Tag: Moldova

Another long war in the offing

Mark Hertling, a retired lieutenant general who knows his stuff, offers on Twitter a good explanation of what is going on inside Ukraine:

Ukrainians currently outgunned, but not forever

A few weeks ago, as the “new phase” was being discussed, I suggested we should look for a couple things happening in the east and south of Ukraine. We’re very early in that new phase & there are indicators those things are happening. Let’s review what we should see. What RU has done is reinforce with lots (repeat, LOTS) of tube and rocket artillery. That is according to RU doctrine. To penetrate an enemy’s defense, RU uses mass artillery barrages all along the front. They’ve been doing that. And it is deadly.

There’s two ways to counter massive artillery strikes. 1. Get out from under it (giving up land) 2. Conduct counterfire with your own artillery after pinpointing the enemy’s guns with radar. While Ukraine’s army (UA from here out) have some Russian 152 mm cannons, and they are receiving LOTS of guns (155 mm cannons) from the US & NATO, there’s 2 problems. 1. UA is running low on 152 (Russian) ammo 2. The western guns/ammo ain’t there yet.

Yeah, yeah, I know @PentagonPresSec said the guns/radars are arriving fast, and *some* are already there. But they’re not all at the front, with the ammo, just yet. Things just don’t magically move to the front & get into the fight immediately in combat. A seque: during combat our division fielded MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush protective) trucks, due to an IED threat. Trucks. Not hard to learn. Not hard to drive. No triggers to pull. It took us awhile. Fact: fielding ANY new equipment to units in combat takes time.

So there will be counterfire fights between RU and UA, but it might be awhile. So UA has to give up ground. When they do that, the RU will send in “reconnaissance in force” or RFI. Small combat units to take limited objectives in multiple places. That’s what we’re seeing now in several locations in the east & south. Lots of Russian artillery barrages against the front line, followed by smaller RU combat units attempting to seize terrain/cities/critical objectives. RU artillery is working.

The RU maneuver forces……are undermanned, not well supplied, not well led, are on ground they’re not familiar with, and they don’t do maneuver all that well. So we’re seeing RU forces temporarily take ground, then being pushed back by the smart, better led, more adaptive active defense of the UA. Finally…we’re about 7-10 days (at best) into this second phase. It will go for awhile. New forces are feeling each other out in the east. RU will initially outgun with arty, then it may become a big arty duel. But UA maneuver force will outperform the RU.

The other front

The other front is in Washington DC. There President Biden has launched a money salvo. He is asking for $33 billion more to support Ukraine. That is a lot of money, on top of $17 billion or so already spent. The Americans are also talking about using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.

These moves betoken a broadening of US objectives. Defense Secretary Austin says he wants to weaken Russia so it can’t in the future invade other countries. President Biden has labelled President Putin a genocial war criminal who should not remain in power. Secretary of State Biden is more circumspect, but it is clear that the Americans are now aiming for a clear Russian defeat and Putin’s fall from power (at the hands of his own people, Biden has clarified). These things are not happening anytime soon, so anticipate a long war and even more spending.

The Russians are also going long

The Russians have also changed their objectives. They gave up on capturing Kyiv and installing a puppet government there. Now they aim to take all of Donetsk and Luhansk in the east and the entire southern coast, most of which they already control. But they are stalled at Mykolaiv and will have a hard time swallowing a big city like Odesa, which had about one million inhabitants before the war.

The only major city they have taken so far is Mariupol, which they had to destroy to occupy. Resistance there continues. The Russians may try to use their 1500 or so troops in the Moldovan region of Transnistria to attack Ukraine from the west, but that should not be hard for the Ukrainians to counter. Russian artillery attacks on Kyiv while the UN Secretary General was visiting there signal Moscow’s determination to continue the fight, but current Russian objectives will not be achieved any time soon.

How long can Ukraine take it?

War often involves miscalculation, at least by one side or the other. Both the Americans and Russians have had to recalibrate. Only the Ukrainians have kept constant. They want to push the Russians entirely out from Ukrainian territory, but might well settle for Russian withdrawal to pre-February positions. The issue for Ukraine is how long its population can take the terrible devastation the Russians are wreaking. So far, the Ukrainians are stalwart. Another long war is in the offing.

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Stevenson’s army, April 28

– WSJ says Russia making slow progress in southern Ukraine.

– Microsoft says Russia has been hacking Ukraine.

– Moldova events raise fears of wider war.

– Axios says pro-Israel groups have been involved in primary fights.

– RollCall notes that the Senate has been having only 1/3 as many votes on amendments as 30+ years ago. Only in passing does it mention what I think is the cause — repeated filling of the amendment tree.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, April 27

– UK says Ukraine controls most of its airspace.

– Russia halts gas shipments to Bulgaria & Poland.

– WaPo has background on Moldova .

US warns Solomon Islands about China pact.

– UN modified rules on Security Council vetoes.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, April 23

[The magnificent “Merchant of Venice” ends its run at STC tomorrow.]

– An issue that may come up in next week’s discussion of the Courts is the Chevron Doctrine and delegation of powers to the bureaucracy. See this CRS report.

Moldova worries about Russian threats

– Cornell prof says sanctions won’t stop the Ukraine war.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Want to make an impression? Send the airborne

Last month’s threat by Serb political boss Milorad Dodik is fading into the holiday mist. No one who watches Bosnian poitics should relax. He has made it clear his goal is de facto secession of Republika Srpska. This regional entity’s authority extends to 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory.

Dodik is moving small step by small step. Each time he slices the salami to get closer to what he wants. Last month the RS National Assembly convened to begin planning for withdrawal starting in six months from Bosnia’s security, justice, and taxation institutions. These were all established in the aftermath of the 1992-95 war that ended in the Dayton peace agreements. American efforts “to walk Bosnia back from the cliff” at least made Dodik stop at the edge.

The plan is to eviscerate the minimal Bosnian state

He is unlikely to step much farther back or to declare independence. Dodik’s plan is to eviscerate the Bosnian state, minimal though it is. He wants the RS to withdraw from Sarajevo’s vital institutions under a veil of legislative approval. He would then be all-powerful and unaccountable in his own fief. Failing that, he wants his threat of secession to prevent any further strengthening of Sarajevo governance.

Russia will support Dodik’s moves and try to protect him. Moscow is already denying the authority of the High Representative in Bosnia, who is responsible for civilian implementation of the Dayton agreements. Serbian President Vucic will be more circumspect, as he fears EU and US disapproval. But his minions, including Interior Minister Vulin, cheer more openly. The RS is an important component of what they call the “Serbian world.” That would be a Greater Serbian state incorporating neighboring Serb populations.

The ethnic authoritarian paladin

Dodik is the embodiment of the ethnic authoritarian ideal. He started political life as a relative moderate in the Bosnian context. But he has become a denier of crimes (including genocide) the RS committed during the 1990s war. He is now a champion of Serb exceptionalism, a subservient puppet of Moscow, and a deeply corrupted pocketer of ill-gotten gains. The Dayton agreements divide the Bosnian pie along ethnic lines. That reduces political competition and incentivizes predatory behavior. Most people in Washington and Brussels understand that Dodik is irredeemable. So their diplomats work hard instead to get Serbian President Vucic to restrain him, offering mostly carrots and few sticks.

That is no longer working as well as once it did. Like his genocidaire predecesssor Radovan Karadzic, Dodik regards himself as a political competitor to Vucic in Belgrade, not just a provincial party chief in Banja Luka. The time is coming for a showdown between these Serb paladins.

Vucic is unquestionably more powerful, but Dodik is more useful to the Russians. They would regard de facto RS secession as a useful precedent and bargaining chip for breakaway provinces in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Moscow would also enjoy derailing a Western triumph of the 1990s unipolar moment: the negotiated end of the Bosnian war.

What is to be done?

Dodik is making it impossible for the US and EU to continue ignoring his moves towards de facto independence. The question is: what can they do about it? Next time he slices the salami, how should they react?

First, the EU and US need to nullify any decisions in the RS Assembly that contradict the Dayton accords and subsequent decisions of the High Representative. This the HiRep can do with the stroke of a pen. But then what? How do his decisions get enforced?

Once upon a time, the HiRep would not have hesitated to remove Dodik from office. But is that any longer feasible? Another possibility is his arrest for insurrection against the Bosnian state, of which he is blatantly guilty. But Bosnia’s prosecutors seem unwilling and likely incapable of doing that.

The US and EU will need to act

If nothing can be done inside Bosnia, then the burden falls to Washington, Brussels, and European capitals (if the EU fails to act jointly). They will need to levy punishing sanctions on Dodik personally, all members of the RS Assembly who vote for withdrawal from Bosnian institutions, and the RS institutionally, including an end to all World Bank and IMF as well as bilateral assistance and access to international financial markets. If the RS has de facto seceded from Bosnia, it shoud not benefit from grants or loans available to its sovereign. It would be rank hypocrisy to allow any international financiing or official development assistance to reach the RS.

There are other possible moves. Brussels and Washington could shut down RS representational offices. The international military presence, EUFOR, could move troops to the vital northeast town of Brcko while the UK and US deploy NATO troops there, to prevent any effort by either Sarajevo or Banja Luka to seize it. Want to make an impression? The British and Americans could arrive in the hundreds by parachute outside Banja Luka, in a NATO training exercise.

Dodik and any other politicians supporting de facto secession could be barred from Sarajevo and any requirements for Serb approval of Bosnian government actions there could be abrogated. Any funding for the RS from Sarajevo could stop. Bosnia could revert to its pre-war constitution, or devise a new one that erases the RS as well as the Federation and its cantons, relying on municipalities for local governance.

Dodik should not be ignored

This is an illustrative, not an exhaustive, list of options, not recommendations. The main point is that Brussels and Washington should no longer downplay or ignore Dodik’s moves. If they do, patriotic Bosnians, who were the main victims of the 1992-95 war, will take matters into their own hands, seizing Brcko before Dodik does.

That too, would mark a failure of Dayton, but one that would preserve the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as its multi-ethnicity. For anyone thinking democracy is a preferable system of government, it would be better than secession by genocide-denying political and ideological successors to Radovan Karadzic, bent on ethnic authoritarian rule with Moscow’s support and on creation of Milosevic’s Greater Serbia.

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Admire Russia’s provocative statecraft, even if its objectives are odious

Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. | Library of Congress

Russian President Putin is feeling his oats. He is pushing against the West along a front that extends from the Baltics to Syria and possibly beyond. Here is an incomplete account of his maneuvers:

  1. The Baltics: Russia has concentrated troops along its border with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Moscow is also conducting menacing exercises and violating Allies’ airspace.
  2. Belarus: Again lots of military exercises, but more inventively Putin has encouraged President Lukashenko to import Kurds from Iraq and try to push them across the border into Poland and thus the EU. This constitutes intentional weaponization of third-country nationals.
  3. Ukraine: Moscow has (again) concentrated military forces on the border with the apparent intention of threatening an expansion of Russian-controlled territory inside Ukraine beyond Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea. Moscow is also raising gas prices and shipping more gas to the West avoiding Ukraine and thus reducing its revenues.
  4. The Balkans: Russia is giving and selling arms to a vastly re-armed Serbia, is financing the Serb entity inside Bosnia and Herzegovina and encouraging secession talk there, and has gained vastly increased influence through proxies inside Montenegro.
  5. Turkey: Moscow has sold its advanced air defense system to Turkey, which as a result has lost its role in manufacturing components of the American F-35 fighter and will likely look to Russia for modernization of its fighter fleet.
  6. Syria: Russian air forces intervened in Syria in 2015, when rebels were seriously threatening the regime in Damascus. Russian forces have occasionally tested their mettle against the Americans and US-supported forces in the northeast.

Russian military forces have also taken on a “peacekeeping” role inside Azerbaijan after its 2020 clash with Armenian-supported secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow’s troops were already stationed inside Armenia. Prior Russian interventions in Georgia and Moldova were explicitly aimed at preventing NATO and EU membership, respectively, and have resulted in separate governance of Russian-controlled territories within those states.

For Putin, not only NATO but also the EU is an enemy. He is right: the EU and NATO are committed to open societies, democratic governance, and the rule of law, which are anathema to Putin. He wants none of their members on Russia’s borders or even nearby. The Eurasian Economic Union is intended as the economic dimension of his fight against the West. He is also seeking to weaken the EU and NATO from within. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is Russia’s handmaiden within the EU. Montenegro risks becoming one inside NATO.

It is difficult to know how the West should respond to all this. Neither the EU nor NATO is skilled at anticipating and preventing trouble. Nor can they coordinate and focus resources as quickly as an autocrat can. But it is important to recognize that for Russia all these pieces are part of the same puzzle. Obsessed with being surrounded, Russia responds by trying to expand and establish autocratic hegemony in what it regards as its near abroad, even if that designation is no longer so commonly used. You have to admire Russia’s provocative statecraft, even if the objectives are odious.

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