Tag: Moldova
Partition has failed, prepare something else
Serbian President Vucic has announced that his efforts to get something in negotiations with Kosovo have failed. What could he mean, and what does the announcement portend? It is hard to tell, but my guess is that Vucic has come to realize that there will be no unilateral partition of Kosovo.
That is what Vucic wanted: the northern majority-Serb municipalities in exchange for some sort of recognition of rump Kosovo. Kosovo President Thaci has made it clear he would only agree to some version of that proposal if Kosovo gets equivalent territory in southern Serbian municipalities that have Albanian majorities as well as UN membership.
The Serbian security services have no doubt told Vucic that is unacceptable. The land/people swap just isn’t going to work out, as it fails to protect vital interests of both Belgrade and Pristina: the former is concerned about its main route to the sea through southern Serbia and the latter with its main water supply in the north. Moreover, Serbia can no longer–if it ever could–commit to UN membership for Kosovo, which is blocked by a Russian veto in the Security Council.
The failure of this proposition is a relief, as it will avoid raising questions about borders in Macedonia, Bosnia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Vucic and Thaci may regret it, but the rest of the world should rejoice that Putin has not been handed a prize he would use to try to shift borders to accommodate Russians in what he regards as his “near abroad.” We should also be glad that Serbia itself, Spain, China, and other countries with ethnically diverse regions will not find ethnic secessionists re-empowered.
So far so good, but what about Kosovo? What are its prospects if the land/people swap is dead?
Again I’m guessing, but I think there are still deals to be had. They will not involve UN membership, because Russia now has its own interests in blocking that unless it gets satisfaction on South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Crimea, and Donbas. But Pristina still wants and needs bilateral recognition, or at least de facto acknowledgement of it authority on all the territory of Kosovo, not least so that it can join multilateral organizations as well as settle issues still outstanding with Belgrade: unpaid pensions, state property, border demarcation, Serbian efforts to prevent Serbs from joining its police and security forces, protection of Serbs and Serb religious sites throughout Kosovo, and creation of a Kosovo army.
Belgrade has wanted to use the creation of an Association of Serb Municipalities, something that has already been agreed, to create in Kosovo a de facto self-governing Serb “entity,” analogous to Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia, with veto powers in Pristina. Vucic is likely now to double down on that idea, but it is clearly something Thaci cannot deliver. The Kosovo constitutional court has already ruled out anything analogous to the RS, which has rendered governance in Bosnia dysfunctional. The votes for a constitutional amendment to enable creation of a Serb entity in Kosovo simply don’t exist in the Kosovo Assembly.
Nor do the votes exist in the Serbian parliament for changing its constitution, which claims Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. Those votes are unlikely to emerge before EU accession is imminent. At that point, Serbia can expect to get nothing in return, since all the leverage will be with the EU, which will not accept Serbia until normalization with Kosovo is a done deal.
So whatever emerges now is likely to be messy. That is not unusual. Colleagues in KIPRED have done us all a favor by reviewing some available options that have proved feasible elsewhere. I’d suggest Vucic and Thaci read that fine paper. They’ve both got good thinkers available. Put them in the same room to come up with something viable for both parties. And in the meanwhile focus political efforts on preparing their electorates for the inevitable compromises.
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You don’t need to know a lot of history
I tweeted to Kosovo President Thaci on Friday:
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@HashimThaciRKS: do you really want to open for renegotiation the deal with the US and most of the EU that got your state recognition? This could end very badly.
He responded:
Dear
@DanielSerwer, I’m committed deeply to obtain#Kosovo‘s membership in@NATO and EU. Based on values we share. Based on need to ensure safety of our children. We need to close a chapter that brings about reciprocal recognition & good neighborly relations between RKS & SRB.I’m against partition. I’m against swaps. I’m against status quo. I’m against making a Republica Srpska in
#Kosovo. But I’m in favor to peaceful demarcation and settling the 400km long border between Kosovo and Serbia. Balanced agreement is in all our interests, incl US & EU.
I prefer to respond here rather than on Twitter, which doesn’t work well for complex issues. This one is complex.
I share the President’s goals: NATO and EU membership, recognition, and good neighborly relations between Kosovo and Serbia. I am also against partition and land swaps, and a Republika Srpska (RS) in Kosovo (that is part of Kosovo that de facto escapes Pristina’s sovereignty, like the RS in Bosnia). Peaceful demarcation of the border is vital. You can look long and hard for two countries with good relations that have not agreed on and demarcated their border.
So what’s the problem? Just this: President Thaci has responded to Serbian President Vucic’s constant harping on partition of Kosovo with the suggestion that Kosovo would like to absorb at least some of the Albanian-populated communities in southern Serbia. Never mind that Serbia’s main route to the sea is adjacent to those Albanian communities and that Kosovo’s main water supply is the Serb-controlled north. The tit-for-tat presidential speculation on partition opens what diplomats call Pandora’s box: border changes throughout the Balkans that would necessarily involve significant populations and land areas.
Calling it “border correction” and associating it with demarcation does nothing to lessen the broad and dramatic impact an attempt to redraw borders along ethnic lines would entail. Consider this from Father Sava on his Facebook page today:
Acceptance of ethnic partition between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo by territorial division, forcing 70.000 Serbs south of the partition line to an imminent exodus and leaving their holy sites in peril would mean that EU accepts the idea of an AGREED ETHNIC CLEANSING as a legitimate solution.
This would be a dangerous precedent with unforeseeable consequences which would inevitably encourage replication of such a model throughout the continent. EU member states are before a critical historical responsibility if this scenario is politically supported. This will bring us back to the tragic years of the ex-Yu wars in the 90ies.
Meanwhile, Republika Srpska President Dodik is declaring:
I think that BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] will not survive and that it will peacefully dissolve.
He knows that there is no possibility of a peaceful dissolution and has been arming his police with weapons from Russia to ensure that RS is ready to defend its secession when the time comes. That would of course lead to the expulsion of the (relatively few) Croats and Bosniaks who have returned to RS and might imperil the Serbs in the Bosnian Federation as well. The net result would likely be a non-viable Islamic Republic in central Bosnia that could readily become an extremist safe haven.
In Macedonia, there is a real risk that more extreme ethnic nationalists of both the Albanian and Macedonian varieties will benefit from the atmosphere that these partition fantasies are creating. That could lead to defeat of the September 30 referendum on the agreement that would end the more than 25-year dispute with Greece over the country’s name. NATO and EU membership would then become impossible and agitation in favor of an infeasible partition would become inevitable.
The implications for the secessionist regions of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are all too obvious. President Putin couldn’t hope for more.
Why is this happening? In part because the US has an ethnic nationalist administration whose erstwhile chief strategist, Steve Bannon, is running around pushing ethnic partition while former Trump campaign officials sign up lobbying clients like Dodik and Vucic. The lobbyists don’t care how much trouble their schemes may cause, but those who are actually governing in Washington, European capitals, and Brussels should. You don’t need to know a lot of history to know how easily conflicting ethnic territorial claims in the Balkans can lead to instability, and instability to much worse.
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