Tag: NATO

20 years on

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 12, 2019 - 2 Comments

I spoke today at a conference in Pristina commenmorating the 20th anniversary of the NATO deployment in Kosovo. These were my speaking notes, but time restriction meant I started around point 11.

I underlined in addition that solid US/EU agreement is vital to getting things done in the Balkans. It does not exist for swapping people and territory on an ethnic basis, as the Americans have said they would entertain the idea but Germany and the UK have ruled it out.

  1. It is a pleasure to be back in Pristina, a city I have known since it was under Serb control.
  2. Whatever your preoccupations today—and I know they are many—let me assure you that this is a far more lively, free, interesting, youthful, and energetic place than it was in 1998.
  3. The Kosovo state that exists today is a product of an amazing, unlikely, and entirely unpredictable series of events. In addition to Kosovo’s own hard work, it involved
    • Albanian nonviolent and violent rebellion,
    • Serbian repression,
    • the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia,
    • state collapse in Albania,
    • NATO intervention,
    • U.S. and EU support,
    • Russian weakness, and
    • ample international assistance and UN administration.
  4. Without one or another of these ingredients, it might never have occurred, and certainly not in the surprising way that it did.
  5. I underline this point for a reason: those who think they can predict the future of Kosovo, or of the region, are unlikely to be correct. That includes me.
  6. But I do think that we can hope to identify some factors that will either contribute to or detract from regional stability and sustainable peace.
  7. The Prespa agreement, for example, clearly improved regional stability, as it ended any prospect of partition there and opened the door to NATO membership for North Macedonia.
  8. I think normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade is the next important step towards sustainable peace.
  9. But like the Prespa agreement it needs to be done in a way that respects regional requirements, not only the desires of Belgrade and Pristina.
  10. This is one of many reasons why I believe all transfers of territory, except those technically required in the border demarcation process, need to be ruled out.
  11. Exchange of people and territory on an ethnic basis would not only demonstrate that neither Pristina nor Belgrade is able to treat all its citizens correctly. It would also destabilize Bosnia as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Only President Putin could welcome such a move.
  12. Land swaps would even cast doubt on the future of the Serbs south of the Ibar River and of remaining Albanians in southern Serbia.
  13. None of us should want to take such risks.
  14. So what is the alternative?
  15. First, Kosovars need to be patient. Pristina’s leverage will increase as Belgrade approaches EU accession. To get a good deal, you need to be able and willing to walk away from a bad one.
  16. But you also need to be prepared to put something on the table that Belgrade finds attractive. I’ve made several suggestions: limits on the capabilities of the Kosovo army, enhanced protection for Serb sites south of the Ibar, implementation of an Association of Serb Municipalities consistent with the Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
  17. You also need to get the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue restarted, because the Americans and Europeans want it and you need it.  
  18. Here I am going to offend, in a single sentence, both your President and your Prime Minister: you need to forget about ethnic territorial division and get rid of the tariffs on Serbian goods.
  19. To your President I say this: Vucic cannot give you what you want in southern Serbia and you cannot give him what he wants in northern Kosovo. Neither parliament nor a referendum in either country will approve such a deal.
  20. To your Prime Minister I say this: the tariffs have succeeded in getting you back into the dialogue, but now you should stand on the well-crafted Platform that the political parties have generated. The tariffs have served your purpose and need at least to be suspended.
  21. But you should expect something in return: the EU should implement the visa waiver and the Serbs should end their campaign against Kosovo membership in international organizations. CEFTA should open a serious discussion of Kosovo’s concerns with trade barriers in Serbia.
  22. A mini-package of that sort could restart the dialogue on a more realistic basis, which means ending the discussion of territory but beginning the process of demarcating the border.
  23. A final appeal: you are going to need the Americans to cut a deal with the Russians for your UN membership, a deal that may involve serious sacrifice on the part of Washington.
  24. The Americans will only be ready and willing if you can carry over the incredibly friendly spirit of these two days celebrating the NATO deployment in Kosovo to the dialogue.
  25. That is one more reason for ending talk of ethnic division and tariffs and thereby making sure that the Americans will be ready to do whatever is necessary to ensure your UN membership.  
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Remote war

Posted in Bouela Lehbib - March 26, 2019 - 0 Comment

New America hosted a panel discussion March 21 about twenty-first century proxy warfare with Candace Rondeaux, Senior Fellow at New America’s International Security Program and  C. Anthony Pfaff, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute at Army War College.

Rondeaux gave an overview of the strategic and tactical changes in twenty-first century proxy war. Proxy warfare is moving away from both Cold War bipolarity and also uni-polarity. The reason for this shift is the proliferation of standoff, remote targeting capabilities, mainly in the Middle East region. Iran and other states in the region have standoff capacity, which means limited war has expanded beyond the great powers. States can limit their direct engagement. There is also the rise of transnational movements and the weakening of nation-states. The decay of multilateral institutions and their power to exert influence over conflict, such as the UN and increasingly NATO, has also become quite remarkable. The situation in Syria would be different without the log jam among the permanent members of the Security Council, with Russia always objecting to resolutions that seek to contain conflict.

At the tactical level, Rondeaux argues the nation-states that are struggling internally with their own domestic order often look to conflict beyond their borders as a means to signal cohesion at the national level. That is quite apparent in Iranian support to Hizballah, which helps to contain domestic challenges. Also, there is an increasing appetite within autocracies, particularly Russia, for a “military sugar rush” of instant victory on the battlefield, even if it causes big diplomatic trouble. It has been hard to make the Minsk agreement for Ukraine work so far. The last tactical concern is the way in which communication technology has connected social networks in ways never seen before. The rapid transit of ideas and national, ethnic and political identities in Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen has been a big factor in the availability of proxies.

Pfaff stated that proxies not only are not well understood but also under-regulated. The world is becoming multi-polar with state actors who can serve as benefactors and proxies and also a proliferation of non-state actors who can do the same thing. This comes with increasingly fragmented and contested sovereignty, which changes the security calculations of all actors as well as the options they have for pursuing their security goals. According to Pfaff, the inclusion of benefactors won’t make an unjust cause just, or illegitimate authority legitimate, but their involvement can make the disproportionate proportionate, and alternatives to fighting less appealing. Work still needs to be done in terms of international law to hold benefactors responsible for the illegal actions of their proxies .

Pfaff argues that international law does not address proxies. There are no norms in this situation. There isn’t any problem with having a proxy relationship, but the question is whether this relationship is stabilizing or destabilizing. States should be held responsible for the acts they sponsor remotely.

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The Balkan regatta

Posted in Daniel Serwer - February 4, 2019 - 3 Comments

I’m not a handicapper, but it seem to me the race for EU membership in the Balkans is shifting. Serbia is often referred to as the “frontrunner,” but it no longer really is, if it ever was. Macedonia has been a laggard, but that too is no longer the case. Kosovo is having a hard time keeping up, but that is in part due to an unreceptive EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina still occupies last place.

Serbia was arguably never really in first place, but by now it has certainly yielded to Montenegro, which has opened 32 chapters of the acquis communautaire required to become an EU member (and closed 3 of the 32). Serbia has opened 16 and closed 2. But Montenegro also has an easier path to EU membership, as it lacks many of the industries that Serbia needs to make comply with EU regulations. Montenegro also has a far freer press, whereas Serbia’s is under the government’s informal but still tight control. Both countries lack the fully independent and professional judiciary that will be necessary before accession. That is the long pole in the tent throughout the Balkans.

The big difference between Montenegro and Serbia lies in foreign policy. Montenegro, already a NATO member, is fully aligned with the EU on Russia. Serbia is not: it hosts a Russian “humanitarian” base and has refused to go along with sanctions against Moscow for its annexation of Crimea. Belgrade has no intention of seeking NATO membership. Serbian President Vucic recently gave President Putin a hero’s welcome in Belgrade, complete with paid crowds bused in from the provinces.

Skopje’s resolution of its “name” dispute with Athens has thrown the door to NATO wide open. Accession for “the Republic of North Macedonia” will follow as soon as ratifications are received from the 29 other members. The name change will also re-initiate Macedonia’s stalled EU accession process. As with Serbia and Montenegro, the long pole in the tent will be an independent and professional judiciary, but North Macedonia will likely make quick progress on other chapters.

Kosovo carries several burdens that the others don’t, even though all its legislation has been required to be EU-compatible since independence. Its stalled dialogue with Serbia needs to get restarted. Only after a fully normalized relationship can it hope to open accession talks, because of opposition from the EU’s five non-recognizing members. In addition, the EU sets a particularly high bar for Kosovo. This was apparent in its postponement of a visa waiver program even after Pristina had fully met many more requirements than any other country in the Balkans. Judicial professionalism and independence will also be a serious challenge in a country where personal relations count for a lot and institutional consolidation is still limited.

Still, Bosnia brings up the rear. It has been saddled with a coordination mechanism that gives both its entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska, as well as the ten Federation cantons and the Brcko District veto power over negotiation and implementation of the acquis. This is unworkable. Only when the Sarajevo government gets full authority to negotiate and implement the acquis will Bosnia be able to make serious progress on EU accession. NATO membership for Bosnia is ruled out for now by the leadership of Republika Srpska, which shares Belgrade’s antipathy for the Alliance as well as its affection for Russia and Putin.

So here is my sense of the regatta: Montenegro>Macedonia>Serbia>Kosovo>Bosnia. Serbia has slipped a couple of places, Macedonia is gaining, Kosovo is lagging in part because the EU wants it that way, and Bosnia is bringing up the rear.

Of course there are serious questions about the condition NATO and the EU will be in when any of these countries accede. Brexit, President Trump, and ethnic nationalist populism are real drags on the liberal democratic evolution of the former Yugoslav states, where ethnic nationalist populism in the 1990s became homicidal and even genocidal. But let there be no doubt that the accession processes are still the best thing going for the Balkans: they give people and governments there purpose and hope.

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Between past and future

Posted in Daniel Serwer - December 19, 2018 - 0 Comment

I spoke yesterday in Belgrade at a conference organized by the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation on “Serbia and Kosovo Between Past and Future.” It was run under Chatham House rules, but I regard my own remarks as suitable for public consumption:

  1. First a word of thanks to the Forum on Ethnic Relations and the Open Society Foundation as well as the Helsinki Committee for providing this opportunity, at a particularly fraught time, for this discussion of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
  1. First, on their relations right now: we are going through a difficult period, largely caused I think by exaggerated expectations.
  1. I don’t know who told President Thaci that he could get what he wants in southern Serbia without giving up vital interests in northern Kosovo. I also don’t know who told President Vucic that he could get what he wants in northern Kosovo without giving up vital interests in southern Serbia. Each was willing to take, but not to give.
  1. I’m fine with that, because however apparently rational to two ethnic nationalist presidents, the exchange of territories based on the ethnic affiliation of their populations is a bad idea.
  1. It would be an admission by both that neither can offer equal protection of the law to all his citizens. That is the essence of what they need to do to become EU, and if they want, NATO members.
  1. It would also destabilize Macedonia and Bosnia, and strengthen Vladimir Putin both there and in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
  1. It was foolhardy for both the EU and the US to entertain the proposition of land and people swaps, which are antithetical not only to EU and NATO membership but also to the Badinter principles laid down in the early 1990s that govern the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
  1. Now we need to deal with the consequences of the failed swap proposition. These include Pristina’s imposition of tariffs and its decision to convert its security forces to an army, as well as Belgrade’s opposition to Kosovo’s entry into Interpol and other international organizations.
  1. In my view, the tariffs are a CEFTA question and need to be dealt with there. I hope its mechanisms will be sufficient both to eliminate them and fix any legitimate problems Pristina has with treatment of its exports to Serbia.
  1. As for the army, I find it hard to imagine how anyone thought the Kosovo Albanians would do without one after what they suffered. KFOR will not stay in Kosovo forever. Pristina needs the means to defend itself at least for a week or 10 days, so long as Serbia presents a threat.
  1. That it does: its prime minister has made it crystal clear that an intervention into Kosovo under the guise of protecting the Serbs there is an option. Serbia’s concerted efforts to prevent Kosovo membership in international organizations and bilateral recognitions are also hostile acts.
  1. NATO needs to make it clear to Belgrade that such a move would lead to a military response. At the same time, Pristina needs to make it clear that Serbs in Kosovo are not threatened. Prime Minister Haradinaj has been trying to do just that.
  1. But managing the immediate threat doesn’t solve the longer-term problem.
  1. What is needed is normalization, so that Serbia doesn’t represent a threat to Kosovo and Kosovo does not represent a threat to the Serbs who live there.
  1. That will require much more extensive cross-border relations than exist today, including but by no means limited to diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives.
  1. But, some say, what does Serbia get? How can you expect Belgrade to accept Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence without a quid pro quo?
  • If Serbia is seriously concerned with the Kosovo army, it might get some concessions on its size and capabilities.
  • It will get nothing if it waits to just before accession to recognize Kosovo, since then all the leverage will be with the EU members.
  1. Let me remind you of a page from US history: our most threatening enemy for about 100 years after independence was Great Britain, whose Canadian territory had the longest border of any country with the US.
  2. Today, both Canada and Great Britain are two of America’s key allies.
  3. But 100 years is too long to wait in the 21st century. The time to end the enmity between Kosovo and Serbia, to the advantage of both, is now. It can be done, but only on the basis of mutual recognition and respect.

 

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From war to peace

Posted in Daniel Serwer - December 19, 2018 - 0 Comment

I spoke at the Media Centre in Belgrade yesterday about my recently published Palgrave MacMillan book, From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine. Here are my speaking notes for the occasion:

  1. It is a pleasure to be back in Belgrade, and a particular pleasure to give my first talk about this book here in a Media Center that witnessed so many of the pivotal events of the 1990s wars in the Balkans. Many thanks to Dusan Janjic for providing the opportunity!
  2. Many of you will remember that period: the US and Europe fumbling for years in search of peaceful solutions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo only to find themselves conducting two air wars against Serb forces, first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo.
  3. But Americans have mostly forgotten this history. Europeans too often believe there were no positive results. Here in the Balkans, many are convinced things were better under Tito.
  4. I beg to differ: the successes and failures of international intervention in the Balkans should not be forgotten or go unappreciated.
  5. That’s why I wrote my short book, which treats the origins, consequences, and aftermath of the 1995, 1999 and 2001 interventions that led to the end of the most recent Balkan wars.
  6. In my view, conflict prevention and state-building efforts thereafter have been partly successful, though challenging problems remain in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia.
  7. The book examines each of these on its own merits, as well as their prospects for entry into NATO and the EU, whose doors are in theory open to all the Balkan states.
  8. Bottom line: I believe all states that emerged from Yugoslavia as well as Albania are closer to fulfilling their Euroatlantic ambitions than they are to the wars and collapse of the 1990s.
  9. They were making decent progress when the financial crisis struck in 2007/8. The decade since then has been disappointing in many different respects:
  • Growth slowed and even halted in some places.
  • The Greek financial crisis cast a storm cloud over the EU.
  • The flow of refugees, partly through the Balkans, from the Syrian and Afghanistan wars as well as from Africa soured the mood further.
  • Brexit, a symptom of the rise of mostly right-wing, anti-European populism, has made enlargement extraordinarily difficult.
  1. The repercussions in the Balkans have been dire:
  • Bosnia’s progress halted as it slid back into ethnic nationalist infighting.
  • Macedonia’s reformist prime minister became a defiant would-be autocrat.
  • Kosovo and Serbia are stalled in the normalization process.
  • Russia has taken advantage of the situation to slow progress towards NATO and the EU.
  1. Now the question is whether the West, demoralized and divided by Donald Trump and right-wing populists, can still muster the courage to resolve the remaining problems in the Balkans and complete the process of EU and, for those who want it, NATO accession.
  1. I think Plan A is still viable. I also don’t see a Plan B that comes even close to the benefits of completing Plan A. Only three big obstacles remain.
  1. First is ending the Macedonia “name” issue. Skopje and Athens are on the verge of doing just that. New leadership was required to make it happen.
  1. For those who claim the West is prepared to tolerate corruption and state capture, I suggest a chat with Nikola Gruevski. If there is a viable liberal democratic option, the West will support it.
  1. Second is normalization between Belgrade and Pristina, the subject of the conference that will open within the hour.
  1. I’ll have more to say then, but let me say here that Serbia has already abandoned its claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo, both in the April 2013 Brussels agreement and in opening the question of partition along ethnic lines.
  1. I think that is a terrible idea, for many reasons I will outline later, but it confirms that Belgrade has no intention of ever again governing the Kosovo Albanians.
  1. The third issue that needs to be resolved in the Balkans is the dysfunctional state structure that the Americans imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina at Dayton.
  1. It has kept the peace for close to 25 years, but it needs reconfiguration to enable the Sarajevo government to negotiate and implement the acquis communautaire.
  1. These three are serious problems, but not insoluble ones. The road ahead is shorter than the road already traveled. Doubling back is a bad idea.
  1. My book proceeds after the Balkans to apply lessons learned to the Middle East and Ukraine, which also face identity-based conflicts challenging sovereignty and territorial integrity, lie close to the Balkans, and share more Ottoman history than is generally acknowledged.
  1. The lessons are these: leadership is key to starting, preventing, and ending wars; early prevention can work, with adequate resources; ethnic partition will not; international contributions can be vital; neighborhood counts; power sharing and decentralization can help.
  1. This accessible treatment of what makes war and how to make peace will appeal to both scholarly and lay readers interested in how violent international conflicts can be managed. It is available free, worldwide, courtesy of my generous employer, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. To get it, click on the book cover at www.peacefare.net
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Peace Picks December 10 – 16

Posted in Rory Coleman - December 10, 2018 - 0 Comment
  1. Reflections on the Middle East in 2018 | Tuesday, December 11 | 12 pm – 1:30 pm | Middle East Institute and Arab American Institute | 1319 18th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Arab American Institute (AAI) are pleased to host James Zogby (Co-founder and President, AAI and Director, Zogby Research Services) to reflect on his latest poll of perspectives from across the Middle East and North Africa. The report includes the opinions of 8,628 adults from eight Arab countries as well as Turkey and Iran on the current landscape of employment opportunities, confidence in governmental institutions, and the future of Palestine. The poll also assessed regional attitudes towards the U.S.’s role in the region, the Iran Nuclear Deal, the region’s refugee crisis, and the fight against extremism.

Joining James Zogby to discuss these findings are Nadia Bilbassy(DC Bureau Chief, Al Arabiya News), Steven Cook (Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), and Alex Vatanka (Senior Fellow, MEI).

The poll and resulting report were organized by the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The findings are available for use by the public on the website of Zogby Research Services.

2. The Open Society and its enemies in South Korea: from Right Authoritarianism – to Left? | Tuesday, December 11 | 3 pm – 5 pm | American Enterprise Institute | 1789 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

The North Korean nuclear crisis and the US–Republic of Korea (ROK) military alliance dominate international coverage of the Korean Peninsula, but what about South Korea itself? South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s administration has reportedly clamped down on media outlets, restricted freedom of speech, and encouraged partisanship in the judiciary and civil service.

Is the ROK government on a path to limit freedoms in the South? Or is this all just politics as usual in a democracy with different rules from our own? Please join AEI for a discussion on the domestic politics of South Korea and their implications for the ROK, the US, and North Korea.

Agenda

2:45 PM
Registration

3:00 PM
Panel: Toward illiberal democracy? South Korea under the Moon administration

Panelists:
Jean Lee, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Tara O, Pacific Forum; Institute for Corean-America Studies
Joshua Stanton, One Free Korea

Moderator:
Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI

4:10 PM
Conversation: The open society and its enemies in Korea: Reckoning with the ironies of history

Participants:
Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI
Sung-Yoon Lee, Tufts University

5:00 PM
Adjournment

3. Resilience in Conflict: Lessons from a Youth Exchange with the Dalai Lama | Wednesday, December 12 | 10 am – 11 am | US Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here

The world’s most violent conflicts are being fought within its most youthful populations. In the five countries that suffered nearly 80 percent of recent deaths from violent extremism, half of all people were younger than 22. The youth in these countries are also some of their communities’ most effective peacebuilders and best hopes for breaking cycles of violence. What does it take for these young leaders to overcome crisis, conflict, and displacement? Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace on December 12 for a streamed forum with thought leader and youth leader participants from USIP’s Youth Leaders’ Exchange with His Holiness the Dalai Lama as they share their expertise, discuss what it takes to build inner resilience and, crucially, examine how to strategically apply it to peacebuilding.

In the third year of the Exchange, USIP’s Generation Change program brought 27 youth leaders from 12 countries to Dharamsala, India, where they enhanced their peacebuilding skills through trainings in conflict management, leadership, and prejudice awareness and reduction. They engaged His Holiness the Dalai Lama on issues ranging from cultivating inner peace, building bridges across social divides, human rights and the refugee crisis, and youth leadership. By the end of the program, the participants had learned from and inspired each other, and returned home ready to redouble their efforts to reduce violence in their communities.

Speakers

Wadi Ben-Hirki
Founder, Wadi Ben-Hriki Foundation (Nigeria)

Jimmie Briggs
Executive Director, Leave Out Violence-U.S., (U.S.)

Meron Kocho
Member of Council, MESPO-Iraq (Iraq)

Maya Soetoro-Ng
Advisor, Obama Foundation (U.S.)

Gregg Zoroya
Editorial Writer, USA Today (U.S)

4. How Should the Trans-Atlantic Alliance Counter Russian Aggression? | Wednesday, December 12 | 10 am – 11:30 am | Brookings Institution | 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

The West is searching for a response to Russia’s ongoing malfeasance, including its recent attack on Ukraine in the Black Sea and its just-revealed effort to “muck around” in U.S. 2018 midterm elections. These are the latest in a long sequence of transgressions on the part of the Kremlin, ranging from the invasion of Georgia, to the violation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, to interference in the democratic processes of NATO member states, perhaps most dramatically seen in Putin’s assault on the 2016 U.S. presidential election. As a result, on both sides of the Atlantic, democratic values and institutions—and the trans-Atlantic alliance predicated upon them—are at risk.

On Dec. 12, Governance Studies and the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will jointly co-host an event with the bipartisan Transatlantic Democracy Working Group (TDWG), featuring an expert panel that will discuss the threats emanating from Russia and elsewhere to security, democracy, and the trans-Atlantic alliance—and what the alliance can and should do about it.

Panel Speakers

Mary Louise Kelly, Host, All Things Considered – NPR

Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program – Center for a New American Security 

Bill Kristol, Editor at Large – The Weekly Standard

Alina Polyakova, David M Rubenstein Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Distinguished Fellow – The Atlantic Council

5. Can International Organizations Promote Democracy? | Wednesday, December 12 | 10 am – 11:30 am | Stimson Center | 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

Organizing Democracy, a new book by Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen, argues that new democracies are more likely to flourish when they receive support from international organizations to help them provide public goods to their populations. This event will present the findings of Organizing Democracy, analyze the relationships between new democracies and international organizations in the cases of Ukraine and Libya, and explore policy implications for democracy promotion by the U.S. government.

FEATURING: 

PAUL POAST, Co-Author, Organizing Democracy, and Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Chicago

STEPHEN LENNON, Director, Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID

STEVEN GRINER, Director, Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions, Organization of American States

AMANDA KADLEC, Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation

ADITI GORUR, Director, Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program, Stimson Center (Moderator)

6. Discussion with Jerusalem Expert Daniel Seidemann | Wednesday, December 12 | 11 am – 12 pm | Foundation for Middle East Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 |
Please RSVP to Blair Scott by no later than Monday, December 10

The Trump Administration has implemented a wholesale shift in US policy in Jerusalem. From the moving of the US embassy and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, to de-funding Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem, to the decision to close down the US Consulate General, to removing the brakes on East Jerusalem settlement activity, the policies playing out today in Jerusalem have profound implications locally, regionally, and in the geopolitically. Please join FMEP and the Carnegie Endowment for a discussion with Jerusalem expert Danny Seidemann examining these and related issues.

Speakers:

Daniel Seidemann is a practicing attorney in Jerusalem who specializes in legal and public issues in East Jerusalem. He has participated in numerous Track II talks on Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians and served in an informal advisory capacity to the final status negotiations as a member of a committee of experts commissioned by Prime Minister Barak’s office to generate sustainable arrangements in Jerusalem. He is the founder and director of Terrestrial Jerusalem, an Israeli nonprofit that that works to identify and track developments in Jerusalem that could impact the political process or permanent status options, destabilize the city, spark violence, or create humanitarian crises.

Michele Dunne is the director and a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on political and economic change in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East. She was the founding director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council from 2011 to 2013 and was a senior associate and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from 2006 to 2011. Dunne was a Middle East specialist at the U.S. Department of State from 1986 to 2003, where she served in assignments that included the National Security Council, the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. She also served as a visiting professor of Arabic language and Arab studies at Georgetown from 2003 to 2006.

Zaha Hassan is a Middle East Fellow at New America. She is a human rights lawyer and former coordinator and senior legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team during Palestine’s bid for UN membership (2010-2012). She is a member of Al Shabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network, and is a contributor to the Hill and Ha’aretz. Her political commentary and analysis has been published by the New York Times, CNN, Salon, the Oregonian, the Detroit News, and other outlets. She is the former cohost of the Portland, Ore.-based radio show, One Land Many Voices, on KBOO 90.7 FM.

7. Our Uncertain Nuclear Future: How Do We Proceed if Treaties are Trashed? | Wednesday, December 12 | 4 pm – 6 pm | Stimson Center | 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

Donald Trump’s announcement of intent to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty constitutes another severe blow to a treaty-based system of nuclear arms and threat reduction. One last treaty governing formal, verifiable draw-downs of nuclear forces remains — the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Mr. Trump has vacillated wildly in his comments on the future of U.S. strategic forces, ranging from an expressed interest in deep cuts to significant arms build-ups. For now, he has declined Vladimir Putin’s offer of extending New START. Trump’s national security adviser, John Bolton, might be expected to seek withdrawal from New START, and he might well succeed, rather than to leave the decision of its extension and further reductions to the winner of the next presidential election.

Please join us for a discussion of our nuclear future with Nina Tannenwald, Director of the International Relations Program at Brown University, Jon Wolfsthal, Director of the Nuclear Crisis Group and Senior Advisor to Global Zero, and Lynn Rusten, Vice President of the Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Our speakers will address the following questions: What role will norms play in our nuclear future? What role will treaties play, with specific reference to New START? Will we be entering a future of “arms control without agreements”? If so, what might this look like? Stimson’s Co-founder, Michael Krepon, will moderate our discussion.

8.  Targeted Sanctions on Human Rights Abusers and Kleptocracies: Lessons Learned and Opportunities from the Global Magnitsky Santions | Thursday, December 13 | 9 am – 10:30 am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

Please join the Human Rights Initiative for reflections from U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), the author of the Global Magnitsky Act. He will be followed by a panel examining the impact of the Global Magnitsky sanctions, opportunities to improve implementation, and how the sanctions fit within financial sector approaches to human rights and corruption. These sanctions enable targeted designations based on human rights abuse and corruption around the world, and have been imposed on officials and companies in a number of recent high profile situations, including Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nicaragua.

Keynote Speaker
U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD)
 

Panel
Robert Berschinski
Senior Vice President Policy at Human Rights First

Robert Peri
Director of US Sanctions at Citibank

Joshua White
Director of Policy and Analysis at The Sentry

9. How Can U.S. Foreign Policymakers Do Better for the Middle Class? | Thursday, December 13 | 9:30 am – 10:45 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

Americans are increasingly skeptical that the U.S. role abroad benefits them economically at home. What will it take to bridge the divide between America’s foreign policy and domestic imperatives? Join Susan Glasser for a conversation with two former White House chiefs of staff on how to make U.S. foreign policy work better for America’s middle class.

This event will launch a new report, U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives from Ohio — the first in a series of state-level case studies from Carnegie’s bipartisan task force on foreign policy for the middle class

William J. Burns is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously served as U.S. deputy secretary of state.

Joshua Bolten served as White House chief of staff under president George W. Bush, and is currently president and CEO of the Business Roundtable.

Denis McDonough is served as White House chief of staff for president Barack Obama’s second term, and is currently a visiting senior fellow in Carnegie’s Technology and Internatinal Affairs Program.

Susan B. Glasser is a staff writer at the New Yorker, where she writes a weekly column on life in Trump’s Washington. She was a founding editor of Politicoand editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy Magazine.

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