Tag: Pakistan

The end is nigh, again!

I made a bunch of predictions a year ago.  Here is how they turned out:

  • Iran:  the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense.  Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action.  If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011.  No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh).  I wasn’t far off on this one.  No Green Revolution, no military action yet.
  • Pakistan:  it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse.  The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis.  Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan.  Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use.  It got worse, as suggested.  No I did not anticipate the killing of Osama bin Laden, or the increased tensions with the U.S., but otherwise I had at least some of it right:  growing internal tension, no Army takeover, some American success.
  • North Korea:  no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be.  Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul.  I did not predict the death of Kim Jong Il, but otherwise I got it right.  There was military action during the year, but no artillery barrage against Seoul.
  • Afghanistan:  sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July.  But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective.  There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces.  This is pretty much on the mark.
  • Iraq:  no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented.  But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues.  The big unknown:  can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)?  I did not anticipate the break between Maliki and Iraqiyya, but I pegged Maliki’s intentions correctly.  The Arab/Kurdish disputes are still unsettled.
  • Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate):  Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose.  That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens.  My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves.  Wrong so far as I know about the Americans offering a detailed settlement, even if Obama’s “land swaps” went a few inches in that direction.  Right about failure and Israel’s unfortunate direction.
  • Egypt:  trouble.  Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts.  Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow.  Pretty good for late December, though I was happily wrong about Mubarak hanging on.
  • Haiti:  Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes.  Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements.  Presidential election was held and things have improved.  Haiti has been calmer than anticipated.  Good news.
  • Al Qaeda:  the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize.  They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level.  Happy to be wrong here too:  they did not succeed, but they did try several times.  And they did not recentralize.
  • Yemen/Somalia:  Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter.  Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others.  Yemen has pretty much gone over the brink, and parts of Somalia are on their way back.  Pretty much on the mark.
  • Sudan:  the independence referendum passes.  Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat.  Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls.  Close to the mark, though Darfur has not deteriorated as much as I anticipated, yet.
  • Lebanon:  the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments.  Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them.  Four indictments were delivered against Hizbollah officials.  I was also right about yawning and stretching.
  • Syria:  Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel.  The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians.  Dead wrong on both counts.
  • Ivory Coast:  the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!).  The French and UN settled it by force of arms instead of the first-class ticket.  Not cheaper, but less long-term trouble.
  • Zimbabwe:  Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance.  If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket.  If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction.  He failed and the predicted delay ensued.
  • Balkans:  Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking.  Right on Bosnia, wrong on Kosovo.

I’m content with the year’s predictions, even if I got some things wrong.  Of course I also missed a lot of interesting developments (revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria, for example).  But you wouldn’t have believed me if I had predicted those things, would you?  Tomorrow I’ll discuss 2012.

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OK Santa Claus, here’s what I want

I’m hoping it’s true Yemen’s President Saleh is coming to the U.S.  As that eagle-eyed young journalist Adam Serwer tweeted:  “not to prosecute him…would be, u know, awkward.”  That set me thinking about other good fortune that might come our way this Christmas eve:

1.  Syria’s president Bashar al Assad decides he really wants to practice opthamology in London.

2.  North Korea’s “supreme commander” Kim Jong Un wants to see professional American basketball so much he decides to give up the nuclear nonsense and buy an NBA team for Pyongyang instead.  Lots more prestige and very lucrative.

3.  Iran follows suit, abandoning its pan-Islamist pretensions, separating mosque and state and restoring close relations with Israel.  It also buys an NBA team for Tehran.

4.  Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki declares peace on earth and good will towards Sunnis and Kurds, steps down from power and invites Iraqiyya to name a replacement.

5.  The new Islamist-run governments in Tunisia, Egypt (and yes, eventually) Libya follow the Iranian example, which convinces them separation of mosque and state are the best protection for religious freedom and will encourage religious devotion, as it seems to do in the U.S.

6.  The Saudis rise to the occasion and do likewise, making the king a constitutional monarch to boot.

7.  Bahrain does the same.  Yemen gets not only a democratic government but lots of water.

8.  Without implacable enemies, Prime Minister Netanyahu reaches a quick agreement with the Palestinians, whose state is admitted to the UN with no opposition.

9.  The Taliban see that their Islamist counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are on to a good thing and reach a power sharing agreement with the Northern Alliance, jettisoning President Karzai and precipitating an early American withdrawal.

10.  Pakistan follows up American withdrawal and the new government in Kabul by reaching a broad-ranging agreement with India, including self-determination for Kashmir.

11.  Al Qaeda opens a resort on the Somali coast called “The Caliphate.”

12.  I retire to observe the peaceful competition between China and the United States, who compete in ping pong but do everything else collaboratively.

If Santa Claus really does exist, children, he’ll bring me those things for the 12 days of Christmas.  If he doesn’t, then…

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That was a signal, not a Biden gaffe

If you’ve been wondering whether there are really secret talks going on with the Taliban, Vice President Biden’s “gaffe” yesterday is confirmation:  “the Taliban, per se, is not the enemy,” he said.

This is not a change in policy,  but it is certainly a shift in emphasis.  When President Obama announced the surge of troops into Afghanistan two years ago, he made it clear we were targeting not only Al Qaeda but also the Taliban.  We sought, he said, to reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government, on our way to disrupting, defeating and dismantling Al Qaeda.  He added that “We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens.”

The lyrics have changed, if not the tune.  Now we are talking with the Taliban, with help from the Germans, whether the Afghan government likes it or not.  I am not hearing a lot of talk about respect for human rights or even the requirement to abandon violence.  It would appear to be sufficient for the Taliban to foreswear support to Al Qaeda and give up on toppling the Karzai government.  Here is the fuller context of what Biden said:

…we are in a position where if Afghanistan ceased and desisted from being a haven for people who do damage and have as a target the United States of America and their allies, that’s good enough. That’s good enough. We’re not there yet.

Look, the Taliban per se is not our enemy. That’s critical. There is not a single statement that the president has ever made in any of our policy assertions that the Taliban is our enemy because it threatens U.S. interests. If, in fact, the Taliban is able to collapse the existing government, which is cooperating with us in keeping the bad guys from being able to do damage to us, then that becomes a problem for us. So there’s a dual track here:

One, continue to keep the pressure on al Qaeda and continue to diminish them. Two, put the government in a position where they can be strong enough that they can negotiate with and not be overthrown by the Taliban. And at the same time try to get the Taliban to move in the direction to see to it that they, through reconciliation, commit not to be engaged with al Qaeda or any other organization that they would harbor to do damage to us and our allies.

Note that the White House backed him up.  This was a signal to the Taliban that there is a door to a deal with the Americans that did not previously exist.  If, as is rumored, Afghan detainees at Guantanamo are transferred to Kabul’s control, that will be a clear indication that we think the Taliban ready to walk through.  Confidence building measures of this sort are an important part of the diplomatic game.  A prisoner transfer would help the Taliban to sell the idea of a deal to their cadres and supporters.

The road ahead is still not an easy one.  The options for a real deal with the Taliban are not appetizing.  And the reaction to Biden’s trial balloon suggest it will be hard to sell to many people in the U.S.  What if those prisoners are transferred and then released, or they escape?  That’s not something the Obama administration will want to see happen in the lead-up to a presidential election.

So there is still a lot of uncertainty and risk on the path to a negotiated exit from Afghanistan.  But that was a signal, not a Biden gaffe.

 

 

 

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What threatens the United States?

The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week.  What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?

Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:

  • a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
  • an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
  • a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations

Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:

  • a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
  • a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)

The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:

  • a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
  • a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
  • severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
  • political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
  • intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources

Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:

  • a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
  • rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
  • a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
  • a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
  • a mass casualty attack on Israel

But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:

  • political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
  • an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
  • an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
  • rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
  • growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action

Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:

  • military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
  • increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
  • renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
  • an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh

And some non-military threats:

  • heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
  • political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
  • political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
  • an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
  • violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
  • political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan

I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats.  But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones.  And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.

And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note:  the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.

 

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Diplomacy imitates confused reality

Yesterday’s Bonn conference on Afghanistan reflected all too starkly the war.  Lots of countries showed up, but Pakistan–certainly among the most important–did not.  The Taliban weren’t there either.  Iran was, but sounding out of tune with both the Americans and Afghans, who emphasized the need for continuing assistance and foreign military presence.  Tehran blames the whole mess on foreign intervention.  Afghanistan was looking for long-term commitment, not specific pledges.  There was no progress on the country’s confusing current reality.

The best I can say for the event is that Hillary Clinton knows what is important:  she emphasized rule of law, including the fight against corruption, and underlined the importance of being realistic about what can be achieved.  Some might claim that these two points are mutually contradictory, but that’s the confusing reality.

I am surprised that the pressures for withdrawal from Afghanistan are not stronger than they are.  I guess having an opposition devoted to “winning” gives a Democratic president a free hand to remain longer, if he wants to do so and can keep his own party in line.  But it is hard to see how we’ll make it to 2014, when most of the U.S. troops are supposed to be on their way home, unless there is progress in negotiating with the Taliban.

No one seems to think that is happening, but I admit it would be hard to tell from outside.  Negotiations of this sort go slowly and badly until suddenly they go well. It is worth trying, if only because success in is so important to rescuing the overall effort from failure.

Today’s sectarian attacks on Shia targets, which are unusual in Afghanistan, can be interpreted at least two ways:  either there is a Taliban splinter group (or Al Qaeda) that is trying to wreck ongoing negotiations, or the Taliban have decided to widen their war in a sectarian direction, hoping to bring more chaos to Kabul and Afghanistan generally (one of the attacks took place in the usually quiet northern town Mazar-i-Sharif).  More confused reality.

PS:  The Taliban have joined in condemnation of the attacks.  A Pakistani group with ties to al Qaeda,  Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami, has now claimed responsibility.

PPS:  Those asking for the U.S. to complete the job in Afghanistan seem to me to be asking for more than we are likely to give.

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Next week’s “peace picks”

1. Looking to the Future of Pakistan

With each passing day, Pakistan becomes an even more crucial player in world affairs. Home of the world’s second largest Muslim population, epicenter of the global jihad, location of perhaps the planet’s most dangerous borderlands, and armed with nuclear weapons, this South Asian nation will go a long way toward determining what the world looks like ten years from now.

Event Information

When

Monday, December 05, 2011
2:00 PM to 4:00 PM

Where

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map

Email: events@brookings.edu

Phone: 202.797.6105

Register Now

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Stephen P. Cohen
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On December 5, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host the launch of The Future of Pakistan(Brookings Institution Press, 2011), which evaluates several scenarios for how the country will develop and evolve in the near future. A team of 17 experts from Pakistan, the United States, Europe and India, led by Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen P. Cohen, contributed chapters to the book, looking at pieces of the Pakistan puzzle. Several of the authors will join other Pakistan experts on two panels to examine the issues, relevant actors and their motivations, different outcomes they might produce, and what it all means for Pakistanis, Indians, the United States, and the entire world.After each panel, participants will take audience questions
Participants

2:00 PM — Opening Remarks

Stephen P. Cohen

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, 21st Century Defense Initiative

2:10 PM — Panel 1 – Paradoxical Pakistan

Moderator: Teresita C. Schaffer

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, 21st Century Defense Initiative

C. Christine Fair

Assistant Professor
Georgetown University

William Milam

Senior Scholar
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Shuja Nawaz

Director, South Asia Center
The Atlantic Council

Moeed Yusuf

South Asia Adviser
U.S. Institute of Peace

3:10 PM — Panel 2 – Pakistan: Where To?

Moderator: John R. Schmidt

Professorial Lecturer
The George Washington University

Pamela Constable

Staff Writer
The Washington Post

Bruce Riedel

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Marvin Weinbaum

Scholar-in-Residence
Middle East Institute

Joshua T. White

Ph.D. Candidate
Johns Hopkins University, SAIS

2. Which Way Forward for Egypt?

Wednesday, December 7, 2011 – 12:15pm – 1:45pm

New America Foundation

1899 L Street NW Suite 400

Washington, DC 20036

Egypt’s first parliamentary elections since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak began on November 28th. The vote for the People’s Assembly will stretch over six weeks into January 2012.

An outpouring of enthusiastic voters has for the moment raised a note of optimism in Egypt. Yet following days of mass protest over the military’s continued rule, state violence, and deepening political and social polarization, it appears that Egypt’s transition will be long and rocky.

Join us for a conversation co-hosted by the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association about the election’s impact, transitional prospects, and implications for the wider MENA region and U.S. foreign policy.

A light lunch will be served.

Participants

Featured Speakers
Randa Fahmy
Vice President, Egyptian American Rule of Law Association

Nathan Brown
Professor, Political Science & International Affairs, George Washington University
Nonresident Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Michael Wahid Hanna
Fellow, The Century Foundation (will have just returned from Egypt)

Moderator
Leila Hilal
Co-Director, Middle East Task Force
New America Foundation

3. Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East

A Book Launch for a USIP-funded study by Katerina Dalacoura

Wednesday, December 7 from 3:00-4:30

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Choate Room
1779 Massachusetts Avenue Northwest
Washington, DC 20036

The putative relationship between political repression and terrorism remains a matter of active debate in scholarly and policymaking circles.  Based on investigations into individual Islamist movements and the political environments in which they operate, this study assesses whether the emergence of Islamist terrorism is linked to the absence of political participation and repression.

The U.S. Institute of Peace is pleased to sponsor an in-depth discussion with Dalacoura centered on her recently-published work.

Funded by a grant from USIP, the volume draws on a series of case studies that include al Qa’eda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Groupe Islamique Armé, Gamaa Islamiyya, the Jordanian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhoods, the Tunisian Nahda Movement, the Turkish Justice and Development Party, and Iranian Islamist movements.

“Drawing on her deep knowledge of Middle East politics, Dalacoura powerfully challenges past assumptions about a simple link between democratic deficits and the spread of Islamist terrorism,” said Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Conceptually rigorous, empirically rich, incisive and searching, this is a major study.”

Speakers

  • Daniel Brumberg, Chair
    U.S. Institute of Peace
  • Katerina Dalacoura, Author
    London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Dafna Rand
    Department of State
  • Eric Goldstein
    Human Rights Watch

4.  The Arab Spring:  Implications for US Policy and Interests

A publication launch and discussion featuring

Middle East Institute scholars:

Allen Keiswetter

Principal Coordinator and Author
with

Charles Dunne
Amb. Art Hughes

Amb. Molly Williamson

Thursday, December 8, 2011

12:00pm-1:30pm

SEIU Building, Room 2600

2nd Floor

1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

*Please note that this event is not being held at MEI. An ID is required for entrance into the building.*

The Middle East Institute is proud to present its first ever policy paper produced exclusively by MEI scholars.  Entitled “The Arab Spring: Implications for US Policy and Interests,” it draws upon the broad expertise of 25 Middle East Institute scholars to examine the impact of this year’s popular uprisings in the Arab world on a variety of sectors and issues, including oil and energy, Iran, the peace process, and democratization and reform.  The paper is based on a series of roundtable discussions amongst MEI scholars in response to the historic and unprecedented changes taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and beyond, and offers and offers insights and recommendations for US policymakers recalibrating America’s approach to the Middle East.  Please join us for the launch of this MEI featured publication and a discussion with principal coordinator and author Allen Keiswetter and contributors Amb. Molly Williamson, Amb. Art Hughes, and Charles Dunne.  You can read the full paper in advance of the event here.

TO RSVP for this event, please click here.
5.  Getting Rights…Right: How Companies are Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

Thursday, December 8, 2011
9:00 AM – 4:30 PM

Grand Ballroom, 3rd Floor
Marvin Center, 800 21st Street, NW

To mark International Human Rights Day 2011, George Washington University, the UN Global Compact US Network, and the US Institute of Peace will host a one day conference on the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These principles, approved by the UN Human Rights Council in June, are designed to help business monitor its human rights impact. These guidelines clarified both the human rights responsibilities of states and firms and made them clear and actionable. Our speakers, representing business, civil society, the US Government, and academia, will focus on practical approaches to implementing the Guiding Principles (the GPs).

9:00-9:10 – Welcoming Remarks
Stephen C. Smith, Professor of Economics and International Affairs; Director, Institute for International Economic Policy, GW

Dave Berdish, Manager of Sustainable Business Development, Ford Motor Company

9:10-9:45 – “Why Firms Should Advance Human Rights: Manpower’s Approach”
David Arkless, President, Corporate and Government Affairs, ManpowerGroup

9:45-11:15 – Panel 1 – “Addressing the Problems of Slavery and Human Trafficking”
Brenda Schultz, Manager of Responsible Business, Carlson Hotels Worldwide Samir Goswami, Director of Corporate Responsibility, Rule of Law, Lexis Nexis

Jean Baderscheider, Vice President, Global Procurement, Exxon Mobil

Indika Samarawickreme, Executive Director, Free the Slaves

Moderator:
Pamela Passman, President and CEO, CREATe

11:15-11:30 – Coffee Break

11:30-1:00 – Panel 2 – “How Business Should Operate in Conflict Zones”
Bennett Freeman, Senior Vice President for Social research and Policy, Calvert Group

Charlotte Wolff, Corporate Responsibility Manager, Arcellor Mittal

Olav Ljosne, Regional Director of Communications, Africa, Shell Corporation

Moderator:
Raymond Gilpin, Director, Center for Sustainable Economies, U.S. Institute of Peace

1:00-2:15 – Luncheon Keynote
Ursula Wynhoven, General Counsel, UN Global Compact

Gerald Pachoud, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary General, UN and former Senior Advisor, Special Representative on Business and Human Rights

2:15-3:45 – Panel 3: General Implementation of the Guiding Principles Is it difficult to get buy in? Is it costly? What recommendations or roadblocks have you found?
Mark Nordstrom, Senior Labor & Employment Counsel, General Electric

Dave Berdish, Manager of Sustainable Business

Brenda Erskine, Director of Stakeholder and Community Relationships, Suncor

Meg Roggensack, Senior Advisor for Business and Human Rights, Human Rights First

Moderator:
Susan Aaronson, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, GW

3:45-4:30 – General Discussion: What should policymakers do to encourage adoption of the GPs?

RSVP at: http://tiny.cc/guidingprinciples

Sponsored by Institute for International Economic Policy, U.S. Institute for Peace, U.N. Global Compact, and the U.S. Network

6.  The Valley’s Edge: A Year with the Pashtuns in the Heartland of the Taliban

Start: Friday, December 9, 2011 4:30 PM
End:   Friday, December 9, 2011 6:00
You are cordially invited to a book lecture with author Daniel R. Green for his new book
The Valley’s Edge: A Year with the Pashtuns in the Heartland of the Taliban Friday, December 9
4:30 PMThe Institute of World Politics
1521 16th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
Please RSVP to kbridges@iwp.edu.This event is sponsored by IWP’s Center for Culture and Security.

About the author

Daniel R. Green is a Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and is pursuing a PhD in political science at the George Washington University. For his work in Afghanistan in 2005-2006, he received the U.S. Department of State’s Superior Honor Award, the U.S. Army’s Superior Civilian Honor Award, and a personal letter of commendation from then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace. He has also received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Exceptional Public Service Award and in 2007 served with the U.S. military in Fallujah, Iraq. He lives in Washington, D.C.

About the book

In this gripping, firsthand account, Daniel Green tells the story of U.S. efforts to oust the Taliban insurgency from the desolate southern Afghan province of Uruzgan. Nestled between the Hindu Kush mountains and the sprawling wasteland of the Margow and Khash Deserts, Uruzgan is a microcosm of U.S. efforts to prevent Afghanistan from falling to the Taliban insurgency and Islamic radicalism.

Green, who served in Uruzgan from 2005 to 2006 as a U.S. Department of State political adviser to a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), reveals how unrealistic expectations, a superficial understanding of the Afghans, and a lack of resources contributed to the Taliban’s resurgence in the area. He discusses the PRT’s good-governance efforts, its reconstruction and development projects, the violence of the insurgency, and the PRT’s attempts to manage its complex relationship with the local warlord cum governor of the province.

Upon returning to Afghanistan in 2009 with the U.S. military and while working at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul until 2010, Green discovered that although many improvements had been made since he had last served in the country, the problems he had experienced in Uruzgan continued despite the transition from the Bush administration to the Obama administration.

 

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