Tag: North Korea
North Korea bites back
Here, via @JChengWSJ, is North Korea’s statement on the prospective Summit between Presidents Trump and Kim:
This tirade is aimed not at Trump but at Bolton, who over the weekend cited the “Libya model,” by which he seems to have meant the access Qaddafi provided to his nuclear and chemical weapons programs when he committed to abandoning them. But of course the North Koreans remember what happened to Qaddafi thereafter. They are trying to signal to Trump that his hawkish National Security Adviser is not with the program, which has to include Kim Jong-un’s survival, hoping that Trump will throw “regime change” Bolton under the bus.
Bolton may be what provoked Pyongyang’s ire, but the statement is clear enough on other issues: it rejects the standard American versions of what “denuclearization”means as well as the notion that North Korea can be bought off with economic benefits, an idea Secretary of State Pompeo has been touting. It essentially says that Washington needs to end its belligerence towards North Korea, possibly by removing troops from South Korea as well as signing a peace treaty formally ending the Korean war, without clarifying precisely what Pyongyang is prepared to provide in return, but the implication is some sort of limit on, but not abandonment of, its nuclear weapon and missile programs. The zero option is out, the North Koreans are saying.
This is far short of what the US has wanted, and far short of what it had achieved in the Iran nuclear deal that Washington has abrogated. The North Korean statement, however, was made only in the name of a vice minister of foreign affairs, which is far from the top of the hierarchy. There is certainly the possibility that Kim will be more forthcoming at a summit.
But I wouldn’t bet on it. Just the fact of the Rocket Man/Dotard Summit is an enormous “get” for North Korea, as it puts Kim on an equal footing with the US President, confirming the North Korean leader’s legitimacy both domestically and internationally.
Kim needs a successful summit only if he needs sanctions relief. That is not yet clear. A lot depends on whether China and Russia are prepared to keep tightening the screws. Their annoyance with US withdrawal from the Iran deal, Moscow’s peeve at US sanctions, and Beijing’s concern about bilateral trade issues will all factor in to their willingness to continue the united front against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
Trump and Bolton are nowhere near Kim’s diplomatic league. Their skills were honed on Fox TV, where they rarely face any opposition. They are used to saying what they feel like and having everyone nod yes. Kim knows how to bite back.
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Peace picks, May 14 – May 20
- The Fallout from Trump’s Decision on the Iran Deal | Monday, May 14 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
May 12 is the deadline for President Trump to renew sanctions waivers under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In January, he vowed to pull out of the JCPOA unless European nations met his demands for new pressure on Iran’s ballistic missile program, more stringent inspections of Iran’s military installations and a commitment to extend curbs on the Iranian nuclear program beyond the terms of the nuclear deal. The Future of Iran Initiative, the Global Business and Economics Program, and the Middle East Security Initiative invite you to a discussion of the ramifications of Trump’s decision on the likely responses of Iran and US European allies as well as the consequences for non-proliferation and conflict in the Middle East. A conversation with Axel Hellman (Policy Fellow; European Leadership Network), Elizabeth Rosenberg (Director, Energy, Economics and Security Program; Center for a New American Security), Ali Vaez (Iran Project Director; International Crisis Group), and David Mortlock (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center; Atlantic Council). Moderated by Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative; Atlantic Council), with keynote remarks by David O’Sullivan (Ambassador and Head, European Union Delegation to the United States).
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- How to Talk to North Korea | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here |
As a possible Trump-Kim summit draws closer, join Carnegie for a conversation about what negotiating with North Korea is really like. Previous U.S. negotiators and experts will talk about what lessons have been learned in previous rounds of talks, and what the United States should know going forward. The New York Times’ Mark Landler will moderate. Panel includes Suzanne DiMaggio (Director and Senior Fellow, New America), Robert L. Gallucci (Professor, Georgetown University), Christopher Hill (Professor, University of Denver), and Daniel Russel (VP for International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute)
- US Policy Towards Iran: Strategic Options | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Register Here |
The president’s decision on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has dominated the discussion in Washington. But recent events also reinforce the need for an American strategy for the broader challenge posed by Iran. Returning some measure of stability to the increasingly fractured Middle East—a vital and enduring U.S. national security interest—requires confronting the spread of Iranian influence.
Join us on May 14 for a discussion on Iran’s influence in Syria and Iraq, and the release of a report from the Task Force on Managing Disorder in the Middle East on U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Strategic Options. Fireside chat includes Amb. Eric Edelman (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) and Jake Sullivan (Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department and Former National Security Advisor to the Vice President). Panel includes Amb. James Jeffrey (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq), Mary Beth Long (Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Denise Natali (Director, Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for National Strategic Studies) and Blaise Misztal (Director of National Security, Bipartisan Policy Center). Moderated by Arshad Mohammed (Diplomatic Correspondent, Reuters).
A Tale of Two Elections: Recapping the Polls in Lebanon and Iraq | Tuesday, May 15 | 12:00pm – 2:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
As Lebanon holds its first parliamentary elections in nine years and Iraq paves a way forward in the aftermath of the war against ISIS, many questions remain as to what the political future holds for both countries. The parliamentary elections in Lebanon on May 6, and in Iraq on May 12, serve as a barometer for transparency, inclusion, and the political realities in both countries. The polls have raised pressing political and governance issues such as how to overcome sectarianism, corruption, and economic stagnation in order to encourage further openness and plurality. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel discussion to examine these issues. MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab and Paul Salem will be joined by Abbas Kadhim (SAIS), Omar al-Nidawi (Gryphon Partners), and Bilal Wahab (WINEP) for a two-hour panel event moderated by MEI’s director for conflict resolution and the Track II Dialogues initiative, Randa Slim.
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5. Cuba: Post-Castro Transition | Wednesday, May 16 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In April, Miguel Díaz-Canel became the 19th President of Cuba and the first in over 40 years who was not a member of the Castro family. This appointment — not election — of a new Cuban president raises a number of important questions about the future and stability of the regime. In a post-Castro era, Cuban politics will likely change, though the direction and magnitude of those changes remains to be seen. On May 16, Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore these issues and discuss the possibility of a democratic transition on the island. Panelists will include Eduardo Ulibarri, a Costa Rican journalist, diplomat, university professor, and international consultant; Hector E. Schamis, a teacher at Georgetown University’s Center for Latin American Studies and Democracy & Governance Program; and Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, senior fellow and director of Hudson Institute’s Center for Latin American Studies.
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6. Decision Point: Iran, the Nuclear Deal, and Regional Stability | Wednesday, May 16 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement will have far reaching implications for U.S. policy; the trans-Atlantic alliance; non-proliferation efforts; and even on regional stability – particularly in the Israeli-Lebanese-Iranian-Syrian arena. Indeed, those implications may go far in defining the U.S. posture in the region for years to come. Join us as four veteran analysts and policy advisers on the Middle East assess the implications of the president’s decision, including on U.S. foreign policy in the region at large. Featuring speakers Robert S. Litwak (Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center), Michael Singh (Managing Director and Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Ray Takeyh (Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), and Tamara Cofman Wittes (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution). Moderated by Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center), with introductory remarks by Jane Harman (Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center).
There will be a live webcast of this event.
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7. Turkey’s Early Elections | Wednesday, May 16 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | SETA Foundation | Register here |
On June 24, Turkey will hold its first presidential and parliamentary elections under the new presidential system that was adopted in the 2017 constitutional referendum. In the presidential race, several political parties have nominated their own candidates, while in the parliamentary elections, several parties have formed alliances to gain the majority in the legislature. The winner of the presidential election will form the first Turkish government under the new presidential system for the next five years. The parliamentary makeup will be of critical importance in the transition to the new system. Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a timely discussion on Turkey’s upcoming June elections, current coalitions, political party dynamics, and the future of Turkish politics. With speakers Ihsan Aktas, President, GENAR Research and Polling; Nebi Mis, Director, Domestic Policy, SETA Foundation; and Murat Yesiltas, Director, Security Policy, SETA Foundation; with moderator Kilic Bugra Kanat, Research Director, SETA Foundation.
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8. The Risk of Interstate War(s) in the Middle East | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
While armed nonstate actors and proxy militias have been grabbing most headlines in recent years, the risk of interstate war in the Middle East is rising at an alarming rate. Tensions between Israel and Iran have boiled over several times in recent weeks in Syria, risking a serious escalation between the two countries. Iranian-supplied missiles have been launched from Houthi-held areas in Yemen targeting Riyadh and other Saudi towns and cities, risking an escalation between the two regional powers. Tension also persists between the United States and Iran as the Trump administration moves away from the JCPOA. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces are flying missions in a crowded air and military space; the risk of escalation there between the two superpowers also cannot be discounted. How high is the risk of interstate war in the Middle East? What are the dynamics of these various tension axes? How could the United States and other regional and international powers help avert such potential outbreaks? The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel featuring Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution, Kenneth Pollack of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab, Julianne Smith of the Center for New American Security (CNAS) to discuss these mounting tensions and how best to address them. MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs, Paul Salem, will moderate the discussion.
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9. Decentralization in Tunisia — Empowering Towns, Engaging People | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
Tunisia’s first ever democratic local elections in May are a crucial step in the country’s efforts to devolve power from the national to the local level. In their latest paper, Decentralization in Tunisia: Empowering Towns, Engaging People, Carnegie Fellow Sarah Yerkes and Vice President for Studies Marwan Muasher argue that if done right, decentralization will both empower local actors and introduce a new political class outside of the country’s traditionally dominant political parties. Successful decentralization requires strong political will from central government officials, who must demonstrate their commitment to participatory local governance both on paper and in practice, and from local officials who must build trust with their constituents, provide opportunities for citizen engagement, and prevent the recreation of ineffective institutions at the local level. With the participation of Carnegie Senior Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers and PBS NewsHour’s P.J. Tobia in the first session (10:05 – 10:45); Director of the Tunisian Institute of Elected Officials Elyès Ghanmi, independent consultant on local and international governance Laura J. Hogg, and programmes director at the Jasmine Foundation and researcher at Sciences Po Paris Intissar Kherigi with Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher in the second session (10:50 – 12:15).
A light lunch will follow.
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10. The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans | Thursday, May 17 | 10:30am – 12:30pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |
Amid a growing number of foreign policy rifts between the United States and the European Union, the Western Balkans remains one region where the new US administration has identified an opportunity for close cooperation with Brussels. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. The timing for such a discussion is critical, given the renewed secessionist threats in the region and the need for a joint US and EU response to grapple with this challenge. A conversation with Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lords and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ms. Marsaili Fraser; former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Mr. James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group and former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans; moderated by Dr. Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS.
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11. Politics and Economics in Putin’s Fourth Term | Friday, May 18 | 9:45am – 11:00am | Atlantic Council | Register here |
As Vladimir Putin begins an unprecedented fourth term as president of Russia, his country stands at a critical crossroads. With a volatile economy and an increasingly authoritarian government, the country is facing high levels of political and economic uncertainty. At this event, Vladimir Milov, Russian opposition politician and economist, will join a panel of US-based experts to discuss the political and economic future of Putin’s Russia. Featuring Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Dr. Anders Åslund and David M. Rubenstein Fellow at the Brookings Institution Dr. Alina Polyakova, with moderation by Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Ambassador John Herbst.
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12. Can Inclusive Peace Processes Work? Strategies for Meeting Resistance to Inclusion | Friday, May 18 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Too often, peace processes only include dueling parties — leaving women; religious, indigenous, and ethnic groups; youth; and survivors of violence excluded from critical discussions that shape the future landscape of a country. Yet, sidelining their voices often results in a resurgence of conflict and fails to achieve comprehensive or sustainable peace. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and Conciliation Resources for a discussion on overcoming challenges to inclusive peace processes and negotiated settlements. The research draws on case studies and local perspectives with local partners from Colombia, Bougainville and Nepal, exploring how inclusion is negotiated in war to peace transitions, common barriers to and trade-offs between inclusion and stability, and types of external and internal support that have been effective. In three segments: Presentation of Findings with Zahbia Yousuf (Senior Advisor, Peace and Transition Process, Conciliation Resources) and Sophia Close (Senior Advisor, Gender and Peacebuilding, Conciliation Resources); Application and Experiences on the Ground with Deepak Thapa (Director, Social Science Baha; Kathmandu, Nepal) and Rosa Emilia Salamanca (Director, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Action; Bogota, Colombia); and Policy Implications with Esra Cuhadar (JR Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace) and Jennifer Marron (Peace Process Advisor, Bureau of Conflict Stabilization and Operations, Department of State). With moderator Rosarie Tucci (Director, Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace) and introduction by Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace).
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No formula for success
The downsides of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal are all too obvious. But it behooves any conflict management type like me to consider the other side: what does the Administration think it will accomplish, and why do some allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia support withdrawal?
The Administration is saying that its main reason for withdrawing was the sunset clause, that is the expiration of parts of the agreement seven years from now. That sounds silly: why not wait until just before the agreement expires to threaten re-imposition of sanctions in order to negotiate a follow-on agreement? The answer is that Washington is trying to prevent Iran from gaining the economic benefits that will accrue during those seven years.
The Administration’s goal is to squeeze Iran through not only re-imposition of US sanctions but also through secondary sanctions that will dis-incentivize European, Russian, Chinese, and other companies from doing business with Tehran. Proponents of withdrawal believe this will at least limit Iranian capabilities–non-nuclear as well as nuclear–and make Iran less of a threat in the future. Some Americans seem to hope it will even bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, precipitating regime change.
These effects would depend on virtually universal adherence to the re-imposed sanctions. Why would the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese play ball? A well-informed Israeli put it this way, with respect to the Europeans: they fear war with Iran more than they fear re-imposition of sanctions. They will, in other words, go along in order to avoid an American attack on Iran. Even if you believe that–and I doubt it–it leaves Russia and China unconstrained. They are unlikely to be as easily cowed as the Europeans. They and many other countries will gladly do business with Iran, surreptitiously if not openly.
There is thus no reason to believe that sanctions can be made nearly as tight as they were in 2015 when the UN Security Council was unanimous and the nuclear deal was negotiated. Nor do I think the Europeans will buckle easily to American will. They are far more likely to try to sustain the agreement, which is what Iranian President Rouhani is saying he wants to do as well, so long as Tehran sees the consequent economic benefits.
If the Europeans withdraw, I suspect the Iranians will ramp up their enrichment activity and weapons research so as to reduce their breakout time to well under the one year the nuclear deal was designed to maintain. But Tehran will also want enough transparency through international inspections to ensure that the Israelis and Americans can be reasonably confident they are not actually producing nuclear weapons. It is not in Tehran’s interest for there to be any doubt on that score, since Israel can be expected to react or even pre-empt in kind if it perceives that it might be subject to a nuclear attack.
As for the hope that Iran may be constrained or even fatally weakened by re-imposed sanctions, that day is far off. It suits the Islamic Republic, especially its hardliners, well to have a foreign enemy it can blame for its own economic failures. The public demonstrations of the last year or so occurred precisely because the regime could no longer blame only the foreigners. Nor do I know of any regime that has wanted nuclear weapons that couldn’t find the financial resources to fund the program. North Korea has demonstrated how even a very poor country can do it. Iran will do likewise, no matter what sanctions are re-imposed.
As in many things, Trump has over-estimated his own power and underestimated his enemy. That is not a formula for success.
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BIG mistake
As expected, Donald Trump today announced American withdrawal from the nuclear deal, re-imposition of sanctions, and a threat of sanctions against any country that helps Iran’s economy. He justifies these moves on the basis of Iran’s missile program, support for terrorists and regional behavior, none of which are covered under the agreement.
It is uncertain what will happen next, but it is Tehran’s move. Its main options are
- Maintain the nuclear agreement, along with Europe, China and Russia. That will create an enormous split in the West and discourage allies in Asia from joining with the US in a nuclear agreement with North Korea. It will also provide Iran with the lion’s share of the economic benefits it was promised, at least until the US levies secondary sanctions on European, Russian and Chinese banks and companies that do business with Iran. When the US does that, it will drive the Europeans into the arms of the Iranians, Chinese and Russians.
- Withdraw itself and re-embark on its nuclear weapons program. It is likely not much more than a year from having nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. We won’t know as much as we do today about Iran’s nuclear capability, because the Iranians will likely kick out the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Tehran may try to maintain some level of nuclear transparency, not least because of the risks associated with misunderstanding of its intentions. No one in Iran should want Israel to conclude that a nuclear weapon is being mounted on a missile. We all know how the Israelis would deal with that eventuality.
I’d bet on Tehran choosing Option 1, which provides economic and diplomatic benefit not available in Option 2.
In both options, the US and Israel are losers. Trump has done precisely what the hardliners in Iran have wanted. His pitch at the end of his TV appearance to the Iranian people will fall on deaf ears, crowded out by the chorus of denunciation of the US and its unreliability. Some of the hardliners will want to retaliate against the US in Iraq, Syria, or even in the US.
This is the worst US foreign policy decision since the invasion of Iraq, but with one important difference: the entire intelligence community and a good part of the cabinet believes Iran has been fulfilling the terms of the nuclear agreement and the US is wrong to withdraw. President Bush at least had the lame excuse that the intelligence community told him Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. This president has no one else to blame for a blatantly BIG mistake.
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The faster the better
The Trump Administration is well into the process of self-destruction. The evidence:
- It can’t decide whether the President himself paid hush money to a porn star or his enforcer/fixer did it without his knowledge.
- The Trump real estate empire disposed of large quantities of cash of uncertain origin in the decade prior to the 2016 election.
- Efforts to negotiate more favorable trade deals with China, Canada and Mexico are bellying up.
- Economic and job growth are slowing and the stock market has stalled.
- Trump has created a lose-lose situation for himself on the Iran nuclear deal and is headed in that direction with North Korea.
Any one of these items would be devastating to most American administrations, but Trump has managed to lower the bar for presidential performance so dramatically it hardly matters at this point.
With regard to items 1 and 2, I’m confident the Special Counsel will find the answers. He has the computers, cell phones and other records of Trump’s personal lawyer. He no doubt also has ample financial records for the Trump enterprises. Let’s wait for his investigation to discover the truth, which I doubt will be pretty.
Trump’s aggressive approach to trade is producing an equally aggressive reaction. The Chinese booted his proposals last week. Mexico and Canada are stiffening their resistance. Trump could end up imposing tariffs that will spark retaliation against American food and other exports, shredding the rural and manufacturing support that was vital to his election. Meanwhile, the trade deficit is up since his election, but no one notices because he makes so much noise.
The same is true for the economy more generally. While the press for some reason continues to laud economic and job growth figures that are no better (and recently worse) than the Obama performance they categorized as “lackluster,” the business cycle is aging and Trump’s initiatives are all inflationary. His tariffs, tax cuts, and overblown budget deficit are generating inflation and will soon cause a rise in interest rates, precipitating a slowdown and likely a recession. This could happen well before the 2020 election, if not before this year’s Congressional contests.
On the nuclear deal with Iran, Trump will either stay in despite his often expressed preference or get out, causing either a major rift with Europe or triggering an Iranian push to get nuclear weapons. That’s a lose-lose. Likewise with North Korea: either he buys what Kim Jong-un is selling, which won’t be the US goal of complete, irreversible or verifiable denuclearization, or he walks away without a Plan B. That too is a lose-lose.
You can’t sell flim flam forever. Sooner or later it all catches with you. That’s what’s happening. The faster the better.
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“Wicked” globalism
“Wicked” is the word wonks use to describe problems that are difficult to solve because they are so complex it is difficult to predict the impact of anything you do, which may cause consequences different from those you intend. That’s what is happening today: the US is facing nuclear issues with both North Korea and Iran that defy resolution in part because they may interact in both predictable and unpredictable ways.
This was not necessary. President Trump has chosen to schedule a decision for withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal for May 12, the date on which Congress requires him to certify whether continuing it is in the US interest. He refused to do that three months ago, without consequences. This time around he says he’ll withdraw if the deal isn’t “fixed” to include ballistic missile and eliminate the expiration clauses. There is no indication that can be done in the time frame available, though the Europeans are trying to back him down by committing to a follow-on agreement. The Iranians, however, show no sign of being interested in that.
Meanwhile, things are moving in the other direction with North Korea, which has expressed some interest in “denuclearization,” though what that means to Kim Jong-un is not yet clear. It almost surely doesn’t mean “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” that the Americans want. The North Koreans have a long history of reneging on agreements with the international community, but the Trump Administration seems determined to ignore that and instead seek still another one. Trump has already given Kim a big prize: the promise of a meeting that will legitimize Kim’s regime, something he would have criticized ferociously had his predecessor done it. Any agreement will have to involve some concessions from the US, likely on the American military presence in South Korea and maybe elsewhere in Asia.
Israeli President Netanyahu today went on TV to demonstrate that Iran was lying when it claimed not to have a nuclear weapons program prior to 2004. That was already well known. How that is supposed to undermine the agreement concluded in 2015 known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not clear. The JCPOA committed Iran to international inspections that have so far confirmed there is no longer a nuclear weapons program, as well as dismantling of most of Iran’s centrifuges and one of its reactors. The JCPOA looks to many like a good antidote to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Netanyahu’s TV appearance confirmed that.
Trump has nevertheless indicated he will withdraw from it and reimpose unilateral sanctions. That will give Iran the option of sustaining the agreement with the Europeans (thus splitting them from the US and weakening the impact of sanctions) or withdrawing and going hell bent for nuclear weapons. Neither outcome would benefit the US. Withdrawal would also give North Korea good reason to doubt that any agreement with the US concerning its nuclear program will be maintained, though admittedly it already has ample reason for doubts. Iran racing for nuclear weapons would certainly give North Korea more than enough reason to hold on to its own.
This trifecta of likely bad outcomes has not been enough to convince Trump that he should override whatever promises he made during his election campaign. Most Americans support the JCPOA. But Trump isn’t interested in what most Americans think, only what his deep-pocketed donors like Sheldon Adelson think. That’s what Trump meant when he told French President Macron he would withdraw from the JCPOA due to domestic political pressure.
Netanyahu has also ordered airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria that reportedly store missiles for use against Israel. Tehran, including the Iranian Supreme Leader, has promised a response, while denying any Iranians were killed. Escalation of the tit-for-tat in Syria could well get out of hand, leading to a still wider war and even the Israeli ground invasion Syrians often warn of. The Americans have shown no interest in joining such an enterprise to drive the Iranians back from the Israeli border, but they likely aren’t saying a loud “no” to it either.
We are at one of those tipping points, like the eve of the Iraq war. The US can barge ahead on its current path, with some predictable negative consequences and likely many other unpredictable ones, though it is hard to think of positive outcomes. Or it can pause, rethink, and try to unravel the global interconnections that make its current course so likely to produce bad results. Globalism has its virtues, but it also has its exceedingly complicated, “wicked,” side. Clarifying problems so they can be solved is a lot better than muddying them, as Trump and Netanyahu both prefer to do.
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