Tag: Russia
The likely Russian veto
Russia faces a big decision in the UN Security Council: whether to veto the draft resolution on Syria, or use the threat of a veto to extract further concessions in the text and then go along, maybe by abstaining.
There are ample reasons for Moscow to veto. In its current form the resolution foresees “delegation by the President of Syria of his full authority to his Deputy to fully cooperate with the national unity government in order to empower it to perform its duties in the transitional period.” If seriously implemented, this would mean the end of Bashar al Assad, though not necessarily of his sidekicks. Farouk al-Sharaa, the vice president, is a solid Assad regime type. But once a transition is set in motion, it will be difficult for Moscow to prevent it from gathering momentum.
That is not something Prime Minister Putin would like to see happening, especially in the run-up to Russia’s own March 4 presidential election. Putin will want to maintain his image as strong, unmoveable and defiant of the West. Russian protesters will view any concession on Syria in the Security Council as an incentive to up their game: if Syrians can displace an autocrat, why can’t Russians follow suite?
So the odds are in favor of a Russian veto this week, but there is still a slim possibility they would allow a defanged resolution to pass. The text is already less than crystal clear on what is supposed to happen. It reads like an obfuscated “puzzler” on Car Talk. The part immediately preceding the text on delegation of powers to the vice president reads this way:
Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ initiative set out in its 22 January 2012 decision to facilitate a political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the League of Arab States, aimed at:
So the delegation of powers is not to happen right away. There is to be a serious political dialogue aimed at the delegation of powers. There is lots of wiggle room here: what is the “whole spectrume of the Syrian opposition?” Elements of the opposition will likely refuse to take part. Who is to blame if the dialogue doesn’t happen? What if it takes a long time?
The main Russian concern will be to ensure that any resolution passing the Security Council cannot be interpreted as authorizing the use of force against the Syrian regime. While the Arab League has been at pains to emphasize that it is not asking for military intervention but rather indicating a way forward that will avoid it, the resolution still has a few points on which the Russians can be expected to balk. For example:
stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to resort to the use of force or the threat of force,
Moscow will want that to read “nothing in this resolution permits States…” Nor will Moscow like this bit at the end:
Decides to review Syria’s implementation of this resolution within 15 days and, in the event that Syria has not complied, to adopt further measures, in consultation with the League of Arab States;
Moscow will read “further measures” as opening the door to military intervention.
But these points seem to me negotiable: the West and the Arab League are far from pressing for the use of force against Bashar al Assad, even if some of the Syrian opposition would support it. How would President Obama justify another war in the Middle East in the midst of an election campaign? Only if Bashar al Assad is dumb enough to commit truly mass atrocities, which he so far has avoided on a daily basis, even as the numbers add up to well over 5000. Washington does not want to engage militarily–it is far more likely to make the mistake of throwing its weight behind the Free Syrian Army, perhaps clandestinely.
If the Russians can get a real commitment to no use of force, and if they would like this problem to go away and not come back before their own elections, they might even abstain on a resolution that, while changed from the current draft, is not too far off in its general outlines. I’m not holding my breath, just hoping that somehow the UNSC can finally move on what is a major threat to international peace and security. Getting the outlines of a transition plan through the Security Council is only a first step, but that’s how journeys start.
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How bad could Syria get?
It is hard to be optimistic about Syria. The question is, how bad could it get? The possible scenarios are essentially driven by two factors:
- the degree of success Bashar al Assad has in repressing the protests;
- the effectiveness of international efforts to weaken the regime and protect the protesters.
These two factors yield four scenarios:
- Divided sovereignty: Bashar is successful in repressing protests in some areas, but the international protection efforts are successful in others. Syria is effectively divided between areas loyal to a weakened regime and liberated “safe” areas. A lengthy struggle for predominance ensues.
- The regime wins: Bashar is successful in repressing the protests and international efforts to protect protesters fail. The regime regains its predominance and strengthens its ties with Iran.
- Protesters win: international efforts to protect protesters are effective and repression is not. The regime loses control of the country and has to yield. Iran/Syria alliance is broken.
- Civil war: Repression is ineffective, but so is international protection. Fighting escalates, organized mainly along sectarian lines. Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states align with their sectarian favorites inside Syria, creating regional havoc.
1. and 3. are what most of us the West would regard as preferred outcomes, though divided sovereignty would likely create continuing problems and even a clear win by the protesters will leave Syria with many transition problems.
2. and 4. are what we would like to avoid. Some people ask, as Marc Lynch did yesterday on Twitter, why diplomats are attracted to an Arab League proposal for transition that starts with Bashar passing power to his vice president and creation of a broad unity government. The answer is that they are trying to avoid 2. and 4., because they know full well that international protection efforts are not likely to be effective enough to ensure 1. and 3.
2. and 4., a regime win or civil war, should be our biggest concerns. We can try to avoid them not only by tracing a path forward that weakens or eliminates Bashar’s hold on power, but also by tightening sanctions and strengthening the protest movement, which still seems divided and at times incoherent. But in the past few days it seems to have found its voice in the appeals to the Security Council.
The “defensive action” of the Free Syria Army, which others see as strengthening the protest movement, I see as more likely to take it down the path to 2. or 4. Only if it stays in a strictly defensive posture–keeping order at demonstrations, outing agents provocateurs, conducting counter-intelligence operations–can it really help. If it guns down the regime’s army and police, that and the regime’s reaction will discourage people from taking to the streets.
Let there be no doubt: “regime wins” and “civil war” are still real possibilities. Either one would be a big setback for Europe and the United States, which need to invest a bit more diplomatic oomph in making Syria come out closer to “divided sovereignty,” or better: “protesters win.” For the moment, this entails a concerted effort with the Russians to get a decent resolution denouncing the violence and projecting a political path away from the Assad regime through the Security Council.
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This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
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A stage for a lying murderer?
Burhan Ghalioun, head of the Syrian National Council (SNC), suggests “an international conference on Syria to stop the atrocities and the killings,” in the likely event that the SNC plea for a “safe area” goes unheeded. I’d be the first to admit that the record of international conferences in stopping anything is mixed at best. Certainly the international conference on Yugoslavia in the 1990s was not 100% effective, though some of its spinoffs like the Badinter commission played an important role in clarifying the rules of the game.
I wonder whether this is an idea worth exploring, admittedly out of desperation. So far, the Russians and Chinese have stymied the UN Security Council. It is much harder for them to stymie an international conference, where there is no formal veto and a good deal of pressure to come up with a consensus statement. The Iranians may even be tiring of what Bashar al Assad is costing them. If the Syrian government refuses to attend, as well it might, that would enable the SNC to speak for the Syrian people.
The Americans would want to go to such a conference knowing exactly what they could hope for by way of results. It seems to me a conference statement denouncing violence on all sides (yes I know that the regime is by far the bigger offender), endorsing the mission of the Arab League human rights monitors and noting the failure of the Syrian government to cooperate fully with them is not out of reach. I don’t know that it would help much, but anything that undermines the legitimacy of the Assad regime is at this point useful.
Could a conference give Bashar al Assad a bully pulpit that would be useful to him in reaffirming his legitimacy on the world stage? Yes, but that’s what we’ve got diplomats for: to stage manage this so he comes off as the lying murderer he is.
Tomorrow is Friday. Let’s hope the demonstrators turn out in numbers, building on last week’s extraordinary showing. Here are Arab League monitors documenting violations by the Syrian Army near Deraa yesterday:
Or if you prefer, here is first-hand testimony of a former Defense Ministry official:
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The Arab League monitors improve the odds
Two things are clear about the impact of the Arab League human rights monitors in Syria: they have prompted the protesters to turn out in very large numbers, but they have not stopped the Assad regime from killing, which appears to be the only response the security forces can muster.
What we need now from the monitors is some serious reporting on what is going on. Initial indications are not good. Their Sudanese leader, Mustafa al Dabi, has already indicated he saw “nothing frightening” at Homs, where the security forces have been firing indiscriminately on peaceful protesters for months. Much as I share concerns about his background and qualifications, I still hope we will find a few of the monitors willing to communicate clearly and directly about regime abuses. It doesn’t have to be al Dabi.
At the same time, I am hoping we see a renewal of nonviolent discipline among the protesters. The Free Syrian Army’s feeble attempts to harass the security forces are provocative and counterproductive:
They will reduce the numbers of people in the street and allow the regime excuses for violence. I don’t like to see unprotected people who are standing up for their rights killed, but the toll will be far worse if Syria deteriorates to civil war.
On other fronts: the Russians are still stalling UN Security Council action and the Iranians are pumping resources in to help Bashar al Assad. There is little we can do to block the Iranian assistance, but we should take some satisfaction that they are being forced to spend precious coin at a time when their economy seems to be deteriorating rapidly. Their threats to the strait of Hormuz may even be an effort to lift oil revenue at a time of pressing need.
The Russians must be beginning to wonder whether their interests in maintaining their naval facilities in Syria are best served by supporting the regime. Contacts between Moscow and the Syrian National Council (SNC) last month were in principle a good sign. The SNC has to keep at it. It might also help if President Obama would tell Prime Minister Putin directly that Russia needs to get on the right side of history before it is too late.
Bashar al Assad is still trying to outlast the demonstrators. His odds of doing so have gone down with the arrival of the Arab League monitors, however serious their limitations. That is a good thing.
PS: This video purports to show observers running from gunfire, and the Syrian Free Army creating the excuse for the security forces to shoot.
PPS: And this one memorializes a brave soul:
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Ten places ICG neglects
I don’t entirely agree with ICG’s “Next Year’s Wars,” their choice of conflicts is idiosyncratic, and they don’t really predict anything, but it is hard to compete with an organization that has smart people on the ground in difficult places. I’ll focus on 10 places they don’t mention:
1. Russia: Putin doesn’t make it over 50% in the March 4 election but wins the second round. Demonstrations continue but he resists new parliamentary polls. Weakened, Putin lashes out at his opposition and makes things worse. Who knows where this ends, but it will probably not be in 2012.
2. Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Nayef succeeds to the throne and tries to roll back King Abdullah’s modest reforms. Demonstrations break out but are brutally repressed. Oil prices, already high due to Iran’s threats to the strait of Hormuz, skyrocket.
3. Iraq: The Sadr bloc’s call for new elections in Iraq is echoed by the Kurds and eventually Iraqiyya. Maliki tries to avoid it, but he eventually falls to a vote of no confidence in parliament and elections are held towards the end of the year. I’m not going to predict the outcome.
4. Egypt: The constitutional process is difficult and delayed, but presidential elections are held in the fall (postponed from June). Secularist candidates split their constituency, the Muslim Brotherhood blows its lead by pressing social conservatism and Abdel Fotouh, a relatively moderate Islamist, wins.
5. Libya: Continues to implement its established roadmap, elects the “National Public Conference,” prepares a constitution and succeeds in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating most militias.
6. Bahrain: The Americans continue to support the regime. Iran, stung by tightened sanctions, sponsors demonstrations against the Fifth Fleet.
7. Sudan: War, between north and south. South wins, takes back Abyei and part of South Kordofan. President Bashir is shipped off to The Hague by his generals.
8. Zimbabwe: Mugabe dies, his loyalists hang on but can’t manage the economic collapse. The opposition takes over.
9. Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
10. United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
And for extra measure:
11. China: Big real estate crash late in the year cripples Chinese banks and causes bigger problems for the world economy than the euro, which muddles through.
12. Israel/Palestine: Big but largely nonviolent demonstrations on the West Bank. Israelis say “genug ist genug” and unilaterally withdraw from Palestinian population centers.
That should give me something to write about a year from now! None of it should be mistaken for advocacy, and a good bit of it is based on feel rather than analysis.
I reviewed last year’s predictions yesterday.
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