Tag: Qatar
Are things going to hell in Libya?
Not yet is the answer.
But you wouldn’t know that from the media coverage. National Transitional Council (NTC) chair Mahmoud Jalil’s comment about allowing polygamy got a lot of ink. So too does every hiccup of the armed militias in Tripoli, not to mention what happens if an Islamist sneezes or a supposed Al Qaeda flag flies. I need hardly mention the disgusting, criminal behavior of the young men who capture Qaddafi and then allegedly sodomized and murdered him.
I wouldn’t want to minimize any of these issues. In fact, I drew attention to the militia and Islamist issues weeks ago. Integrating the militias under NTC control, establishing law and order and ensuring no room for Al Qaeda are vital, as is regaining control of as many surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs) as possible.
But any government that can peacefully switch out its prime minister and begin the process of appointing a new cabinet, in accordance with its constitutional framework, is not yet going to hell in a handbasket. Nor does the relatively chaotic situation outside of Tripoli and Benghazi, and the wasteland that used to be Sirte, prove that things are going in the wrong direction.
What we need to do now is ensure that they continue to go in the right direction. Where are the goals agreed between the Libyans and the international community? Where is the structure for donor coordination? What kind of program is the European Union putting in place? What are the Qataris up to? The internationals quickly lost their focus once the fighting was over.
This is a big mistake. Libya has bigger problems than Tunisia: the lack of a state, the violence of the rebellion, militia competition, some revenge killing and torturing. But it also has resources, good leadership, and some serious planning, including the constitutional framework. Let’s make sure it heads down Tunisia’s path towards good elections and a constitution.
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Game changer
Politics and Policy in the New Middle East: that’s what they are calling the Middle East Institute 2011 Annual Conference at the Grand Hyatt, 1000 H Street:
Wednesday, Nov. 16th
6:00pm: Kickoff Banquet: Keynote by Bill Burns, DepSecState; awardees Lakhdar Brahimi and Esraa Abdel Fattah
Thursday, Nov. 17th
Conference
8:45 – 9:00am: Opening Remarks: Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, President MEI
9:00-10:30am: After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy In the Middle East
10:45am-12:15pm: The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
12:30-2:10pm: Keynote Luncheon: Samih al-Abed and Yossi Beilin
2:15-3:45pm: Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
4:00-5:30pm: Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
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So how is that revolution going?
Libya is more or less completing its first week since the Qaddafi boys and their father skedaddled to we not where, yet. How is the Transitional National Council (TNC) doing in stabilizing Tripoli and restoring basic services?
Only people “on the ground,” as we say in the conflict world, can answer this kind of question. NPR this morning reports that uniformed but unarmed police are back on the street in response to an appeal from the TNC, but water is still not flowing. The New York Times has a description of jockeying for position among rebel leaders, both in Tripoli and at the national level. Looting and other disorder has been reported, but it does not appear to have been widespread. It is hard to get too excited about the guys who stole Qaddafi’s golf cart, but attacks on government offices to destroy files would betray an organized resistance that poses more serious problems.
The main contestations among the rebels seems to be emerging along the Islamist/secularist and east/west fault lines, with Islamist forces from the west who played a major role in liberating Tripoli claiming they are entitled to a good share of the political spoils. War is about power, which abhors a vacuum even more than nature.
It is nice to have the traffic cops back on the street, so long as the local communities welcome them. But the NTC has a big challenge in consolidating the various militia that fought to liberate Libya into a single army answerable to civilian authority, while finding jobs in the police or elsewhere for enough of the excess personnel to prevent them from creating problems. Right now is when some of these militias will find themselves short of cash or food. They can become protection rackets and organized crime syndicates almost overnight.
The terms of art for dealing with this problem are DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration) and SSR (security sector reform). More often than not, they have been treated as two separate processes, with DDR preceding SSR. That is a mistake. They are really two sides of the same coin, one that is supposed to buy the authorities a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, which is one textbook definition of sovereignty.
If the NTC manages to get control of the militias and restore order in Tripoli, its future prospects will improve dramatically. The unseen hand that can help them are those shadowy foreigners–said to be British and French special forces as well as Qataris, and likely also some Americans–who assisted in the Libyan war. They will have enormous influence with the militias they assisted, and deep knowledge of who really did fight effectively. We all would like to see this revolution proceed with Libyan leadership, but that leadership is going to need foreign assistance in many different ways. Helping to unify the freedom fighters and getting them to respect civilian authority is, I am afraid, one of them.
Getting the water flowing again is more a Libyan responsibility. Qaddafi’s Great Manmade River, which supplies much of the country, is said to have been shut off at Sabha, a town south of Tripoli that is still in the hands of Qaddafi loyalists. The perils of a full-fledged military assault on Sebha and Sirte, Qaddafi’s home town, are serious, which is why the rebels have given the loyalists there until Saturday to surrender. Let’s hope they do, and that no serious damage has been done to the water equipment or supplies.
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Making Bashar al Assad history
As Marc Lynch points out in a tweet this morning, the region is belatedly beginning to react to regime violence against protesters in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have denounced it and have withdrawn their ambassadors, along with Qatar and Kuwait. Turkey is sending its foreign minister to Damascus tomorrow with a “final warning.” The Arab League has expressed “growing concern.”
Blake Hounshell at Foreign Policy is predicting the downfall not only of Bashar al Assad but of the whole regime:
The whole Baathist system has to come down, and it probably will. The only questions now are how long it will take, and how much more innocent blood will be shed in the process.
I hope he is correct, but it won’t happen unless the pressure builds.
Let’s leave aside the remarkable hypocrisy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia denouncing violence against demonstrators. They are more than welcome to join the international chorus against it in Syria, even if they jointly repressed the demonstrations this spring in Bahrain. The denunciations already make some difference, as they are necessarily the first step on the road to more vigorous action. What more can Syria’s neighbors do that will make a difference?
Andrew Tabler and David Schenker discussed the options early in July. Those that have not been tried yet include depriving Bashar al Assad of revenue by blocking oil exports, expanding sanctions on his businessman cronies, referring him to the International Criminal Court, and encouraging Syrian army defections. Most of the rest of what they recommend has already been tried, including denunciation by UN human rights experts, enhanced relations with the opposition and more vocal alignment with the Syrian people.
The brutal fact is that whether Bashar al Assad falls, and how long it takes, depends more on the wisdom and fortitude of the Syrians than on anything else. So far, they have been remarkable. A journalist who has been there and talked with the protesters recently has assured me that they look even better up close.
The two key “pillars of the regime” remain the army and the business communities in Aleppo and Damascus. If one or both of these crumbles, Bashar al Assad is history.
PS: The LA Times put up this video, allegedly recorded in Idlib yesterday:
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A Libya busman’s holiday
I’ve got a paper coming out on Libya over at the Council on Foreign Relations in the next couple of days, but I mosied over to the Carnegie Endowment this afternoon for a discussion on Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition featuring Esam Omiesh of the Libyan Emergency Task Force and Fadel Lamen of the American-Libyan Council, Carnegie’s Marina Ottaway in the chair.
Marina started off with a cautionary tone: the transition has to be fast enough to provide the country with some semblance of order and governance, but not so fast that legitimacy is brought into in doubt. The country was already devastated by the Gaddafi regime even before the fighting, which has now split it east and west. The security forces are also divided. Political agreements take time, elections are not urgent, but some sort of interim administration is necessary.
Esam outlined the process as currently foreseen by the Transitional National Council (TNC). The goal is a united, constitutionally based, democratic Libya. In the immediate future, the NTC hopes for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Gaddafi’s forces, creation of humanitarian “safe zones,” release of prisoners and removal from power of Gaddafi and his family.
The NTC thinks of itself as a temporary umbrella group, a hybrid executive and legislative body. It has already expanded from the original 31 members to 60 and will need to expand further as more areas are liberated. Tripoli will be a particular challenge. Tribal cleavages will not be an issue in Libya, as so many foreigners seem to think. Nor will ethnic differences emerge as important, as Berbers are thoroughly integrated and have been fighting with the rebels in the Nafusa moutains.
The NTC foresees a committee of 15 to write a new constitution within 45 days by a committee of 15, then approved in a referendum. Legislative elections would follow in 4 months, with presidential elections 2 months later. Fadel and Marina preferred a provisional constitution, subject to subsequent revision in an unspecified way. The new constitution, it has already been decided, would cite Islam as “a” (not “the”) source of law.
All this would be done in line with international mandates and seeking international support through a reconstruction conference. International nongovernmental organizations will be welcomed, provided they are well informed and seek the trust of the Libyans, and especially if they have Libyan American staff. The NTC may negotiate with Gaddafi, but it will not agree to allow him or any of his family to remain in power.
Fadel, noting that Libya under Gaddafi was a stateless state, or worse a stateless autocracy, surveyed the key players. The TNC, he said, is accepted as legitimate everywhere, as is its chair Judge Abdul Jalil. There is controversy about some of its other members, and it does not always make good decisions, but it has served well so far.
Local councils have grown up in liberated areas as well as in Gaddafi-held territory, including Tripoli (where there are thought to be four). They are the ones governing at the local level. The February 17 coalition of lawyers and judges is influential. A relatively moderate Muslim brotherhood seems to dominate the Islamists part of the political spectrum, at least for the moment. Technocrats from the Gaddafi regime, military officers, militia leaders, “syndicates” (regime-sponsored guilds of lawyers, doctors, etc.), secular democrats will all have roles to play.
An international honest broker will be needed, but not Qatar or the Arab League. The UN and EU will play important roles, but Fadel wants the U.S. not to lead only from behind. There will be a real need in order to ensure security for Muslim and Arab peacekeeping boots on the ground.
My comment: A lot of wishful thinking here, especially about the speed and ease of the transition. But what’s a revolution without a bit of idealism and hope? I’m not one to fault people for wanting a good outcome, moving quickly, and being inclusive.
The local councils are the real news here: few conflict societies generate bodies of this sort with palpable legitimacy. For some reason, Libya does. It will be difficult but important to preserve them from the depredations of the foreign invasion of embassies and NGOs, who will want to hire away everyone in sight who speaks English or has a decent education.
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It should stop only with Gaddafi at the exit
While the rest of the world focuses on current military operations, I’d like to focus again on the critical, but not yet urgent, question of when the military effort against Gaddafi should stop.
As Neal Ascherson points out in The Guardian this morning, the problem in Libya is Gaddafi. UN Security Council resolution 1973 does not recognize that. It calls for “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, and Hillary Clinton (among others) has been at pains to reiterate that regime change is not the objective.
This matters because it could determine when the military effort against Gaddafi comes to a halt. Arab League Secretary General, and putative presidential candidate in Egypt, Amr Moussa is already trying to distance himself from the military effort due to alleged civilian casualties. Pressures of this sort will build over the next several days, as Gaddafi is sure to make all sorts of claims about the damage the air attacks are doing.
Resolution 1973 provides precious little guidance on when to stop, beyond the overall purpose of protecting civilians. Yesterday’s statement from the Paris meeting of those states that want to be counted as constituting or supporting the coalition of the willing provides more:
Muammar Gaddafi and those executing his orders must immediately end the acts of violence carried out against civilians, to withdraw from all areas they have entered by force, return to their compounds, and allow full humanitarian access.
If this is fully operative, it is hard to see how Gaddafi could survive in power, as “those executing his orders” certainly include not only the military under his command but also the internal security forces. If they were to withdraw “from all areas they have entered by force,” he would have no means of continuing to control most of Libya, as arguably this phrase could even apply to Tripoli but certainly applies to Zawiya in the west and the towns his forces have taken in the last ten days in the east as well.
In practice, the international community often compromises on issues of this sort, as it comes under enormous public pressure to stop a one-sided military campaign. The military “coalition of the willing” includes not only leaders France and the UK but also Canada, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Norway in addition to the United States. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar, slow on the draw, are thought to be getting ready to contribute combat aircraft. I can only imagine how strong the internal political pressures in several of these countries will be against continuing the military campaign a week from now.
If the campaign stops too early, with Gaddafi still in place and controlling a substantial part of the country, it will be difficult to implement the peace in a way that preserves Libya’s territorial integrity and gives it an opportunity to become a more normal state than it has been for more the four decades. If the campaign stops too late, it will leave Libya in shambles.
At least as much wisdom is required to know when to stop as was required in deciding to start, but getting Gaddafi out should certainly be an important factor in the calculus. I trust American diplomats are working as hard on that as they did on the remarkable Resolution 1973.
PS: I expected pressures to build, but not as fast as this morning, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen said on Meet the Press: Qaddafi staying in power is “certainly potentially one outcome,” adding the UN-approved airstrikes “are limited and it isn’t about seeing him go.” I stick by what I said above: he should be at the exit door before we stop. We don’t need another half-baked result that burdens us for years to come.
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