north. Biden is likely to be less friendly to Turkey but won’t want to undermine the Turks in Syria. Some Americans are talking about a federal Syria, with Idlib and the northeast remaining outside Damascus’ control as the US presses for regime change there. But in the end the big issues for the Americans are pulling Turkey out of Russia’s orbit and dealing with Iran. Biden might toughen on Iran in Syria because of the nuclear deal, where he will need to soften.
Bottom line: Syria is not a problem Washington will focus on, as there are no good solutions. But they are likely to keep troops there. If the Americans were to withdraw, the Kurds would be sitting ducks and would have to make a deal with Damascus. Their civilian and military organizations would crumble. At least now in the northeast there is a military command under a civilian government. In the northwest, military and Islamist forces rule under Turkish control.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | June 22-28
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live-streaming.
- Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves | June 22, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
Algerian officials in the northeastern border area between Algeria and Tunisia continue to permit the cross-border smuggling of petrol and other commodities. In turn, smugglers have participated in the authorities’ efforts to neutralize security threats, even as they continue to engage in the illicit trade. The two ostensibly adversarial parties effectively complement each other. In her new paper, Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves, Algerian political scientist Dalia Ghanem examines such paradoxes and argues that state formation remains an evolving process in the country.
Speakers:
Dalia Ghanem: resident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Max Gallien: political scientist at the Institute of Development Studies.
Isabelle Werenfels: senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
- Assessing the Implications of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act | June 22, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On June 17, the long-awaited Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into force, imposing the most comprehensive set of sanctions against Syria’s Assad regime to date. Aimed principally at preventing further war crimes by preventing any foreign investment into the Syrian regime, the sanctions will almost certainly have a consequential impact on Syria’s politics and economy. As the act comes into force, Syria is already beset by a spiraling economic crisis, the effects of which have generated unusually defiant and persistent anti-regime protests in the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda and rising levels of discontent within regime-held territories. Southern Syria faces an expanding insurgency, ISIS is slowly resurging in the central desert, Turkey is doubling down on a permanent presence in the northwest and for now, U.S. troops appear to be staying.
How will the Caesar Act’s sanctions be enforced and with what goals in mind? What effect are they likely to have within today’s context? Does a policy of escalating pressure on the Assad regime promise diplomatic progress or humanitarian suffering?
Speakers:
Amb. James F. Jeffrey: Special Representative for Syria and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
Rime Allaf: Syrian writer and commentator; board member, The Day After Project
Qutaiba Idlbi: Non-resident scholar, MEI; Syria fellow, International Center for Transitional Justice
Charles Lister (Moderator): Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs, MEI
- U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East | June 22, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
While prominent voices in Washington have argued that U.S. interests in the Middle East are dwindling and will require the United States to “do less” there, Jake Sullivan argued in a recent Foreign Affairs article that the United States should be more ambitious using U.S. leverage and diplomacy to promote regional stability.
Speakers:
Jake Sullivan: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Geoeconomics and Strategy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Jon B. Alterman: Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program
- Iranian Kurds: Challenges, Existence, and Goals | June 23, 2020 | 11:00 AM | Washington Kurdish Institute | Register Here
With 12 million people, the Iranian Kurds make up the second largest population of the Kurds in the greater Kurdistan. Similar to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the Iranian Kurds have been struggling for decades for freedom under the current Iranian regime. The Kurdistan region of Iran (Rojhelat) has the highest rate of political prisoners in the country. The regime’s discriminatory economic policies in Rojhelat have resulted in poverty and poor living conditions for the Kurds, which led many to become border porters known as Kolbars. Hundreds of Kolabrs are victims of the Iranian border guard attacks and executions every year. The dire political, economic, and security situation of Rojhelat continues under the current regime that has been suppressing its citizens on an ethnic and sectarian basis.
As the first founders of the Kurdish nationalism and political parties in greater Kurdistan, the panel will discuss the current situation of the Iranian Kurds and their goals. The panel will also discuss the Iranian Kurdish relations and cooperation with other opposition groups in Iran and potential future understandings.
Speakers:
David L. Phillips: Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights
Arash Salih: Representative of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan to the United States.
Salah Bayaziddi: Representative of the Komala Party to the United States.
Kamran Balnour: Representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party to the United States
- The World Economy After COVID-19: A Conversation with President Romano Prodi | June 23, 2020 | 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register Here
Join Johns Hopkins SAIS for a conversation with Romano Prodi, Former President of the European Commission (1999-2004); Former Prime Minister of Italy (1996-1998; 2006-2008). The event is moderated by Justin O. Frosini, Adjunct Professor of Constitutional Law, SAIS Europe; Director of the Center for Constitutional Studies and Democratic Development and Associate Professor, Bocconi University.
- The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division | June 24, 2020 | 7:00 AM – 8:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
The 2011 uprising in Syria totally transformed the religious establishment in Damascus. The regime sent into exile many prominent, influential religious figures who, forced to work from abroad, formed a religious opposition group called the Syrian Islamic Council. The regime also restructured what remained of the capital’s competing religious institutions. This robbed the religious establishment in Damascus of the financial and administrative independence that had been its key privileges. But it also presented new Sunni clerics from the capital’s hinterland with opportunities to enter the competitive religious arena — as well as posing a major challenge to the SIC, obliged to operate in exile. In her latest paper, The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division, Laila Rifai mentions how the religious sphere in Rural Damascus Governorate is poised to become a political battleground as both the regime and the exiled opposition seek to court a new rising group of religious leaders.
Speakers:
Laila Rifai: writer and researcher, specializing in Syrian religious affairs.
Thomas Pierret: senior researcher at CNRS-IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence.
Muhammed Mounir Al Fakir: fellow at the Omran Centre for Strategic Studies.
- Turkish-Israeli Relations: Prospects for Improved Diplomacy | June 25, 2020 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Over the past decade Israel-Turkey relations have been strained. There have been recent positive signs, however. Israel’s decision not to sign a statement by France, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and Egypt condemning Turkey’s actions in the eastern Mediterranean and a tweet posted by Israel’s official Twitter account praising its diplomatic relations with Turkey raised hopes. Turkish analysts saw the moves as a sign of both countries’ willingness to cooperate when it comes to eastern Mediterranean energy but tensions remain.
How does Israel and Turkey’s involvement in Syria and increasing opportunities for economic cooperation affect the prospect of improved bilateral relations? How will Israel’s plans for annexation and Turkey’s public support for the Palestinians affect diplomatic relations? Are there enough incentives to normalize Israel-Turkey relations or will the barriers be insurmountable?
Speakers:
Nimrod Goren: Founder and head of Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Karel Valansi: Political columnist, Shalom Newspaper
Gönül Tol: (Moderator): Director of Turkey Program and Senior Fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
- The Broader Implications U.S. Disentanglement from Afghanistan| June 26, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On 29 February, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban designed to allow for an orderly withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan by next spring if not sooner. Coming after many months of difficult negotiations, the decision carried a promise from the Taliban to deny to any terrorist group or individual the use of Afghan soil to undertake an attack on the United States or its allies. The accord also carried a Taliban commitment to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue quickly aimed at a peaceful resolution of the civil conflict. American policy for Afghanistan must be seen as well on a broader canvas of continuing U.S. diplomatic, political and military disengagement regionally. As in Afghanistan, withdrawal leaves unanswered many questions about how American national security interests may be affected, particularly at a time of increased great power competition.
What might be the impact of a full U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan on the course of the civil war and prospects for peace talks? What would the United States do if after departure the Taliban broke the terms of their agreement or threatened the survival of the Afghan state? How would the end of an American military presence affect relations with Pakistan? And is the United States prepared to accede to strongly increased Iranian, Russian, or Chinese influence in Afghanistan and the region?
Javid Ahmad: Nonresident fellow, Atlantic Council
Ronald E. Neumann: President, The American Academy of Diplomacy
J. Alexander Thier: Senior advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Senior fellow and deputy director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center
Marvin Weinbaum (Moderator): Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Asymmetric warfare and the great powers
I spoke last night at the Alexander Hamilton Society at Johns Hopkins’ Homewood campus. Here is what I said:
I have two points to make: the first concerns proxy forces, which are becoming the rule rather than the exception; the second concerns asymmetric or hybrid warfare, which is taking on new guises. But none of it is really new—warriors have always sought to strike an enemy where he is weak and to remove their own forces from danger.
Increased use of proxy military forces to enable great powers to duel with each other without engaging directly with their own military forces is already happening in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine. Iranian-trained and equipped militias, Turkey’s Turkoman and Islamist allies, America’s Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Lebanese Hizbollah, the Houthis, Haftar’s forces, and Russia’s mercenaries and Ukrainian proxies are playing central roles in contests that the U.S. or its Gulf allies are engaged in, mostly as adversaries against Russia or Iran.
In an era of great power competition, the inclination will be not to worry too much about our own proxies’ internal governance or abuse of human rights any more than we did during the Cold War. Realists and would-be autocrats will see that as idealistic claptrap. But governance matters to some of us. Let me remind you of what Alexander Hamilton said, in a strikingly different context, in the Federalist Papers:
Vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty.
It is hard to support Ukraine to win a military confrontation with Russia if Ukraine is a kleptocracy, which is why it was right for Joe Biden to back firing of a corrupt prosecutor and wrong for the Trump Administration to regret his firing, while still claiming to be against corruption. It is also hard to support UAE and Saudi forces that have committed crimes of war in Yemen, or switch to support Khalifa Haftar in Libya or Bashar al Assad in Syria. Domestic and international support for odious allies is difficult to muster. One of the reasons the Americans have backed the Syrian Democratic Forces is the Kurds’ relatively decent governance, but of course we ignore their PKK credentials and the PKK’s terrorist acts inside Turkey.
Let me turn to asymmetric warfare. Adversaries have agency. Asymmetric warfare is the product of their ingenuity. America is hard to fight on land or sea. Since the purpose of warfare is political, better to fight it where expensive armor and submarines count for less: among the people.
War amongst the people is taking on new meaning with the rise of geopolitical challengers. In Bosnia and Kosovo, we saw the use of human shields, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. We are now seeing the weaponizing of masses of people on a giant scale: Assad’s effort to drive one million IDPs from Idlib to the Turkish border and beyond with Russian backing is intended to rid his territory of people he thinks are opponents and break Turkey’s will in occupying parts of Syria. Human shields have become human spears. Turkey is using people as well, though in a less deadly way: by allowing refugees to cross into Greece, it is pressuring the Europe Union for more humanitarian assistance.
The Russian satellite states South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia as well as Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine likewise aim at political results: to make the parent states ungovernable and block their progress towards the West.
Hybrid warfare using other means other than population movements and puppet states is also on the rise. In the Balkans, the Russians are aiming at destabilization without spending much. They’ve tried assassination, cyberattacks, mass mobilization, illicit political financing, and social media. The U.S. is not above using all those tools as well. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Stuxnet, the color revolutions, financing of NGOs and political training, and the State Department’s more than 120 acknowledged Twitter accounts (not to mention the covert ones) may look to you and me like good causes, but they look like potent weapons to America’s adversaries.
We may not be headed into a Cold War with any single adversary, but we are certainly heading towards a geopolitical competition that will entail use of all the means available in an environment of shifting alliances and uncertain outcomes.
But in the end, it may not be state adversaries that bring us down via proxies, weaponizing people, and hybrid warfare. Something much smaller may put on display our own inadequate government services. It shouldn’t escape notice that Xi Jinping, Ali Khamenei, and Donald Trump are all at risk from the political and economic consequences of a virus. Defending populations from epidemics is not a new governance requirement, but rather a longstanding one. This, too, is war amongst the people, who might just demand some minimal competence and truthfulness in their governance.
Remember, again, Hamilton:
Vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Syria isn’t over
On October 6 last year President Trump and Turkish President Erdogan had a telephone call that altered US policy in Syria. The White House released a statement that the United States Armed Forces would not support or be involved in the Turkish operation into northern Syria. The US no longer deemed ISIS to have a territorial ‘Caliphate,’ leading the Administration to leave the area. This phone call resulted in the abandonment of a strong US ally, the Kurds in northeastern Syria, to face Turkey alone.
This policy shift served as the foundation of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy policy forum titled The New Status Quo in Northeast Syria: Humanitarian and Security Implications on January 23. The forum was composed of Gonul Tol, Founding Director of the Middle East Institute’s Turkish Studies Program, Wladimir van Wilgenburg, coauthor of the 2019 book, The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity, and Conflicts, and Dana Stroul, Kassen Fellow in The Washington Institute’s Geduld Program on Arab Politics.
SDF still functioning
Van Wilgenburg, who recently returned from a trip into northeastern Syria, utilized this map to illustrate the presence and role of geopolitical actors.
The yellow portion of the map is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which continue to control significant territory. Having visited Syria post-October, he noted the increase of Russian vehicles on the roads, replacing American trucks. Overall, van Wilgenburg stated that the situation on the ground has not changed tremendously; however, the Kurds are scared of possible upcoming demographic changes due to Turkish plans for the creation of refugee resettlement camps in the region.
Van Wilgenburg emphasized that the biggest problem for the SDF is that they still lack recognition from Damascus and are not official participants in peace talks. The economy is much better than in the areas the Syrian government controls, particularly with regards to electricity and water services. While Assad isn’t willing to make concessions to recognizing SDF, he does understand that without the 80,000+ SDF fighters, there would be a huge vacuum, as Syrian forces are not large enough to maintain the SDF territory. SDF is in a weaker state than it was prior to October, but it is still functioning, as long as the cease-fire holds.
Erdogan is worried about his domestic support
Gonul focused on Erdogan’s foreign policy, which is connected directly to his domestic policies. While Turkey’s hope was to create a Turkey-controlled safe zone stretching all the way to the Iraqi border with the capacity to host 1-2 million Syrian refugees, that has not happened. The pocket of Turkish controlled-area is significantly smaller than Erdogan’s intentions.
According to Gonul, Erdogan has not been speaking about Syria as much on local news because the topic is closely tied to domestic Turkish politics and his own status. Turkey is hosting close to 4 million refugees from Syria. This weakens Erdogan, as anti-Kurdish sentiment is strong and blames Erdogan for allowing so many refugees in.
Turkish Kurds have captured a historic 13% of the vote and deprived Erdogan a parliamentary majority. With the Kurds supporting the Turkish opposition, President Erdogan lost local elections in March. Erdogan is trying to marginalize and criminalize the Kurdish opposition. Gonul suggested that Erdogan’s failure to meet his goals in Syria has led to his shift of attention to Libya.
Turkey has also not delivered on capturing Idlib, where there are tensions between Ankara and Moscow. Despite their fragile relationship, Erdogan will not act in Syria without a Russian “green light.” Between tensions with Russia and the United States, Turkey is squeezed in Syria. Gonul does not believe Erdogan will defy the United States in Syria, as the threat of sanctions could strain the already weak Turkish economy.
Why the US Government should care about Syria
Stroul brought the conversation to a more global and US-centric arena, highlighting the core findings from the Syria Study Group report in 2019. She emphasized that Syria is of interest to the US for multiple reasons, but mainly because it represents a geostrategic nexus of threats facing the US: terrorism, Iran and it’s power projection into the region, and Russia and Great Power competition. Stroul disagreed with the notion that the conflict is over, suggesting that it is only entering a new phase. Stroul emphasized that since the Trump/Erdogan phone call there is no longer the same trust between the SDF and the US. This will lead to major consequences in the region.
All three panelists emphasized that refugees are not going to return to Syria at present despite Erodgan’s plan. Van Wilgenburg added that most of the refugees in Turkey that Erdogan is referring to are actually from Aleppo and other more western cities in Syria. They will not want to be relocated to northeastern Syria.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Iran is winning this round
The big news of the day is that Tehran will maintain its commitment to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections even though it will no longer be bound by the operational limits in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran nuclear deal). Why would it do that?
Because it is smart. There are several benefits:
- It will give the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese reason not to withdraw from the nuclear deal, thus keeping them split from the Americans;
- It will make it clear to the international community how far they are willing to go in preparing the materials needed for nuclear weapons, and at what point they are prepared to stop if given some sanctions relief;
- It will give them the moral high ground while possibly continuing clandestine nuclear weapons design, much of which can be done by computers without nuclear materials.
Washington meanwhile is losing on several fronts. It has had to suspend anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria, its claims of an imminent attack on US targets are less than credible, there are credible claims that Soleimani was carrying in Baghdad a peace overture to Saudi Arabia, and pressure to remove US forces from Iraq, or at least from Arab-controlled Iraq, is growing. The assassination of Soleimani has tamped down the anti-Iranian demonstrations in Iraq and has quieted the demonstrations against the Islamic Republic inside Iran as well. Even Riyadh is asking Washington to tone it down.
The Republican wizkids like Senator Rubio are speculating about US support for Kurdistan’s secession from Iraq, so that the American troops could stay there. But he forgets: Kurdistan has lost control of Kirkuk, without which its oil revenue is nowhere near sufficient to maintain it as an independent state, not to mention Turkey’s, Syria’s, and Iran’s reactions as well as China’s and Russia’s. Does Marco want the US to go to war to restore Kirkuk to Kurdistan’s control?
Donald Trump likes to upset the apple cart and create crisis, then pretend to resolve it, as he has done with the trade wars. This one won’t be an easy pretense. He has made Americans far less safe not only from Iranian attacks but also from ISIS and Al Qaeda, which are no doubt enjoying the relief. The only Iranians endangered so far other than Soleimani are Iranian-Americans, who are reportedly being stopped at our borders in droves and sent to secondary interrogation. I’ve been there and done that–it is not fatal–but it helps our enemies to claim that America only believes in equal rights for non-immigrant white people, which is pretty much the case for this Administration.
Hillary Clinton was correct when she said Donald Trump did not have the temperament to be president. Republicans in the Senate know that as well as anyone else. There is a good chance killing Soleimani will hurt Trump’s chances for re-election as well as Republican hopes of maintaining their majority in the Senate. It is high time they step up and provide the conditions for a serious and fair trial on the impeachment charges. John Bolton’s new-found willingness to testify if subpoened provides a golden opportunity. It would be truly ironic if Bolton and the Iranians were to be the causes of Trump’s undoing.
RSS - Posts
