Tag: Israel/Palestine
The end is nigh, again!
I made a bunch of predictions a year ago. Here is how they turned out:
- Iran: the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense. Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action. If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011. No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh). I wasn’t far off on this one. No Green Revolution, no military action yet.
- Pakistan: it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse. The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis. Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan. Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use. It got worse, as suggested. No I did not anticipate the killing of Osama bin Laden, or the increased tensions with the U.S., but otherwise I had at least some of it right: growing internal tension, no Army takeover, some American success.
- North Korea: no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be. Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul. I did not predict the death of Kim Jong Il, but otherwise I got it right. There was military action during the year, but no artillery barrage against Seoul.
- Afghanistan: sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July. But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective. There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces. This is pretty much on the mark.
- Iraq: no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented. But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues. The big unknown: can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)? I did not anticipate the break between Maliki and Iraqiyya, but I pegged Maliki’s intentions correctly. The Arab/Kurdish disputes are still unsettled.
- Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate): Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose. That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens. My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves. Wrong so far as I know about the Americans offering a detailed settlement, even if Obama’s “land swaps” went a few inches in that direction. Right about failure and Israel’s unfortunate direction.
- Egypt: trouble. Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow. Pretty good for late December, though I was happily wrong about Mubarak hanging on.
- Haiti: Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes. Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements. Presidential election was held and things have improved. Haiti has been calmer than anticipated. Good news.
- Al Qaeda: the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize. They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level. Happy to be wrong here too: they did not succeed, but they did try several times. And they did not recentralize.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter. Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others. Yemen has pretty much gone over the brink, and parts of Somalia are on their way back. Pretty much on the mark.
- Sudan: the independence referendum passes. Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat. Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls. Close to the mark, though Darfur has not deteriorated as much as I anticipated, yet.
- Lebanon: the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments. Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them. Four indictments were delivered against Hizbollah officials. I was also right about yawning and stretching.
- Syria: Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel. The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians. Dead wrong on both counts.
- Ivory Coast: the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!). The French and UN settled it by force of arms instead of the first-class ticket. Not cheaper, but less long-term trouble.
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance. If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket. If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction. He failed and the predicted delay ensued.
- Balkans: Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking. Right on Bosnia, wrong on Kosovo.
I’m content with the year’s predictions, even if I got some things wrong. Of course I also missed a lot of interesting developments (revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria, for example). But you wouldn’t have believed me if I had predicted those things, would you? Tomorrow I’ll discuss 2012.
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OK Santa Claus, here’s what I want
I’m hoping it’s true Yemen’s President Saleh is coming to the U.S. As that eagle-eyed young journalist Adam Serwer tweeted: “not to prosecute him…would be, u know, awkward.” That set me thinking about other good fortune that might come our way this Christmas eve:
1. Syria’s president Bashar al Assad decides he really wants to practice opthamology in London.
2. North Korea’s “supreme commander” Kim Jong Un wants to see professional American basketball so much he decides to give up the nuclear nonsense and buy an NBA team for Pyongyang instead. Lots more prestige and very lucrative.
3. Iran follows suit, abandoning its pan-Islamist pretensions, separating mosque and state and restoring close relations with Israel. It also buys an NBA team for Tehran.
4. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki declares peace on earth and good will towards Sunnis and Kurds, steps down from power and invites Iraqiyya to name a replacement.
5. The new Islamist-run governments in Tunisia, Egypt (and yes, eventually) Libya follow the Iranian example, which convinces them separation of mosque and state are the best protection for religious freedom and will encourage religious devotion, as it seems to do in the U.S.
6. The Saudis rise to the occasion and do likewise, making the king a constitutional monarch to boot.
7. Bahrain does the same. Yemen gets not only a democratic government but lots of water.
8. Without implacable enemies, Prime Minister Netanyahu reaches a quick agreement with the Palestinians, whose state is admitted to the UN with no opposition.
9. The Taliban see that their Islamist counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are on to a good thing and reach a power sharing agreement with the Northern Alliance, jettisoning President Karzai and precipitating an early American withdrawal.
10. Pakistan follows up American withdrawal and the new government in Kabul by reaching a broad-ranging agreement with India, including self-determination for Kashmir.
11. Al Qaeda opens a resort on the Somali coast called “The Caliphate.”
12. I retire to observe the peaceful competition between China and the United States, who compete in ping pong but do everything else collaboratively.
If Santa Claus really does exist, children, he’ll bring me those things for the 12 days of Christmas. If he doesn’t, then…
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What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
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The game is changing, but to what?
More than a little difficult to sum up today’s Middle East Institute “game changer” conference in a few words, but here’s a try:
1. Enthusiasm for Arab spring, with lots of uncertainty about both transition and how it will come out in the end. It is still the first five minutes. Economic problems loom.
2. Tunisia could be a hopeful bellwether: good electoral process, moderate Islamist victory, clear roadmap.
3. Libya shaky, with militias the big immediate problem but the constitutional framework provides a clear roadmap ahead, if they can stick with it.
4. But Egypt is the big prize. Things there are not going well: security shaky, military holding on, electoral process too complicated, liberals fragmented, Muslim Brotherhood strong, economy weak.
5. Revolution likely to succeed sooner or later in Syria, but possible high cost (civil war) and high payoff (depriving Iran of an important ally). Arab League moves do make a difference.
6. Also like to succeed in Bahrain and Yemen, but cost may also be high there.
7. Little hope to revive the Israel/Palestine peace process before the U.S. presidential elections, though Dan Kurtzer argued strongly for a bold U.S. initiative to define parameters.
8. Iran is gaining in Iraq and Afghanistan, but losing in Syria and the Arab world generally, as Turkey and smaller Arab monarchies gain but Saudis do not.
9. Israel, facing many uncertainties, hopes for preservation of the status quo but navigates when need be.
10. Lots of change, but overall outcome not yet clear.
These are obviously only my impressionistic highlights. I’ll be glad if others chime in.
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Waffling, weak-kneed, paltry stuff
Carl Bildt, Sweden’s able foreign minister, today tweeted this “good conclusion” from the Euroepean Union meeting today:
In the light of the new IAEA report, which is to be considered by the IAEA Board of Governors, the Council expresses its increasing concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme and the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts. It condemns the continuous expansion of Iran’s,enrichment programme, and expresses particular concerns over the findings of the IAEA Director General report on Iranian activities relating to the development of military nuclear technology. Iran has been found in violation of international obligations, including six UNSC and ten IAEA Board Resolutions. We urge Iran to address the international concerns over the nature of its nuclear programme
through full cooperation with the IAEA and by demonstrating readiness to engage seriously in concrete discussions on confidence building steps, as proposed by the HR on behalf of the E3+3. The Council recalled the latest European Council conclusions inviting it to prepare new restrictive measures against Iran. The Council will continue to examine possible new and reinforced measures and revert to this issue at its next meeting, taking into account Iran’s actions.
There may of course be something lurking here that is not spelled out: we can hope that there will in fact be “new and reinforced” measures out of the next meeting. But on the face of it, this is waffling, weak-kneed, paltry stuff from people who should know better and by now be ready to act.
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Best freebie next week
Game Changer: Policy and Politics
For a New Middle East
The Grand Hyatt Hotel
1000 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Thursday, November 17, 2011
8:45am-5:30pm
Conference Schedule
8:45am-9:00am – Opening remarks
Ambassador (ret.) Wendy Chamberlin, Middle East Institute President
9:00am-10:30am – After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy in the Middle East
Steve Clemons, New America Foundation, The Atlantic
Ambassador (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Princeton University
Ambassador (ret.) Ron Schlicher, Former US Department of State
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Deputy Assist. Secretary of State-NEA
10:45am-12:15pm – The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
Esraa Abdel Fattah, Egyptian Democratic Academy
Michele Dunne, Atlantic Council
Larry Diamond, Stanford University
Radwan Masmoudi, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
2:15pm-3:45 pm – Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
Abdelkhaleq Abdalla, UAE University
Jamal Khashoggi, Al-Arab TV
Haim Malka, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mohsen Milani, South Florida University
Paul Salem, Carnegie Middle East Center
4:00pm-5:30pm- Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
Adel Abdellatif, UN Development Programme
Odeh Aburdene, OAI Advisors
Iman Bibars, Ashoka/MENA
Ambassador William B. Taylor, US Department of State
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