Tag: Libya
Stevenson’s army, February 20
– President Biden’s speech to the Munich Security Conference signaled several policy changes.
– NYT says US is trying to avoid red lines with Iran.
– Although Biden hasn’t called anyone in the Saudi leadership, SecDef Austin spoke to MBS.
-Report to UNSC says Erik Prince helped organize mercenary army for Libya.
– FP reports disagreement in State over Uighur “genocide” label.
– Lawfare piece says China coast guard law violates Law of Sea treaty.
-Defense One article analyzes China’s military-civil fusion plan.
I don’t agree with everything I send around. Here’s an example. Several former intelligence officials argue that cyber deterrence requires strong offensive capability I have long believed that the US has a cult of the offensive preoccupation with cyber offense and that we need much more spending for defense and resiliency.
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Peace Picks | February 15 – February 19, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Iraq: A Road Map for Recovery | February 16, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Iraq faces a range of complex and interrelated challenges across the political, socioeconomic, and security sectors. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative, with support from DT Institute, convened a US-Europe-Iraq Track II Dialogue beginning in March 2020 and continued through virtual venues through December 2020. The dialogue brought together experts from the United States, Europe, and Iraq for a series of workshops to identify policies to help address Iraq’s cross-sector governance challenges. The attendees included a mix of former and current high-level officials and experts, all of whom are committed to a better future for Iraq.
In a new report, Iraq: A roadmap for recovery, Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff outlines some of the most important discussions, findings, and recommendations of the dialogue. The panel will explore some of the most important discussions of the working groups and share recommendations to support the government of Iraq on its road to recovery.
A link to the meeting will be sent to those who register to attend. The event is open to press and on-the-record.
Speakers:
Dr. Dhiaa Al-Asadi: Former Member of Iraqi Council of Representatives
Amb. Ramon Blecua: Former European Union Ambassador to Iraq
Amb. Feisal Al-Istrabadi: Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East; Professor of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy, Indiana University, Bloomington
Amb. Rend Al-Rahim: President, Iraq Foundation;
Former Ambassador of Iraq to the United States
Mr. Olin Wethington: Founder and Chairman
Wethington International LLC
Ms. Louisa Loveluck (Moderator): Baghdad Bureau Chief
The Washington Post
2. MENA’s Economic Outlook 2021: Challenges and Opportunities February 16, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Wilson Center| Register Here
This is a critical year to revisit economic hopes for the region. The COVID-19 epidemic will continue to constrict national GDPs and as vaccinations accelerate, countries will be looking beyond survival to recovery. The incoming Biden administration will be in the early stages of formulating its Middle East strategy, of which economic development will play a central role. Policy makers will need a carefully considered approach to dealing with a region in the midst of economic and political transformation. We believe this discussion will provide much needed clarity on key questions regarding economic opportunities and challenges facing MENA countries.
Speakers:
Jihad Azour: Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund
James F. Jeffrey: Chair of the Middle East Program;
Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS
Merissa Khurma (Moderator): Program Director, Middle East Program
3. Croatia: Opportunities and Obstacles to Peace and Economic Growth in the Balkans | February 17, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | The Hoover Institution |Register Here
In this ninth episode of Battlegrounds, H.R. McMaster and former President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović discuss education reform, peacebuilding in the Balkans, and strategies to achieve energy security and combat cyber-enabled information warfare.
H.R. McMaster in conversation with Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, First female President of the Republic of Croatia (2015- 2020)
Speakers:
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović: Former President of the Republic of Croatia (2015- 2020).
H.R McMaster (Moderator): Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
4. Building an Army Ready for Great Power Competition | February 17, 2021 | 1:30 PM ET | The Heritage Foundation | Register Here
The Army is aggressively preparing for Great Power Competition by moving beyond incremental improvements and making transformational changes across the entire force. Most notably, the Army announced People as their #1 priority, enabling resources to efforts that take care of people and transform how to manage talent. Army transformation includes implementing new doctrine, new organizations, new ways to train, modern equipment, and how the Army competes around the world. Just recently, the Army announced a new model called Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) to balance priorities and requirements. These changes ensure the Army maintains strength for the Great Power Competition environment already on the horizon.
As the Army moves into 2021 there are, however, some storm clouds on the horizon. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley recently predicted “a lot of bloodletting” as the Pentagon tries to fund all the necessary programs in a constrained funding environment. A new administration, with undoubtedly different priorities, will be soon sworn in. The recruiting environment remains difficult.
Speakers:
General James C McConville: 40th Chief of Staff of the US Army
Thomas Spoehr (Moderator): Director, Center for National Defence
5. Nonstate Armed Actors and the US Global Fragility Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities | February 18, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
In December 2020, the United States released its first U.S. “Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability,” as called for in the 2019 Global Fragility Act. To maximize the strategy’s efficacy, the U.S. government must ensure the implementation plan has a clear goal and theory of success, as well as addresses pressing challenges such as the fallout from COVID-19 and efforts to subvert peace. Chief among these challenges will be nonstate armed actors who are an entrenched driver of violence in nearly every potential priority country, from Central America to East Africa and beyond.
On February 18, the Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors at Brookings will hold a panel discussion examining how the U.S. government should think about working with, and through, nonstate armed actors in implementing the fragility strategy. The discussion will address the following questions: How should the Biden administration approach working with nonstate actors as a potential means to maximize efficacy of conflict prevention and stabilization? What, if any, broader changes should it make to engage such actors? What challenges and opportunities do nonstate armed actors pose in potential priority countries?
Speakers:
Matthew D. Steinhelfer (Keynote): Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations – U.S. Department of State
Frances Z. Brown: Senior Fellow, Democracy, Governance, and Conflict Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
George Ingram: Senior Fellow – Global Economy and Development, Center for Sustainable Development
Patrick W. Quirk: Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Vanda Felbab-Brown (Moderator): Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors; Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
6. Turning a Blind Eye: the Human Cost of Trafficking | February 18, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Friends of Europe | Register
Human traffickers run sophisticated operations. Often bypassing border officials, national and local police – and on occasion the judiciary – human trafficking is intimately intertwined with migration. Reports have brought to light how women are taken by trafficking networks during their journey and face widespread sexual exploitation. And the danger does not end at the border – even after arriving at reception centres, shortages of police and guardians for unaccompanied children create hotspots for exploitation and smuggling.
There isn’t a major city in Europe that doesn’t benefit from human trafficking of women and girls. Furthermore, the proceeds of trafficking underpin illegal arms, drugs and terrorism. This is a sinister and dirty equation, and yet we in Europe largely turn a blind eye to it. Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, recently released its annual risk analysis, claiming to provide a comprehensive picture of the European Union’s migratory situation. Yet, missing from the picture – human trafficking and its significant impact on women and girls. As the European Commission looks towards its 2021-2025 Action Plan against migrant smuggling, it will be vital to address protections for those on the move and the relationship between human trafficking and organised crime.
This Policy Insight debate will broach the realities of migrant smuggling and address the steps that must be taken to ensure that people on the move can undertake safe and legal journeys.
Speakers:
Ana Christina Jorge: Director of Operational response Division at Frontex
Notis Mitiarachi: Greek Minister of Migration and Asylum
Malaika Oringo: Founder and CEO of Footprint to Freedom and member of the International Survivors of Trafficking Council
Monique Pariat: Director-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) at the European Commission
Dharmendra Kanani: Director, Asia, Peace, Security and Defence, Digital and Chief Spokesperson
7. Libya: The great game. A decade of revolution, civil war and foreign intervention | February 18, 2021 | 11:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Ten years after the 2011 revolution that overthrew Muammar al-Qaddafi, the Biden administration is facing renewed challenges in Libya. Placed at the center of great powers’ diverging geopolitical interests, such as those of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Russia, Libya will face enormous political, economic and security challenges in the foreseeable future. The Biden administration must now face the current state of play: The United States’ diplomatic absence has left the country in turmoil and facilitated the intervention of foreign powers in the country.
The panel will explore the role of international actors in the post 2011 Libyan political landscape. The panel will also analyze their interactions, as well as the relationship these actors have with forces on the ground. Please join the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs in collaboration with the Tripoli-based think tank Sadeq Institute for a public conversation to launch the upcoming publication of the Sadeq Institute’s book part of a long reads collection: Libya: the Great Game. A Decade of Revolution, Civil War and Intervention.
Speakers:
Steven A. Cook: Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow, Middle East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Marta Dassù: Senior Advisor for European Affairs, The Aspen Institute
Anas El Gomati: Founder and Director, Sadeq Institute
Deborah K. Jones: Former United States Ambassador to Libya
Karim Mezran (Moderator): Director, North Africa Initiative, Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
8. Veterans, Novices, and Patterns of Rebel Recruitment ? | February 18, 2021 | 12:15 PM ET | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Register Here
Why do insurgents recruit experienced fighters at some times and untrained novices at others? Research suggests that insurgent organizations place a premium on committed members who demonstrate political devotion. But research also suggests that groups are willing to compromise on commitment when compelled by other priorities. The speaker will argue this extends to recruitment of experienced fighters who are capable and knowledgeable, but also less committed and generally riskier. Specifically, he expects groups will accept these risks and recruit veteran fighters when initially building their organization, when transitioning to new modes of warfare, and when competing with peer organizations for dominance.
At other times, groups should more readily focus their efforts on novices who can be molded to fit their less urgent operational needs. The speaker will evaluate this theory with a case study of Al Qaeda in Iraq and its successor, the Islamic State. This research sheds light on an understudied component of insurgent recruitment that has implications for organizational behavior, counterinsurgency, intergroup conflict, and civilian victimization.
Speakers:
Evan Perkoski: Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program
9. Is Now Finally the Time to Discuss Inequality in Lebanon? | February 19, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Here
Lebanon’s political economy has long been described as exceptional. The trope of a “Lebanese economic miracle,” in which Lebanon is a paragon of economic success, was long amplified by the ruling elite in order to maintain a status quo.
The 2019-2020 crises not only swept away this idea but also made blatant another kind of exceptionalism in the country—its record-high income and wealth inequality, which is perpetuated by the corrupt political economy. Extreme inequality is not a new phenomenon, however; rather it was brushed aside by the ruling elite, which largely consists of the nation’s wealthiest.
How can Lebanon create a new economic model that would put social justice at its core? Did the 2019 revolution create the opportunity to think and design policies that could decrease inequality levels? Join us for a conversation with Lydia Assouad, Toufic Gaspard, Haneen Sayed, and Gregg Carlstrom to discuss Lebanon’s worsening inequality and Assouad’s latest paper, Lebanon’s Political Economy: From Predatory to Self-Devouring, on Friday, February 19 from 5:00-6:00 p.m. Beirut (10:00-11:00 a.m. EST).
Speakers:
Lydia Assouad: El-Erian fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center where her research focuses on public and political economics.
Toufic Gaspard: Former senior economic adviser to the Lebanese minister of finance and adviser to the International Monetary Fund.
Haneen Sayed: Lead human development specialist at the World Bank.
Gregg Carlstrom: Middle East correspondent with The Economist.
10. The Syrian Civil War and its Aftermath | February 19, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute’s (MEI) Syria program is pleased to announce a panel discussion to launch Syrian Requiem: The Syrian Civil War and its Aftermath (Princeton University, 2021). In this volume, the authors trace the origins and escalation of the conflict from 2011 protests in Deraa to the current state of widespread humanitarian devastation and displacement a decade later.
The authors will be joined by MEI Syria Program Advisory Council Member Rime Allaf and MEI Senior Fellow Robert Ford, who will reflect on the origins and development of this conflict and explore what avenues exist today toward reconciliation, humanitarian relief, or solutions for the millions of displaced Syrians around the world.
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Itamar Rabinovich (author): President, the Israel Institute; Israel’s Chief Negotiator with Syria in 1990s
Carmit Valensi (author): Research fellow, Institute for National Security Studies
Rime Allaf: Advisory Council Member, MEI Syria Program
Amb. (ret.) Robert Ford: Senior fellow, MEI
Charles Lister (Moderator): Senior fellow and director, Syria and CTE programs, MEI
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America is back, but where and how is not yet clear
President Biden today in two appearances at the State Department–one for the staff and one to address foreign policy–was anxious to say that America is back to diplomacy, to the defense of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and to cooperating with allies. His foreign policy will, he said, benefit Americans, whose security and welfare will be primary goals.
He is clear enough about Russia and China. He’ll be much tougher on the former than Trump, calling out its repression and even murder of dissidents and countering cyberhacking and election interference, while seeking areas of common interest like the already extended limits on strategic nuclear weapons. On China, the policy will be similar to Trump’s in aiming to compete as well as cooperate, but with more attention to human rights and less inclination to trade wars, though the tariffs don’t appear to be coming down yet.
In the Middle East, Biden was clear about one thing: he wants a negotiated end to the war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen and will cut off American support to the Saudis and Emiratis. So much materiel has already been transferred that this make take some time to have a logistical impact, but the psychological impact will be immediate. The Hadi government the Saudis and Emiratis have backed is going to have to cut a deal or step aside so someone else can. It is unclear what the Houthis will be willing to yield, as they currently have the upper hand in much of the fighting, but we’ll find out soon enough.
Biden has also made it clear he is prepared to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal) if Tehran does likewise. But the sequencing of the respective returns, and precisely what they amount to in terms of sanctions relief and nuclear reversal, are still unclear. So is any future nuclear agenda: the Iranians have so far refused widening, deepening, or prolonging the JCPOA.
On the rest of the Middle East, Biden has left things unclear. He has said little or nothing about:
- Syria, where the US still has forces pursuing ISIS, protecting oil wells, and cooperating with Kurdish-led insurgents regarded as terrorists by NATO ally Turkey,
- Palestine, though he has renewed diplomatic contacts with the Palestinian Authority and will presumably return to the two-state goal Trump tried to obliterate,
- Iraq, where US forces were drawn down to 2500 by his predecessor,
- Libya, where the UN has been making some apparent progress on ending the civil war.
- Egypt, where President Sisi has imposed a renewed autocracy at least as ferocious as either of his two immediate predecessors.
Each of these countries is at least as important to the United States as Yemen, but it is unclear what “America is back” means to them. Americans are tired of these longstanding messes, whose resolution is hard to tie directly to American security and welfare, even if we know that withdrawal from them could be costly.
America is really good at getting in, especially if can be done with warplanes and troops. It is much harder to get out, which requires diplomacy. But at least we now have a president who believes in diplomacy and is prepared to back America’s diplomats.
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Good grief: problems with friends and adversaries
Anyone who thinks there is no risk of US military action in the Middle East before January 20 hasn’t been paying attention to
- President Trump’s efforts to block reversal of his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement and to reassert his declining political relevance at home;
- The refusal of the Defense Department to brief fully the incoming Biden transition team and the reversal of its decision to withdraw an aircraft carrier from the Gulf;
- The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s interest in continuing Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, Tehran’s decision to enrich uranium to 20%, and Iran’s desire to avenge the assassinations of Generals Qassem Soleimani and (nuclear physicist) Mohsen Fakhrizadeh;
- The Tonkin Gulf and Iraq war precedents, the former an intentionally manufactured excuse for escalation and the latter a fabulous miscalculation, at best.
Flying B52s around the Gulf is not in itself particularly dangerous. Nor is the passage of an Israeli submarine through the Suez Canal or patrolling by the USS Nimitz. But their maneuvers were deliberately publicized, supposedly as deterrence against Iranian attacks. That may be their intention–hard to tell. But even minor or incidental responses by Iran or its surrogates could drive an erratic president to take retaliatory action aimed at shoring up his own image and political relevance as well as hampering re-entry into the nuclear deal.
Fortunately, Tehran seems determined not to give Trump an excuse for military action. They seem anxious to deal with Biden. His National Security Adviser is signaling willingness to return to the status quo ante, but he wants Iran to be willing to engage on missile issues in a regional context. That means America and its allies in the region would also need to be willing to discuss missiles. That isn’t going to be an easy sell.
After January 20, Biden is going to face a cool reception in the Middle East from America’s friends. Trump’s strongest supporters–Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia–will not welcome Biden, as he will be critical of their human rights abuses. Turkey is also on the outs with the US, mainly right now over its purchase of the S400 air defenses from Russia. Iranian proxy forces imperil US troops in otherwise friendly Iraq. The war in Yemen has tilted heavily in the direction of Iran’s favorites, the Houthis, while the US Congress wants the US to stop supporting the Saudi and Emirati intervention there. The war in Libya has tilted towards the Turkish-supported government in Tripoli, leaving the Emiratis on the losing side and the Egyptians scurrying to reach a modus vivendi with the UN-supported government in Tripoli.
Just about the only unalloyed welcome for Biden will be from Jordan and the Palestinians, two of the weakest reeds in the Middle East, as well as Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. There will be early decisions required on the Palestinians, in particular whether to re-initiate aid to them through the UN Refugees Works Agency. Biden will happily inherit the “Abrahamic accords,” which exchanged American goodies for Emirati and Bahraini normalization of relations with Israel. But the supposed normalization with Morocco entails American acceptance of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which Biden may well want to reconsider and possibly reverse.
Biden will have as many problems with America’s friends as with its adversaries. He will want to be critical of Saudi imprisonment of women activists as well as the Kingdom-ordered murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Israeli settlements and annexation of the Golan Heights, Iraq’s failure to rein in paramilitary forces that threaten US troops, Turkish attacks on US-allied Kurdish forces in Syria, and Emirati as well as Turkish violations of the UN arms embargo on Libya. But each of those moves will risk undermining US influence in a region where it is already waning. As the US seeks to withdraw from Middle East commitments, Russia, China, autocrats, extremists, and other undesirables will move to fill the vacuum.
These challenges above all require skilled diplomacy. But the State Department is a shambles and the Defense Department is close behind. The Biden appointments so far in both places are superb people with deep experience. They’ll need it. They won’t want to spend time and energy on the Middle East, which is a region of declining US interest. But it is a region where a lot can be lost, even if little can be gained.
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Stevenson’s army, December 1
The Hill has some data, though not all seats have been determined.
Glimmers of bipartisanship over stimulus.
Supreme Court tentative on census question.
DOD IG says UAE is aiding Russian military in LIbya.
NBC 4 reports on burrowing into civil service.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Forty-five years is too long to wait for a referendum
Bouela Lehbib, who was a Middle East Institute research intern with me in 2019 during his time as the first Fulbrighter from Western Sahara, writes:
The 29-year UN-brokered ceasefire that had been in place since September 1991 between the Polisario Front and Morocco has collapsed. Morocco’s military incursion on November 13 in the Guergarat’s buffer-strip — a UN- designated demilitarized zone in the south-western corner of Western Sahara — prompted the Polisario Front, a liberation movement seeking independence, to resume armed struggle.
Morocco claims its operation comes as a response to “restoring free circulation and commercial traffic” towards sub-Saharan Africa. It had been blocked since October 21 by dozens of Saharawi civilians protesting peacefully against what they consider Moroccan occupation of their land and plundering of their natural resources.
The Polisario Front sees Morocco’s move as a violation of the ceasefire and a bid to alter the status quo in its favor. Both parties had agreed according to the UN peace plan of 1991 to keep maintain the status quo until the final status of the territory is decided.
Tensions have been on the rise in Guergarat since 2016, when Morocco tried to asphalt an approximately 5-km road in Western Sahara, across the buffer strip and into Mauritania near Nouadhibou. The Polisario interfered with the work, claiming it was illegal. The military agreement No.1, signed in the late 1990s, forbids any military presence in the buffer strip. It allows, though, Saharawi civilian circulation under Polisario Front control.
There was no crossing point at the time of the ceasefire agreement. It was introduced by Morocco on March 2001. Although MINURSO, the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara, warned Morocco the road construction and change of the status quo “raised sensitive issues and involve activities that could be in violation of the ceasefire agreement,” the latter went ahead with the work.
For Rabat, ensuring a crossing point and an asphalted road in Guergarat is strategically and economically significant. Since 2010, Morocco has invested widely in West African countries, becoming the first investor in the region and the third in all Africa, with its communication, construction, and bank enterprises leading the market. In 2017, it had officially requested to become a member of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. Though admission was blocked, Morocco still has political and economic clout in the region and seeks to neutralize the Saharawi Republic in the African Union, which it joined on January 2017. An asphalted road in Guergarat would link Morocco to ECOWAS economically but, most importantly, it contests the Polisario Front in the 20% territory it considers liberated.
Pundits blame the UN for the region slipping into tension. MINURSO has not fulfilled its mandate of holding a self-determination referendum according to Security Council resolution 690. Nor has it maintained a neutral position as an independent entity. Its vehicles carry Moroccan plates and its staff passports carry Moroccan stamps. The UN is playing a waiting game.
Security Council members, including the US, bear some of the blame. Its do-nothing policy and effort to ignore 45 years of low-intensity conflict have allowed the return of war. Joe Biden’s victory has raised the possibility that a shift in US policy towards Western Sahara could fix past mistakes. A self-determination referendum that both Morocco and the Polisario Front accept and the UNSC ratifies remains by far the best way out of this long-standing dispute.
With war in Libya and chaos in Mali, the new conflict in Western Sahara is likely to expose the region to much more instability. But it can also be an opportunity for the new Administration, as the moment looks ripe to bring a just solution to what many see as the last colony in Africa.
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