As the ceasefire between Israel and Iran continues, the new reality is characterized by some critical certainties and uncertainties.
Certainties:
1. The Israeli and US bombings of Iran’s nuclear facilities have caused significant damage to its nuclear program.
2. Tehran has expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, suspending indefinitely inspections of its nuclear program. But Iran remains a member of the IAEA and party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
3. Tehran’s regime remains in place, enjoying enhanced internal popular and military support. Moscow and Beijing have also confirmed their strategic alliances with Tehran.
Uncertainties:
1. Indeterminate loss of knowledge on Iran’s nuclear program, resulting from the suspension of IAEA inspections by Tehran.
2. This knowledge was already incomplete, based on confirmation of Tehran’s nuclear declarations and not of their completeness. It did not cover potential clandestine nuclear material, facilities, and activities.
3. The current quantitative and qualitative level of Iran’s uranium enrichment is unknown. Did Iran rescue its highly enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges, to what extent and where?
4. Whether Tehran will remain party to the NPT and eventually continue nuclear inspections is unpredictable.
5. Next Israeli and American moves to obliterate Iran’s potential nuclear weapons capability are vague.
Implications
The military operations and subsequent ceasefire were a high-risk undertaking. It was based on the expectation Iran would not withstand maximum pressure, abandoning at least its controversial nuclear activities.
However, Tehran had already resisted strong pressures after the 2018 US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). This suggests incredible resilience and strategic persistence in continuing its controversial nuclear program. Iran may try to reconstitute its nuclear capability. However, this time the program would most probably include a declared, not just a possible, military dimension.
A new attack could lead to all-out war with tragic and irreversible consequences. War in areas with nuclear processing facilities could result in radioactive contamination of the environment. Or, in case of an attack to the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, to a Chernobyl-type nuclear catastrophe.
Revival of a serious diplomatic process is a necessity. Iran’s possible exit from the NPT will encourage would-be proliferators. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan, South Korea, and others are watching attentively.
The United Nations’ global architecture for defending peace and security is severely endangered. Its credibility needs to be restored.
Vice President Vance has confirmed that Iran still has its significant stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium. But he also asserted that Tehran no longer has the capacity to enrich. That is dubious. Tehran has no doubt squirreled away some of its more advanced centrifuges as well. We don’t know their number. The breakout time will be much greater if there are only a hundred rather than a thousand or ten thousand.
It is only reasonable to assume that the dash for nuclear weapons Ken Pollack feared is now a reality. The sterling military prowess displayed in the US attack on Iran has amplified, not diminished, Iran’s incentive to go nuclear. That is true even if the attack has reduced Iran’s means.
Options
The military option is not exhausted. If the Americans or Israelis can find the enriched uranium and the remaining centrifuges, their destruction will be a priority. The Israelis will no doubt try. Their intelligence has been superb. The Americans will help, if need be.
If the enriched uranium and centrifuges can’t be found, or aren’t found soon, regime change becomes the de facto objective. The Israelis will continue pummeling Iran in hopes of producing a change at the top. They may even kill the Supreme Leader. The problem with this approach is uncertainty that any successor regime will abandon the nuclear program. The only well-organized forces in Iran capable of taking over seem more inclined to continue it. That is certainly the case for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The diplomatic option was open before the US attack. It is now more difficult. The Iranians already had good reason to distrust President Trump. Now they view him as having misled them twice. First he used the scheduled sixth round of talks as a cover for Israel’s initial attack. And then he said he would postpone a decision for two weeks, during which the US attacked Iran. Not to mention his withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.
Difficult conditions
The conditions are daunting, even apart from the lack of trust. The Israelis have killed the Iranian chief negotiator as well as many IRGC and military leaders. The Supreme Leader is in hiding and avoiding any electronic communications. All his remaining lieutenants will be doing likewise. Unreliable and slow communications are not good for diplomacy.
The Supreme Leader’s logic and vitality are dubious (see the video above). But somehow the Iranians warned the Americans and Qataris about today’s attack on the US base in Qatar. Was that done on orders from the Supreme Leader, or by an Iranian officer trying to gain some credit with the enemy? However that may be, it was a piddling effort that fizzled. It may signal that the Iranians are ready for de-escalation.
For the Iranians, it’s about regime preservation
The Supreme Leader’s first concern is regime preservation. The obvious means at this point is a nuclear weapon. We don’t really know how far the Iranians have already gone in that direction. It would be prudent to assume they have at least thought about weapon design and integration with a delivery missile.
But how would Iran use a nuclear weapon? It can’t bomb Jerusalem with a nuclear weapon, as it is the third holiest place in Islam. Mohammed rose to heaven from the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif during the Night Journey. The Iranians could bomb Tel Aviv, but even there they would kill a lot of Muslims. And any perceived effort to ready a nuclear weapon for launch would prompt the Israelis to attack first. If nevertheless Iran managed a surprise attack, the Israelis could still launch massive retaliation in kind from their submarines.
The only real use of a nuclear weapon to Iran comes from not using it. Then it might be wielded for regime preservation, as North Korea has done. I’m not sure that will work with the Israelis, but the North Koreans have made it work with the Americans.
For the Israelis, it’s about regime change
The Israelis understand that Iran can’t actually use a nuclear weapon, but they don’t want to share power in the region with a nuclear Iran. They have fought their way through Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. That would have been far more perilous if Iran had been threatening to back them up with nukes.
Prime Minister Netanyahu wants regime change. He isn’t going to trust the Iranians after three decades of personal and institutional enmity. Nor will he want this war to end in an agreement like the Iran nuclear deal he opposed when it was signed and convinced President Trump to ditch. Netanyahu is looking for the unconditional surrender President Trump demanded, likely at Netanyahu’s behest. That would make him a big hero in Israel.
What about the Americans?
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, aka @ArmsControlWonk concludes that the real objective is regime change also for the Americans. He comes to this conclusion from a careful examination of the bombing targets:
Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran’s nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 1/17
Netanyahu’s justification for conducting this strike was that “Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs — nine.” He refers to Iran’s stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let’s consider. 2/17
The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17
No one even knows where the HEU is now! @rafaelmgrossi says Iran moved it. Lil’ @marcorubiosays nothing can move in Iran. But trucks are moving in Iran. Trucks and heavy equipment showed up at least two days ago to seal the tunnels to protect them. @planet took a picture. 4/17
Trucks also showed up at the Fordow FEP the day before the strike, possibly to relocate sensitive equipment, and certainly to cover those entrances with dirt. Iran just isn’t a no-drive zone at the moment. 5/17
To be fair, some Trumpkins acknowledge Iran still has the material. @JDVance says they’re going to “have conversations with the Iranians about” it. The talking point is that the US has knocked out Iran’s ability to further enrich it and convert it to metal, so its fine.
IT’S NOT FINE. Yes, the strikes on the enrichment plants at Qom (Fordow FEP) and Natanz (PFEP and FEP) appear successful. But there has been no effort to strike the enormous underground facility next to Natanz where Iran can make more centrifuges and maybe do other things. 7/17
In 2022, Iran moved a centrifuge production line to “the heart of the mountain” there. This facility is huge — we estimated 10,000 m2 or more — and we don’t really know what else it might house (like enrichment or conversion). 8/17
FYI: Iran has been digging a UGF not far from Natanz that is too big for its stated purpose. It’s also 80-100 m under a mountain. @madwonk made a model of what it *might* look like. The new centrifuge facility could be here; could be somewhere else. https://sketchfab.com/3d-models/underground-tunnels-near-natanz-2022-3e7414f8461c47ddadcce5fa04b
Also, Iran recently announced a “new enrichment facility in a secure location” and told the @iaea it was ready to start installing centrifuges. The @iaea was set to inspect the facility, near Isfahan, before the bombing. It hasn’t been bombed AFAIK. 9/17
Let me say again: Iran said it had a new enrichment facility. The @iaeaorg was about to go see it. But before that could happen, Israel struck other facilities in Iran — but not the new one. See the problem? 10/17
This means Iran has retained 400 kg of 60% HEU, the ability to manufacture centrifuges, and one, possibly two underground enrichment sites. That is also to say nothing of possible secret sites, which opponents of the JCPOA used to invoke all the freaking time. 11/17
Let’s say Iran decides to rush a bomb. Iran can install ~1.5 cascades a week. In six weeks, it could have 9 cascades of IR-6 machines. It would take those machines about 60 days to enrich all 400 kg to WGU. Altogether that’s about five months although IMMV. 12/17
Look, I get it. Watching bombers conduct an >11,000 km precision bombing raid is awesome. I am the sort of wierdo who happily read a 528 page book about the first Black Buck raid of the Falklands War in 1982. I really do get it. 13/17
But what does it say of two of the most amazing military operations in modern memory are still unable to fully eliminate Iran’s nuclear program? I think that’s proof that this is tactical brilliance may be in service of a foolhardy strategy. 14/17
RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER have not slowed the Iranian program nearly as much as the JCPOA. We hold diplomacy to much higher standards than bombing. The same people who endlessly complained about the JCPOA “sunsetting” are now happy to delay Iran’s bomb by much less. 15/17
This is why I said the strike is about regime change. As late as May, @DefenseIntel said Iran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program. When asked about that, @marcorubio said intel was “irrelevant.” It’s only irrelevant if the problem is the regime, not the program. 16/17
·We ought to judge this strike by its real purpose, not the legal camouflage of preemptive self-defense. If the strike leaves the current regime, or something very much like it, in power with a nuclear option then it will have been a strategic failure. 17/17
PS: I obviously wrote this before learning of the announced ceasefire. I stick by it. But it does look like Trump did one thing I had suggested. He made the US bombing contingent on Israel accepting a ceasefire. So far it has done that in word, but not entirely in deed.
One thing we know: the US successfully launched 14 (!) of the biggest bunker busters at three Iranian nuclear strikes. The massive strike force of more than 125 warplanes encountered no resistance. There were no US losses.
We don’t know a lot more. It will take time to learn the extent of bomb damage and the Iranian response. The Americans did not use my suggested approach.
What the US wants
The Americans are looking for Iranian agreement to end their uranium enrichment efforts. That is unlikely so long as the Islamic Republic remains intact. Iran has insisted for decades that it has a right to enrich uranium that it will not give up. The Supreme Leader could change his mind, but agreeing to give up enrichment would likely trigger moves within Iran to displace him.
The Americans have said they are not looking for regime change. But if Iran continues to defy demands that it give up on enrichment, regime change could become the result. That’s a problem, as regime change could go in the direction of more defiance, not less.
Lots of Americans did not want to go to war with Iran. They can hope this raid will be the end of it, as the Trump Administration is suggesting. But there is no guarantee of that. Iran may race to reconstitute its nuclear program. It likely has at least one secret site from which to do this. The US may need to continue building and using bunker busters.
What Iran wants
The Supreme Leader’s first concern will be regime preservation. That will dictate a show of willingness to negotiate. But giving up on uranium enrichment is not in the cards.
Ayatollah Khamenei favors deliberate responses, but it is difficult to imagine he will do nothing. The Iranians will seize opportunities to harm Americans, both troops and civilians. With Gaza’s Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Yemeni Houthis constrained and diminished, Tehran will look to its proxies in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces for help. The Iranians can waste a few missiles targeting the Americans there and in Syria. The Iranians may also activate terrorist cells around the world, including in the US, to harm Americans.
None of that will help Iran much in current circumstances. Tehran today is weaker than it has been at any time since the 1980s war with Iraq. A wise leader in Tehran might want to rebuild and attack sometime in the future. That would not however satisfy the militants of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They will want to shed American blood sooner rather than later.
What the Israelis want
The Israelis are pleased. They have sucked the Americans into a war Washington wanted to avoid. And they have gotten the kind of massive attack on nuclear sites that has the best chance of causing serious harm.
Prime Minister Netanyahu got the war, and the results, he has sought for decades. He has made no secret of his hope for regime change, but even without it Israelis will see him as having succeeded. Destruction of Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity is a big triumph.
But the war may continue for a long time. Iranian missiles are increasingly penetrating Israel’s air defenses. Iran’s widely dispersed, well-hidden, and mobile missile inventory is still substantial. Israelis are not going to be happy if they are still dodging Iranian attacks in six months. Even Hamas and Hezbollah still have missiles, despite many months of Israeli dominance in the air and on the ground.
Net results
Odds are no one is getting all they want. I am guessing the Americans will have to repeat their attacks, perhaps many times. US troops and citizens will get wacked. The Israelis won’t get the kind of regime change they want and will find themselves under a barrage of Iranian attacks for months or years to come. The Iranians will lose their enrichment capabilities even as their regime becomes more belligerent and militaristic.
There is little hope of a brighter scenario for the Middle East, despite positive developments in Syria and Lebanon. Even those are a dead cat bounce after dramatic falls. The “narrow path” to a New Middle East is looking rocky as well as narrow. The Trump Administration has systematically dismantled the programs that are needed not only in Lebanon and Syria but also in Libya and Yemen. Military force, not diplomacy, is prevailing. More devastation will be the result.
President Trump has postponed a decision on the bunker buster question for two weeks. With him, that often means no decision at all. But the two weeks provide time for negotiations. That is a good thing. The Europeans are wisely trying to take advantage of the opportunity, so far without results.
It is still reasonable to ask whether the US should or should not act against the deeply buried enrichment facility known as Fordow, if negotiations fail.
Why not
The arguments against US use of bunker busters are strong but general. The US definitely does not need another Middle East war. Ensuring that Fordow is destroyed after the bombing might require deployment of US troops. That would bleed (pun intended) easily into regime change, with little chance of a good outcome. Any offensive US involvement in this war will increase Iran’s focus on US troops and citizens as terrorist targets.
The Israelis started this. They should finish it. The US should not get sucked into Jerusalem’s mistakes. Prime Minister Netanyahu defied the US and wrecked the ongoing negotiations. We shouldn’t reward him for doing that. A negotiated end to Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions would have served US interests better than the current war.
Why
But that is water under the bridge. If Fordow remains intact at the end of this war, Iran will race, as best it can, for a nuclear weapon. That would make things worse than the use of bunker busters. It would also encourage other proliferators to follow Iran’s lead. Saudi Arabia and Turkiye have both committed to matching Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
If we refuse to destroy Fordow and leave the Israelis to their own devices, the war could go on for a long time. That would keep Netanyahu in power and encourage his regime change fantasy. Continuation of the war is also not in the US interest. It will kill a lot of Iranians and make any organic regime change in the right direction unlikely.
What to do
The war is on. There is no point in wishing it didn’t happen. The US should tell the Israelis that they need to make their own good faith effort to destroy Fordow. That would likely mean a special forces ground operation, with details shared with the Americans. If they are unwilling, we should be unwilling too.
If they try and fail, we should be prepared to use the bunker busters, provided Israel pledges that destruction of Fordow will end the war. Their forces, not ours, should verify the destruction. An end to the war would be contingent on Iranian willingness to negotiate, but that is already manifest. Netanyahu will require a harder squeeze. US weapons shipments should be suspended if he refuses.
So yes, bunker busters if the Israelis fail. But then Israel has to end the war.
The Israelis have succeeded in sucking Donald Trump into their war with the Middle East. He is already saying “we” when referring to Israel’s successes in destroying Iran’s air defenses. “We” are also threatening to kill the Supreme Leader.
This talk is inappropriate, and the Israeli war was ill-advised. More diplomacy was in order. But still there is a big question out there.
The predicament
If Iran keeps its deeply buried Fordow enrichment facility, any ceasefire will allow Tehran to rush to build a nuclear weapon. That is not in the US interest, or in the interest of most of the rest of the world.
This has put the US in a predicament. It can refuse to use one of its bunker busters, but that will leave the Israelis with the task. They could try to do it with a special forces air and ground raid. Or they could use their 2000-pound bombs, which experts think can do no better than block the tunnel entrances.
Unless the Israelis can be certain Fordow and any other enrichment facilities are destroyed, they will continue the war. Prime Minister Netanyahu might welcome that, since he wants regime change.
The quicker way to end the war short of regime change is to use two 30,000-pound penetrators (GBU-57 E/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP). Even that is not a sure thing. The US could acted under a thin veil of secrecy, without deploying forces to the region. The B2 bombers that carry the massive bombs could have accomplished the task flying from the United States, or many other places on earth.
What Trump will choose
But that is not Trump. He has already blown the possible (thin) cover of a B2 raid by talking openly about US involvement, threatening the Supreme Leader personally, and moving US naval assets to the Middle East.
He could insist that the Israelis try a special forces operation first. They might be willing provided he promises a B2 attack if it fails. My guess is that he won’t do that. He wants in on Israel’s success. He’ll go for the B2s. He should get a commitment from Israel first that the war will stop if the B2s are successful.
The wiser choice
Ironically, this is the wiser choice, even if for the wrong reasons. Allowing Netanyahu to continue to pummel Iran would be a mistake. That will kill many more Iranians and Israelis than ending the war quickly. Bombing rarely causes a population to turn against a regime. Regime change in Iran is up to the Iranians, not the Israelis. They would do better to focus on regime change in Jerusalem, not Tehran.
Israel has established control over Iran’s airspace and is now attacking at will. But it has not yet destroyed either of Iran’s main enrichment sites. Nor has it tried to kill the Supreme Leader, so far we know. That’s the next decision point.
If the aim is nuclear, Fordow is where it’s at
Israel claims it is attacking Iran because of its nuclear program, especially uranium enrichment. The enrichment site at Natanz has suffered above ground damage, including to its power plant. That may have damaged the underground centrifuges. Fordow still shows no attack damage. There the centrifuges are 100 yards underground. There is also a third, newer and deeper enrichment site not yet in operation.
Fordow and the new site are so deep the Israelis can’t reliably destroy them. The the bombs they are capable of delivering are not powerful enough. They might bomb the entrances to block them, or land a ground force to blow them up. Or they can ask the Americans to do it with 5000-bomb behemoth bombs.
President Trump is refusing to comment on possible US involvement in offensive operations against Iran. That is a sign the Americans are at least thinking about helping out. Destroying Fordow and the third site would return Iran to a year from its earlier “threshold” nuclear status. Trump caused this war. He’ll want to be in on it if Israel is going to win.
Or is the Islamic Republic the real target?
Rumint suggests Trump has asked Netanyahu not to kill the Supreme Leader. That gives Trump incentive to help with the enrichment sites.
But it surely displeases Netanyahu. He seems as much interested in regime change as in destroying nuclear sites. Hostility towards the Islamic Republic is a pillar of his career. He won’t want to end this war with it still in place. Just as he doesn’t want the Gaza war to end with Hamas in place. If he can destroy both, he can even hope to win a post-war election.
Israel has killed lots of Iranian military commanders and scientists. Killing Khamenei would up the ante. There is no telling who might take his place, or whether the institutions of the Islamic Republic would survive. Khamenei is bad. A successor could be worse. Or not. No one knows.
Protection or perdition?
The guy who says he is protecting the world doesn’t know either. His thirst for destruction seems insatiable in Gaza. Why would it be less in Iran? He may think he is protecting the world while sending it down the path to perdition. Without a vote, even inside Israel. For the sake of his own career. Doesn’t sound quite right.
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