Tag: NATO
It should stop only with Gaddafi at the exit
While the rest of the world focuses on current military operations, I’d like to focus again on the critical, but not yet urgent, question of when the military effort against Gaddafi should stop.
As Neal Ascherson points out in The Guardian this morning, the problem in Libya is Gaddafi. UN Security Council resolution 1973 does not recognize that. It calls for “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, and Hillary Clinton (among others) has been at pains to reiterate that regime change is not the objective.
This matters because it could determine when the military effort against Gaddafi comes to a halt. Arab League Secretary General, and putative presidential candidate in Egypt, Amr Moussa is already trying to distance himself from the military effort due to alleged civilian casualties. Pressures of this sort will build over the next several days, as Gaddafi is sure to make all sorts of claims about the damage the air attacks are doing.
Resolution 1973 provides precious little guidance on when to stop, beyond the overall purpose of protecting civilians. Yesterday’s statement from the Paris meeting of those states that want to be counted as constituting or supporting the coalition of the willing provides more:
Muammar Gaddafi and those executing his orders must immediately end the acts of violence carried out against civilians, to withdraw from all areas they have entered by force, return to their compounds, and allow full humanitarian access.
If this is fully operative, it is hard to see how Gaddafi could survive in power, as “those executing his orders” certainly include not only the military under his command but also the internal security forces. If they were to withdraw “from all areas they have entered by force,” he would have no means of continuing to control most of Libya, as arguably this phrase could even apply to Tripoli but certainly applies to Zawiya in the west and the towns his forces have taken in the last ten days in the east as well.
In practice, the international community often compromises on issues of this sort, as it comes under enormous public pressure to stop a one-sided military campaign. The military “coalition of the willing” includes not only leaders France and the UK but also Canada, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Norway in addition to the United States. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar, slow on the draw, are thought to be getting ready to contribute combat aircraft. I can only imagine how strong the internal political pressures in several of these countries will be against continuing the military campaign a week from now.
If the campaign stops too early, with Gaddafi still in place and controlling a substantial part of the country, it will be difficult to implement the peace in a way that preserves Libya’s territorial integrity and gives it an opportunity to become a more normal state than it has been for more the four decades. If the campaign stops too late, it will leave Libya in shambles.
At least as much wisdom is required to know when to stop as was required in deciding to start, but getting Gaddafi out should certainly be an important factor in the calculus. I trust American diplomats are working as hard on that as they did on the remarkable Resolution 1973.
PS: I expected pressures to build, but not as fast as this morning, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen said on Meet the Press: Qaddafi staying in power is “certainly potentially one outcome,” adding the UN-approved airstrikes “are limited and it isn’t about seeing him go.” I stick by what I said above: he should be at the exit door before we stop. We don’t need another half-baked result that burdens us for years to come.
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Actions now count more than words
While Tripoli’s Foreign Minister had initially announced acceptance of UN Security Council resolution 1973 and implementation of the ceasefire it called for, Colonel Gaddafi’s spokesman has rejected it:
Tripoli’s forces apparently continued to fight, entering Benghazi in tanks as well as activating “sleeper” cells in the still rebel-held city.
None of this should surprise: Gaddafi’s penchant for duplicity is legendary. What is disturbing is the lack of readiness on the part of those taking on the responsibility to enforce Resolution 1973 militarily. President Obama set out explicit redlines in his speech yesterday that have already been crossed. Militarily, it is much harder to do something about a tank in the streets of Benghazi than in the desert sands surrounding it. French and British planes are said to be beginning their efforts today–they need to make haste.
What should they do? We are past the point at which the no fly zone (NFZ) is an adequate response. Resolution 1973 authorizes all necessary means to protect civilians. I’ll leave it to the military planners–if they’ll work quickly–to decide what actions will have the biggest effects, but in addition to obvious targets like armored vehicles I would think taking out the supply convoys for Gaddafi’s force moving east would be both appropriate and effective. A tank doesn’t run long without fuel, and soldiers need water. And there shouldn’t be many civilians in a military supply convoy.
There is also the question of Tripoli’s command and control. So long as it is giving orders to attack civilians, it is a legitimate target. The responsibility to protect will mean little if Gaddafi continues to defy the Security Council. Taking out communications facilities can be amazingly effective–ask the Bosnian Serb Army, which turned and fled once its communications nodes were bombed by NATO in 1995. Even if Gaddafi is not there, it may be symbolically important to destroy his main bunker at Bab Al Aziziya. It might even be wise to give warning, if there is concern about collateral damage. Once Gaddafi is on the run, maintaining control of Tripoli is going to be very difficult for him. Saddam, remember, fell from power well before he was captured.
Of course none of this should take place without a parallel diplomatic effort to enforce the sanctions more vigorously and get Gaddafi out of Libya. The sooner he leaves, the better. Neither Libya nor those enforcing 1973 will benefit from extended military action.
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Thinking ahead to New Libya
Some will be surprised that Gaddafi’s Foreign Minister announced an immediate ceasefire in response to the UN Security Council resolution. This is no surprise. Gaddafi’s forces hold most of Libya–a ceasefire in place favors them, not the rebels. Moreover, Gaddafi likely hopes to prevent strikes from taking down his air defenses, the necessary prelude to real enforcement of the “no fly, no drive” zone.
In the meanwhile, his forces continue to fire on rebels in Misrata. That too should be no surprise.
What is surprising is that NATO is apparently behind the curve in getting organized for the air campaign. The UK and France are expected to take the lead. U.S. NATO Ambassador Ivo Daalder tweets: “#NATO will meet this morning to discuss #UNSCR 1973 authorizing “all necessary means” to protect civilians in #Libya. Busy days.” I should say so. Why isn’t all this ready?
There is real peril here. If Gaddafi perceives that there is a window of opportunity to advance further, he may well take it. Anticipating negotiations, he’ll want to control as much territory as possible.
On the rebel side, the military effort is looking weak and exhausted. Let’s hope they are better at the negotiating.
What they need is for Gaddafi to leave Libya. This he will do if he sees a real threat in Tripoli, either from demonstrators or from those within his regime who are starting to see the handwriting on the wall. Demonstrators who braved the streets this morning were shot for their courage. I assume he’ll do the same to any of his inner circle who turn on him. This is a situation in which a few brave souls count for a lot.
President Obama is to speak on Libya at 2 pm. He has reason to vaunt American diplomacy’s success at the Security Council last night. But he likely also wants to make it clear that this is not a U.S. operation. I won’t be surprised if he says UK, France and others will take the lead on military operations.
Who is working on the post-war efforts? Libya is a country without a state. It is going to need a lot of help–not money–once Gaddafi is gone.
Who is going to maintain law and order? How will revenge killings be prevented? How will accountability for past crimes be pursued? Are the Libyan courts and prisons functioning? How will state property be protected from regime elements who will try to walk away with it? Is there a social safety net that needs to be rescued quickly? How will a new constitution be written? Will foreign workers be invited back, or should Libyans fill their jobs? Lots of questions for a post-Gaddafi government.
The Benghazi Transitional Council looks like the best bet for a new government, but is it fully representative? Will Tripoli embrace it? How can it be made more so? What about local governance? Can the Gaddafi-era local committees be used, or reconstituted with different people?
Who will take the lead in supporting all this in the international community? The Americans and Europeans have clearly maxed out their state-building capacity. What about the Arab League? UN?
Of course there is also a possibility that a new dictator will emerge from the wreckage of the old regime or from the ranks of the rebels. But it is hard to see how Libyans who have tasted freedom are going to be stuffed back into an autocracy. Libya is going to need help getting it together after this war.
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Fewer troops, more politics
The Center for American Progress weighs in with another report that advocates reducing military efforts in Afghanistan. This one should go on that shelf I suggested you clear: it makes a good, strong argument for an improved political and diplomatic strategy.
While trying to avoid criticism of the Administration, the report is forceful and clear in faulting current efforts for failing to define a clear political end-state for Afghanistan and for giving Afghanistan a higher priority than it deserves in the hierarchy of threats to U.S. national security.
The report fails however to ask or answer explicitly that vital question: “is Karzai worth it?” But it gives a clear enough implicit answer: no, not unless he cleans up a good deal, and even then there is a compelling need to decentralize, thus reducing his control, enlarging the political pie and enabling more local power brokers access to a slice. Failing that, CAP would have us withdraw both troops and money more quickly than currently planned.
Where the report fails to convince is in arguing that troop drawdown and increased political and diplomatic effort are compatible. When did we ever manage that trick in the past? It gives ample examples of problems the troop presence creates, but do we really think thinning out in Helmand and Kandahar before making more progress is going to improve the situation there?
The report is big on leverage, conditionality and benchmarks: give the Afghans things we want them to do, and cut funding (or the troops) if they don’t do them. There may well be too much money in Afghanistan (we are spending several times the country’s GDP), but conditionality and benchmarks have rarely worked well elsewhere (certainly not in Iraq). It is not clear why they would work much better in Afghanistan.
So yes to more politics and diplomacy, but so long as we are willing to ignore the question “is Karzai worth it?” we’ll likely do better not drawing down the troops too fast.
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Brilliant policy vs. real world resistance
Writing in the Christian Science Monitor, SAIS colleague Kurt Volker welcomes the results of the NATO Summit but wonders whether the real world will permit serious implementation.
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