Tag: Israel/Palestine
Mission leap
I’ve been wondering, as many of my readers have, how long the war in Gaza will continue. This depends on what Hamas and Israel are trying to achieve. What is the mission? What is an acceptable end state?
Hamas has been pretty clear: it wants an end to the siege of Gaza, which means opening it to trade and commerce with both Egypt and Israel. Hamas also wants release of the West Bank operatives Israel arrested in the prelude to this latest Gaza war. It will resist demilitarization and try to maintain its hold on governing Gaza.
Israel is more of a mystery to me, so I listen carefully when an Israelis speak. They initially seemed to focus on ending Hamas’ rocket threat. But Iron Dome has effectively neutralized the rockets, one-quarter to one-third of which have either been used or destroyed. Destroying many more would require a full-scale reoccupation of Gaza, which the Israelis are loathe to do.
The tunnels into Israel now loom larger as a security threat, albeit one limited to the immediate surroundings of Gaza. So far, the Israelis have destroyed about half the tunnel network. But in order to be effective, the tunnels have to come up inside Israel. Sooner or later–likely sooner–the Israelis will acquire the technical means to detect the digging. The tunnels could then be destroyed inside Israel, making the kind of operation now going on in Gaza unnecessary. It may provide some satisfaction to destroy a couple of years of digging, but it puts Israeli soldiers at risk. If alternative ways are developed to reduce the threat they would obviously be preferable.
Israel’s objectives do not seem to be limited to restoring calm (aka ending the rocket attacks) and destroying the tunnels. It appears to want to break Hamas’ will to fight. The Israelis think they share this objective with Egypt, which regards Hamas as a Muslim Brotherhood organization and therefore an implacable enemy of the restored military regime in Cairo.
Both Egypt and Israel would like to see a post-war political evolution that puts the Palestinian Authority (PA) back in charge of Gaza. Israel has had bad experience trying to engineer regime change in the Arab world (witness the 1956 effort to overthrow Nasser and its later Lebanon machinations). But the Israelis still imagine they can, with cooperation from the international community, help the PA by steering reconstruction funding from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and border openings in the right directions. Hamas was already in trouble before this latest war, perhaps even on the verge of collapse as a viable governing entity. More radical groups like the Islamic State have little traction in Gaza, the Israelis think.
Unless one side or the other is victorious, the end of this war will likely involve a trade: improved security for Israel, reconstruction and economic benefits for Gaza. But there is no guarantee of the political outcome the Israelis and Egyptians are hoping for. Displacing Hamas entirely is not just mission creep but mission leap. In the meanwhile, Gaza’s civilians are paying an exorbitant price.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
An unhappy Eid
For most Muslims, today marks the begining of Eid al Fitr, the feast thats end the month of Ramadan. It won’t be an Eid Mubarak (Blessed Eid) for lots of people: there is war in Syria, Iraq, Gaza/Israel, Sudan and Libya, renewed repression in Egypt and Iran, instability in Yemen. The hopes of the Arab spring have turned to fear and even loathing, not only between Muslims and non-Muslims but also among Shia, Sunni and sometimes Sufi. Extremism is thriving. Moderate reform is holding its own only in Tunisia, Morocco and maybe Jordan. Absolutism still rules most of the Gulf.
The issues are not primarily religious. They are political. Power, not theology, is at stake. As Greg Gause puts it, the weakening of Arab states has created a vacuum that Saudi Arabia and Iran are trying to fill, each seeking advantage in their own regional rivalry. He sees it as a cold war, but it is clearly one in which violence by surrogates plays an important role, even if Riyadh and Tehran never come directly to blows. And it is complicated by the Sunni world’s own divisions, with Turkey and Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia opposing it.
The consequences for Arab civilians are dramatic. Well over 100,000 are now dead in Syria, half the population is displaced, uncounted more are dead in Iraq and millions more displaced. Egypt has largely reversed the liberation of its aborted 2011 revolution but still faces more violence than before it. Libya has been unable to tame or dissolve its militias, which are endangering its population and blocking its transition. While the total numbers killed in the Gaza war are far smaller than in Syria or Iraq, the percentage of civilians among the victims–and the broader impact on the civilian population–is causing anti-Israel revulsion worldwide.
Greg wants the United States to favor order over chaos. The trouble is it is hard to know which policies will do what. Will support for Iraq Prime Minister Maliki block the Islamic State, or will it incentivize extremist recruitment and make matters worse, perhaps even causing partition? The military government in Egypt, with which Greg thinks we should continue to engage, is arguably creating more problems with extremists in Sinai and the western desert than it is solving with its arbitrary and draconian crackdown against liberals as well as Islamists. The Obama administration is inclined to support America’s traditional allies in the Gulf, as Greg suggest, but what is it to do when Qatar and Turkey are at swordpoints with Saudi Arabia ?
Many Arab states as currently constituted lack what every state needs in order to govern: legitimacy. The grand failure of the Arab spring is a failure to discover new sources of legitimacy after decades of dictators wielding military power. The “people” have proven insufficient. Liberal democracy is, ideologically and organizationally, too weak. Political Islam is still a contender, especially in Syria, Iraq and Libya, but if it succeeds it will likely be in one of its more extreme forms. In Gaza, where Hamas has governed for seven years, political Islam was quite literally bankrupt even before the war. Their monarchies’ ability to maintain order as neighbors descend into chaos is helping to sustain order in Jordan and Morocco. Oil wealth and tribal loyalties are propping up monarchies in the Gulf, but the demography there (youth bulge and unemployment) poses serious threats.
The likelihood is that we are in for more instability, not less. Iran and Saudi Arabia show no sign of willingness to end their competition. They will continue to seek competitive advantage, undermining states they see as loyal to their opponent and jumping in wherever they can to fill the vacuums that are likely to be created. Any American commitment to order will be a minor factor. This will not, I’m afraid, be the last unhappy Eid.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Gaza enigma
The current Gaza war is an enigma. Israel’s “mowing the grass” strategy, if it can be called by that offensive label, condemns it to repeated military efforts intended to provide respites from attacks without the prospect of an acceptable long-term political outcome. Hamas’ use of rockets and infiltration that kill few people but terrorize many seems calculated to shore up its reputation for “resistance” but likewise to lack a political end state.
Yet when some Israelis and Palestinians describe what it is they would like to see happen, there is a hint of similarity. Hamas’ proposal for a ten-year truce includes
…lifting the Israeli siege in Gaza through the opening of its borders with Israel to commerce and people, the establishment of an international seaport and airport under U.N. supervision, the expansion of the permitted fishing zone in the Gaza sea to 10 kilometers, and the revitalization of Gaza industrial zone.
Or, as a statement from Gaza “academics, public figures and activists” put it: “we call for a ceasefire only when negotiated conditions result in the following:
- Freedom of movement of Palestinians in and out of the Gaza Strip.
- Unlimited import and export of supplies and goods, including by land, sea and air.
- Unrestricted use of the Gaza seaport.
- Monitoring and enforcement of these agreements by a body appointed by the United Nations, with appropriate security measures.”
The devil, as always, is in the details, which I suppose are covered in that stunningly undramatic phrase “with appropriate security measures.”
Once the current conflict is over, Israel is not going to want Hamas to be free to import more rockets. But even a retired Israeli Brigadier General writes:
Weakening Hamas may ultimately produce a cease-fire arrangement that prevents the remilitarization of Gaza — with Egypt effectively sealing its border with the territory — and deters Hamas from using violence. Such an outcome may allow for the opening of Gaza’s crossings to extensive humanitarian assistance and economic development channeled through the Palestinian Authority, to the benefit of the people of Gaza rather than Hamas.
There is of course a potentially big gap between “unlimited” and “unrestricted” in the Palestinian version and “extensive” in the Israeli version, but both statements seem to recognize that the Gaza status quo ante was not sustainable. I find it hard to believe Hamas will ever agree to anything resembling demilitarization, but depriving it of longer-range rockets may not be beyond possibility. Deputy National Security Adviser Blinken pushed the demilitarization line yesterday on NPR.
Anyone who has been to Gaza understands that its relationship with its nearest neighbors is a major determinant of the welfare of its people and their economy. Cut off from Israel and Egypt, it is an open air prison. Unless Egypt is prepared to take it back, an option some Israelis would like to pursue but few Egyptians would countenance, Gaza needs commerce with Egypt and Israel even to begin to thrive.
This isn’t as visionary as it may sound to some.I am reminded of a colleague who keeps Kosher and attended a meeting in Gaza in the period between the two intifadas. Could the hotel supply Kosher food? Of course, it replied, through contacts in Israel.
There are Palestinians and Israelis who don’t want their common interest in commerce to prevail over mutual loathing and military confrontation. The current destruction in Gaza will make the road back to a more normal relationship long and hard. Palestinians will seek justice. Israelis will want security. It will sound as if they agree on nothing.
But still it is important to keep in mind that wars end, people return to more normal discourse, relationships and commerce. Jews and Arabs have known periods of strife, or worse than that, and periods of coexistence, or even more than that. The enigma is not forever.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Palestine needs new political options
After days of rising hostilities and predictions of a third intifada, Israel launched a ground invasion of Gaza last Thursday night. The number of displaced Gazans has nearly doubled and neither Hamas nor Israel has shown any sign of concession. Critiques and counter-critiques abound, from Hamas’ refusal of the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire to Israel’s relentless military offensive. On Thursday, the American Task Force on Palestine (ATFP) hosted “Israeli-Palestinian War in a New Regional Landscape” with a panel of its own experts. Ziad J. Asali, Saliba Sarsar, Ghaith Al-Omari, and Hussein Ibish discussed the current humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the political realities that could play out in the future.
Al-Omari, ATFP Executive Director, analyzed the current political dynamic between Israel and Hamas. “We are entering a posturing moment before a deal is struck for the ceasefire,” he stated. Both sides have made their priorities clear and have proven how much is at stake in this longstanding conflict.
After weeks of heightened tensions, Prime Minister Netanyahu initially accepted the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire this week, while Hamas refused it. Hamas has thus received a great deal of criticism from the international community due to the continued loss of civilian lives. Al-Omari stated that this decision derives from Hamas’ three fundamental objectives in the current conflict:
- Hamas wants to emerge in a position that would allow it to claim some form of victory. Thus far, they have entirely failed to do so.
- Hamas needs a ceasefire that provides some kind of gain. Again, Hamas has failed in this as well, with the Egyptian ceasefire proposal allowing no territorial or political advantages.
- Lastly, Hamas wants Qatar and Turkey to play a role in the ceasefire. Neither has had a significant role so far, as Egypt has been in the lead.
Hamas has prioritized its own objectives, at great humanitarian cost to Gazans in the last several days. Thus, Al-Omari stated that it is absolutely necessary that we open up Gaza in the short-term. Egypt and the US can play a critical role in this context and it is ultimately in their best interests to do so.
Many other regional factors have also had an impact on the current hostilities between Hamas and Israel. Ibish, ATFP Senior Fellow, discussed divisions within Hamas, which is both a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate and an ally of Iran. Hamas is also in need of external help, as support from Syria has dried up. The rise of ISIS also causes concern.
At the end of the day, the outcome of this current violence will most likely look a great deal like the “old normal.” This is exactly what Hamas doesn’t want—it will be a crushing blow after the violence and innocent lives lost to return to the way things were. This “old normal” is a desperate box and Hamas is doing everything it can to get out of it, as evidenced by its controversial refusal of the ceasefire this week.
The Palestinians ultimately do not have a lot of options: they lack domestic choices and the great majority does not trust Hamas or Fatah. It is also evident that an increasing number of Palestinians have put more and more blame on Hamas with each rise in hostilities.
According to Asali, President and founder of ATFP, we must rebuild the credibility of the Palestinian leadership and open up the political space. If the international community is as invested in a two state solution as it claims, it can assist, with funding. International sponsors can demand the political space be opened up and another round of elections in the future. They can aid in a protracted campaign with a broader range of candidates other than Hamas and Fatah. This would allow more moderates who better represent the Palestinians to emerge. There never has been a more opportune time to put the international community’s words to the test and break the grim cycle of violence.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
I surrender
While I agree with those who see the world developing in positive directions over the longer term, I confess to feeling drained of all I have to say for the moment on Gaza, Ukraine as well as Iraq, Syria, Libya and several Balkans conflicts. Somehow this struck a chord:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Post hoc ergo propter hoc
Nathan Thrall, an International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst in the Middle East, wrote Thursday in the New York Times:
the most immediate cause of this latest war [in Gaza] has been ignored: Israel and much of the international community placed a prohibitive set of obstacles in the way of the Palestinian “national consensus” government that was formed in early June.
This is a classic case of the logical fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc: after this, hence because of this.
Thrall is right about the merits of support for the national consensus government. It would have been a good idea. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s allergy to negotiating with a united Palestine has more to do with his own hesitation about a two-state solution than it does with Hamas, with which Israel is in daily contact under normal conditions. But the notion that failure to support the national consensus government caused the war, and therefore the West is responsible, is both logical and analytical nonsense.
The most immediate cause of the ongoing Gaza war lies in the objectives of the warring parties. Israel says it is trying to end Hamas’ rocket and infiltration capabilities, by destroying rockets, launchers, manufacturing facilities and tunnels. Hamas says it wants release of its cadres re-arrested after the murder of three Israeli teenagers, as well as relief from the Israeli blockade of Gaza. I doubt either will achieve more than a small portion of its objectives, but both seem prepared to sustain the effort for weeks if not months.
Thrall however purveys the notion that Hamas would not have gone to war except that it was denied funding to pay its civil servants. He writes in reference to the funding:
Hamas is now seeking through violence what it couldn’t obtain through a peaceful handover of responsibilities.
This ignores Hamas’ stated war aims and strains credibility. If paying civil servant salaries were its primary objective, Hamas would stop manufacturing and launching rockets so that it could redirect the resources. If it wanted the border crossings with Egypt opened for legitimate trade, as Thrall also claims, it would have done well to accept the Egyptian-proposed ceasefire, since Cairo controls them.
Thrall is no better on Israel’s war aims. He describes them this way:
Israel is pursuing a return to the status quo ante, when Gaza had electricity for barely eight hours a day, water was undrinkable, sewage was dumped in the sea, fuel shortages caused sanitation plants to shut down and waste sometimes floated in the streets. Patients needing medical care couldn’t reach Egyptian hospitals, and Gazans paid $3,000 bribes for a chance to exit when Egypt chose to open the border crossing.
No doubt there are Israelis who wish these plagues on Gaza, and they may return as a result of this war. But Israel’s government will clearly not be satisfied with the status quo ante, which it would define not in terms of undrinkable water but rather in terms of the missile and infiltration threat.
Thrall’s inability to state Israel’s or Hamas’ war aims dispassionately and accurately renders his conclusion illogical and even silly:
The current escalation in Gaza is a direct result of the choice by Israel and the West to obstruct the implementation of the April 2014 Palestinian reconciliation agreement. The road out of the crisis is a reversal of that policy.
Does he seriously believe that Hamas would be so pleased with Israeli willingness to talk to the national consensus government (in which Hamas is not directly represented) that it would agree to use financial transfers to pay its civil servants rather than to buy more rocket fuel? Is Israel likely to find reversal of its policy on Palestine’s national consensus government an attractive proposition from the perspective of ending the rocket and infiltration threats?
I agree with Thrall about the virtues of a “generous” ceasefire that enables Gaza to obtain the resources needed for its administration and to trade legitimate goods and services with the rest of the world. But there is no evidence that those are Hamas’ primary concerns, or that meeting them would convince Hamas to lay down its arms.
Regular readers of peacefare.net will know that I have often criticized ICG work on the Balkans in recent years. I fear the sloppy syndrome has infected its Middle East work as well. Neither ICG nor the New York Times should fall for post hoc ergo propter hoc.
RSS - Posts
