Tag: Russia
Stay, but not for long
March 29 President Trump declared:
We’re coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now. Very soon—very soon we’re coming out.
He reiterated that sentiment Tuesday. Yesterday the White House confirmed that the troops will stay, at least for now. Apart from the question of who is really commander-in-chief, and whether President Trump has any idea what he is talking about, this ambiguity (or is it vacillation?) leaves us with important questions: should the troops stay or go? What should their goals be?
The only valid purposes for staying should be US national interests, in particular vital ones. Staying only if Saudi Arabia agrees to pay–a proposition the President has floated–violates this first principle. Foreign governments do sometimes pay part of the costs of deployed American forces, but only when the deployment (to Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, or Qatar for example) meets the criterion of being in the US national interest. American troops should not be for sale.
What American interests can be served by extending the US presence in Syria, now that the Islamic State has lost almost all of the territory under its control? I think there are three possibilities:
- Prevent resurgence of ISIS, which will continue its insurgency despite its loss of territory.
- Counter Iran’s presence and influence.
- Prevent allied Syrian Kurdish forces from aiding the insurgency inside Turkey.*
A continuing American presence in eastern Syria is not going to bring down President Assad or otherwise hinder his depredation of the Syrian people. It will not expel the Iranians or the Russians. The US hasn’t even been willing to counter Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, never mind the extensive bombing of civilian targets and abuse of those who surrender to “reconciliation” agreements.
Weighing against the continued US presence are many factors: the risks to the small numbers of Americans (2000 or so) spread out over the large territory east of the Euphrates, the dubious legality and legitimacy of the operation (especially once ISIS has been pulverized), the likelihood that our presence will lead to mission creep in either military or civilian directions, and the costs and domestic political sustainability of the operation. The US troops have shown they are capable of defending themselves, having fended off a Russian mercenary attack weeks ago. But sooner or later, dozens or maybe hundreds will be killed or wounded. How long will an impatient president who promised to bring American troops home from the Middle East persist in keeping them there once that happens?
The troops will at some point be withdrawn. The question is what conditions can be created to allow that to happen without imperiling vital US interests.
First and foremost is some minimal stabilization before withdrawal, so that local people will have the means and the will to resist any ISIS resurgence. That is what is going on now. The key is not physical reconstruction, which will take years, but rather clearing mines and rubble as well as establishing a modicum of legitimate governance by and for local people. Here is a lengthy discussion of the issues involved in stabilization of both Iraq and Syria Monday at USIP:
If President Trump, as some have suggested, was talking about Saudi money for the stabilization process, that would make a whole lot more sense than selling our troop presence.
Countering Iran’s presence and influence is not going to be easy. They are on the winning side in this war. They don’t really have to come through the part of Syria US and allied forces control to be present and influential there. It seems to me the best we can do is try to negotiate withdrawal of the Shia militia forces Iran has deployed inside Syria, in exchange for US withdrawal of its ground forces. It might not work of course, especially as the President has already tipped them off as to what he wants. I thought he said he wasn’t going to do stupid things like that. But it might be worth a try.
It will be difficult, to say the least, to sever the tie between the Syrian Kurdish forces (PYD) with which the US has collaborated to defeat ISIS and the Kurds rebelling inside Turkey (PKK). The two organizations are closely tied ideologically and loyal to the same leader. But if the US wants to restore its relations with NATO ally Turkey, that is what it needs to try to do. The first step should be getting the PYD out of Manbij, a mostly Arab town west of the Euphrates, as Vice President Biden promised in the summer of 2016. The US Central Command is dead set against fulfilling that commitment, as it doesn’t want to abandon its Kurdish allies. But that’s why we have civilian control of the military.
The Turks should be able to live with PYD, or at least Kurdish, dominance of the area east of the Euphrates, but the Kurds as well as their Arab allies south will need at least continuation of US air support to prevent the area east of the Euphrates from falling to a revived extremist group, the Syrian armed forces, or Shia militias. As a former colleague pointed out to me yesterday, that is precisely what the US did in Iraq for more than a decade: it enforced a no-fly zone that effectively protected Iraqi Kurdistan from Saddam Hussein. During that time, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds found a modus vivendi, at least until the Kurdistan referendum last year. The air support would most effectively be provided from Turkey, as it is today. Turkey would expect to receive from the PYD at the very least a verifiable pledge of non-assistance to the PKK, as well as assurances about allowing pluralism in their part of Syria.
The good options in Syria evaporated long ago. The best the US can do now is use its position there to meet limited but important national interests that will endure past the troops withdrawal. That will mean staying, but not for long.
*For those keeping score, here are Secretary of State Tillerson’s deadletter objectives:
1) ISIS and al-Qaeda must suffer an “enduring defeat” and Syria must never again become a platform for transnational terror organization that targets U.S. citizens;
2) Syria’s seven year-long civil war must draw to a close through a brokered diplomatic settlement;
3) Iran’s influence in Syria must be “diminished” and its “dreams of a northern arch…denied;”
4) The conditions should be created to allow Syrian refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes;
5) Syria must be “free” of weapons of mass destruction.
I’ve watered down 1), eliminated 2), kept much of 3), eliminated 4) eliminated 5), and added Turkey and the Kurds.
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Russia should be job 1
Far be it from me to in any way align myself with John Bolton, but there are things he could get the Administration to do consistent with at least some of his stated positions that would be preferable to the hodge-podge of contradictory signals Washington is currently sending on foreign policy.
For the moment, President Trump has prioritized the Iran nuclear deal. He is trying to use his threat to withdraw as leverage to get the Europeans to agree to amend the deal in order to gain access to Iranian military sites, restrain Tehran’s missile program, and end the “sunset” (expiration) clauses. His self-imposed deadline is May 12, when Congress requires him to certify once again that the deal is in the US interest. He didn’t do that last time around and said he would withdraw if the agreement wasn’t fixed by the next deadline.
Withdrawing from the deal is patently not in the US national interest. Either Iran will also withdraw and re-initiate its nuclear program, giving it the potential for nuclear weapons within a year or so. Or Tehran and Brussels will decide to proceed without the US, splitting the Western alliance on a vital issue. US withdrawal would also spell the end of any distant hope (but see below) for a deal with North Korea, as Pyongyang would be correct to conclude that the US can’t be trusted to hold up its end, and strain relations further with China and Russia (who helped negotiate the agreement with Iran and continue to support it). There are simply no gains from withdrawal, only losses, unless you want to provide yourself with an excuse to go to war. That means risking the Sixth Fleet as well as numerous US bases and troops in the Gulf and Iraq, as well as attacks elsewhere in the Middle East and even inside the US.
Another apparent priority is North Korea. It already has nuclear weapons and credible if not certain means to deliver them, at least against US forces and allies in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. The odds of successfully negotiating “denuclearization” with Pyongyang are risible. There simply is no better protection for North Korea against an American attempt at regime change than Kim Jung-un’s nukes. Once again, the only real option to “denuclearize” is war. The consequences would be worse than catastrophic: at the very least a massive artillery barrage by the North against Seoul, killing tens of thousands, if not a nuclear exchange.
A third priority for Trump has been trade, in particular the North American Free Trade Agreement, (that is, Canada and Mexico) as well as China’s intellectual property expropriation and excess capacity in steel and aluminum. There is little hope of anything good coming of Trump’s unilateral measures (tariffs on steel and aluminum as well as on Chinese products), beyond the agreement already reached with South Korea (which has lots of reasons to be nice to the US these days). Tariffs are a blunt tool that has nothing to do with intellectual property theft, and the US doesn’t import much steel or aluminum from China. It does from Canada and Mexico, which have already been exempted from the tariffs, whose main impact will be to raise prices to American consumers (not only for steel and aluminum but for all the products in which they are used).
The remaining priority is Russia, which has distinguished itself in recent years by defying the norms of the liberal international order: murdering its opponents abroad and at home (including with nerve gas in a public place!), refusing to leave parts of other countries (Moldova and Abkhazia), annexing Crimea, invading Ukraine, threatening the Baltics as well as Sweden and Finland, meddling in democratic elections while making its own non-competitive, and intervening to slaughter the relatively moderate opposition as well as thousands of civilians in Syria while launching a mercenary attack on US troops and allies there. Moscow is the capital of a state that has gone rogue.
Bolton is no friend of Russia. He recognizes and has denounced most if not all of the offenses listed here. The problem is the President. While the Administration rightly boasts that it has done more against Russia (in expulsion of diplomats and sanctions) than Obama did (partly because Russia has done more against the US than in Obama’s time), President Trump has still not uttered a word of criticism against Vladimir Putin. Such consistency is not his normal habit and raises the question worldwide whether the US really speaks with one voice. That incoherence limits the impact of the modest moves made so far to counter Russia’s troublemaking.
It seems to me the right order of priorities is this:
- Russia: pushback worldwide, with a view to reaching a new, more balanced, modus vivendi
- Iran: no withdrawal from the nuclear deal but instead get it and its proxies out of Syria, where they pose a threat to Israel
- Trade: by using the WTO and other well-established multilateral mechanisms, not unilateral tariffs and exceptions that will shift imports but do little to limit them
- North Korea: deterrence is really the only option
More in a future post on how to accomplish at least 1 and 2.
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Peace picks, March 26 – April 1
- Will the Russians Meddle in Latin American Elections? | Monday, March 26 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) | Register here |
2018 will see presidential elections in several countries across Latin America, notably in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela. This event will discuss Russia’s strategic interests in Latin America, including how the region should prepare for potential Russian meddling in upcoming presidential elections. Featuring Javier Lesaca (Visiting Scholar, School of Media and Public Affairs, GWU) and David Salvo (Resident Fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, GMF).
This event will be webcast live.
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- The New Geopolitics of Turkey and the West | Monday, March 26 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union are under significant strain, and they are likely to remain difficult ahead of Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for 2019. Ankara and Washington remain at loggerheads over the way forward in Syria; several EU member states have been calling for an end to the accession process; and Turkey’s domestic politics are raising further questions about Turkey’s place in the trans-Atlantic alliance. Yet, there is much at stake: Turkey is facing threats from terrorism, struggling to manage 3.5 million Syrian refugees, and dealing with the aftermath of a failed coup. Europe and the United States have shared interests in addressing regional challenges with Turkey, especially as Russia seeks to expand its influence in the region. So how should the West handle this important but challenging ally? Featuring Eric Edelman (Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, SAIS), Kemal Kirişci (Director, The Turkey Project, Brookings), Amanda Sloat (Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe), and Stephen F. Szabo (Senior Fellow, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies). Lisel Hintz (Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies, SAIS) will moderate the discussion.
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- US in a Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria: Realigning Allies and Constraining Adversaries | Monday, March 26 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In the Post-ISIS Middle East, Iran, Bashar al-Assad, and Russia continue to pose challenges for the U.S. as the Trump Administration develops its policy for Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s expansion of its Syria operations has the U.S. and NATO allies concerned that Turkish actions in the region run counter to NATO goals. Additionally, cooperation between Russia and Iran continues to disrupt the balance of power in the region. Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore U.S. options to realign our allies with traditional NATO and U.S. positions, hold adversaries responsible for atrocities, and prevent security backsliding in the region. Featuring Hillel Fradkin (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Michael Pregent (Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute), Jennifer Cafarella (Senior Intelligence Planner, Institute for the Study of War), and Dr. Nahro Zagros (Vice President, Soran University).
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- Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria | Monday, March 26 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Widespread violence has plagued Nigeria over the years, with an epicenter of activity in northeast parts of the country. Much of this violence is related to the Boko Haram insurgency, although other battles between ethnic groups have also intensified, largely over land and partly due to a growing drought. Despite some success by Nigerian security forces in tamping down violence, lives continue to be lost and communities displaced. All of this is ongoing as the country prepares to hold elections next year. Featuring Alexandra Lamarche (Advocate, Refugees International), Mark Yarnell (UN Liaison and Senior Advocate, Refugees International), and Vanda Felbab-Brown (Senior Fellow, Brookings). Michael O’Hanlon (Senior Fellow, Brookings) will moderate the conversation, while adding his own perspectives.
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- Russian Influence in Moldova | Monday, March 26 | 3:30pm – 5:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Since emerging from the Soviet Union as an independent country, the Republic of Moldova has faced various challenges. Moldova, together with Ukraine and Georgia, were “captive nations” of the former Soviet Union; today, the three countries are still affected by Russian interference. For Moldova, the autonomous region of Transnistria raises questions regarding the state’s path forward with various international bodies, and the Kremlin still has clear influence in Moldovan politics. With Moldovan parliamentary elections approaching this year, the stakes are high for Moldova’s future as a free, whole, and secure European state. Featuring Ambassador John Herbst (Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council), Dr. William Hill (Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Professor, National Defense University), Dumitru Mînzărari (State Secretary for Defense Policy and International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Moldova), and Agnieszka Gmys-Wiktor (Program Officer, National Endowment for Democracy). Mark Simakovsky (Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council and Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies) will moderate the discussion.
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- Elections in Tunisia and Hope for Democratic Reform | Thursday, March 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Leading up to long-awaited municipal elections, Tunisia is at a crossroads. The beginning of 2018 saw widespread protests and social unrest in both cities and rural areas, as economic stagnation and unemployment continue to worsen. However, the vote currently set for May 6 signals an opportunity for Tunisian youth, women, and minorities to make their voices heard. How might the elections encourage confidence among Tunisians in a transparent democratic process? Could the results promote or undermine Tunisia’s fragile stability? How can the international community better support Tunisia and its government to address the rising social tensions? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Ambassador Fayçal Gouia (Ambassador of Tunisia to the United States) and Elie Abouaoun (Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, USIP) for a panel discussion to examine Tunisia’s political challenges—both local and national—ahead of the elections. Paul Salem (Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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- Securing Their Roles: Women in Constitution-Making | Thursday, March 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Women’s participation in drafting constitutions leads to more equitable legal frameworks and socially inclusive reforms, laying the groundwork for sustainable peace. Yet new research from Inclusive Security reveals that while 75 conflict-affected countries oversaw significant reform processes between 1995-2015, only one in five constitutional drafters in these environments have been women. As actors from Syria, Libya, and other countries marked by violence are taking steps towards building new constitutions, USIP and Inclusive Security are convening a panel to draw out lessons for policymakers by discussing women’s roles in constitution-making, gender equality in constitutional provisions – including in relation to constitutions developed with an Islamic identity—and their implications for long-term, inclusive peace and security. Featuring Palwasha Kakar (Senior Program Officer, Religion and Inclusive Societies, USIP), Marie O’Reilly (Director of Research & Analysis, Inclusive Security), Amira Yahyaoui (Founder, Al Bawsala), and Jason Gluck (Policy Specialist, Political Dialogues and Constitutional Processes, UNDP). Carla Koppell (Vice President, Applied Conflict Transformation, USIP) will moderate the discussion.
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- Ukraine’s Future Leaders on the Front-lines of Change | Thursday, March 29 | 4:00pm – 5:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
In the four years since the end of the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine has not answered its most important question: how will the country ensure democratic values in its future development? Much of Ukraine’s hope lies in its young leaders who will drive the country forward in the coming years. Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) has been fortunate to provide a year-long residency to some of these future leaders as part of the inaugural year of the Center’s Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program. This event will feature this year’s Ukrainian leaders Oleksandra Matviichuk (Chairwoman, Center for Civil Liberties), Dmytro Romanovych (Member, Reform Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), and Olexandr Starodubtsev (Head, Public Procurement Regulation Department, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine). They will each discuss their own perspectives on opportunities and challenges to democracy and development in their home country, as well as objectives for strengthening public administration, civil society, and economic reforms upon their return to Ukraine With introductory remarks by Ambassador John Herbst (Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council) and a keynote address by Dr. Francis Fukuyama (Mosbacher Director, CDDRL, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University). Melinda Haring (Editor, UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council) will moderate the discussion.
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- After Syria: The United States, Russia, and the Future of Terrorism | Friday, March 29 | 10:00am -11:30am | Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with EastWest Institute | Register here |
The collapse of Islamic State control in Syria has been hailed in both Russia and the United States as a victory over terrorism. Both credit their country’s military involvement with victory. But the war that continues in Syria also lays bare Moscow and Washington’s conflicting definitions and approaches when it comes to terrorism, insurgency, and combat operations. Moreover, even if a path to stabilization in that country is found, America and Russia will continue to face terrorism and terrorists at home and abroad. The ways in which these two crucial countries respond as the threat evolves will shape both their own polities and the world as a whole. Featuring Dr. Kim Cragin (Senior Research Fellow for Counterterrorism, National Defense University), Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova (Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of World Economy and International Relations), Dr. Irina Zvyagelskaya (chief research fellow, Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies), and Dr. Seth Jones (Harold Brown Chair; Director, Transnational Threats Project; and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS). Dr. Olga Oliker (Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS) will moderate the discussion.
This event will be webcast live.
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Hardliners
There isn’t much more to be said about President Trump’s recent appointments than that: future Director of the National Economic Council Alan Kudlow, National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are all harder line on trade, North Korea and Iran than their more “adult” predecessors. Ditto the new lawyers Trump is bringing in to the White House to protect himself from Special Counsel Mueller. Joe DiGenova is an attack dog, not serious legal practitioner. The only adult left is Secretary of Defense Mattis, whose days could be numbered, if only because Pompeo and Bolton will push him in directions he doesn’t want to go.
What can we, and the world, expect for the next year?
In a word: conflict. Even if Trump doesn’t follow Bolton’s advice to go to war against both Iran and Korea, the president is likely to pull the plug on the Iran nuclear deal and use his proposed meeting with Kim Jong-un to set up a casus belli. These moves will at the very least strain relations with US allies in Europe and Asia, reducing American influence on both continents and creating openings for Russia and China to fill vacuums there.
Trump has already precipitated sharp falls in the stock market with his announcement of aluminum and steel tariffs as well as his intention to impose tariffs on a broad range of Chinese goods. The tariffs, massive budget deficit, and tax cuts are all inflationary moves, on top of an economy that has been performing close to capacity pretty much since Barack Obama took office in 2009. The Fed will react by increasing interest rates to slow the economy and preempt inflation. The end of the long recovery from the 2008 financial crisis is in sight.
Tighten your seat belts one more notch. Trump is also likely to fire Special Counsel Mueller, who has clearly breached the President’s red line, drawn to protect himself from any inquiry into his finances. That’s where the crux of the Russia investigation lies: Trump’s real estate empire is highly dependent on hot Russian money, which Putin controls. That’s why Trump fears him. The legal team Trump is assembling is not one that could capably defend Trump in court or even prepare him for an interview with Mueller. The President thinks he is immune. His only defense will be offense.
On top of all this, three different women are going public with their stories of sexual encounters with Trump, Cambridge Analytica is facing accusations that it abused personal data and violated campaign finance laws (with some eyes wide shut from Facebook), and relations between the Trump campaign and the United Arab Emirates as well as the Russian intelligence service are coming into focus. Any one of these scandals would be headline news were it not for everything else going on. Distraction is one of Trump’s main tactics.
What does it all add up to? A sharp decline in American prestige and power has already begun: we are overspending on conventional military hardware in a period of cyber and other nonconventional threats, we are blowing up a thriving economy, we are risking two catastrophic wars, we are challenging trading and investment partners with a weak and ineffectual tariff attack, and Trump is embarrassing the country with salacious sexual, financial, and intelligence scandals.
Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi are laughing at a president who inflicts more damage on America than they could ever imagine doing. American allies are panicking. Trump is making America small again. His hardliners will now make things worse.
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More pushback needed
This weekend, after winning a campaign against no serious opponents, Vladimir Putin celebrated winning his fourth term as President of Russia. With another six years leading Russia, what course will Putin follow? Given Putin’s increasingly aggressive tone since the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, will this continue with regard to Russia’s neighbors?
To explore that question, an American Enterprise Institute group of experts on post-Soviet states drafted To Have and to Hold: Putin’s Quest for Control in the Former Soviet Empire. The project focuses on six post-Soviet states that remain vulnerable to Russian influence: the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, Southeastern European states of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, and a lone state in Central Asia, Kazakhstan. The report includes two chapters on each of the six states, the first describing that nation’s importance to Russia, while the second describes the likely means by which Russia could press its interests.
On Wednesday, March 14, AEI debuted its report at an event featuring five of its authors: Leon Aron, resident scholar and director of Russian studies at AEI; Agnia Grigas of the Atlantic Council, who wrote a chapter on Estonia; Michael Kofman of the CNA Corporation and the Wilson Center, writer of a chapter on Ukraine; Mihai Popsoi of the University of Milan, author of two chapters on Moldova; and Paul Stronski from the Carnegie Endowment, whose chapter centered on Kazakhstan. Joining the authors was Representative Seth Moulton of Massachusetts, who opened the panel by speaking to his own observations on the Russian threat to the United States and allies in Eastern Europe, with Leon Aron acting as moderator. A video recording of the event can be seen here:
Takeaways:
Russia seeks to extend its regional influence by any means possible. Despite the nearly three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin views the USSR’s successor states as indisputably within Russia’s sphere of influence. Putin’s grand project is to reestablish Russian control over its former territories – anything less is inadequate. As in Ukraine, Russia approaches any state moving away from its hegemony as a Western-sponsored provocation. Though Grigas argued that Putin’s government doesn’t truly believe its own rhetoric, the effect is the same. Kofman warned that Putin still has not given up on Ukraine; he predicted the possibility of a larger Russian war against Ukraine if its attempts to manipulate politics there fail.
Russian overreach in Ukraine has hindered its influence across the region. Russia’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 opened a new chapter in Russia’s relations with its neighbors. The increased tension between Russia and the West has soured relations with even Russia’s closest allies. Belarus, whose president Alexander Lukashenko is Putin’s closest foreign ally, has sought to carve out a moderate role between Russia and Europe. To this Putin has responded coldly, introducing restrictions on trade and passport control on Belarussian travelers to Russia. With Putin’s aggressive reputation and Russia’s economic slowdown dragging on the social contract in Belarus and Kazakhstan, Stronski suggested that their respective governments are now searching for alternatives.
When Putin cannot win subservience, he seeks to destabilize. In Moldova, which holds only small symbolic or economic importance for Putin, Russia has instead achieved its aims by fracturing the small nation politically. Russian sponsorship of select Moldovan political parties and media companies has enabled Putin to engineer a Moldova that exists in a gray zone internationally – too chaotic to be a full Russian ally, too corrupt to be an EU member. As Popsoi noted, in Putin’s eyes, cultivating weakness in Russia’s neighbors is an alternative to building international friendship. Despite legal requirements, the Eurasian Union has not stopped Russia from blocking dairy products from Belarus and dumping cheap products in Kazakhstan.
What happens in Eastern Europe also affects America. Congressman Moulton described the Russian threat to America as “very, very real,” calling AEI’s monograph “required reading” for US policymakers. In Moulton’s assessment, the American government’s measures to defend its Eastern European allies have not kept up with Russian strategies – American money is going to buy too many tanks and missiles where cybersecurity is needed. Congress has started a few clear-sighted initiatives – Moulton spoke approvingly of the bipartisan Countering Foreign Propaganda Act, in particular – but those efforts have been too much “tinkering around the edges” to be effective.
Without decisive American pushback, Russian attempts to undermine its rivals will likely only grow bolder in the near future.
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Peace picks, March 19 – March 25
- Japan’s Balancing Between Nuclear Disarmament and Deterrence | Monday, March 19 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | Stimson Center | Register here |
Join us for the launch of Balancing Between Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament: Views from the Next Generation. This volume offers analyses by five scholars who examine the complex question of how Japan should balance between its short-term requirement for effective nuclear deterrence and its long-term desire for a nuclear-free world in the face of increasing uncertainty relating to nuclear weapons in its own neighborhood. Yuki Tatsumi leads a panel discussion of the report with its five authors: Masahiro Kurita, Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in the Ministry of Defense of Japan; Wakana Mukai, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of International Relations, Asia University; Masashi Murano, Research Fellow at the Okazaki Institute; Masahiro Okuda (joining via pre-recorded remarks), Ph.D. candidate at the Takushoku University Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies; and Heigo Sato, Vice President of the Institute for World Studies at Takushoku University.
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- Foreign Policy and Fragile States | Monday, March 19 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Seven years into a brutal civil war in Syria, we are reminded how fragile states can lead to regional instability, cause humanitarian crises, and fall prey to extremist organizations such as ISIS. In this discussion, we’ll ask how the United States and the international community can address these national security challenges. How should U.S. assistance be prioritized and allocated? What is the difference between stabilizing a country versus nation building? How can the international community help a country like Syria? What lessons can be learned from efforts in countries, such as Nigeria and Colombia, preventing violence? And ultimately, how can we get ahead of the underlying causes of fragility that lead to and perpetuate violent conflict? Join leading experts at the United States Institute of Peace to discuss these vital questions. With Nancy Lindborg, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace; Ilan Goldenberg, Director of the Middle East Security Program at Center for a New American Security; Kimberly Kagan, Founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War. Moderated by Joshua Johnson, host of NPR’s program 1A.
This event will be live-taped for future broadcast on Public Radio International’s America Abroad and WAMU’s 1A.
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- Looking Ahead at the Next Presidential Term in Russia | Monday, March 19 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Few doubt that Vladimir Putin will be re-elected to a fourth presidential term on March 18, but there are many questions regarding what that election outcome will mean for Russia’s future. Putin’s main competitor, Alexei Navalny, was barred from participating and has called for a boycott. While a widespread boycott is unlikely, the number of recent protests suggest that political dissatisfaction is growing among at least a well-organized minority. Many questions also remain about where the next Putin Administration will take the Russian political system, economy, and foreign policy. The Atlantic Council will host a discussion on what’s next for the Russian government and population during the new presidential term. With Dr. Anders Åslund (Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Vladimir Kara-Murza (Chairman, Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom), Dr. Lilia Shevtsova (Associate Fellow, Chatham House), and Ambassador Alexander Vershbow (Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council); moderated by Ambassador John Herbst (Director of the Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council).
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- Charting a Path Forward for the Democratic Republic of the Congo | Tuesday, March 20 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution (hosted by Service Employees International Union) | Register here |
Amid rising turmoil in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), President Joseph Kabila remains in power despite a constitutional mandate calling for the end of his rule in December 2016. Although the next round of presidential and parliamentary elections is now scheduled for December of this year, and opposition leaders are gearing up for a fight, there is considerable uncertainty regarding Kabila’s real intentions. Facing numerous calls from Western leaders to step down, regional nations such as Botswana have also called attention to the rise in violence as an effect of Kabila’s corrosive hold on the DRC. The Foreign Policy program at Brookings, in collaboration with Stand With Congo, will host a discussion on the current state of the DRC as violence rises and elections are purportedly on the horizon. Panelists will include Tom Perriello, former U.S. special envoy for the African Great Lakes and Congo-Kinshasa; Omékongo Dibinga, professor at American University; and EJ Hogendoorn from the International Crisis Group. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate the conversation.
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- Challenges to Democracy in the Digital Age | Wednesday, March 21 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register here |
While the United States and the European Union have different approaches to privacy and data protection, both are critical partners to protecting freedom online. Europe and the United States have faced an escalation of hate speech, terrorist content, fake news, and misinformation online. They both encounter challenges in accessing electronic evidence for investigative purposes and in protecting personal data against cyberattacks. Join CSIS on Wednesday, March 21 for a timely conversation with H.E. Věra Jourová, EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers, and Gender Equality, on the EU approach to the challenges democracies face in the digital age. The subsequent panel will review transatlantic efforts to countering hate speech, misinformation, and protecting personal data. Featuring Renate Nikolay, Head of Commissioner Jourová’s Cabinet; with CSIS experts James Andrew Lewis, Heather A. Conley, and Samm Sacks.
This event will be webcast live from this page.
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- Hidden Wounds: Trauma and Civilians in the Syrian Conflict | Wednesday, March 21 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Seven years of conflict in Syria have exacted an enormous human toll and led to widespread physical destruction. The psychological impact of the war, although less visible, has been just as devastating. The levels of trauma and distress impacting Syrian civilians have been staggering, with nearly 500,000 killed, half the population displaced, and more than 13 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The traumatic impact of the Syrian conflict is less often acknowledged, but could significantly impair the ability of Syrian civilians to recover and build a more peaceful future. Please join USIP and specialists from the Syrian American Medical Society, the U.S State Department and Save the Children for a panel discussion, addressing an aspect of the Syrian conflict that often receives less attention than it deserves. Featuring Catherine Bou-Maroun of the U.S. Department of State, Dr. Mohamed Khaled Hamza of the Syrian-American Medical Society, and Amy Richmond of Save the Children. The panel will be moderated by Mona Yacoubian of USIP, with opening remarks from USIP President Nancy Lindborg.
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- Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean | Wednesday, March 21 | 3:00pm – 4:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
On March 21, Hudson Institute will host a panel to discuss transnational organized crime in Latin America. The panel will discuss a new book, Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: From Evolving Threats and Responses to Integrated Adaptive Solutions, by Dr. Evan Ellis. The book details the interaction and evolution of various criminal entities, including powerful cartels, criminal bands, territorially-oriented gangs, groups performing intermediary functions in the international criminal economy, and groups with a focus on political or religious extremist objectives. The conversation will be moderated by Hudson Senior Fellow Ambassador Jaime Daremblum.
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- Can the Balkans Really Join the EU? | Wednesday, March 21 | 4:30pm – 6:00pm | SAIS Conflict Management Program and Center for Transatlantic Relations | Register here |
The European Union has opened the window for accession of new Balkan members starting in 2025. It is not clear when the window will close. Can the countries of the region take advantage of this opportunity? Who leads and who trails? What can be done to ensure success? This conversation features a panel of representatives from various Balkan states: Josip Brkic, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Vlora Citaku, Ambassador of Kosovo to the United States; Srdjan Darmanovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro; Djerdj Matkovic, Ambassador of Serbia to the United States; Vasko Naumovski, ambassador of Macedonia to the United States. Moderated by SAIS professor Daniel Serwer.
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